

THREE VISIONS IN MODERNIZING *TURĀTH* FOR THE ARAB-ISLAM THOUGHTS AND CIVILIZATION: A REVIEW OF MUḤAMMAD ʿĀBID AL-JĀBIRĪ'S METHOD

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Abstract: *This article examines the contribution of the methodological thought of Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī in examining “Arab reason” as a system of thought in relation to modernity on the one hand and efforts to awaken on the other. A review of al-Jābirī’s intellectual efforts finds that Arab reason needs to be re-read rationally and objectively by a way of deconstruction. Al-Jābirī employed the method of deconstruction to explore the epistemological problems in it. After dismantling by referring to three epistemological, ideological, and historical critiques, al-Jābirī finds that so far, the Arabs’ understanding of their system of reason has not undergone reform. That is one of the things that causes the constraints of adaptation to the rapid changes in the modern era.*

Keywords: *Arab Reason; Turāth; Deconstruction; Modernity.*

Abstrak: Artikel ini mengkaji kontribusi pemikiran metodologis Muhammad 'Abid al-Jābirī dalam mengkaji "Nalar Arab" sebagai sistem pemikiran dalam kaitannya dengan modernitas di satu sisi dan upaya kebangkitan di sisi lain. Tinjauan terhadap upaya intelektual al-Jābirī menemukan bahwa nalar Arab perlu dibaca kembali secara rasional dan obyektif dengan cara dekonstruksi. Al-Jābirī menggunakan metode dekonstruksi untuk menggali permasalahan epistemologis di dalamnya. Setelah dibongkar dengan mengacu pada tiga kritik epistemologis, ideologis, dan historis, al-Jābirī menemukan bahwa selama ini pemahaman masyarakat Arab terhadap sistem nalarinya belum mengalami reformasi. Hal itulah yang menjadi salah satu penyebab terhambatnya adaptasi terhadap perubahan yang begitu cepat di era modern.

Kata Kunci: Nalar Arab; Turāth; Dekonstruksi; Modernitas.

Introduction

The progress of a nation's civilization reflects its progress in the field of science and technology. The progress of science and technology echoes the civilizational way of thinking. And that means, examining the nature of the mind that influences the progress of civilization is a study that involves the history of science and all the methods that developed in it. Greek civilization is synonymous with the civilization of reason. Likewise, modern Western rule is characterized by the enlightenment movement (*Renaissance*) which is a critique of the old way of thinking represented by religious (church) authority where the role of reason is relatively minimal. This movement makes man the center of truth (anthropocentric) and reason an infinite force. From this movement were born scientists based on empirical data which in later became referred to as "scientific civilization". It is from this scientific civilization that has given birth to many findings in the field of technology.

In other parts of the region, Arab-Islamic civilization has its own scholarly development. Arab-Islam inherited the realm of the mind from other civilizations such as the Greek civilization, as well as the Western civilization, and also adapted the realm of the mind born from within its own civilization in the form of a legacy of thoughts (*turāth*) that had circulated widely in the second century as an era of codification (*'aṣr al-tadwīn*). All the systems of reason that followed referred to this era.

In subsequent developments, Arab-Islamic civilization faced a new challenge called modernity with all its problems and consequences for Arab-Islamic civilization. Among the crucial issues faced is how to harmonize between the modernity (*al-ḥadāthah*) and tradition (*turāth*) in relation to the problem of the rise of civilization as a contemporary problem. In examining this contemporary issue, some experts have carried out various conceptual mappings and typologies of thought development

that emerged in this era especially in the face of intellectual discourses about tradition (*al-turāth*) and modernity (*al-ḥadāthah*). The studies of Ibrahim Abu Rabi',¹ Issa J. Boullata,² Abdullah Saeed,³ Amin Abdullah,⁴ and Israel Gershoni⁵ shows the debates and responses of Islamic thinkers to the *turāth*. At the heart of the debate is how to re-understand the traditions in Islam in the midst of the great challenges of modernization.

Some critical questions then arise in finding the ideal relationship between tradition and modernity; how could Muslims live according to the demands of religious texts on the one hand, but on the other hand putting oneself in balance with the developments of humanity, how could Muslims adapt to changes but remain to be faithful, how to be authentic as well as to be modern, how to change but stick to the basic principles set by religion, how to maintain a balance between *al-aṣālah* (authenticity) and *al-ḥadāthah* (modernity) at once.

It is in this context that the thought of al-Jābirī is important to study because of his very strong interest in the study of the philosophy of science and civilization by making his project of thought in his magnum opus, *Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabī*. Al-Jābirī dissects the ins and outs of Arab reason as the main problem (the fundamental problem) in the issue of awakening especially in answering the critical question above.

The Basis Methodology of al-Jābirī's Thought

Al-Jābirī employs Western methods of thought especially the French philosophy of postmodernism. The thoughts of Andre Lalande (1867-1963), Gaston Bachelard ((1884-1962), Louis Althusser (1918-1990), Goerges Canguilhem (1904-1995), Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) become the reference of al-Jābirī's methodological basis.⁶ As a Contemporary Arab thinker who chose the path of epistemology,⁷ precisely the critique of epistemology as his intellectual core, al-Jābirī has placed "Arab Reason" (*al-'Aql al-'Arabī*) as the main problem in his study which he outlined in *Mashrū' Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabī*.⁸ The system of reason that prevails dominantly in Arab world, according to al-Jābirī's version, is the main causes of the terrible fact of the backwardness of the Arabs from a hundred years ago to our time.⁹

Al-Jābirī defined Arab reason, in its trilogy, as a collection of principles and rules given by Arab civilization to its followers as the foundation for acquiring knowledge, or epistemological rules, that is, as a collection of concepts and procedures that become the subconscious structure of knowledge in a particular historical phase. Al-Jābirī saw that the collection of concepts and thought procedures that strictly governed the viewpoints

of the Arabs and the patterns of their interaction with something did exist. That is, the Arab is an individual child of man whose intellect is open, grows and develops in Arab civilization, until (that Arab civilization) formats the main, if not the only, reference to his thought. In this case al-Jābirī divided reasons into two types. First is *'Aql al-Mukawwin (la raison constituante)*.¹⁰ Reason in this sense means pure mind (thought), something that distinguishes man from animal. All human beings have that sense. While the second is *'Aql al-Mukawwan (la raison constituée)*. Reason in this second sense serves the meaning of cultural thought that shapes the culture of the particular society in which the person lives. It is the reason in the second sense that al-Jābirī calls the "Arab Intellect".¹¹

To define the Arab reason, al-Jābirī deliberately and consciously borrowed the concept of reason from Andre Lalande (1867-1963) a French philosopher of post-structuralism.¹² As dictated in the writings of Ahmad Baso,¹³ and Luthfi Assyaukani,¹⁴ al-Jābirī, as well as other contemporary Arab thinkers especially Muhammad Arkoun, was a partisan in the philosophical discourses of post-structuralism and post-modernism. Thus, al-Jābirī's idea of Arab reason inherited from Lalande is within the spirit of post-structuralism realm that developed in France.¹⁵

In general, the approach of post-structuralism differs diametrically from the approach that developed in the enlightenment century which character is a positivistic way of thinking that views social reality dualistically, that is, subject and object. This approach also does not look at the reality of the world from the side of material conditions, but looks from outside matter and does not separate between subject and object. This approach emphasizes the constellation of forces contained in the processes of formation and production of meaning and language. Furthermore, in this approach, the language that appears in the form of discourse is not as a neutral medium located outside the speaker. Language is a representation that plays a role in shaping certain types of subjects, certain themes of discourse, and also strategies in them. Political discourse, furthermore, is a "representation" in itself, and is a space for the holding of certain powers that construct social reality. So, according to this approach, social reality is not something that arises by itself due to the will of history, but reality arises due to social construction by agents of power in producing discourse. Thus, for post-structuralism, the text is no longer traditionally understood (as a final corpus of writing), but rather a network of differences, a factory of traces that endlessly refer to something else.

Here it is clear, that al-Jābirī embodies the post-structuralism¹⁶ spirit of defining and analyzing "Arab Reason" as a collection of discourses

that involves various cultural relations in a specific context of time and space. If “Arab Reason” is referred to as “text” which means writing, trace, supplement, difference, remnant, iterability, and mark,¹⁷ then in fact the meaning in the text is always connected with other markers; an intertextuality. Meaning is always in the process of being so. That is, the text is no longer stable, especially in terms of meaning. This is because the markers interpret the text in many times, and in different ways. The text, thus, will always show its inherent instability.¹⁸

If the meaning of Arab Reason is the same as text in the framework of post-structuralism, then how to read it? Herein lies the relevance of the thought of Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), Louis Althusser (1918-1990), and Michel Foucault (1926-1984) in the context of al-Jābirī’s methodology of reading *turāth*. Al-Jābirī borrows Bachelard’s approach in the concept of “ephemological disconnection” (*al-qaṭī‘ah al-ibistimūlūjiyyah*). Althusser’s concept in comprehending the history of science in Europe¹⁹ inspires al-Jābirī in reading the history of science in Arabic-Islam.

In the mainstream view, new discoveries in science depart from previous inventions. The “old one” has always been the foundation for the “new”. However, Bachelard discovers that the development of science goes through disconnection and discontinuity between the old and the new. Bachelard explains that the conceptions of science at certain times always have crises that demand the emergence of new conceptions altogether. The “old one” does not contribute to the “new”. The “new” is always completely disconnected from the “old one”. This is evident by a phenomenon that science since the era of Galileo has witnessed not a small amount of discontinuities.²⁰

Adopting Bachelard’s theory of “epistemological rupture”, al-Jābirī divided the history of Arab-Islamic thought into two: Andalusian-Maghribian thought (Morocco, al-Jazair, Tunis and Libya) and *Mashriq* thought (Egypt, Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, Iraq, and Persia). *Mashriq*’s thought is gnostic-irrational in character as represented in the thoughts of Ibn Sinā, Suhrawardī, al-Ghazālī, Ṣadr al-Muta‘allihīn, Isma‘īlī Shi‘ah, and adherents of the philosophy of illumination. On the other hand, Andalusian-Maghribi thought is Aristotelian and empirically rational as reflected in Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn Bājah, Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Khaldūn, al-Shāṭibī, and Ibn Madā al-Qurṭubī. The Andalusian-Maghribi prominent scholars appear to have excluded their epistemology of thought from the pattern of those that developed in *Mashriq*. The Andalusian-Maghribis are considered to have presented a “new” thought at all: a thought that differs from *mashriq*’s model of thought.²¹

To Michel Foucault, al-Jābirī borrows the theory of *episteme* to develop the Arabic episteme: *bayānī*, *irfānī*, and *burhānī*. The history of the Arab idea, according to al-Jābirī based on Foucault's theory of *episteme*, is a system. This system manifests itself in three types of reason as mentioned above. If Arkoun determines the limits of the Arabic episteme on the periodical parameters (classical, mid, and modern), al-Jābirī measures it in terms of the terms of the validity of knowledge (*shurūṭ al-ṣiḥḥah*).²²

Shurūṭ al-ṣiḥḥah refers to the project of selecting, codifying and canonizing Islamic heritage in the 2nd AH/8th AD) which served as the starting point for the "history of Islamic thought". With this project, according to al-Jābirī, the knowledge of Muslims about his past history has been reconstructed by the era of codification (*ʿaṣr al-tadwīn*) in which he has the following significance: first, it can determine what can be known about the past of Islam before the 2nd century, second, to accumulate and standardize the material wealth that can be recorded from various disciplines such as interpretation, fiqh, language, and kalam that take place under state rule, thirdly, as an effort for comprehensive reconstruction in culture.

By borrowing, adapting, contextualizing, and applying some theories of postmodernism, al-Jābirī clearly has a methodological basis that is considered relevant to the trend of contemporary Arabic thought: the problem of reading to tradition. The epistemological model developed by al-Jābirī is thus inseparable from the ephemeral model developed by postmodernist thinkers in general. In this context, in terms of the methods he pursued and applied, al-Jābirī can be classed as postmodernist Islam. In other parts, he can be placed as an Islamic post-traditionalist.

In addition to reflecting on the postmodernist thought that developed in France, al-Jābirī was an Arab thinker who focused on the trend of Islamic thought that developed in the Islamic Western region (*Maghrib*). As he himself admits, the Islamic thought that developed in the Maghrib region was aristotelian and empirically rational. His proximity to the intellectuals of the region, inevitably, colored almost all of his thinking. So it can be said that al-Jābirī was an Arab thinker who continued the rational-empirical Aristotelian tradition. Islamic thought that lived and developed in the Western part of Islam (Andalusia and Maghribi: Morocco, al-Jazair, Tunisia, Libya) has a different character than the one that once lived and developed in the Eastern region (*Mashriq*). The epistemological pattern of Maghribi Islam tends towards the *burhānī* system, which is a method of reasoning that relies on the power of reason (rational, demonstrative-empirical syllogism) which is derived from Aristotle's thought. Such

thinking for example is reflected in the shops of such figures as Ibn Ḥazm, al-Shāṭibī, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Khaldūn. Al-Jābirī based his methods of rationalism on these figures.

By tracing the epistemological bases of andalusian-Maghrib thinkers written and commented on by al-Jābirī it was found that the rational-empirical thought bases of Maghribi thought boil down to Aristotle's rationalism. Thus, it can also be said here that the rationalism developed by al-Jābirī in his epistemology was motivated by the geneology of Maghribi thought which came down to Aristotle. Thus, the source and methodology base of al-Jābirī's thought comes from the thought of French postmodernism and maghribi intellectual rationalism which boils down to Aristotle.

Deconstruction-Reconstruction Methods and Their Application to the Arab-Islamic Turāth

One of the most important contributions of the rapidly growing philosophy of postmodernism in France was the method of deconstruction by which al-Jābirī was heavily influenced and used it to read Arab-Islamic turāth. Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) was a French contemporary philosopher who contributed much to this issue. In the hands of Derrida, the method of deconstruction²³ derived from Martin Heidegger became more operational when it was to be applied in reading the text.²⁴ Derrida's anxiety is addressed to the metaphysical system of modernism about the concepts of "being" as presence and "logocentrism" (believing in ratios). The metaphysics of presence explains that a concept or theory can be said to be true if it already represents "being" (existing). Something that "exists" it can be represented by words and signs. Derrida rejected that view. For him, words, signs, and concepts are not a reality that presents "there" but rather just a "trace". For him, something that "exists" is compound, unstructured, and systemless, to the point that it cannot be immediately justified through single words, signs, and concepts. Then the metaphysics of presence must be dismantled (deconstructed) to find a solution to the problem of modernity.

Derrida's deconstruction was an attempt to undermine the ambitions of philosophical supermajority over public life. Thus, philosophy no longer appears as an emancipatory project that directs the public world. Because with the decomposition of philosophical truth is no longer a representation of the truth of the world out there. "Every thing is text and there is nothing beyond the text." Everything is text, philosophical reality is textual reality.²⁵ Derrida explains deconstruction with negation sentences. According to

him, deconstruction is not an analysis and not a criticism, not a method, not an action or an operation. In short, deconstruction is not a means of solving “an individual or collective subject who takes the initiative and applies it to a particular object, text, or theme”. Deconstruction is an event that does not wait for the consideration, consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even modernity.

Derrida adapted the word deconstruction from the word destruction in Heidegger's thought. The word deconstruction is not directly related to the word destruction but rather related to the word analysis which etymologically means “to delay”-synonymous with the word deconstruct. There are three important points in the deconstruction of Derrida, namely: first, deconstruction, just as change occurs constantly, and this happens in different ways to maintain life; second, deconstruction occurs from within living systems, including language and text; thirdly, deconstruction is not a word, tool, or technique used in a work after a fact and without a subject of interpretation.

For Derrida, changing reality means changing the text, and the text itself is the reality of human life. To change reality, one needs to first understand and describe reality. There is a deep connection between describing (to describe) and transform (to transform). Derrida's starting point is speech act theory which is widely developed in communication theory and linguistics. Before formulating his own thoughts originally, he delved a lot into the theory of speech action, especially as formulated by J.L. Austin. The book that became Derrida's main reference was “How to do Things with Words”, by Austin. According to Austin, every human speech action can be interpreted in two ways, namely constitutively, or performatively.

Thus Derrida not only described the intent of the texts he read exactly, but also turned them into texts that had a new meaning. The two concepts, namely description and transformation, can be combined into deconstruction. At first glance this concept of deconstruction seems strange and contradictory. How is it possible to read precisely while developing the meaning of the text by changing it? But that's what Derrida presumably did. According to the research of Nicholas Royle,²⁶ Derrida himself did not like the word very much. The concept also broke away from Derrida, and began to become an understanding, that is, an ism. Since that time the concept of deconstruction has continued to be the subject of debate among the disciplinary thinkers of science.

Royle even argues that we can understand Derrida's philosophy without using the concept of deconstruction at all. Indeed, it will be very difficult,

but that does not mean it is impossible. In philosophical dictionaries and English dictionaries, as cited by Royle, deconstruction is defined as an action to change the construction of an object. In the dictionary of philosophy, deconstruction is defined as an analytical strategy attributed to the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, which aims to open up previously unquestioned metaphysical suppositions, as well as open up internal contradictions within philosophy and theories of language.

In the context of Islamic thought, Derrida's method of deconstruction inspired many contemporary Arab thinkers. Among them was the Islamic thinker of Algerian origin, Muhammad Arkoun. Arkoun thought is a fusion of various types of scientific discourse developments that are loved in France such as Derrida (gramatological deconstruction),²⁷ Lacan (psychology),²⁸ Barthes (semiology),²⁹ Foucault (epistemology),³⁰ Saussure (linguistics), Levi Atrauss (anthropology), Politics (Voltaire), Existentialism (Nietzche and Sartre), Rationalism (Descartes), also the socio-historical archaeological sciences of the French Analle school. This can be seen from the many concepts of post-structuralism that he applied to the area of Islamic studies. Concepts such as corpus, episteme, discourse, deconstruction, myth, logocentrism, the unthinkable and thought-out, parole, aktant, and others.

What about al-Jābirī himself? Al-Jābirī's tendency to use deconstruction methods in understanding the Arab-Islamic tradition cannot be separated from its socio-historical context. Namely that the Arab deconstructionist thinkers mostly came from the Maghrib regions (Morocco, al-Jazair, Tunis and Libya). The French language elements of colonialism's legacy left over in these lands caused its academic circles to absorb French-language literature more, than other European languages. The intellectual attachment of maghribi Arab thinkers to France was not only limited to the language, they were also influenced by movements of contemporary French thought and philosophy, in particular the (post) movement of structuralism. Almost all Maghribi Muslim thinkers who are concerned about Islam and islam are adherents of structuralism. That's because the problem they face happens to be the same, namely the problem of reading tradition, both in the form of text and reality. And according to them, the most modern and most powerful method of reading traditions (*turāth*) is deconstruction.³¹

Al-Jābirī used the method of deconstruction to understand the Arab-Islamic tradition in relation to modernity. It offers approaches to objectivism (*mauḍū'iyah*) and rationality (*ma'qūliyah*). Objectivism means to make tradition more contextual with itself, and means to separate itself

from our present state. This process of separation must be carried out deconstructively³² in a methodological sense, that is, to free oneself from a priori assumptions against the traditions and desires of the present, by means of separating between the subject of study and the object under study. Meanwhile, what is meant by rationality is to make the tradition more contextual with our current conditions. This process is to reconstruct new thinking by connecting between the object and the subject of study. This process is carried out in order to obtain a holistic reading of the tradition.³³ According to al-Jābirī, to reread or modernize the Arab-Islamic *turāth* must be observed three things:³⁴

Dismantling and Deconstructing

Turāth must be dismantled with a sharp and harsh critique of existing and inherited reason that has precipitated especially in the practice of mechanical analogy. The way to deconstruct it is to decide on epistemology (*al-qaṭī'ah al-ibistimūlūjīyah*). This means that by abandoning the traditional understanding of tradition, that is, the way of understanding tradition is to remove the remnants of tradition that have taken root, especially the grammatically-juridical-theological analogous patterns, which are applied without responsibility, as well as in an unscientific way. This disconnection does not mean the termination of tradition in the general sense of language. This disconnection also does not occur at the level of knowledge an sich. He has nothing to do with the various theses that call for tradition in museums or imprison them in the distant and isolated history of the past. For the rejection of tradition is an unscientific and ahistorical attitude.³⁵

The idea for the termination of epistemology, as alluded to earlier, was actually taken from the thought of Bachelard, where in the case of Bachelard it was used in the history of science. Bachelard used this method to discuss historical problems in general and in particular when discussing the problems of human history initiated by Karl Marx.³⁶ But al-Jābirī tried to use this motto to examine the history of philosophy, especially Islamic Arabic philosophy.³⁷ The application of epistemological disconnection can go when there is a confirmation of mechanical relationships between various parts. The above pattern causes the breakdown of the cohesion of the whole part, as well as reducing the various parts of the whole with its entire historical-cognitive-ideological setting in order to shift some part of the whole of one to another whole, the part that belongs to the practitioner of the analogy, which causes a fusion (union between the subject and the object).³⁸

That fusion will lead to distortion of the object, or drowning the subject into the object unconsciously, and often in both at once. It is a fortiori when that union is applied to tradition, since it has consequences, that is, the total union of the subject into the object of tradition. This idea of a pattern of unification is different for subjects mixed with tradition; that is, the subject that tradition absorbs, while other subjects carry out the assimilation of tradition. Thus, the context of the termination of epistemology is not the termination of tradition, but only a certain pattern of relationship with tradition.

This disconnection is important to keep one from being a slave to tradition but precisely to become the ruler of tradition. This means the personality of tradition that forms a system with its own various components, which makes it possible for a person to be able to find his membership in the broader personality, that is, the personality in the community that has inherited that tradition. The problem that arises then is the management of the objectivity of the study itself. In solving that problem, al-Jābirī provides a solution in understanding the association of objectivity in two frameworks: first, the framework of the relationship of subject versus object, in which objectivity must include separation from object from subject; secondly, the framework of the relationship of the object versus the subject, in which objectivity must confirm the separation of the subject from its object.³⁹

The first separation is conditioned by the second separation. This is important, as most contemporary Arab readers have been restricted in tradition and subject to its presence. In the sense that tradition has absorbed, deprived of independence and freedom. Since its birth, a person has never stopped teaching traditions to his *protégés*, both forms of vocabulary as well as certain various concepts derived from language and thought; which are contained in the form of fables, legends, imaginary figures as well as in the form of certain patterns of relationships to each thing and a certain way of thinking; which is contained in various forms typical of knowledge and some specific truths.

Most readers accept all that without the slightest reaction or critical reasoning. From these various principles taught, a person understands everything, at the same time bases their opinions and observations on the basis of some of these principles. The practice of thinking in these various conditions is merely a game of remembrance, and merely evocative without any exploration.⁴⁰

To separate the subject from the tradition so that it can be objective, al-Jābirī tried to offer what has been done in modern linguistics.⁴¹ In

simple terms, this can be done in a way that the researcher must ignore the interpretation of the meaning of the text before he understands the material and its content. One must free from the biases that provide a vague understanding. One must position the text in parentheses to concentrate on one task, that is, to examine the significance of the meaning of the text in the text itself in a web of existing relationships with its various elements.⁴²

Positioning the text in such a way makes it possible to dismiss the “infinite pile of sheaves” by reducing the various vocabulary of Arabic in the reader’s view to a melodic language, some of which appear in a purely sensitive form, while part of which appears in sensation in the form of sensation and desire. In other words, in order to free oneself from the text, one must dissect it meticulously, making the text of the language an object of study for the subject.

While the second form is to separate the object from the subject. This is useful for regaining its independence, personality, identity as well as historicity. The process for going in that direction requires the right method. al-Jābirī offers it with three approaches (as previously reviewed).⁴³ First, the structuralist approach (*al-bunyawiyah*): meaning to examine the system of thought that the author of the text produces as a totality, which is directed by various constant unity, and can be enriched by some form of transformation, which is supported by the author’s thinking dwelling on the same axis. The author’s thinking should be focused on the main problems capable of accepting various forms of transformation as a place for the operation of the author’s thinking, so that the idea gains a natural place in its totality.

The Historical Approach (al-Tārikhī)

This approach seeks to link the author’s thinking to cultural, ideological, political, and social historicities. This approach is a form of inevitability. Because in addition to gaining a historical understanding of what is being studied, it is also useful for testing the validity of the structuralist model offered earlier. Third, the ideological approach (*al-idiyūlūjī*), this approach is a renewal of the ideological (socio-political) function that contains a thought, by way of filling or filling, in the cognitive field of which it is part. This approach is important, for it is the only way to make a classical thought modern in itself, while at the same time as associating that thought to one’s own world; (2) Implement a contingency system (associating the object of the text and the subject of the reader). Traditions or texts are products of history, formed by history and society. It is also the sum of the

roles and contributions of the individual. The moral or material pressures used by society have given birth to various burdens on the contributions of certain figures who have various new ideas and wrong aspirations. Society prevents figures from disclosing themselves openly and directly. Finally, it causes the authors to express a thought of being in the deepest region, in the language of metaphors, where it can only be understood by exceeding the boundaries of language and logic.⁴⁴

To enter this realm must be done through intuition that is able to create a readable self into the reader, and is able to create a readable self taking part in the reader's problematic and self-attention, while making the readable self interested in his various aspirations. This intuition is not like the intuition initiated by Henry Bregson⁴⁵ nor is it like the intuition of the phenomenological group, but a certain intuition, like mathematical intuition.⁴⁶ It is a direct and ecloratorical representation that reveals evidence, as well as provides a variety of anticipatory understandings, when there is a dialogue between the reader and the text, which is created based on objective data that arises from the first representation. This kind of intuition allows the reader to dig out the hidden meaning in the text. In this case, logic must be carried out for the purpose of discussion, in order to obtain various important conclusions resulting from various premises and propositions.

Elements of Vision and Principles of Text Reading.

In al-Jābirī's view, a method always begins with a vision. A method must look at the perspective of the vision that is its starting point, in order for it to be validly applied. Because vision is a representation of a methodical framework, as well as a device capable of defining in various perspectives. To read that al-Jābirī offers three aspects of the vision: first, the Vision of the unity of thought. There is something that needs to be realized that theoretical thinking in society at a certain time is a particular unity that is given its own protection and in it seems to be mixed with various movements and tendencies. That is, the whole is a very significant totality, not the components that are in it. With this kind of understanding, one can talk about Greek thought, for example, although there are various tendencies that make it up, or talk about Arab thought with its various schools.

What is meant by this unity of thought is not the ownership of the community for the author's system of thought (nation, religion, language and others), nor the identity of the topic being studie. Amun, what is meant by this unity of thought is the unity of the problems that exist in a

thought.⁴⁷ A problem is a network of relationships in a particular system of thought, which includes various problems and interacts with them in such a way, that at a theoretical level it is impossible to solve in isolation patterns. In other words, a problem is a theory whose various conditions of creation have not been brought together. And is a theory that is in the process of creation as well as a tendency towards the stability of thought.⁴⁸ For example, the issue of the "Arab revival". This system is the same unity, namely the issue of awakening.

So, what is being talked about is the problem of a resurrection not the problem of resurrection. The issue of revival that concerns Islamic thinkers is not a single problem, but a network of overlapping problems, and is impossible to solve by the path of isolation, even by analyzing the problems one by one without relating to others, such as poverty, illiteracy, education, language, women's status, disintegration, Turkish despotism and others.

When dealing with these issues, Arab thought in the period of the revival, was able to look at these issues globally. Because, when one of the several problems arises, it automatically raises another problem, at least related to some aspect of it. Because in a certain problem, nothing is more important than the function of this problem, as one of the elements of the problem. The unity of thought insofar as it is united in problems, would present itself in the same way at a certain periodic level, as a representation of the characteristics of the historical realm in which the work of all thinkers of that period was produced. Therefore, when reading the work of an author there arises the necessity to think about it as one part of the intellectual result, based on the certain historical periodic characteristics in which the work was born.

In addition, the problem of a particular system in general means exceeding the limits of its actual results while presenting the totality of the various mechanisms of thinking that are possible in thinking. The plurality of different views does not necessarily mean a plurality of problems. The heterogeneity of thinkers with the same problem, may be asking a variety of different questions, but the answers and solutions they offer to the questions that arise may be identical, the same, or even complementary. Or even vice versa, there is no answer, no idiosyncrasies, no coherence and others. Second, A vision of the historicity of thought. When a problem is not necessarily trapped within the limits of time and space, it means that it still accommodates various thoughts that have arisen backwards, but have not become stale. That way the problem is the relationship between thought and reality, as well as between thought and history.

The historical field is a system of thought that does not have to correspond to a certain period, that is, according to various dynastic successions, economic growth, wars and various other determinants that do not determine the evolution of this thought.⁴⁹ The relative independence of this thought encourages one to use various components that are inherent in the thinking itself, in order to be able to understand its historical field. The historical field is a system of thought defined by two fundamental criteria.⁵⁰ First, the cognitive aspect. That is the aspect that limits the motion of a thought.⁵¹ It is formed from homogeneous cognitive matter, that is, various conceptual devices that are homogeneous. Second, the ideological aspect. That is the aspect brought about by this thought, namely the ideological (socio-political) function in which an author even the thinkers of this thought tradition subordinate their cognitive material to the above ideological functions.

In order to be able to understand the form of the relationship of the above criteria and determine their interrelationship, al-Jābirī requires to understand fundamentally the theoretical problems of a cognitive nature as long as they are the result of the coexistence of various contradictions that exist in a particular cognitive field.⁵² Whereas the various ideological charges in which cognitive matter is used, are not the result of this type of various contradictions, but rather the type derived from various other contradictions. This type of various ideological conflicts it does not come from a cognitive device, but from the development of society in a certain level of evolution. Likewise, since the evolution of knowledge does not always follow in the footsteps of the development of society, the cognitive and ideological charges articulated by the same thinking are not required to always be in rhythm.

Third, a vision of Islamic Philosophy. The urgency of distinguishing between cognitive and ideological charges articulated by the same thinking comes only from methodological urgency. This according to al-Jābirī must be done, since it is the phenomenon that takes place in Islamic thought.⁵³ The creative activity of all Muslim philosophers revolves around a problem, commonly referred to as the problem of reconciliation of reason and revelation. This he proved when reading the problem of Mu'tazilah who brought up the problem of the creed of reason preceding the data transmitted through revelation. Then came Ibn Sinā who became the pinnacle of eastern philosophy as a spokesperson who always sought to bring the structure of Greek scientific thought into the religious structure of Islam, based on the belief that the term the first is a representation of the rational and scientific conception of man and the universe, while

the second term is a representation of absolute truth, as well as a cultural identity.

In al-Jābirī's view, one must distinguish ideological and cognitive content in Islamic philosophy. This is useful in order to be able to detect the forms of variation, dynamics and expansion of this thought, and then replace it in its context and various socio-historical commitments. Meanwhile, those who look at it in terms of cognitive content (scientific and metaphysical) only get some opinions and discourses that have been repeated and perhaps only choose the location of differences in the way the authors present the focus of study on certain themes, as well as in the degree of dexterity. This model of thought is actually not far from phenomenological thought which was later developed into hermeneutic thinking as constructed by Paul Ricoeur, only al-Jābirī did not recognize the thinking of socialist groups which means marxist.

Al-Jābirī's approach to deconstruction, departs from the context of one's own tradition in the sense of the Arab tradition. He gave an example by quoting a hadith of the Prophet which means: "Every new is heresy, every heresy is heresy, and every heresy goes to hell." In this case he saw the structure of its surface, at the strength of the language and the beauty of its language. For in his opinion how could a misdirection go to hell. But those who go to hell are perverted people. So the hadith above means that misguidance will bring the perpetrators into hell. The meaning he stated was a distance of discourse and also a psychological and cognitive distance. The distance is the sentence "bring the culprits".⁵⁴

If such differences are brought into the language of reality, it is conceivable that a person who is in an Arab village directs himself and leads to things he does not want, which are on the far other side (for hell is in the afterlife). So, there is a distance that psychologically makes the listener feel light when sentenced to him. Thus giving rise to a beautiful phrase to throw that distance into the position of misguidance itself into hell. This then impacts the listener who commits misguidedness with a feeling of full certainty that hell is related and closely intertwined with misguidedness. This aspect of the beauty of language has been raised by many scholars in the past, especially those found in the Quran. But in this case al-Jābirī tried to elevate the structural relationships that exist in the hadith, especially from its internal structure. According to him, the text can be formulated in the form of logic as follows: each (a) is (b); each (b) is (c) and each (c) is (d). thus logically it can be said that every (a) is (d). It's a logical and definite conclusion from logic. But if the conclusion is used, then someone will reject it. Because, it is absurd to say that every new

one goes into hell. The reason is that the premise is absurd and contrary to religion itself.⁵⁵

Conclusion

Arab reason, which is the thinking system of Arab-Islamic society in relation to modernity, has the problem of adaptation to answer the needs of the Arab-Islamic revival, especially since the second revival era began around 1967. Al-Jābirī believes that one of the causes was a non-dynamic thinking system. Therefore, one of the ways out of problems of an epistemological nature is that it must begin with the way of dismantling (or deconstructing) that thinking system by first doing a critique of that model of reason. The criticism includes three models of criticism: epistemological criticism, ideological criticism, and historical criticism. Al-Jābirī admits that he borrows the tradition of post-structuralist thinking and post-modernism that lived in the French philosophical tradition with focus on the problem of reading texts as underlying concepts for his three models of criticism. What makes his thought apart from western post-structuralists is that al-Jābirī represents the tradition of thought that lived in the western-Islamic hemisphere (*maghrib*) with the characteristic of Aristotelian thinking.

Al-Jābirī's Epistemological efforts by employing three main visions as deconstruction methods conclude that the Arab-Islamic thinking system have long been dependent to a belief that "the past" must constantly be a "judge" of "the present". The various contexts that gave birth to that belief have made the modern and contemporary arab-Islamic generations "failed" to understand and adapt to new and ongoing developments and changes. Thus, the presence of epistemic dismantling approaches is absolutely necessary in creating an order of thought that is compatible with time and space contexts without having to discard tradition as an identity that distinguishes it from systems of thought and civilizations other than Arab-Islamic.

Endnotes

1. Ibrahim Abu Rabi', "Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A Theoretical Perspective", *Islamic Studies* 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2005): 503-526.
2. Issa J. Boullata, *Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990).
3. Abdullah Saeed, "Trends In Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempt at a Classification", *The Muslim World* 97 (July 2007): 396.
4. Amin Abdullah, *Falsafah Kalam* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1995), 31.
5. Israel Gershoni, "Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought by Issa J. Boullata",

- Middle Eastern Studies* 28, no. 3 (Jul., 1992): 609-616.
6. Ibrahim Abu Rabi, "Toward a Critical Arab Reason: The Contributions of the Moroccan Philosopher Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri", *Islamic Studies* 42, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 63-95; Toha Abdurahman, *Tajdid fi Tawim al-Turath* (Beirut: al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-'Arabi, 1994), 34.
 7. In the context of al-Jabiri, epistemological criticism wants to invite to analyze the structure of thought (*bunyah al-'aql*) on the one hand, and conduct a search on the process of thought formation (*takwin al-'aql*) on the other.
 8. Al-Jabiri, *al-Khitab al-'Arabi al-Mu'asir* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasah al-Wihdah al-'Arabiyyah, 1992), 15.
 9. Within the framework of the Islamic sciences, according to Ahmad Baso, one of the important contributions of al-Jabiri is his introduction of reason in Islamic studies, regardless of whether the definition comes from Lalande, Levi-Strauss or Michel Foucault. See Ahmad Baso, "Posmodernism as a Critique of Islam: Methodological Contributions: The Critique of Reason" Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri' in Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri', *Post Islamic Traditionalism* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000), xxxi.
 10. If examined comparatively, the terms *al-'aql al-mukawwan* (al-Jabiri) and *la raison constituee* (Andre Lalande) are not much different from Michel Foucault's concept of episteme and Thomas Khun's paradigm. Episteme is the whole space of meaning and presuppositions that underlie life that allows knowledge to be born which contains things that can be thought and understood at a time. See, Michel Foucault, *The Order of Think: An Archeology of Human Science* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), xxii.
 11. Al-Jabiri, *Takwin al-'Aql al-'Arabi*, 15.
 12. Indeed, the definition of reason that al-Jabiri borrowed from Lalande was corrected by al-Jabiri's critic, George Tarabisī, who said that Lalande never formulated reason as "a collection of rules or laws (thinking) that a particular culture gives to its adherents." as a basis for acquiring knowledge. (See George Tarabisī, *Naẓariyyah al-'Aql: Naqd Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabi* (London: Dār al-Sāqī, 1996). However, if one refers to the spirit of post-structuralism discourse of which Lalande is a part, one can find the significance of al-Jabiri's explanation of the definition of reason.
 13. Ahmad Baso, "Posmodernisme sebagai Kritik Islam: Kontribusi Metodologis, xxx-xxxi.
 14. A. Luthfi Assyaukanie, "Tipologi dan Wacana Pemikiran Arab Kontemporer", 6.
 15. Al-Jabiri, *al-Turath wa-al-Ḥadāthah*, 9.
 16. Typically, post-structuralism thinking proclaims the death of the subject (the death of the subject), or better known as decentring the subject. In the Renaissance and Enlightenment thought that marked the birth of the modern century (16th century) and ended the Middle Ages, it emphasized the authority and freedom of the subject, individual, where society and culture were considered as products of choice and human agreement as the subject of the agent (agent) autonomous. It is the subject who constructs and creates reality. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was his spokesman. In the community and post-structuralism era, the subject is not a free agent, but an entity created by the power of history and culture. See, Mudji Sutrisno and Hendar Putranto (Ed.), *Teori-teori Kebudayaan* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2005), 165-166.
 17. With the terms used by this post-structuralism, the author equates it in general with turath. And more specifically with "Arabic Intellect" in the context of al-Jabiri's study.
 18. Nicholas Royle, *Jacques Derrida* (London: Routledge, 2003), 72.
 19. The concept of "epistemological cracks" was then used by Louis Althusser as an analytical tool to find the relationship between the thoughts of Karl Marx and Hegel. Until the 1840s, the ideas of Marx and Hegel were inseparable. Marx's thought at that time always moved under the shadow of Hegel's conceptions which hegemonized German ideology.

- However, after analyzing the economic system of capital, Karl Marx seems to break the conceptual ties with Hegel. *Das Kapital* becomes a master piece that can no longer be correlated with the previous books of Karl Marx. *Das Kapital* has transformed Marx into “the other”: the “new” Marx and the “epistemological beholder”. See, al-Jābirī, *al-Turāth wa-al-Ḥadāthab*, 327.
20. Bachelard’s view like that, later on—directly or indirectly—was followed by Thomas Khun with his ‘paradigm’ theory. In Khun’s view, the development of science does not run in a linear, homogeneous, and rational way. Rather, it develops through the scientific revolution by dismantling the old paradigm and replacing it with a new paradigm. What is considered correct in the old paradigm will experience a crisis until a new paradigm is established with new truths in it. See, Thomas S. Khun, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: The University of Chiago Press, 1970).
 21. Later, the idea of a scientific division between Mashriq and Maghrib by al-Jābirī was widely criticized as an extreme view by ignoring important data. The criticism came, among others, from George Ṭarābīshī, Yahyā Muhammad, and Ṭāha Abdurahman.
 22. Ahmad Baso equates al-Jābirī’s concept of “*shurūṭ al-ṣiḥḥah*” with Immanuel Kant’s “Criticism of Pure Intellect” and Levi-Strauss’ “Social Anthropology” project which examines “the possible conditions of human reasoning activity”. See, Ahmad Baso, “Methodological Contribution: Criticism of Reason”, xxxiii.
 23. The term deconstruction itself was originally used as a translation of the term used by Heidegger in one of his books *Being and Time* written in the 1972’s, namely *destruction*. Heidegger uses this term of *destruction* as an effort to disarm the building of thought that has been formed in such a way. *Destruction* here means *demolition* (a freeing-up) or *disarming* (a de-structuring). Even so, the term *destruction* is not interpreted by Heidegger as *total destruction* (obliteration) which leaves nothing left. This *destruction* that brought the spirit of dismantling and disarming then inspired Jacques Derrida to implement his *deconstruction* idea. In relation to understanding, *deconstruction* theory is related to the technique of reading texts (a reading technique). That is a technique that makes the text “fight with itself”, or a technique that seeks to reveal the phenomenon of meaning that is hidden behind the words, ideas or ideas contained in each text, but is covered by “pretense of meaning”. which appears literal and attached to the text. See, Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Oxford: Basil Blacwell, 1962).
 24. In the future, this method is often used by contemporary Islamic thinkers in reading Arabic-Islamic texts/traditions as will be discussed in this paper by presenting an example in the case of Muḥammad ‘Abid al-Jābirī’s thought.
 25. Abdul ‘Dubbnun’ Hakim, “Diskursus Filosofis Modernitas, Debat Jurgen Habermas dan Jacques Derrida” dalam, *Majalah Filsafat Diryakara*, XXV No. 2, (Jakarta: Seksi Publikasi Senat Mahasiswa, 2001), 63
 26. Nicholas Royle, *Jacques Derrida* (London & New York, Routledge, 2003), 24.
 27. The meaning of *deconstruction* in general is the subject’s act of dismantling an object composed of various elements that deserve to be dismantled. Jacques Derrida’s theory of *deconstruction* (1930-2004) actually emerged as a critique of the Saussurian theory (Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913)). Saussure formulated his theory through the existence of binary oppositions (2 opposite things) such as *langue-parole*, *speech-writing*, *presence-non-existence*, *pure-polluted*, in which the first is more dominant in nature, the second alias is superior, while the second tends to inferior so that it is as if the former has privileges while the latter is abused. Approximately, Derrida’s method of *deconstruction* aims, among other things, to show the unsuccessful attempts to present absolute truth and expose a hidden agenda that contains many weaknesses and lamenesses behind the texts. See, Christopher Norris, *Unpacking Jacques Derrida’s Theory of Deconstruction* (Jogjakarta: Ar-Ruzz Media, 2008), 68.

28. Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) was the most prominent French psychoanalyst. He developed psychoanalysis using ideas in anthropology and linguistic structuralism. He reinterpreted Freud using the theory of structuralism and poststructuralism. With his psychoanalytic theory, Lacan made many contributions to cultural studies and cultural criticism, such as the theory of mirror image, desire or the postulate "the unconscious is structured like language." One of the most pressing needs related to cultural studies, is the existence of a theory of subjectivity that can explain how cultural artifacts can affect humans. Some social scientists point to the great untapped potential of psychoanalysis, namely that it can provide such a theory of subjectivity. While having great potential in the critical use of Lacanian categories, psychoanalysis is seen as capable of liberating human beings from those things that prevent them from achieving satisfaction and well-being. Thus psychoanalysis is a theory that carries out the practice of transformation, and up to this point it can be equated with radical politics. See, Mark Bracher, *Jacques Lacan, Discourse, and Social Change: An Introduction to Psychoanalytic Cultural Criticism* (Yogyakarta: Jalasutra, 2009)
29. Roland Barthes (1915-1980) used the significant-signifié theory and came up with a theory of connotation. Barthes emphasizes his theory on myth and on certain cultural societies (not individuals). He argues that all things that are considered natural in a society are the result of a connotation process. It emphasizes marking. Barthes uses the terms expression (form, expression, for signifiant) and content (content, for significant). Theoretically, language as a system is static, for example, a green table means a green table. This is what he calls language as first order. However, language as a second order allows the word green table to carry the meaning of "trial". This second layer is called connotation.
30. Michael Foucault (1926-1984) is one of the postmodern figures. There are two important concepts in his works that are often used by contemporary Islamic thinkers in Islamic studies, namely 'archaeology' and 'geneology'. In fact the two concepts are difficult to separate, so that both are a complete series in Foucault's historical methodology. Foucault's archaeological idea is a response to the modernist literary idea which says that language is a source of thought in itself, not only as an instrument to express the ideas of its users. According to Foucault's idea is difficult to accept because there are always obstacles how people can know. These barriers are not only formal, namely grammar or logic, but also involve things that have been 'unthinkable' by consciousness for centuries. Archeology wants to uncover things -that 'unthinkable' thing, which had been placed in outside of our consciousness.
31. See, Yasmeen Samy Daifallah, *Political Subjectivity in Contemporary Arab Thought: The Political Theory of Abdullah Laroui, Hassan Hanafi, and Mohamed Abed al-Jabiri* (California: California University, 2012), 23.
32. The method of deconstruction can be referred to the thought of a postmodernist Jacques Derrida. The point is to question the orientation of achieving results and the systematic analysis of the principles of the method of knowledge. Derrida criticizes the traditional method which seeks to describe the object from a certain angle by removing the sides that are considered irrelevant for the purposes of a research on the object. On the other hand, deconstruction intends to approach the object from the position of the object itself, and not based on certain assumptions to determine how the object reveals itself. Derrida wants to blur the boundaries between the researcher and the object he is studying, even the reader and the text. The basic character of deconstruction is its attention to text, conceptual systems, and linguistics by continuously linking interiority and exteriority. The text cannot be completely external to the reader, in the process of understanding it is assumed that there is an internalization of self, to make the text his own. Thus the strategy of reading deconstruction does not seek to find a particular meaning or main idea of a text, but examines how the text gives birth to various meanings that may conflict with each other.
33. Al-Jābirī, *al-Turāth wa-al-Hadāthab* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wiḥdah al-‘Arabiyah,

- 1991), 5.
34. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 21.
 35. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 20.
 36. Ahmad Baso, “Kritik Nalar al-Jabiri: Sumber, Batas-batas, dan Manifestasi”, 5. And about epistemology of Bachelard see: K. Bertens, *Filsafat Barat Kontemporer Perancis* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2001), 166.
 37. Al-Jābirī, *al-Turāth wa-al-Ḥadāthah*, 262.
 38. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 21.
 39. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 22.
 40. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 22.
 41. This idea arose, because al-Jābirī saw a phenomenon that there is a relationship between Arabic text readers and Arabic itself, where Arabic is considered sacred so that it creates a habit when reading Arabic texts, people prefer reading language than reading text. In addition, the Arab reader feels overwhelmed by the present reality, so he looks for some guarantor in his own tradition, to be able to project his hopes and aspirations. Because he was wrong in dreaming of the present reality, he hoped to gain knowledge, rationality, and progress in the tradition. al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 22-23.
 42. This kind of process is a way of working that has been carried out by the phenomenology group, especially the one developed by Husserl. In the case of Husserl, this method is used to find a pure truth. Aholiab Watloly, *Responsibility for Knowledge* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2001), p. 93-95., FX. Mudji Sutrisno & F. Budi Hardiman (ed.), *The Philosophers that Determined the Movement of the Ages* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1992), 88-91.
 43. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 23-24.
 44. Many Islamic philosophers have stated about some policies that should not be disclosed to other audiences, for example Ibn Sinā, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd and others. If it is disclosed it will harm the person.
 45. For Bergson, intuition is able to lead humans to enter the inner depths of their lives. This intuition which he understands as instinct does not categorize reality. Bergson was greatly influenced by Darwin's theory of evolution. According to him, human actions are determined by the surrounding environment. Humans have instincts that have a strong drive to determine actions. This kind of character is something that is natural in life. It is these instincts that make humans capable of having the power to survive. For him, the intellect is only an instrument used to help improve life. Intuition has a special ability that is obtained from non-natural science. Intuition can only be obtained by detaching oneself from the demands of action, that is, by immersing oneself in spontaneous awareness. The absolute reality revealed by metaphysical intuition is that time never runs out. Reality is always changing because in human life there will always be freedom of creativity. And the changing reality can only be experienced intuitively and not fragmented. According to Bergson, evolution contains the Elan Vital process or life force. It is the Vital Elan that drives the evolutionary process towards order, the Vital Elan which is the fundamental cause of the creation of varied species and is also the basic principle of existence. Species variation exists, because there are bursts of vitality. Because the process of evolution itself is never linear. So at that time there were three main types of possible evolutionary lines, namely plants, insects, and humans. Man is the best and strongest product of evolution because he has vitalism. Henry Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, (New York: Mineola, 1998), 177.
 46. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 25.
 47. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 27.
 48. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 28.
 49. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 28.
 50. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 29.

51. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 29.
52. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 30.
53. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 31.
54. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 32.
55. Al-Jābirī, *Naḥnu wa-al-Turāth*, 28.

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