

# **Islam, Fundamentalists & Democracy: A Perspective from Indonesia**

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**Abstract:** *As a religion, Islam provides values, ethics, norms and guidelines, but not a quick panacea, for Islam and democracy in Indonesia. So it is very important for Islamic scholars, leaders and Muslim intelligentsia to make their people be aware and conscious that the fundamentalism, radicalism and violence are the wrong answer at the wrong time to address the problems. Fundamentalism and radicalism with violent face are not the answer to tackle the poverty, social crisis, environmental crisis, global inequities and various multi-dimensional problems in recent years. Islam will be come in handy, useful and meaningful if it can make a real contribution as values, ethics, morals, ideas, thoughts, solutions and philosophy for the communities in addressing the real issues, so that Islam would be menaningful and useful in overcoming radicalism and fundamnetalism. Will Indonesian Islam be capable and credible in dealing with this challenge? It depends on its leader and 'ulamā's.*

**Keywords:** *Fundamentalism, Social crisis, 'Ulamā'*

**Abstrak:** *Islam menyediakan nilai-nilai, etika, norma dan panduan agama, bukan obat mujarab yang cepat, dalam memahami Islam dan demokrasi Indonesia. Jadi sangat penting untuk ulama, pemimpin dan Inteligensia Muslim untuk membuat umat mereka menyadari dan sadar bahwa fundamentalisme, radikalisme dan kekerasan adalah jawaban yang salah di waktu yang salah. Fundamentalisme dan radikalisme yang berwajah kekerasan bukanlah jawaban untuk mengatasi kemiskinan, krisis sosial, krisis lingkungan, ketidakadilan global dan pelbagai masalah multidimensional dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Islam akan berguna, bermanfaat dan bermakna jika dapat memberikan kontribusi nyata seperti nilai, etika, moral, ide, pemikiran, solusi dan falsafat bagi masyarakat dalam menangani isu-isu nyata, sehingga Islam lebih bermakna dan bermanfaat dalam mengatasi radikalisme dan fundamentalisme. Apakah Islam Indonesia mampu dan kredibel dalam menangani tantangan ini? Semua itu tergantung pada pemimpin mereka.*

**Katakunci:** *Fundamentalisme, Krisis sosial, Ulama*

### **Introduction**

In the late twentieth century, fundamentalism has emerged as one of the most powerful forces at work in the world, contesting the dominance of modern secular values and threatening peace and harmony around the globe. Indonesia as a center of social pluralism and multiculturalism has been target of terrorist attacks in recent years, reflecting a formidable threat to peace and stability in the capital town. Jakarta and Bali bombings in the past were the perfect crime of the movement of Islam fundamentalism that has been new horror in Indonesia.

There have always been people who, in every age and in each tradition, have fought the modernity of their day. But the fundamentalism that we shall be considering is an essentially twentieth-century movement. It is a reaction against the scientific and secular culture that first appeared in the West, but which has since taken root in other parts of the world. The West has developed an entirely unprecedented and wholly different type of civilization, so the religious response to it has been unique.

The fundamentalist movements that have evolved in our own day have a symbiotic relationship with modernity. They may reject the scientific rationalism of the West, but they cannot escape it. Western civilization has changed the world. Nothing—including religion—can ever be the same again. All over the globe, people have been struggling with these new conditions and have been forced to reassess their religious traditions, which were designed for an entirely different type of society.

### **Fundamentalist Groups & Democracy**

Yet it remains incomprehensible to a large number of people. *In The Battle for God*, Karen

Armstrong<sup>1</sup> brilliantly and sympathetically shows us how and why fundamentalist groups came into existence and what they yearned to accomplish. The militant religiosity that we call fundamentalism has surfaced in all the major faiths in the twentieth century, and fundamentalism has emerged as an overwhelming force in every major world religion. It constitutes a reaction against and a rejection of modern Western society, but it is not a monolithic movement. Each fundamentalist movement has emerged independently and is a law unto itself, sometimes differing from (or in violent opposition to) other fundamentalist movements within a single faith tradition. The fact that fundamentalism has erupted in almost all cultures indicates a wide-spread and worrying disenchantment with modern society, which so many of us experience as liberating, exciting and empowering. Countries such as the United States, Egypt and Israel are deeply polarized, splitting into two camps, one which feels positive about secular modernity; the other passionately hostile to it. As the century draws to a close, these two camps appear to be in an incipient state of war, as witnessed in such incidents as the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma; terrorist attacks on foreign tourists in Egypt, designed to bring down Mubarak's government; and the assassination of President Yitzak Rabin in Israel. One of the most dangerous aspects of the fundamentalist phenomenon is that it seems incomprehensible to the liberal or secular world. The two camps within the same society scarcely speak the same language and have few values in common. Projects that can seem self-evidently good to a liberal—such as democracy, peace-making,

<sup>1</sup> Karen Armstrong, *Battle for God* (Guttenberg Project, 2000.)

concern for the environment, the liberation of women, or freedom of speech— can seem evil or even Satanic to a fundamentalist.

Recently fundamentalists have master-minded critical historical events such as the murder of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, the September 11 tragedy, and the frequent suicide bombings characteristic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These are examples of the kind of dangerous activities in which fundamentalists are reacting to modernism. Though the perpetrators come from different religious backgrounds, they share a common characteristic that is religious fanaticism.<sup>2</sup>

Fundamentalism is one of the most widely discussed phenomenon of the 20th century. It has always been a part of the world views of radicals practicing the world's major religions, not only Christianity and Islam, but also Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism and Confucianism. There is no lucid definition for the term 'fundamentalism.' Initially, the term was used by American Protestants in the early 1990's to differentiate themselves from the more liberal Protestants. Since then the term 'fundamentalism' has been more freely used to refer to the purification movements to be found within all world religions. Therein all fundamentalist movements share certain approaches in that fundamentalism is a defense mechanism which arises as a reaction to a threat or crisis.<sup>3</sup>

The main argument in this book revolves around Armstrong's conception of the world's belief systems as being divided into two

<sup>2</sup> Karen Amstrong, *The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism* (Ballantine Books, 2001.)

<sup>3</sup> Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (ed.), *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.)

dichotomous categories: 'myth versus *logos*' and 'the conservative versus the modern.' Drawing on other social scientists work, she argues that humans have developed two ways of thinking and obtaining knowledge. Johannes Sloek similarly terms them 'myth' and '*logos*,' in his book *Devotional Language*. Therein myth is a form of mystical knowledge, having an abstract supra-logical object, based not on fact and its truth capacity as determined by sense. Myth cannot be confirmed by rational evidence, while *logos* depends on it, i.e. rational, pragmatic and scientific form of thinking. *Logos* is related to the facts and external realities, consequently it can be proved empirically.

Fundamentalist is a term used since the 1920's to refer to the most religiously conservative group within Christianity.<sup>4</sup> Within Judaism, Islam and other religions, the term is used to refer to the extreme conservative wing who Karen Armstrong defines as "embattled forms of spirituality, which have emerged as a response to a perceived crisis"— namely the fear that modernity will erode or even eradicate their faith and morality.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Its roots in Christianity can be traced to the late 19th Century as a reaction against liberal movements of Biblical criticism and analysis. A 1909 publication "The Fundamentals: A testimony to the truth" proposed five required beliefs for conservative Christians; they are listed above under 'Evangelicals,' items 1 to 5. Fundamentalists generally believe that other wings of Christianity, and other religions, are false. The largest Protestant denomination in the U.S., the Southern Baptist Convention, has recently transitioned to fundamentalism. Bob Jones University, the General Association of Regular Baptists, the Moody Bible Institute and other groups are also fundamentalists. Among the most generally known leaders are Jerry Falwell, Bob Jones and Hal Lindsey.

<sup>5</sup> Karen Armstrong, "Fundamentalism in Christianity & Islam," The Wisdom Fund, at: <http://www.twf.org/Library/Fundamentalism.html>

The term has three additional meanings in general usage that cause great confusion: a ‘snarl’ word, used by some non-fundamentalists to imply intolerance, bigotry, lack of flexibility and an anti-intellectual bias. When applied by the Western media to Muslims, it often means ‘anti-American.’<sup>6</sup> When used by conservative Muslims themselves, it refers to a person who strictly follows the teachings of the Prophet Muḥammad, and who promotes the concept of theocratic government.

Karen Armstrong’s book, *Islam: A Short History*,<sup>7</sup> is a concise, eminently interesting, and quite useful work of art. When the work comes out in paperback—and we hope it will somewhere down the line—we will use it as a class text. The first eighty pages are an introduction to the Prophet Muḥammad’s life, to the establishment of the Muslim community, and to the situations facing this community from the time of the Prophet’s immediate successors through the Umayyad dynasty and the early days of the Abbasids. We have yet to find a text that covers for students all the early Islamic historical information. We think it is important to cover in the amount of time we have, but Armstrong’s book ‘fails’ us only in one or two minor areas: we like a little more on Bedouin culture and pre-Islamic Arabia. These short-comings are almost nugatory in light of how well Armstrong does the rest. The remainder of the book deals with the ‘culmination’ of Islam, including the Crusades and the period of the Mongols; with ‘Islam Triumphant’ (section 4), which is an introduction to the Safavids, the Moguls, and the Ottomans;

<sup>6</sup> B.A. Robinson, *Tolerance*, Copyright © 1996 to 2001 incl. by Ontario Consultants on Religious Originally written on: 1996-MAR-11.

<sup>7</sup> Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: Modern Library Chronicles, 2000), 163-4.

and final section that looks at the difficulties Islam has faced in its increasing contact with the West. This last section includes a clear discussion of the move from agrarian societies to technological societies in general, and the difficulties concomitant when modernization is forced upon colonial lands: a situation faced by a number of countries with large Muslim populations. The explanation is helpful in putting not only Islamic fundamentalism into context, but any fundamentalism. And, as Armstrong points out, Islam was the last of the three Abrahamic religions to develop a fundamentalist strain. She presents fundamentalism as “a global fact that has surfaced in every major faith in response to the problems of our modernity.”<sup>8</sup>

Armstrong’s presentation of the problems facing ‘Alī and the early Shiite community is both sensitive and succinct. She weaves the development of Shiism in through a number of other topics, but she does so as well as any study we have seen, including much larger works. Although she only alludes to the miraculous powers described by authors like Amir Moezzi, she does include the eyesight (France: *clairvoyance*) of many other authors do not even mention in relation to the Shiite imams, and she explains (again, clearly and summarily) how the Zaydis and the Ismailis split off from the Twelvers and the main philosophical tenets that distinguish them. It was in part because of the smoothness of this ‘weave,’ and in even larger part because of Armstrong’s sensitivity that the words ‘work of art’ were chosen in the first paragraph above. She has taken on nearly all of the West’s unenlightened fears, criticisms, and misunderstandings regarding Islam (inferior status of women, the veil,

<sup>8</sup> Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History*, 164.



fundamentalist violence, polygamy...) and shown how they fit into the Islamic context in a manner that is lucid and compassionate.

Armstrong, a self-avowed woman without religious affiliation, is here working to help us understand one another at the deepest level, but to do so without glossing over difficult issues and with the scholar's insight. The West must bear some measure of responsibility for the development of the new radical form of Islam, which in some hideous sense comes close to our ancient fantasies. Today many people in the Islamic world reject the West as ungodly, unjust, and decadent.<sup>9</sup> The new radical Islam is not simply inspired by hatred of the West, however. Nor is it in any sense a homogeneous movement. Radical Muslims are primarily concerned to put their own house in order and to address the cultural dislocation that many have experienced in the modern period. It is impossible to generalize about this more extreme form of the religion. It not only differs from country to country, but from town to town and village to village.<sup>10</sup>

We constantly produce new stereotypes to express our apparently ingrained hatred of 'Islam.'<sup>11</sup> Another theme of the new fundamentalism has been an attempt to get Islamic history back on the right track and to make the *umma* (Muslim community) effective and strong once again. The Iranian revolution was not just an

atavistic return to the past, but an attempt to impose decent values in Iran again.<sup>12</sup>

Western commentators often use—or misuse—terms taken from Christianity and apply them to Islam. One of the most commonly used is fundamentalism. As we know it, in its original application it means someone who believes in the fundamentals of religion, that is the Bible and the scriptures. In that sense every Muslim is a fundamentalist believing in the Qur'ān and the Prophet. However, the manner that it is used in the media, to mean a fanatic or extremist, it does not illuminate either Muslim thought or Muslim society.<sup>13</sup> In the Christian context it is a useful concept. In the Muslim context it simply confuses because by definition every Muslim believes in the fundamentals of Islam. But even Muslims differ in their ideas about how, and to what extent, to apply Islamic ideas to the modern world.<sup>14</sup>

Mainstream Sunni Islam is possibly the most broad-based, tolerant form and certainly the one with the largest number of followers—almost ninety percent of Muslims are Sunnis. However, the Wahhābī school within the Sunnis believes in a strictly literal interpretation of the Qur'ān. It dominates Saudi Arabia, which has a small population of about ten million but huge influence because of its oil revenues and as guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Madīna. This school would interpret everything in the Qur'ān literally: thus the chopping off of hands, death for adultery, and so on.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Karen Armstrong, *Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet* (Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1991.)

<sup>10</sup> Michael Gilson has argued that the differences are so great from one district to another that the term 'Islam' or 'fundamentalism' is simply not useful in defining the current attempt to articulate the experience of people in the Middle East during the post-colonial period.

<sup>11</sup> Karen Armstrong, *Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet*, 42-3.

<sup>12</sup> Karen Armstrong, *Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet*, 265.

<sup>13</sup> Akbar S. Ahmed, *Living Islam: From Samarkand to Stornoway* (London: BBC Books, 1993), 55.

<sup>14</sup> Akbar S. Ahmed, *Living Islam: From Samarkand to Stornoway*, 18-9.

<sup>15</sup> Akbar S. Ahmed, *Living Islam: From Samarkand to Stornoway*, 208.

Fundamentalism is a term popularly used to describe strict adherence to Christian doctrines based on a literal interpretation of the Bible. This usage derives from the late 19th and early 20<sup>th</sup> century trans-denominational Protestant movement that opposed the accommodation of Christian doctrine to modern scientific theory and philosophy. With some differences among themselves, fundamentalists insist on belief in the inerrancy of the Bible, the virgin birth and divinity of Jesus Christ, the vicarious and atoning character of his death, his bodily resurrection, and his second coming as the irreducible minimum of authentic Christianity. This minimum was reflected in such early declarations as the 14-point creed of the Niagara Bible Conference of 1878 and the 5-point statement of the Presbyterian General Assembly of 1910.

The name fundamentalist was coined in 1920 to designate those “doing battle royal for the Fundamentals.” Also figuring in the name was the *Fundamentals*, a 12-volume collection of essays written in the period 1910-15 by 64 British and American scholars and preachers. In the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s, however, fundamentalism again became an influential force in the United States. Promoted by popular television evangelists and represented by such groups as the moral majority, the new politically oriented ‘religious right’ opposes the influence of liberalism and secularism in American life. The term fundamentalist has also been used to describe members of militant Islamic groups.<sup>16</sup>

Now that the Cold War is becoming a memory, America’s foreign policy establishment has begun searching for new enemies. Possible new villains include ‘instability’ in Europe —

<sup>16</sup> Paul Merritt Bassett, *Grolier’s Academic American Encyclopedia* (Arête Publishing and Nielsen Media Research, 1999.)

ranging from German resurgence to new Russian imperialism— the ‘vanishing’ ozone layer, nuclear proliferation, and narco-terrorism.<sup>17</sup>

Topping the list of potential new global bogeymen, however, are the Yellow Peril, the alleged threat to American economic security emanating from East Asia, and the so-called Green Peril (green is the color of Islam.)<sup>18</sup> That peril is symbolized by the Middle Eastern Muslim fundamentalist—the ‘Fundie,’ to use a term coined by the economist<sup>19</sup>— a Khomeini-like creature, armed with a radical ideology, equipped with nuclear weapons, and intent on launching a violent *jihad* against Western civilization.

George Will even suggested that the 1,000-year battle between Christendom and Islam might be breaking out once more when he asked, “Could it be that 20 years from now we will be saying, not that they’re at the gates of Vienna again, but that, in fact, the birth of Mohammed is at least as important as the birth of Christ, that Islamic vitality could be one of the big stories of the next generations?”<sup>20</sup>

### ***Islam in Indonesia***

Indonesia, where nearly 90% of the populace is Muslim, is the world’s largest Islamic country.

<sup>17</sup> *Narcoterrorism* is a term coined by former President Fernando Belaúnde Terry of Peru in 1983 when describing *terrorist*-type attacks against his nation’s anti-narcotics police.

<sup>18</sup> Leon T. Hadar, University professor, and former bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post, describes the creation of the myth of Islamic fundamentalism by the US foreign policy establishment. See his work “The Green Peril: Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat,” *Policy Analysis* No. 77 August 27, 1992.

<sup>19</sup> “Fear of Fundies,” *The Economist*, February 15, 1992, 4546.

<sup>20</sup> “This Week with David Brinkley,” *ABC News*, December 29, 1991, transcript prepared by *Graphic Journal*, 6.

However, Islam has never played a central role in the country's politics. Nevertheless, there has been a persistent tension between those advocates of a more prominent and formal role for Islam in the country, and those who resist making Islam an organized political actor. In the late 1980s, under the now defunct New Order era of former President Soeharto, there was an effort to reach out to Muslims and Islam in a more explicit way. The main reason for this was President Soeharto's desire to widen his power base beyond the military and the secular ruling political party, Golkar. A symbolic indication of this effort was President Soeharto's decision in 1990 to make his first trip or Hajj to Mecca. Other steps on the path to Islamization of the New Order regime included reversing the ban on the wearing of *jilbab* (head covering) for female students in state-run schools and the founding of the country's first Islamic bank.

Roughly a decade after Soeharto's attempt to encompass Islam in the political sphere, the New Order collapsed. On 21 May 1998, President Soeharto resigned. In essence, the effort by Soeharto to widen his political base by reaching out to Islam did not prevent the fall of his regime. While Soeharto's efforts in the preceding several years to cultivate Islam may have re-invigorated Islamic groups and organizations, the current evolving role of Islam in the politics and policy-making of post-Soeharto Indonesia is likely to be more sustainable than it was at the beginning of Soeharto's New Order era. A major reason for this expectation is that there has been, over the past decades, a surge in religious consciousness among many circles within the Indonesian Muslim community.

A central point about the Islam in Indonesia is that it is not monolithic. A key divide, other

than the differences between 'traditionalists', 'modernists' and 'fundamentalists,' is that between those working for the Islamization of Indonesia and those who wish to Indonesianize Islam. In some measure, the debates over the role of Islam in Indonesia have been between *santri* (devout Muslims) and the *abangan* (nominal Muslims.) The New Order era largely succeeded in suppressing this basic (and overly simplified) dichotomy.

In the immediate post-independence period of parliamentary democracy, Muslim political parties did in fact play an important role in politics. A number of the Prime Ministers of the period were from the largest Muslim political party, Masjumi. But divisions and differences amongst the various elements that comprised the party led to the weakening of political Islam in Indonesia.

As Sukarno issued in the era of guided democracy, the fortunes of almost all political parties began to flounder. The Masjumi was banned in 1960 on the basis of allegations that its leaders were active in a regional rebellion. Other Islamic groups also began to come under Sukarno's control. The rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and Sukarno's growing support for it put Islamic parties and groups even more on the defensive. However, given Islamic cooperation with the military in the context of the fall of Sukarno in 1965, it appeared that Islam might yet again play a stronger role in the country's politics. This did not materialize however.

While working to diminish the role of Islam in the politics of the New Order, at the same time the government encouraged Islamic religious and ritual activities to flourish. Such encouragement took the form of government-sponsored proselytizing, the increase in Islamic

publications and the construction of mosques. In essence, Soeharto's New Order took a dual-track approach to Islam. On the one hand, it resisted any political role for Islam while on the other it promoted Islam as a private religion.

Between the political and the private, a third dimension of Islam in Indonesia has been its societal role. In this realm, Islam retained an important, and in fact increasingly influential position. For example, Islamic organizations as mass-based movements focusing on social and educational activities remained important aspects of the Indonesian landscape. However, as the two largest Muslim organizations, the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama suggest, even as a social force Islam in Indonesia is not monolithic. Still three developments arising out of the societal role of Islam in the last decade or so of Soeharto's rule have set the background to the role of Islam in the country today. First, members of the Muslim middle class are now culturally and intellectually more self-confident than their predecessors. Second, the Muslim middle class, while accepting that religion and society cannot be separated, including government and politics, does not support an Islamic state. Finally, there is a growing religious awareness amongst the middle class of Indonesia. The contemporary significance of such developments is that the long-standing distinctions between santri and abangan and between modernism and traditionalism is now giving way to a more complicated picture of Islam's role in Indonesian society.

Relations between Islam and the Indonesian military have been problematic. Many reasons have been offered to explain the troubled, and at times mutually suspicious relationship. First, some in the military elite have been unhappy with what they regard as the factious and rebellious

nature of the Islamic community. Specifically, the military elite have suspected that Islam has been a motivating force in regional rebellions in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi to name but a few. Second, the military leadership has tended to be dominated by either the abangan Javanese or secular nationalists. The non-Muslims in the military have tended to shy away from defining national identity in religious terms. Even more, the military leadership, in perceiving its role as the guardian of national unity in an ethnically and religiously diverse society, has tended to regard attempts by Muslims to express political interests through protests on economic and cultural grievances with hostility. Third, in terms of power politics, ABRI was inclined to deny a formal role to Islam out of concern that it would challenge the military's prominent position in the New Order system of government. However, in the early 1990s and since, there appear to be the makings of a greater accommodation between Islamists and the ABRI. The ABRI's suspicion about the Islamic community's rebelliousness and tendency towards factionalism appears to have abated.

In general, Islam has not had an important role in shaping Indonesia's foreign policy. There are two main reasons. First, foreign-policy making has been dominated by state institutions, and non-governmental forces have not been allowed to tread on the government's authority in this area. Second, Muslims leaders themselves have been concerned with a relatively narrow range of international issues; particularly those that have explicit Islamic dimensions or involve the Islamic world or the Middle East. This too may be changing. Emerging leaders in the new political climate of post-Soeharto Indonesia such as Amien Rais, the ex-leader of the



political party PAN, are raising questions about Indonesia's foreign policy. Two compelling issues for these persons are the inter-national identity of the state and the country's place in the Islamic world. Related to these questions is the issue of Indonesia's relationship with the West. It is clear that new voices are emerging in terms of views on foreign and security policy in the new political climate, but it is not clear what these voices will have to say. However, it does not seem likely that the Islamic factor will emerge as a major factor or determinant of Indonesia's foreign or security policy.

Islam has not been a monolithic force in the politics of Indonesia. There have been divergent views amongst several Islamic organizations and movements, most prominently the NU and the Muhammadiyah. The New Order government's policy of diminishing the role of political parties combined with the military's suspicion of Islam, led Islamic organizations to concentrate on religious, social and educational activities rather than politics. This very shift in emphasis led to Indonesian society becoming more Islamicized, including the rise of a Muslim middle class that entered both the government and the military. These changes in part led the military to reassess its view of Islam's role in Indonesia. Moreover, in the post-Soeharto context of Indonesian politics, Islam has emerged as perhaps the most important force. Islam is likely to be a major force in the politics of Indonesia for the foreseeable future.

Southeast Asia is clearly a sub-continent in turmoil. Here I would try to provide analysis on the situation in the Indonesian archipelago. The economic growth of the so-called 'tiger economy' has also been used by the bourgeois to prove the 'spectacular' and 'progressive' role of capitalism. But now the beginning of the

Indonesian revolution collapse of this economy has put an end to the ruling group propaganda, and given a room for oppositional forces to improve condition.

Every ruling group in the world is faced with an opposition. In a real democracy, an important form of opposition can be found in representative assemblies such as parliament. In the present-day Indonesia, however, this kind of opposition is virtually non-existent because the people representative council (MPR and DPR) are representing only a small part of the people. Thus real opposition in today's Indonesia is carried out by extra-parliamentary forces.

It is very important to analyze some of these forces in a systematic way. On the whole these forces can be divided into two broad categories. In the first one, opponents are ideological enemies such as, *first*, the crypto-communistic party, a PRD (People Democratic Party) which is derived from the spirit of the banned party PKI (Indonesia Communist Party) on the left and, *second*, the radical Islam—and even called in notoriously 'extremist' or 'fundamentalist'—DI (*Darul Islam*, Islamic State Movement) or TII (Tentara Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Troop) on the right who are striving for a nomocratic state which is in principle based on Islamic laws, *shari'a*. In other words, what this second opposition leaders want is a return to the original ideals of the Rasulullah Muhammad's Madīna State as enunciated in the seventh century.

In the second category are elements which are, on the whole, of the same ideology with the leaders of the regime is called as a bourgeoisie opposition. They are anti-communist and they welcome foreign investments for the construction of the national economy. There are, however, differences of degree. The army

leaders, intellectuals, and student leaders in this category accuse the regime of having ‘sold out’ the national resources to foreign capital for the sake of ‘development.’ Some of the government leaders are profit taking from this state of affairs, as they received the commissions and kickbacks paid by foreign companies, which go into their personal bank accounts. Concomitant to this, the regime is condemned by these critics because of its rampant, wide spread corruption which has created general demoralization and cynicism (collusions, corruptions and nepotisms) thus obstructing the vigorous growth of the nation. In addition, the violation of democracy and suppression of civil liberties, such as the freedom of the press, form the target of attack of these critics.

The mortal enemy of the Indonesian government is comprising of Islam and Communism the DI/TII and PRD/PKI. If we consider the PRD to be on the extreme left—like its predecessor—in the Indonesian political spectrum, then there is also opposition to the Jakarta regime from the extreme right. The latter is represented by traditional Muslim leaders who aspire to establish a *Negara Islam* (Islamic State), a state based on the precepts of the Qur’ān and devoid of the various aspects of secular Western culture in the form of nightclubs, casinos, massage parlors and the like which are at present mushrooming in the bigger cities of Indonesian.

This group forms a minority considering the fact that officially nearly 90 percent of the population is Muslim and that the majority of Islamic leaders as represented in the NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti—now all of them merged into the PPP—do not show a hostile and antagonistic attitude toward Western culture and its manifestations. For the purpose

of this study, in the quest for implementation of *shari‘a* in Indonesia, are the Muslims and the non-Muslims doomed to clash violently in this century, or are there ways to reconcile the two to create a peaceful co-existence in the world?

Possibly as yet, we have not closely examined or truly understood the situation of Indonesia either through the mass media or directly, and we would probably feel amazed at how despite the size of the Islamic community there, it is historically and socio-logically capable of establishing *Daulah Islamiyyah* (Islamic State) in Indonesia today. The majority of historians write that Islam came to Indonesia by means of traders. There are those of the opinion that they came from India around the 13<sup>th</sup> century, there are those of the opinion that it came from China around the 9<sup>th</sup> century. There is also the opinion of those who say that Islam arrived directly from the Arab lands around the 7<sup>th</sup> century CE. During the next phase of its Islamic development, many states of the Indonesian archipelago became Islamic kingdoms, including the kingdoms of Demak, Banten and Pasai amongst others; and *shari‘a* has been part of Indonesia from the beginning.

It was through out these Islamic Kingdoms that there arose the spirit of self defense when the colonizing Dutch tried to forcibly take these Muslim States which were Indonesian. At that time the Dutch, who were notably Christian came bearing their mission of the 3G (Gold, Gospel [Bible] and Glory [Colonization]). The ulama and the young of the Islamic community who came from various backgrounds arose up to oppose the Colonialists with the irrefutable spirit of martyrdom (*jihad*.) The nature of the Islamic communities’ opposition at that time was indeed still regionally sporadic, and amongst those who led against the colonialists

are such are well-known names such as Imam Bonjol, Pangeran Diponegoro and Teungku Tjik Di Tiro. As to the movement on a national scale, it emerged firstly in the year 1905 with the appearance of the SDI (Sjarikat Dagang Islam, the United Islamic Merchants) which was pioneered by H. Samanhudi. Following this organisation, came the birth of SI (Sjarikat Islam, United Islam) in the year 1912 which was pioneered by H.O.S. Cokroaminoto, and during the development of this organisation there arose the PSII (the United Islamic Party of Indonesia.)<sup>21</sup> The movement was orientated towards the various aspects of life — political ideology, economy and social. By the means of a long exhaustive process, in the year 1949, the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia [NII] or Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia [DI/TII]) was formed under the leadership of Imam Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosoewirjo until he was arrested by the Sukarno regime of the Indonesian Republic. This was achieved using the Muslim hostages as human shields (*pagar betis*) in their battles against the Muslim army (TII.) But, Imam Sekarmaji never surrendered to the secular enemy. Since that time until now some of the Islamic community in Indonesia —who understand these facts through many transitions and power shifts— continue the struggle to return *Daulah Islamiyyah*. This study will be interestingly to discuss how Indonesian triumphed over past Indonesian military

<sup>21</sup> The more interesting problem in SI movement is a new tendency brought by Semaoen who coloured this radical organization by the ideology of Communism. The organization split later, one is SI Merah (Red SI, a communist wing) and other is remained in Islam as SI Putih (White SI.) The struggle against Islam played by communist attracting many political scholars as they study deeply about the communist's strategy of deception.

interregnum, and gracefully succeeded under her current political dispensation.

The supporters of an Islamic State are spread all over Indonesia but there are strong reasons to suggest that their leadership was until 1976 based in the province of Aceh, North Sumatra, as embodied in the late Teungku Daud Beureueh. This is the veteran Muslim leader who, as a matter of fact, has always been in opposition to the successive 'secular' regimes in Jakarta since the beginning of 1945 Independence. They consider that the Indonesian government is 'Colonialist.' The 'Colonialist Indonesia' efforts, which were held by their cadres, were capable of expressing enough success in keeping Islam away from the native Indonesians. This started with the emergence of people in the Islamic Community of Indonesia both from within the *ulamas* (Islamic scholars) themselves, their own leaders, and lay people, who distinctly stated that they did not want Islam to be the basis of their nation. In fact they had already achieved a certain threshold of fear, which was enough to discourage those people who could have raised Indonesia as an Islamic State.<sup>22</sup>

So, in Indonesia today it can be said that there is nobody who clearly states that it is obligatory for the Islamic community to establish an Islamic State. There are those who oppose and compete against Communist

<sup>22</sup> The latest information which is important enough to reveal at this state of affairs is that Amien Rais, a son of Indonesia, who as leader of the 30 million members of Muhammadiyah (an Islamic Organisation which has some potential in Indonesia) is closely watched and respected, stated in the *Time* international magazine (September 23, 1996, Volume 148, No. 13) in an article entitled "The New Face of Islam" by James Walsh: "I don't want to waste any energy talking about stupid issues like an Islamic State, we must have a Democratic System."

who yearns for the establishment of Indonesia as an Islamic State. They use various kinds of pretexts, amongst which is: “There is no order to set up an Islamic State” or “There is no *āya* or *Hadīth* what so ever which orders us to establish an Islamic State.”<sup>23</sup>

But it must be revealed the current Indonesian constitution (UUD 1945) has provision for the *shari‘a* in the Djakarta Charter (Piagam Djakarta) and this study will revealed this point that dismissed the argument whether *shari‘a* is part of the Indonesian constitution and might be possibly to urge an Islamic State democratically.

Like Kahar Muzakkar or Daud Beureueh sympathised with the Darul Islam movement of S.M. Kartosoewirjo and TII which had respectively West Java and Kalimantan/Sulawesi as areas of operation. Both had the same aim of establishing a nomocratic stated based on Qur’ānic Law and both where suppressed by the Indonesian Army in the first half of the 1960s. If Kartosoewirjo was captured, brought to trial and later executed in 1962. Kahar Muzakkar was killed in action in February 1965.

Although it can be said that Daud Beureueh has been outside the Indonesian government since 1949, the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch to the Indonesian people, his opposition to Jakarta was more vociferous when Sukarno was President in the period of Guided Democracy. The main reason for this was his anger because of the policies of Sukarno which were advantageous

to the communist, considered by Daud Beureueh as the infidels *par excellence*. The PKI was not only hated as an atheistic party but also as an enemy which aimed to liquidating the influence of Islam in Indonesia if given the chance. This confrontation between Islam, the state and the Communist has been attracting democracy observers about how their interpretations. Considering that democracy is not an event but a process, the Islam groups reinterpret the democracy practiced in Indonesia on pretext that was Communist’s and secular’s original creed.

With regard to the New Order regime emerged in 1967, the criticism of the radicalist right-wing group is aimed at the ‘sinful’ proliferation of nightclubs, brothels in the camouflage of massage parlors or steambaths, gambling dens and other dubious attractions for tourists in Jakarta and provincial capitals. Within this context it is contended that the Government supported Golkar should better be called *Golkur* from *Golongan Kuraish*, the aristocrats in Mecca who were against the Prophet Muḥammad.<sup>24</sup> Also criticism has been expressed against the policies of New Order President Soeharto considered to favour the Christian communities, Catholics and Protestants, in the country and to discriminate against the Muslims.

Within this last context a letter written by Daud Beureueh to the President on 10 August 1974 is significant. In it the Muslim leader drew the attention of Soeharto to the fact that a wise and just leader should devote his attention to the wishes of the majority of the population. If not, this leader cannot be considered wise and just. He is then a leader who is *zalim* (tyrannical)

<sup>23</sup> Mohammad Roem said, “There is no order to set up an Islamic State,” in discussion of launching Nurcholish Madjid’s book, *Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid* (Jakarta: Yayasan Paramadina, Djembatan dan Panji Masyarakat, 7 November 1997.)

<sup>24</sup> *Sinar Harapan*, Jakarta, March 21, 1977.



and a 'stupid fool.' History has shown that tyrants in the end will be destroyed so that this should be taken as a valuable lesson. Sukarno (the first President of Indonesia) was afraid of Islam and the forces which could be generated by the *umma* (Muslim community.) He looked for an opponent and enemy of Islam and found this in PKI. Sukarno incited the communist to attack Islam, so that the *umma* would not become strong. "But Allah intervened, you (Soeharto) were moved to destroy them (the communist) and finally also Sukarno and the communist whom he had encouraged and aided, were destroyed." Daud Beureueh continued in his letter:

Now I observe that you (Soeharto) are also afraid of Islam and the potentialities of its *umma*. You are now searching for an adversary of Islam. The communists are no longer here so that you have found the disciples of Christianity as a strong and powerful rival. What are you actually seeking? You encourage them, support them, you incite them to attack Islam, the religion of Allah, so that the *umma* remain weak and powerless. Secondly I also observe that you are keen on expanding your own personal power. But believe and I hope you would prevent history from repeating itself. What has occurred to Sukarno and his communist friends, could take place again. May however history not repeat itself and destroy you and your friends. Therefore, Brother, return to the real and correct path. You being a Muslim, help Islam and its *umma*. By doing this you would have placed the demands of the majority of the people high on the list of priorities without forgetting nor neglecting the other groups in Indonesian society. Trust and believe that your victory, power and greatness will be dependent for a

great part on the majority of this country, the *umma* Islam. Only if you devote the necessary attention to it and evaluate it correctly, will you succeed in this and the next life. I hope that my advice and message will be of use to you.<sup>25</sup>

Needless to say this letter infuriated the ruling group in Jakarta in a tremendous way. It seems that the contents have never been published in Indonesia itself. Baihaqqi A.K., a lecturer at IAIN (Islamic College) Jamiah Ar-Raniry at Banda Aceh got hold of a copy of the letter and showed it to some people. As a consequence he was arrested and kept in jail for three months. In the end Daud Beureueh's message to the President was apparently one of the factors for the later to advise the Indonesian Council of Churches (PGI) not to organize the fifth General Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Jakarta as originally planned.<sup>26</sup>

The opposition of Daud Beureueh to the regime is based more on moral forced than on armed strength. Differing from the Darul Islam and the Tentara Islam Indonesia of the 1950s and 1960s which were movements supported by armed units, the radical right-wing Islamic group has no soldiers under its command. It is, however, a potential hearth of unrest for Jakarta as the manifesto or proclamation (*pronunciamento*) of its leader could incite the Muslim masses and alienate them from the regime. The ultimate weapon of the movement is the threat of secession from the Republic.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> The letter is published in *Impact International*, London, May9-22, 1975.

<sup>26</sup> See *Indonesia: Feiten en Meningen* (Amsterdam, June 1975), 13, as quoted by B.J. Boland, *Pergulatan Islam dalam Politik di Indonesia*, tr. (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1984.)

<sup>27</sup> This was once wielded by the same Daud Beureueh in the 1950s against the Ali Sastroamidjojo

At next phase there seemed to be a new version of the movement called the *Komando Jihad* (Holy War Command.) Some of its leaders have been arrested. One of them, Haji Ismael Pranoto, was brought to trial in Surabaya in September 1978. He was accused of having attempted to establish an Islamic State with the support of an army with its main base in Central and East Java near Blitar. At the end of the trial Pranoto was sentenced to life imprisonment. Some Muslim circles contend that the Jihad Command is an invention of the regime with the purpose of discrediting the Islamic State supporters. If so, the trial of Pranoto is nothing else than a sham.

The biggest danger of Islam in Indonesia is not radicalist but fundamentalist who manipulates Islamic practices by the ultra-right groups. This manipulation of Islam has been done by the ultra-right groups and the military by raising the sentiment of racism, anti-Christianity and anti-Communism against the democratic mass movements, in several parts of Indonesia. Like the white terror in Banyuwangi East Java, Ketapang Jakarta, Kupang, Sambas, Mataram and other regions and the formation of the para-military groups to attack the students and people's demonstrations. Indonesia as the largest democracy in Southeast Asia is important to the United States and Western countries. If Indonesia goes down so does the sub-continent. The issue of *shari'a* and Islamic State has to be addressed carefully.

Meanwhile the real Islamic forces grouped in Darul Islam are those which consistently oppose militarism. The Islamic groups in Aceh, Lampung, Tanjung Priok and others

have held lots of demonstration to protest the massacre of their community by the military. Politically, they are also anti the Dual Function of the ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces.) So it is also important for the PRD to have tactical alliance with such Islamic forces to build an anti-militarism front.

In Indonesia itself, Islam is not a representative of a social class or political interest. It is divided into different political groups based on their social taxonomy. NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), for instance, represents Muslims whose social basis is peasant with the remnants of feudalism in political and cultural life. Muhammadiyah and ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) represent the modern Muslim whose social basis are traders, intellectuals and professionals. Islam does not either represent a social class, because it has bourgeoisie, petit bourgeoisie and workers.

In Indonesian history, the Islamic political parties like Masyumi and NU used to be a reactionary force which had roles in slaughtering millions of members of the PKI. But the other period of Indonesian history also shows that Islamic forces like SI (Syarekat Islam) were a progressive force. We cannot generalize whether Islamic forces are progressive or reactionary politically. And the fact is that nowadays there are Islamic forces which are anti-militarism and can be pushed toward the formation of the anti-militarism front. Indonesia is not facing fundamentalism as a real threat, but militarism and the civilian-military or civil militia collaboration. This means that cooperation with Islamic forces which are anti-militarism as tactical alliances need to be taken by PRD to fight against militarism and to anticipate the scenario of civilian-military collaboration. In short, the strategy at

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Cabinet and only skilful negotiations between Jakarta and the Achehnese prevented a national disaster at that time.

the moment is to build a broad tactical alliance with all radical oppositions against the Habibie and Abdurrachman Wahid regime and military during 1996-2000 and the tendency of the bourgeois opposition leadership.

The betrayal of bourgeois oppositions has at least two negative impacts towards the democratization in Indonesia. Firstly, they give the old repressive power of Soeharto regime and the military which is already cornered to come up again on the political stage and do offence. Secondly, they moderate and lower the increasing degree of the resistance of the people. In short, they blunt the main contradiction in the society.

Under such Western type of civilization built by the New Order Soeharto administration of developments, it is no wonder if now the military rises their confidence. If in last November 1998 the military was the common enemy, now they do lots of provocation by shooting the cabs of demonstrators and drive their tanks to campuses. Under the name of securing the 'free and democratic' election supported by the bourgeoisie, they now become more repressive and provocative including by training 40.000 para-military personnel as guards and securing forces for the coming General Election on June 7, 1999 and the Assembly.

Western society has changed the world by introducing a new type of civilization, based not (as in the pre-modern period) on a surplus of agricultural produce, but on technology that enables us to reproduce our resources indefinitely. This type of civilization depends upon a scientific and empirical rationalism, which is not constrained, as in the pre-modern world, by spiritual, religious or mythological values. It took the peoples of Western Europe

and America almost three hundred years to develop this kind of civilization; it was a highly complex process that involved advances in several fields and on various fronts at the same time. It did not come fully into its own in the West until the nineteenth century. Once it was up and running in Europe, the need to continually expand the economy and find new markets led to the formation of Eastern colonies in Indonesia, the Middle East and Africa during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These colonies then had to be modernized according to Western norms to make them fit in with this new Western-dominated economic network. It was at this point, therefore, that the non-Western nations began the process of modernization; it became apparent to them that the only way to take a full part in the new world and to shake off European hegemony was to Westernize. But modernization took over three hundred years in the West, and it was a painful, violent and dislocating process.

### *A New Cold War?*

Indeed, "a new specter is haunting America, one that some Americans consider more sinister than Marxism-Leninism," according to Douglas E. Streusand, "That specter is Islam."<sup>28</sup> The rise of political Islam in North Africa, especially the recent electoral strength of anti-liberal Islamic fundamentalist groups in Algeria; the birth of several independent Muslim republics in Central Asia whose political orientation is unclear; and the regional and international ties fostered by Islamic governments in Iran and Sudan are

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<sup>28</sup> Douglas E. Streusand, "Abraham's Other Children: Is Islam an Enemy of the West?," *Policy Review* 50 (Fall 1989.) See also exchange of letters titled "Is Islamic Fundamentalism a New Red Scare?," *New York Times*, January 29, 1992.

all producing, as Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland put it, an “urge to identify Islam as an inherently anti-democratic force that is America’s new global enemy now that the Cold War is over.”<sup>29</sup> “Islamic fundamentalism is an aggressive revolutionary movement as militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, and Nazi movements of the past,” according to Amos Perlmutter. It is ‘authoritarian, anti-democratic, anti-secular,’ and cannot be reconciled with the ‘Christian-secular universe’ and its goal is the establishment of a ‘totalitarian Islamic state’ in the Middle East, he argued, suggesting that the United States should make sure the movement is ‘stifled at birth.’<sup>30</sup>

The Islam vs. West paradigm, reflected in such observations, is beginning to infect Washington. That development recalls the efforts by some of Washington’s iron triangles as well as by foreign players during the months leading up to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis. Their use of the media succeeded in building up Saddam Hussein as the “most dangerous man in the world,”<sup>31</sup> and as one of America’s first new post-Cold War bogeymen. Those efforts, including allegations that Iraq had plans to dominate the Middle East, helped to condition the American public and elites for the U.S. intervention in the gulf.<sup>32</sup> There is a major difference between the Saddam-the-bogeyman caricature and the Green Peril. Notwithstanding the Saddam-is-Hitler rhetoric, the Iraqi leader

was perceived as merely a dangerous ‘thug’ who broke the rules of the game and whom Washington could suppress by military force. Saddam’s Iraq was a threat to a regional balance of power, not to the American way of life.

The alleged threat from Iran and militant Islam is different. The struggle between that force and the West is portrayed as a zero-sum game that can end only in the defeat of one of the sides. The Iranian ayatollahs and their allies — ‘revolutionary,’ ‘fanatic,’ and ‘suicidal’ people that they are—cannot be coopted into balance-of-power arrangements by rewards and are even seen as immune to military and diplomatic threats. One can reach a tactical compromise with them— such as the agreement with Lebanese Shiite groups to release the American hostages but on the strategic level the expectation is for a long, drawn-out battle.

Indeed, like the Red Menace of the Cold War era, the Green Peril is perceived as a cancer spreading around the globe, undermining the legitimacy of Western values and political systems. The cosmic importance of the confrontation would make it necessary for Washington to adopt a long term diplomatic and military strategy; to forge new and solid alliances; to prepare the American people for a never ending struggle that will test their resolve; and to develop new containment policies, new doctrines, and a new foreign policy elite with its ‘wise men’ and ‘experts.’

There are dangerous signs that the process of creating a monolithic threat out of isolated events and trends in the Muslim world is already beginning. The Green Peril thesis is now being used to explain diverse and unrelated events in that region, with Tehran replacing Moscow as the center of ideological subversion and

<sup>29</sup> Jim Hoagland, “Washington’s Algerian Dilemma,” *Washington Post*, February 6, 1992.

<sup>30</sup> Amos Perlmutter, “Wishful Thinking about Islamic Fundamentalism,” *Washington Post*, January 19, 1992.

<sup>31</sup> Brian Duffy et al., “Saddam: The Most Dangerous Man in the World,” *U.S. News & World Report*, June 4, 1990, 38-51.

<sup>32</sup> See “Gulf War Coverage: A One Note Chorus,” *Extra* 4, No. 3 (May 1991.)



military expansionism and Islam substituting for the spiritual energy of communism.

Islam does seem to fit the bill as the ideal post-Cold War villain. "It's big; it's scary; it's anti-Western; it feeds on poverty and discontent," wrote David Ignatius, adding that Islam "spreads across vast swaths of the globe that can be colored green on the television maps in the same way that communist countries used to be colored red."<sup>33</sup>

Foreign policy experts are already using the familiar Cold War jargon to describe the coming struggle with Islam. There is talk about the need to 'contain' Iranian influence around the globe, especially in Central Asia, which seemed to be the main reason for Secretary of State James A. Baker III's February stop in that region.<sup>34</sup> Strategists are beginning to draw a 'red line' for the fundamentalist leaders of Sudan, as evidenced by a U.S. diplomat's statement last November warning Khartoum to refrain from 'exporting' revolution and terrorism.<sup>35</sup>

Washington's policymakers even applauded the January 1992 Algerian 'iron fist' military coup that prevented an Islamic group from

winning the elections. The notion that we have to stop the fundamentalists somewhere echoes the Cold War's domino theory.

"Geopolitically, Iran's targets are four—the Central Asian republics, the Maghreb or North Africa, Egypt and other neighboring Arab countries, and the Persian Gulf states," explained Hoover Institution senior fellow Arnold Beichman, who is raising the Muslim alarm. Beichman suggested that 'the first major target' for radical Iran and its militant strategy would be "oil-rich, militarily weak Saudi Arabia, keeper of Islam's holy places and OPEC's decision maker on world oil prices."<sup>36</sup> If the West does not meet that challenge, a Green Curtain will be drawn across the crescent of instability, and "the Middle East and the once Soviet Central Asian republics could become in a few years the cultural and political dependencies of the most expansionist militarized regime in the world today, a regime for which terrorism is a governing norm," he warned.<sup>37</sup>

The Islamic threat argument is becoming increasingly popular with some segments of the American foreign policy establishment. They are encouraged by foreign governments who, for reasons of self-interest, want to see Washington embroiled in the coming West vs. Islam confrontation. The result is the construction of the new peril, a process that does not reflect any grand conspiracy but that nevertheless has its own logic, rules and timetables.

The creation of a peril usually starts with mysterious 'sources' and unnamed officials who leak information, float trial balloons, and warn about the coming threat. Those sources reflect debates and discussions taking place

<sup>33</sup> David Ignatius, "Islam in the West's Sights: The Wrong Crusade?" Out-look Section, *Washington Post*, March 8, 1992.

<sup>34</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. to Counter Iran in Central Asia," *New York Times*, February 6, 1992; Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker's Trip to Nations Unready for Independence," February 16, 1992; and Robert S. Greenberger, "Baker Is Wooing Central Asian Republics," *Wall Street Journal*, February 14, 1992.

<sup>35</sup> The diplomat, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Robert Houdek, warned the Sudanese that they would face 'grave' consequences if an international terror is act could be traced to Sudan. See Jane Perlez, "Sudan Is Seen as Safe Base for Mideast Terror Groups," *New York Times*, January 26, 1992.

<sup>36</sup> Arnold Beichman, "Iran's Covetous Glances," *Washington Times*, February 28, 1992.

<sup>37</sup> Arnold Beichman, "Iran's Covetous Glances."

within government. Their information is then augmented by colorful intelligence reports that finger exotic and conspiratorial terrorists and military advisers. Journalists then search for the named and other villains. The media end up finding corroboration from foreign sources who form an informal coalition with the sources in the U.S. government and help the press uncover further information substantiating the threat coming from the new bad guys.

In addition, think tanks studies add momentum to the official spin. Their publication is followed by congressional hearings, policy conferences, and public press briefings. A governmental policy debate ensues, producing studies, working papers, and eventually doctrines and policies that become part of the media's spin. The new villain is now ready to be integrated into the popular culture to help to mobilize public support for a new crusade. In the case of the Green Peril, that process has been under way for several months.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> See, for example, Barbara Crossette, "U.S. Aide Calls Muslim Militants Big Concern," *New York Times*, January 1, 1992; David Ignatius, "U.S. Fears Sudan Becoming Terrorists' New Lebanon," *Washington Post*, January 31, 1992; Perlez, "Sudan Seen as Safe Base for Mideast Terror Groups"; and Robert S. Greenberger, "Islamic Fundamentalism's Rise in Sudan Sparks Concern over Movement's Spread," *Wall Street Journal*, March 16, 1992; Jennifer Parmelee, "Sudan Denies 'Khartoum-Tehran Axis' to Promote Islamic Regimes in Africa," *Washington Post*, March 12, 1992; John J. Fialka, "Former Soviet Republics of South-Central Asia Have Nuclear Arms, Links with Volatile Lands," *Wall Street Journal*, October 9, 1991; Craig Forman, "Islamic Resurgence Sweeps Soviet South," *Wall Street Journal*, October 9, 1991; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Ignoring Tehran's Threat," *Washington Post*, March 2, 1992; Elaine Sciolino, "Iraqis Could Pose a Threat Soon, CIA Chief Says," *New York Times*, January 16, 1992; and Gerald F. Seib, "The New Order: Iran

A series of leaks, signals, and trial balloons is already beginning to shape U.S. agenda and policy. Congress is about to conduct several hearings on the global threat of Islamic fundamentalism.<sup>39</sup> The George W. Bush administration has been trying to devise policies and establish new alliances to counter Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden Network influence: building up Islamic but secular and pro-Western Pakistan as a countervailing force in Central Asia, expanding U.S. commitments to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, warning Indonesia that it faces grave consequences as a result of its policies.

### *Civilizational Dialogues*

The international community has seen that the fundamentalists have gunned down worshippers in a mosque, have killed doctors and nurses who work in abortion clinics, have shot their presidents, and have even toppled a powerful government. It is only a small minority of fundamentalists who commit such acts of terror, but even the most peaceful and law-abiding are perplexing, because they seem so adamantly opposed to many of the most positive values of modern society. Fundamentalists have no time for democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peacekeeping, free speech, or the separation of church and state.<sup>40</sup>

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Is Re-emerging as a Mideast Power as Iraqi Threat Fades," *Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 1992.

<sup>39</sup> Crossette, "U.S. Aide Calls Muslim Militants Big Concern."

<sup>40</sup> Christian fundamentalists reject the discoveries of biology and physics about the origins of life and insist that the Book of Genesis is scientifically sound in every detail. At a time when many are throwing off the shackles of the past, Jewish fundamentalists observe their revealed Law more stringently than ever before, and Muslim women,

History has shown to us that in the era Cold War and after-math, it is not only Muslim and Christian who have been the fundamentalists. There are Buddhist, Hindu, and even Confucian fundamentalisms, which also cast aside many of the painfully acquired insights of liberal culture, which fight and kill in the name of religion and strive to bring the sacred into the realm of politics and national struggle. This religious resurgence has taken many observers by surprise. In the middle years of the twentieth century, it was generally taken for granted that secularism was an irreversible trend and that faith would never again play a major part in world events. It was assumed that as human beings became more rational, they either would have no further need for religion or would be content to confine it to the immediately personal and private areas of their lives. But in the late 1970s, fundamentalists began to rebel against this secularist hegemony and started to wrest religion out of its marginal position and back to center stage. In this, at least, they have enjoyed remarkable success. Religion has once again become a force that no government can safely ignore.

In Indonesia, many intellectuals and academicians have opinion that the WTC terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Bali Bombing 2002 and 2005 and so on, has encouraged the need for the significance of cultural and civilizational dialogues between Islam and the West. There is strong tendency that the cultural-civilizational dialogues between the West and Islamic societies have

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repudiating the freedoms of Western women, shroud themselves in veils and chadors. Muslim and Jewish fundamentalists both interpret the Arab-Israeli conflict, which began as defiantly secularist, in an exclusively religious way.

gained growing importance after the tragedy of Black September.

In this regard, development cooperation is imperative for the West and Islamic World. It is largely equal to politics beyond cultural borders and depends upon building bridges between cultures-civilizations of the West and Islamic world, and finding ways of cultural and civilizational understanding in order to enter into a dialogue about ethical, religious, and political differences and similarities with others cultures-civilizations and in response to the criticism which since then has been expressed in Islamic societies about Western politics towards developing countries.

The relationship between the West and Islam has been suffering from mutual wrong perception of each other which support anti western and anti Islamic feelings and attitudes. Each others cultures are predominantly interpreted as a monolithic enemy and not, as it should be, an area of cultural diversity. For a long time, said Norbert Eschborn (a Germany scholar), the neighbor like relationship between Western and Islamic countries has not been maintained resulting in increasing tension on religious and cultural issues, such as the discussion about the ability of Islam to adjust its value system to the modern world. On the other hand, Islamic extremist could be observed for more than a decade doing everything to pursue a course of action of politicizing culture and religion in accordance with their belief that *Islam is the solution to everything*, therefore, this long running process support the creation of an unreflected paradigm of Islam versus the West.

Given this background the approach of cultural difference must be supplemented with the perspective of cooperative coexistence.

Mutual interest in and understanding of each others culture, history, and social relations are a necessary condition for the dialogue of the West with Islamic states and societies. Such a dialogue should not only underline similarities between both cultures but also identify possible areas of conflict in order to mark the positive potential of religious, cultural and political exchange between both regions which are very heterogeneous within them and, at the same time, share a common history.<sup>41</sup>

As tension in the relationship between Western and Islamic cultures-civilizations have been growing, any kind of dialogue, therefore, has not only to be intensified but must take into consideration the changing situation of world politics.

### ***Indonesian Muslim and Crisis***

Indonesia, as the largest *Muslim country*, therefore, after the fall of President Soeharto, can be regarded as a champion of democracy or at least democratic transition for a Muslim nation, although this must still be tested by the passage of time. It is natural that the West has viewed Indonesian Islam, at least before the Bali bombing, as being Islam with a new face. In 1996, international media called Islam in Indonesia modernist, progressive, and a friend of the West and other cultures-civilizations and perceived it as an example of successful harmony between muslim and modernity.

But, to borrow Anthony Reida's perspective, that Indonesian Islam still remains a *grossly understudied world* appears to be true today ever more than before. So, it is

very timely to the West societies for research and study on Indonesian Islam that actually is very pluralistic and complicated, so often misunderstood by the Westerners. Of course, issue of terrorism is a real matter, especially after Bali bombing that has shocked our state and society. Meanwhile, the radical movements in Indonesia have been rising such as Darul Islam, FPI, HizbutTahrir Indonesia, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara, Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnahwal Jama'ah, Jamaah Tarbiyah Indonesia, Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, KPPSI and soon. These particular movements, which have been among the most prominent and influential, have all been motivated by common fears, anxieties, and desires that seem to be a not unusual response to some of the peculiar difficulties of life in the modern secular world.

We are sure that, facing terrorism and Islam fundamentalism, no way out to solve the issues, except with cultural and civilizational dialogues and economic development cooperation between the West and Indonesia. These dialogues and cooperation are very contextual and pivotal to eradicate poverty, social unjust, backwardness, and multidimensional crises in Indonesian society, beside to improve mutual understanding.

So far, Indonesian society has fallen into *debt trap* amounted to US\$170 billions (state and private loans.) That foreign debt, mostly the *odious debt*, has depleted economic resources of the people. Meanwhile imposition of *Washington Consensus* to Indonesia in conformity with IMF, World Bank and WTO guidelines, has burdened the people economy in which most of them are the poor Muslims. From this sensitive point, Islam has been *rallying*

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<sup>41</sup> Norbert Eschborn, "Democratization and the Issue of Terrorism in Indonesia," presentation in seminar, Bandung: Universitas Parahyangan & Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2004.



point to youth, students, ulamas and scholars as a basic ideology *vis-a-vis* the West hegemony that they blame as the new imperialists in Indonesia under global capitalism.

### **Conclusion**

But, is it Islam the only solution for everything, included as problem solver for poverty, social unjust and multidimensional crisis? Is it Islam the solution to everything? The answer has not yet clear. In reality, Islam has only provided values, ethics, norms and religious guides, not an instant panacea to the real problems that grasped the Indonesian Islam. So it is imperative for ulamas (Islamic scholars), leaders and Muslim intelligentsia to make their *umma* be aware and conscious that radicalism and violence is wrong answer in the wrong time to crackdown poverty, social unjust and multidimensional crises in recent years.

Islam would be useful, beneficial and meaningful if it can provide real contribution such as ideas, thinking, solution and philosophical/practical means in dealing with the real issues, so that the Indonesian Islam is more realistic and pragmatic than radicalistic and fundamentalistic in responding the nowadays and future challenges such as poverty, social injustices, global imbalances, under-development, environmental crisis, the widening gulf between the rich and the poor, between North and South and soon. Whether or not Indonesian Islam capable and credible in dealing with these challenges, all of that depend upon their leaders, intellectuals and ulamas in responding the issues intelligently, directively, adequately and effectively. For the Muslim in every where, the struggle to overcome that matters, would take time in such globalized world.

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