

Reflections on the Structural Base of the Early Islamic Thought

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Abstraksi: Agama bukan hanya sumber nilai yang memengaruhi gagasan dan perilaku penganutnya, melainkan juga berfungsi sebagai inspirasi dan transformasi nilai budaya dan politik yang diwarisi oleh generasi-generasi berikutnya. Tulisan ini membahas akar pemikiran sosial Islam sejak awal, ketika teks kitab suci telah menjadi wilayah 'publik' yang ditafsirkan oleh berbagai aliran teologi sebagai 'reaksi-aksi' terhadap arbitrase (taḥkīm) antara 'Alī b. Abū Ṭālib dan Mu'āwiyah. 'Reaksi-aksi' semula berkisar seputar seseorang itu 'Muslim' atau 'kāfir' meningkat menjadi persoalan politis dan tanpa disadari telah mengalami masa-masa inkubasi basis sosial pemikiran Islam hingga saat ini. Munculnya kelompok garis keras seperti Usamah bin Ladin yang mengatasnamakan Islam di masa modern ini bisa dilacak dari berbagai aliran teologi di masa-masa lalu.

Katakunci: Reaksi-Aksi-Reaksi, Aliran-aliran teologi, Pengaruh agama, Muslim-kafir

Abstract: Religion is not merely value-resources which influence its adherents' ideas and attitudes, but it respectively functions as an inspiration and transformation of cultural and political values that have been inherited by subsequent generations as well. This writing scrutinizes the root of Islamic social thoughts from the classical era, when the texts of the Holy Book have become 'public constitution,' in which the texts have been interpreted by countless theological school of thoughts in the form of 'reaction-action' towards arbitrage (taḥkīm) involving in between 'Alī b. Abū Ṭālib and Mu'āwiyah. This 'reaction-action' previously dealt with an issue of whether a person is a Muslim or kāfir, and later on, rose to reach the political questions—and it unconsciously has experienced the incubation epochs of social basis of Islamic thought until recent days. The emergence of hard-liner groups like Usamah bin Ladin, who fought on behalf of Islam, can be traced in this modern period from the immeasurable theological streams residing in the past phase.

Keywords: reaction-action-reaction, Theological trends, influence of religion, Muslim-pagan

Opening

The writing of Suryan A. Jambrah in this book traces the course of history on the emergence of the *kalām* (theology) issues and the birth of the variety of the Islamic school of thoughts.¹ Jambrah's main thesis follows exactly what has been proposed by Harun Nasution: the emergence of theological branches in Islam were initially driven by the political issue.² Subsequently, then, Amin Nurdin, Muhaimin, Ghufran Ihsan and

A. Ilyas Ismail elucidate the early Islamic theological thoughts and movements: al-Khawārij, al-Murji'a, al-Qadariyya and al-Jabariyya.³ These four theological thoughts of the early Islamic periods took place in a cyclical model: 'reaction-action-reaction.' The first, al-Khawārij, was a reaction to the Ṣiffīn War (July 657 AD), involving the 4th al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn Caliph 'Alī b. Abū Ṭālib and the Damascus Governor Mu'āwiyah

¹ Suryan A. Jambrah, "Sejarah Timbulnya Persoalan Kalam dan Lahirnya Berbagai Aliran dalam Dunia Islam", published in this book (*Ilmu Kalam II*), 1-9.

² Harun Nasution, *Islam Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya*, Second Volume (Jakarta: UI Press, 1986), 92.

³ M. Amin Nurdin, "Al-Khawarij: Ajaran Pokok, Sekte dan Ajarannya" (pp. 10-18), Muhaimin, "Al-Murji'ah: Ajaran Pokok, Sekte dan Ajarannya" (pp. 19-26), Ghufran Ihsan, "Al-Qadariah: Pemuka dan Ajarannya" (pp. 27-34), Ilyas Ismail, "Al-Jabariah: Pemuka dan Ajarannya" (pp. 35-44). All these writings are in this same book.

b. Abū Sufyān. In an attempt to end the war, both of these belligerent groups agreed to use *tahkīm* (arbitrage.) However, both the use of the *tahkīm* method and its results were regarded a violation of Islamic teachings—that prompted the birth of al-Khawārij thought. The crux of the thought was that both ‘Alī and Mu‘āwiya’s groups had deviated from Islam and thus they had no right to call themselves Muslims anymore, alias *kāfir* (infidel.) As a consequence, assassinating both of them was right and legal religiously.

This first radical Islamic thought elicited reaction from another group: al-Murji‘a. The basic idea of this second group is a neutralization effort of the Khawārij radicalism by proposing that no matter how deeply someone has fallen into ‘the great sin,’ once one has converted he/she remains a Muslim. This idea is interesting for it raises a fundamental question of whether the supporters of al-Murji‘a agreed with the Khawārij group that both ‘Alī and Mu‘āwiya had really implicated into ‘the great sin,’ although the two had not lost their Muslim status. What then we see on these two currents of thought is a ‘thesis and anti-thesis model’ which later on, by the birth of al-Qadariyya school of thought, seemingly found their convergence. This third current of thought proposed the that human being is totally independent from Allah’s intervention. The human being is responsible only to his/herself, for Allah just determines the principle guidelines by informing of the right and the wrong ways. For the human being is free to choose, it becomes clear that the issues of who has done right or wrong things are no longer being the burden of Allah. The one whose deeds are in according to Allah’s guide lines invariably receives the rewards he/she deserves. And punishment will automatically be applied on one who choose the wrong path. This thought that emphasizes a total independence from ‘the daily intervention’ of Allah had been viewed too radical by several

parties. As a result, emerged a fourth current of thought: Jabariyya. The chief thesis of this Jabariyya thought is that the human being has not even a whit power except being given by Allah. Accordingly, the human being not only possesses no right to stigmatize someone a *kāfir*, but also should not be responsible on what has been done for his/her right and wrong deeds are totally determined by Allah. Contrast to the Qadariyya point of view, this last thought adhered the radical fatalism.

It is this ‘reaction-action-reaction’ cycle that produced the four currents of thought that finally laid down the permanent foundation of the Islamic thoughts. For, at the end of the tunnel grew the Mu‘tazila—whose history is written in this book by Supriadi and further elaborated by Amani Burhanudin Lubis, Rasyidah and Afrizal⁴—and, what is called by Nurcholish Madjid, *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a*.⁵ Although it is undeniable that in its later development the Mu‘tazila was able to advance a structure of argument based on the ‘*aql* (ratio) in a much more sophisticated way, its early ideas derived from the ones previously formulated by the Qadariyya. Meanwhile, *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a*, mainly under the leadership of Abū Ḥasan al-Asy‘arī (d. 915 AD), had used the Mu‘tazila methods in formulating a new system of thought by heavily relying on the synthesis thoughts from Jabariyya and Qadariyya.⁶ It seems that these latter two systems of thought had been inspired by the traces of ideas left by the earlier Islamic thoughts.

⁴ Supriadi, “Sejarah Timbulnya Pemikiran Mu‘tazilah” (pp. 45-55), Amani Burhanuddin Lubis, “Pemuka-pemuka Penting al-Mu‘tazilah dan Pemikiran Masing-masing” (pp. 56-66), Rasyidah HA, “Al-Ushul al-Khamsah: Lima Ajaran Pokok Mu‘tazilah” (pp. 67-75) and Afrizal, “Mihna dan Perkembangan Mu‘tazilah” (pp. 76-87).

⁵ Nurcholish Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam”, in Nurcholish Madjid, (ed.), *Khazanah Intelektual Islam* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor dan Bulan Bintang, 1984), 27.

⁶ Nurcholish Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam”, 29.

It is worth noting here that by varied events within the same range of time, there had born a distinctive Islamic thought, Shī‘a (Shī‘ite), which is, in this book, studied by Maksum.⁷ However, for its position is too specific, I decide to let somebody else elaborate on this system of idea.

Religious Influence

What can be caught out of this ‘reaction-action-reaction’ cyclical nature of these Islamic thoughts? What we get is a repercussion of the religious influences over the mind and then shape the attitude system and the mental structure of the human beings. Here, it could be said that even up till today the religion having acted as an independent variable in formulating and shaping the perception and the thought of the human beings to treat the world around them. In order to get a better position on this issue let us go for a while to the cases where religious influences are expressed in day to day life of the ‘ordinary people’—i. e. those who have not specified themselves to elaborate the meaning of religion. In this context, we find a unique expression from a pop singer Yuni Sara in the event of “Zona Memori,” broadcasted by Metrotv, Sunday, June 5, 2011,

Tuhan memerintahkan saya untuk menjemput rezeki-rezeki mereka.
(God orders me to pick their rezeki [livelihood] up.)⁸

This remark which is influenced by religious spirit was automatically expressed, although Yuni Sara was wearing a minimal dress in front of the public: a black ‘you can see’ mode; her shoulder and thigh were shown demonstratively and, as she turned her back to the viewers, it was widely opened. Yet with this minimal dress, she referred to Allah in her artistic performance. In a sense that the contracts of the old song (*tembang lawas*) she currently got have been predestined

(*ditakdirkan*) by Allah and thus serve as the source of livelihood for her children—which, in her sentence above, were mentioned by ‘their livelihood.’ The same spontaneity was expressed by another artist Dorce Gamalama. In an “Insert” session of *Transtv*, she replied a question on whether she will meet her parents who had passed away,

Walau sejenak, Tuhan akan memertemukan saya dengan orang tua di akhirat kelak.
(Although within a very brief time, God certainly will organize the meeting between my parents and I in the next world.)⁹

The scene above shows how religious expressions are spontaneously pronounced from the mouths of ‘the cultural industry’ workers. In terms of definition, the ‘cultural industry’ is a culture which is created by the combined work of sophisticated communication technology and various kind of amusements which the people are greatly fond of beyond ethnic, religious and ideological boundaries. This kind of industry, therefore, is not only a new phenomenon but something mentioned by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Odorno as the “(b)reak down of culture and its degeneration into commerce.”¹⁰ In other words, this commercial base would automatically indicate a vivid structural distance between this world and the religious values. Yet, although markedly distant, the spontaneous religious expressions remain heard from the mouths of those artists. It is in this context we would be able to feel how deep is the religious spirit vested into human beings that Hanaa Ben Abdessalem and Hind Sahli—the two Aljeir and Moroccan fashion show models who have been parading over various stages in Europe as well as the United States of America—are also spontaneously state

⁹ “Insert” *Transtv*, 7.15 morning, Monday, June 6, 2011.

¹⁰ Armand Matterlard and Jean-Marie Piemme, “Cultural Industries: The Origin of an Idea”, in Unesco, *Cultural Industries: A Challenge for the Future of Culture* (Paris: Unesco, 1982), 52.

⁷ Maksum, “Syī‘ah Sab‘iyah: Konsep Imamah dan Ajaran Lainnya”, (*Ilmu Kalam III dan IV*), 3-14.

⁸ Metrotv, Sunday, June 5, 2011.

their *Muslima* (Muslim women) identity.¹¹ Having been destined to be Muslim, therefore, an assertive religious identity has become a taken for granted in nature, no matter what is your profession and from where you are. This scene, just adding another example, shown in the case of a clown Alfiansyah—familiarily known as ‘Koméng’—who had tried hard to convince his children on the meaning of *puasa* (fasting), as the obligation for every Muslim.¹² Acting as one of the actors within the world of cultural industries, Koméng did not lost his spontaneity in injecting the religious spirit into his children’s minds—by harnessing the coming of the 2011 *bulan puasa* (fasting month).

Although commenting on a different thing, the same spontaneity is also shown by my Facebook freind Airlangga Pribadi, when he writes a status,

Beberapa tahun lalu, salah satu dosen saya yang menjadi idola kawan-kawan aktivis pada era 1998 menegur saya, “Mas, apabila anda meneruskan perspektif anti neoliberal sebagai fokus studi anda, maka tidak ada yang menerima anda. Dunia berubah, kita harus kompromi!” Ndilalah, kersoning Allah, 3 tahun yang lalu saya bertemu profesor kiri yang menerima saya menjadi bimbingannya. Gusti Ora Saré.

(Several years ago, one of my lecturers who had been an idol of my activist freinds in the era of 1998 warned me, “Mas (brother), if you remain consistent with the anti-neoliberal views and you make them as your focus of study, no one will accept you. The world has changed, we must compromise!” Ndilalah, kersoning Allah (it had become God’s wish), three years ago I met a leftist professor who accepted me to be his student. Gusti Ora Saré (God does not sleep).¹³

Well informed and alert reader will be aware the emphases of the Airlangga’s Javanese phrases such as *ndilalah*, *kersoning Allah* (destiny and God’s wish) and *Gusti*

Ora Sare (God does not sleep) to demonstrate an excitement expression in a religious tone, although they are substantially driven by his acceptance to study under a ‘leftist professor.’ This quite specific expression reminds me of a well known British leftist historian Eric Hobsbawn. In an effort of commemorating 150 years Marxist pamphlet *Communist Manifesto* written by Marx and Engels in 1848, he writes a new introduction and marks it with a religiously typical term, “Whatever else it is, the *Communist Manifesto* as a political rhetoric has an almost *biblical* force.”¹⁴ We know that the spelling is a command for the communist-inspired proletarian class to fight against the capitalist one. And, for it is seen structurally as the cultural tool of the capitalism the religion has been regarded as an integral part of the old world. It therefore, together with capitalism, automatically should also be banished.¹⁵ However, Eric Hobsbawn unconsciously uses the religious nomenclature by referring the spelling as a Bible. Here, religious spontaneity is uniquely mixed with the anti-religious ideas. By the same gesture, the intention to chain the religion with the secular ones is expressed by Fahmi Arif Tsani in one of his Facebook statuses,

Jumat pertama di bulan Rajab. Biasanya khatib dalam khutbahnya berbicara tentang ‘Fadilah bulan Rajab.’ Juga Jumat pertama bulan Juni. Baiknya juga khatib menyampaikan tema ‘Islam, Pancasila dan Ukhuwah Kebangsaan.’ Jumu’ah mubārakah! (The first Jum’a [Friday] in Rajab [a month before the coming of the Ramaḍān.] Usually khāṭib [preacher] in his sermon talks about the ‘Faḍīla [the Prominent] of the Rajab.’ But it is also the first Jum’a of June. It is equally better for the khāṭib to explore a theme ‘Islam, Pancasila and National Unity.’ Jumu’a mubāraka! [The blessed Friday!])¹⁶

Jumu’a mubāraka (the blessed Friday) is

¹¹ Robin Givhan, “The New Faces of Islam”, *Newsweek*, 26 November, 2011, 44-7.

¹² Indah Setiawati, “Jiking Around with Koméng”, *The Jakarta Post*, September 11, 2011.

¹³ Airlangga Pribadi’s status, 16.00 p.m., Saturday, July 30, 2011.

¹⁴ Eric Hobsbawn, “Introduction”, in Karl Marx and Frederic Engles, *The Communist Manifesto* (London and New York: Verso, 1998), 15. Emphasis is added.

¹⁵ Marx and Engels, *Manifesto Communist*, 59.

¹⁶ Fahmi Arif Tsani’s Facebook status, 9. 25 a.m., Friday, June 3, 2011.

a stressed expression that the day is regarded a sacred one. But at the same time, July 1st is also the birth of the state ideology, Pancasila, the phrase of the *Jumu'a mubāraka* is also a spritual power projected by Fahmi Tsani in injecting the religious spirit on this historical and political event. These religious influences permeate also into others ordinary people. Between 1 to 3 p.m., July 18, 2011, there was a swindle action. A person (you could call him Mr. X) claimed himself as an official of the Bank BRI, visited an empty house at Pondok Bambu, an outskirt *kampung* (settlement) in East Jakarta. To the lady who owned of the house, in a convincingly gesture, Mr. X said that he wanted to rent her house because it was needed by his office. Feeling that she would immediately obtain a significant amount of money, the lady hastily agreed to the renting price of the house offered by Mr. X: Rp. 28,000,000 for two years. Before he left, Mr. X asked for the house to be cleaned on the pretext that within several hours it will be packed full with furnitures bought by his office. The shone lady acted rapidly. She asked for the help of a woman vegetable hawker Sudadi, who is called Yu Dadi¹⁷ by her freinds, assited by another the lady's neighboring woman, to do the job. Had the job accomplished, each of these women would have recieved Rp. 100,000. By the calculation that the gratuity for such a 'trivial' job is quite significant, both of them shared the lady's excitement accordingly. This also prompted a husband of one of these women to reveal his joy by chanting a Javanese poetry,

Wong cilik gawéyané iplik/duwité sithik/mangané gogik/linggih dingklik/oklak-aklik.

(The little people are inevitably burdened more jobs/recieve a meagre reward/and are thus able only

to consume gogik (rice mixed with cassava)/sitting on a rotten and crippled bench/that is susceptible to collapse.)

However, when everything had been made ready and the carpet had been laid down in the house, Mr. X did not show up at the stated time. This made the lady gloomy. After having waited for two hours, Yu Dadi tried to solace her, "It is O.K. madam. At least your house is cleaned already." But the madam, who remained unhappy, said to Yu Dadi, "How could it be O.K.? I have given Mr. X Rp. 2000,000." To the surprise of Yu Dadi, Mr. X had asked the lady to lend him such amount of money to pay for a truck to transport the furnitures to the house. The pretext was that, due to bureaucratic red tape, it needed a bit longer time for its disbursement from his office. It is this cheat that made her unhappiness linger.

As a religious person, however, she surrendered everything to God. In a sense that the loss the lady had suffered had something to do spritually—that pushed her to make self-intropection. To Yu Dadi, she said,

Yu, néng opo yo Yu Gusti Allah maringi coban koyo ngéné?

(What is the purpose of God giving me this kind of temptation?)¹⁸

In the end of 1980s up till 2005, an old woman from Wonogiri, Central Java, had worked as the masseuse, a profession in much needed by the tired-prone of the Jakartan families. For her age had been more 70, she was called *Mbah Pijit* (lit. Grandma Masseuse) by the customers. Since her youth age, she had experienced a unique thing. Barely at eleven years old, she was married to a much older man. But not long after, her husband drowned in a village river that toke his life. When the Japanese begun to occupy Indonesia in 1942, she married a man who, fortunately, later on was elected the head of

¹⁷ Sudadi, traditionally is a male name in Javanese culture. For her immediate brother had been 20 year old when she was born, her birth was an unexpected event. It is the reason why she was named Sudadi, meaning once started it ourightly worked (*sekali jadi*). The customers call her *Yu* (originally *ayu*: beautiful woman) Dadi. Personal conversation in Jakarta, October 10, 2011.

¹⁸ This story was told by Yu Dadi to Siti Nurrahmah in Jakarta, July 18, 2011.

her village. With her husband being in this position, she and her family faced no problem economically. However, exactly when the family members had increased in number, her husband died. This incident brought economic consequences. For, while she must surrender the *tanah bêngkok* (appanage land)—over which she hitherto had relied on the substantial income—to her husband's successor, the over growing number of family members was precisely needed larger spending. This made her life a strain, chiefly because of the structural necessity to fulfill the modern demands: a sine qua non of educating her children. Although all of her possessions had been sold, in fact she continued to suffer inadequate earning, even just to pay for her children's tuitions. It is for this reason this Central Javanese old woman challenged the city of Jakarta by acting as a family masseuse.

One day, Mbah Pijit told one of her customers that one of her grandsons had built a *muşallā* (a small building for daily religious service) on her own site of land. Despite confessing that previously she never prayed regularly, the newly established *muşallā* had encouraged her spiritually. To her neighbors, Mbak Pijit appeals,

Monggo. Ayo 'do salat. Benno mung rubuh-rubuh gêdang.

(Let us pray together. Although simply being rubuh-rubuh gêdang¹⁹ [following the leader of the prayer.])

This story shows how the religion has greeted an old woman at—for Mbah Pijit age was approaching 80 years—the end part of her life. Her welcoming attitude toward this religious greeting demonstrates that she now possessed a spiritual firmness which serves as the provision in pursuing the afterlife. But, functionally, the very religion penetrates also into the death affairs. In this context, the religion offers a 'hope' in a critical episode when somebody or a group of people are

suffering after the death of the beloved ones. On July 26, 2011, I was invited to speak in the seminar "Pesantren Sebagai Pusat Peradaban Muslim" (Pesantren as the Center of Indonesian Muslim Civilization), organized by Badan Litbang Kementerian Agama (the Research and Development Bureau of the Ministry for Religious Affairs.) My job in the seminar was to elucidate the different nature between the intellectual and the '*ulamā*' (the people who has great and deep knowledge in the religious teachings.) After the event was over, a woman approached me and handed over a piece of paper. Its content is as follows,

Saya Mbak Faiqoh, keponakan K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, Kajen, Pati, menyampaikan bahwa suami saya Ahmad Susilo, teman Pak Fachry waktu di Ciputat, telah wafat tanggal 17 Juni 2011. Mohon doa dan maghfirah-nya, serta fi jannah al-na'īm.

Panitia di Kementerian Agama, Mbak Faiqoh. (I am Mbak [lit. older sister in Javanese] Faiqoh—a nephew of K.H. [Kiai Haji: venerated Islamic scholar and had performed pilgrimage into Mecca] Sahal Mahfudz—would like to inform you that my husband Ahmad Susilo, a friend of Mr. Fachry while in Ciputat, had passed away on 17 June, 2011. Please pray for him and maghfira (forgiveness) (sic), and fi janna al-na'īm (in the paradise of Na'īm) (sic.)

Member of Committee of Religious Affairs Ministry, Mbak Faiqoh.²⁰

Maghfira (forgiveness) and *fi janna al-na'īm* (in the paradise of Na'īm) used by Mbak Faiqoh in her notes are the religious concepts. Although the method of using both of the concepts aimed at delivering news is unconjugated in nature, it expresses a spiritual hope in order to that her late husband would religiously be treated well in the hereafter. In other words, the two religious-derived concepts above have become the means for the still living wife of seeking spiritual salvation for her deceased husband. The same religious-based symbolic treatment on the death affairs is also witnessed in the

¹⁹ *Rubuh-rubuh gêdang* literally is the fallen of banana trees in a collective and natural manner.

²⁰ Permission to quote this piece was received from Mbak Faiqoh's short message system (sms) at 3 a.m., 21 September, 2011.

aftermath of a skirmish involving some Maros district of South Celebes residents in early May, 2011, that claimed the toll of a police officer's life. A motorist drove his motorbike at an intolerable speed which had prompted the unfortunate police officer to stop it. Without a clear reason, however, the motorist, who brought with him a sharp weapon, suddenly stabbed the law enforcement officer until he died. Through television news, I watched this police's remains being wrapped in a piece of green cloth marked by Arabic writing, *Lā ilāha illā Allah* (No god except Allah.)²¹ We know, the green color is one of the Islamic symbol. In symbolic perspective, by blanketing the remains with such a sacred sentence of the *Lā ilāha illā Allah*, the family and the local religious officers are not only stressing the cultural-religious identity of the remains, but also providing a 'spiritual tunnel,' through which the police officer's soul is believed would be able to step toward a 'safe place.' The transitoriness and the uncertainty during life have pushed human beings, says Armstrong, "(t)o give their fragile mortal activity an infusion of divine strenght."²²

All of these scenes marking the work of popular religiosity, to quote Goitein,²³ and all at once, quoting Wach, characterizing the existence of the expression of religious experience.²⁴ Here, the religion has become a human vehicle in dealing with the world of reality and in facing the unpredictabilities during life, although—to quote Armstrong again—all of these are seemingly the 'ineffable experience.'²⁵ Religion, therefore,

has become a relying factor and giving explanation on the ineffable things. It is its relying factor function that makes almost all religious ideas become easy to institutionalize and internalize into the mental structure of human beings which finally helps them to make self-externalization—an effort of expressing them selves physically and intellectually within the world.

The question is that: why the institutionalization and internalization of these religious ideas have become so penetrative into the mental structure of human beings?

In his effort to explain the cultural roots of nationalism, Benedict Anderson sees the distinctive position of religions in accompanying and, above all, protecting the human beings. While it is true that the emergence of modern ideologies, mainly Marxism and Liberalism —ideas he dubs as 'evolutionary/progressive style of thought—have been able to command the collective action of human beings, these ideas nevertheless are unable or do not want to get involved in seeking the answers to the basic questions on the death, destiny and the continuity. "Again," Benedict Anderson writes, "the disadvantage of evolutionary/ progressive thought is an almost Heraclitean hostility to any idea of continuity."²⁶ The modernization process produced by the Enlightenment Age has brought its own mystery, what he calls 'modern-darkness,' where the uncertainty of the future dominating the structure of life. It is in dealing with this problem, the position of religions remain relevant and functional,

The great merit of traditional world views (which naturally must be distinguished from their role in the legitimation of specific system of domination and exploitation) has been their concern with man-in-the cosmos, man as species beings, and the contingency of life. The extraordinary survival over thousands of years of Buddhism, Christianity or

²¹ Metrotv news, 7.50 p.m., Monday, May 9, 2011.

²² Karen Armstrong, *The Great Transformation: The Begining of Our Religious Tradition* (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), xx.

²³ S. D. Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 23. Examine footnote no. 1.

²⁴ Joachim Wach, *Sociology of Religion* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 19-26.

²⁵ Karen Armstrong, *The Great Transformation*, p.

xvii.

²⁶ Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 19.

Islam in dozens of different social formation attest to their imaginative response to the overwhelming burden of human suffering—deases, mutilation, grief, age and death.²⁷

It is the basic reason why, although being able to explain the fundamental issues of economy and politics, these modern ideologies, up till this seconds, remain powerless in erasing the influence of religions in the life of human beings. As plainly seen, at least this phenomenon of religious influences is vividly demonstrated within various Islamic-inspired activities in the public sphere in a much more expressive way.²⁸

The Influence of Islam

However, if we go back to the formulation of Islamic thought being discussed in this book, what kind of influence has exactly been taken form? This question is desperately relevant owing the first reaction over the political turmoil that giving the birth of the Khawārij thought of movement in 657 AD occured simply less than three decades after the Prophet Muḥammad passing away in 632 AD. And because the birth of the Khawārij was exactly at the end period of al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn (532-661 AD), so it is certain that the structure of the social, political and economic as well as spritual orders had markedly developed. In the religious context, the presence of Allah and the Prophet Muḥammad had deeply rooted in the collective consciousness of the society. Allah, in this sense, other than believed as the cult center Being, is also deemed as the Supreme Power in determining everything. On the other hand, the Prophet Muḥammad,

in addition to acting as a prophet, is an exemplary model for all Muslim behavior. The combined presence of both Allah and the Prophet Muḥammad, therefore, *theoretically*, had created a new center of loyalty—replacing the old loyalty over family and clan. This new center of loyalty is so binding that it totally broke the previous chain-like strength family bond. This evidence by the readiness of Abū Ubayda al-Jarra to kill his own still *kāfir* (infidel) father in the Badar War. Al-Jarra's killing even was devinely endorsed, as stated by *Sūra* (Chapter) al-Mā'ida of the Qur'ān/58: 22.²⁹

Between Allah and the Prophet Muḥammad, exists al-Qur'ān. In its relational structure, via the Prophet Muḥammad, al-Qur'ān serves as a medium between Allah and human kind. Functionally, al-Qur'ān is not only a Sacred Book, but also an absolute source of law. By these three pillars, i. e. Allah, the Prophet Muḥammad and al-Qur'ān, the bases of spritual structure for the formation of a new society had been created.³⁰

From a non-religious perspective, the influence of Islamic military and politics had been so expansive that it extended beyond the Arabic Peninsula. It can be gauged that in the collective consciousness of the chief Arabian tribes who had converted into Islam, this impressive growth and development of the Islamic military and political strength were definitively an unpresedented event and thus became a watershed in nature—where the old and the recent history had diametrically separated. Being endorsed by the steady religious order mentioned above, this extrordinary phenomenon is framed by Goitein in the religious-based political entity perspective,

²⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 18.

²⁸ See Sukron Kamil, Irfan Abubakar, Sri Hidayati, Muchtadlirin, Amelia Fauzia, Ridwan al-Makassary, Rita Pranawati dan Sholahuddin A. Aziz, *Islamisasi Ruang Publik: Identitas Muslim dan Negosiasi Demokrasi di Indonesia* (Ciputat: CSRC-UIN and KAS, 2010).

²⁹ Dr. Muhammad Chirzin, *Buku Pintar Asbabun Nuzul: Mengerti Peristiwa dan Pesan Moral di Balik Ayat-ayat Suci al-Qur'an* (Jakarta: Zaman, 2011), 94-5.

³⁰ Roy P. Mohattadeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in An Early Islamic Society* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publisher, 2001), 8-9.

It had been often said that Muḥammad created the Arab nation, that by his prophetic leadership he transformed a motley group of unruly and mutually hostile tribes into a cohesive and orderly community. In this respect Muḥammad and the Arabs have been compared to Moses and the ancient of the Israelites. "On this very day," says Moses, in the Book of Deuteronomy, to the children of Israel "you have become a people to the Lord, your God." In other words, through the revelation separate tribes were converted into a spritual and, in due course, a political unit.³¹

Abdul Aziz interpretes this formation of 'the Arab nation' and 'the religious-based political unity' is a precursor, or, sructurally led to the birth of new political institution what he calls as *chiefdom*. Although he does not formulate its standard definition, by refering to the institutionalized leadership model of Elman R. Service, Abdul Aziz emphasizes that the chiefdom is a manifestation of the institutionalization of a new political authority in the post egalitarian social relations such as seen in the tribal societies. Within or in the development of this chiefdom authority there had developed a nascent hierachical leadership functioned "for the distribution of job, goods and services."³² In other words, Abdul Aziz wants to stress that during the leadership of the Prophet Muḥammad in Madīna (622-632 AD), the Arab social organization had no longer based on the egalitarian 'tribal republic.' Instead, although it had not yet achieved the stage of a fullfledged state, it had changed to be a hierarchical organization, marked by a simple division of labor. Here, according to Abdul Aziz, the Prophet Muḥammad served as the leader of the chiefdom, notably in the aftermath, or because of the results, of the 620s *Mīthāk al-Madīna* (the Medina Charter.)

It is through the establishment of this chiefdom-like government rapid and large

political and social transformations occured. Holding the authority of religion, the Prophet Muḥammad concentrated the leadership and power into his hands and accordingly, it pushed progressively the liquidation of the influence of *al-'aṣabiyya al-qabaliyya*, namely a collective loyalty based on membership of a tribe. At the same time, through the religious stipulations, the 'individual autonomy' was introduced—chiefly related to personal responsibility in the afterlife on what one has done during their life. In this respect, Abdul Aziz writes,

Muḥammad saw menerapkan berbagai peraturan baru yang bersumber dari ajaran-ajaran Islam, yang membatasi wewenang kabilah dalam mengatur anggotanya maupun dalam berhubungan dengan kabilah lain. Meskipun tiap individu memunyai kemerdekaan dalam rangka hubungan kekabilahan sebagaimana orang Arab sebelum Islam, agama Islam mengalihkan kemerdekaan individu itu ke dalam lingkup tanggungjawab sendiri.

(Muḥammad ṣallā Allah 'alayh wa sallama (SAW: peace be upon him) set new regulations based on Islamic teachings, which limited the authority of the tribes in regulating its members or in relation to other tribes. Although each of them was independent within one's own tribe as practiced in the pre-Islamis era, the religion of Islam shifted this individual freedom into the scope of individual responsibility.)³³

The stressing of this 'individual autonomy' had been viewed by Goitein as the evidence of the Islamic universalism,

Muḥammad, at the begining of his prophetic vocation, certainly regarding himself as sent to 'his next kin,' to the city of Mecca and those around it. However he did not approach them as a tribe, he did not preach to them as a people. From the outset he addresses 'man,' the individual 'soul,' and never tires to emphasize that neither a brother nor father and mother or wife and children are able to do a thing for a man when he stands before his eternal Judge.³⁴

Here, we see the occurence of a deep social and political reorganization in the Arabian Peninsula during the discussed

³¹ Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History*, 5.

³² Dr. Abdul Aziz, MA, *Chiefdom Madinah: Salah Paham Negara Islam* (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet dan Lembaga Pengkajian Islam dan Perdamaian, 2011), 24.

³³ Dr. Abdul Aziz, MA, *Chiefdom Madinah*, 227.

³⁴ Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History*, 12.

periods which eventually rebounded back into collective consciousness of the Islamic society. *First*, serving as its spritual base, the introduction of the ‘individual autonomy’ had been related to the rise of personal responsibility on the whole of one’s worldly deeds in the hereafter. The implementation of this concept had weakened the collective loyalty and socio-cultural relations within the structure of tribes. *Second*, as an alternative, it had roused a new societal fabric in the form of chiefdom, where upon a rudimentary hierarchical structure begun to perform. Being based on Islamic teachings as the principle faith, this frame of the chiefdom authority had facilitated two decisive things: the emergence a more complex power fabric in the post of the Prophet Muḥammad (the era of al-Khulafā’ al-Rāshidūn) and the well organized with expansive capability of the military forces. *Third*, the consequences of the Khulafā’ al-Rāshidīn military expansion had not only changed the Arabian political geography and its surroundings, but also had crystalized in a much stronger and expansive way the institutionalization of ‘warfare culture’ that took place at a surprising rate. To gauge how deep ‘the warfare culture’ had become entrenched, we can just simply examine the legislation of war-related regulations. These regulations provided an insurence for the men who died in the battle field, that their widows as well as their orphans had the rights to be treated well.³⁵ The legislation of the legal rights of these war-induced widows and a special treatment for their orphans, therefore, was a direct response toward the prevailing of the institutionalized ‘warfare culture.’

Internally, the structural roots of this ‘warfare culture’ embedded in the conviction of the truth of Islam, that whoever totally devotes oneself in the interest of God certainly will—as stated by al-Qur’ān—

³⁵ David Pearl, *A Text Book on Muslim Personal Law*, 2nd Edition (London, Sydney, Wolfboro and New Hampshire, 1987), 2.

obtain unimaginable rewads in the hereafter,

You will never find a group of people who believe in Allah and the hereafter make freindship relations with whom hostile to Allah and His Messenger, although they are your fathers, children and siblings or your own relatives. The confirmed believers are the ones whose in their hearts written with a faith and strengthened by the spirit from Allah. And He will include them into heaven, a place wherein running various rivers and they will live there forever.³⁶

Externally, the very roots of the ‘warfare culture’ was vested in the indifferent attitude of the Middle Eastearn peoples to the intermittently changeable dominant power over them. This evidence in the Horaini’s paragraph below,

To most of them it did not much matter whether they were ruled by Iranians, Greeks or Arabs. Government impinged for the most part of the life of cities and their immediate hinterlands; apart from officials and classes whose interests with theirs, and apart from the hierarchies of some religious communities, city-dwellers might not care much who ruled them, provided they were secure, at peace and reasonably taxes.³⁷

This indifferent attitude of the ordinary people toward whoever ruled them had caused the higher capacity for military mobilization to become the dominant power culture in that time. And this surely needed a specific social structure. In this context, the core of this social structure with a perfect skill in military mobilization was—following an eloquent Fuad Jabali’s description—the *ṣaḥāba*-based society.³⁸ Namely, a post the Prophet Muḥammad Arabian society whose survivality was heavily relied on the integrity, distribution and the strategic role

³⁶ Al-Qur’an, Surah al-Majadilah (58): 22. See also Muhammad Chirzin, *Buku Pintar Asbabun Nuzul*, p. 94.

³⁷ Albert horaini, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, Massachussetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), 23.

³⁸ Fu’ad Jabali, *Sahabat Nabi: Siapa, ke Mana, dan Bagaimana?* (Bandung: Mizan, 2011). I want to express my gratitude to Professor Ahmad Suhelmi who has directed me to this work.

of the *ṣaḥābas* in securing the achievements of military expansion. Before going further, the *ṣaḥābas* were the Prophet Muḥammad's companions who concertedly had struggled for the glory of Islam in its early epoch. Being holding the core role, the progressive development of this society was strengthened by the *ṣaḥābas* migration to various Middle Eastern areas which automatically meant also the distribution of the talented war commanders. As a result, the distribution of these talented and dauntless commanders had naturally formed a wide ranging network that—despite marked too by internal conflicting relations—facilitated a continued growth of the military coalition at, judged from that time, an unimaginable scale. The result was the establishment of a resilience and strong military corp which perfectly functioned as the spearhead of the Islamic geographic expansion. In the geopolitics and geostrategy perspectives of the periods, the nations who were able to maintain their dominance militarily were those who possessed the steady institutionalized 'warfare culture.' It was exactly what possessed by the Islamic society that pushes Kennedy to see the expansive Islamic military capability as an '(e)xtordinary revolution in the affairs of men.'³⁹

In my point of view, it is within the prevailing concept of 'individual autonomy,' coupled by the preserved 'warfare culture' in its social structure, that had become the genuine socio-cultural setting upon which the Khawārij, the first Islamic system of thought, was born.

By examining its core doctrine that providing the right to answer the question "Who is being the *kāfir* and deserting Islam?,"⁴⁰ it would be easy to detect that

the influence of the concept of 'individual autonomy'—previously introduced by the Prophet Muḥammad—had already worked within their frame of thought. That the supporters of the Khawārij claimed the right of stamping the *kāfir* status upon anybody. As a consequence, it could be generally applied to any person as long as in line with their perceived standard.

As has been mentioned in the earlier part of this writing, the *kāfir* concept introduced by the supporters of al-Khawārij was triggered by the *taḥkīm* (arbitrage) affair between 'Alī b. Abū Ṭālib (the 4th al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn caliph) and Mu'āwiya b. Abū Sufyān (the governor of Damascus, Syria) in an effort to settle their military conflict. The supporters of al-Khawārij accused such a *taḥkīm* method of violating the Qur'ān-based laws. Up to this point, we find an interesting phenomenon. By claiming that the *taḥkīm* method had violated the Qur'ānic laws, the Khawārij supporters had essentially made an 'impersonalization' of al-Qur'ān. In a sense that although the whole ideas, news and information as well as guiding principles that fall within the Qur'ān are reproduced directly through the Prophet Muḥammad, the Book—in the logic of the Khawārij supporters—is not a private property owned by the Prophet and his family.⁴¹ Instead, a 'public consitution' that gives the rights for every Muslim to interpret it in accordance to his/her perspectives. It is in this context, by referring to Sūra al-Māida that states "*Wa man lam yaḥkum bimā anzala Allah fa'ulā'ika hum al-kāfirūn*" (those who based their laws not on Allah, they are belonging to the infidel ones), the Khawārij group emphatically stated *lā ḥukma illā*

1986), 12.

⁴¹ It worth noting that on his Facebook status, Mohammad Nasih writes: "Provide that the intellectual property rights is applied to the reprinting of the al-ān, Muhammad's family will be the world richest one. However, the al-Qur'ān is a science originated from Allah which is freely taught. (4 p.m., Saturday, October 29, 2011.

³⁹ Hugh Kennedy, *The Great Arab Conquest: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), 1.

⁴⁰ Harun Nasution, *Teologi Islam: Aliran-aliran, Sejarah dan Analisa Perbandingan* (Jakarta: UI-Press,

Allah (no laws except from Allah.) With this slogan, they had built a thick wall to protect Allah and the Qur'ān from the possibilities of being manipulated, even by the Prophet's family members themselves.

It is in this perspective they set a typical view on the existence of the *tahkīm*, the affair of which had become the reason for the birth of the Khawārij doctrine. Although, judging from that time, the *tahkīm* was an innovative methodology in resolving physical conflict, al-Khawārij supporters insisted that, from the Qur'ānic point of view, it was a baseless one. It is the reason why they tended to conclude that the participants of the *tahkīm* had deserted Islam and thus had disgraced themselves into the *kāfir* status. Here, we not only see that al-Khawārij had formulated their theological standing taken from the warfare background, but also projecting the ideas of 'individual autonomy' precisely through the introduction of the *kāfir* concept. For, in addition to Mu'āwiya and his accomplices, the same stigma was also put on the shoulder of 'Alī b. Abū Ṭālib. The fact that 'Alī is a nephew-cum-son-in law of the Prophet Muḥammad and had been a gallant Islamic fighter—well before the Khawārij supporters converted into this religion—had not been taken into account. It means that 'Alī, in the perspective of the Khawārij theological point of view, was simply a person and thus—regardless his kinship relations with the Prophet Muḥammad—should take personal responsibility over his own 'infidelship' (*kekafiran*) status.

The background of applying the *kāfir* concept was, as has been mentioned earlier, the prevailing of the 'warfare culture.' The only method of solving the problem, therefore, was also the violent path. Accordingly, it has become a religious obligation to wage war against whoever regarded *kāfir* or *murtadd* (apostate.) Curiously, however, this theological standing went hand in hand with their democratic-like point of view on the

affairs of leadership election. In this context, the Khawārij tended to stress that a leader must be elected democratically and, above all, he is not necessary to come from the Quraysh tribe or the Arab ones. An '*ajam* (non-Arab) had also the right to be elected. Nevertheless, all of the precedures and the leader quality should meet with the Khawārij's perceived theological standard. Any violation of this, as stated by Amin Nurdin, will face a severe consequence, "his blood is *ḥalāl* (permissible) to be spilt over."⁴² The 'warfare culture' that overrode other cultural systems at the time had steered the whole methods of solving the social relations through the way of violence.

Here I have no courage to speculate of whether the idea of violence the Khawārij projected had confused the geographical order of 'the Islamic war ethics.' To some extent, as found in the course of history, the first al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn caliph Abū Bakr had tried to define an 'Islamic war ethics.' That the effort of waging a war is restrictedly focused against the enemy military forces. Beyond this limit is, theoretically, an invalid war accordingly. Hence, when he sent a troop to Syria in 634 AD, Caliph Abū Bakr forbade not only unauthorized killings, but also emphatically expressed his intolerant attitude towards the destruction of non-human creatures, "(i)njure not the date-palm nor burn it with fire, nor cut down any fruit-bearing tree."⁴³

Although conceding that there are contradicting point of views within the articles of the Qur'ān concerning the war, the Islamic thinker Bassam Tibi states there is a common foundation for all Islamic concepts of war and peace: a worldview based on the distinction between *dār al-Islām* (abode of Islam) and

⁴² M. Amin Nurdin, "Khawarij: Sejarah, Sub-Sekte dan Ajarannya", 12.

⁴³ Dato' Dr. Abdul Monir Yaakob, "Implementation of Justice in the History of Islam," in Aidid Bin Hj. Ghazali, (ed.), *Islam and Justice* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia, 1993), p. 41.

dār al-salām (home of peace) and *dār al-ḥarb* (the non-Muslim world.)⁴⁴ With this common foundation of ‘Islamic war ethics,’ it seems to me that the theological thought of al-Khawārij had made the geography of ‘Islamic war ethics’ upside down, chiefly by justifying the raging of wars and doing violence in the *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-salām* as a *ḥalāl* (religiously permitted) action. This is evidence that the murder of ‘Alī b. Abū Ṭālib by a Khawārij supporter ‘Abd Raḥmān b. Muḥjam⁴⁵ took place in Kūfa, Irak—an area theoretically belonging to *dār al-Islām* or *dār al-salām*. Did it mean that the Khawārij theology which was established with the dominant ‘warfare culture’ background has expanded the area of *dār al-ḥarb* reaching out into the *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-salām*?

Theological Reaction

It is surely that, as aforementioned, the Khawārij theological reaction toward the Ṣiffīn War had created a chain of cyclical ‘reaction-action-reaction’ by the emergence of the Murji‘a, Qadariyya and Jabariyya schools of thoughts. The Mu‘tazila system of thought, the Qadariyya-derived one, is conceptually reflected in the ideas of Muḥammad ‘Abduh.⁴⁶ However, its deeper influence could not be clearly found today. While Ahl al-Sunna wa a-Jamā‘a, derived (and experienced a further improvization) from the Jabariyya, having been accomodating a much larger supporter up till today. This majority group, known latter on as the Sunnī school of thought based themselves on *ijmā‘*. For the *ijmā‘* means ‘concensus,’ Roy Mottahadeh then calls them concensus-minded Muslims “(w)ho more prone to inclusion than exclusion, to postponement rather than haste, and remained

close to the spirit of famous saying of St. Thomas á Kempis that man proposes but God disposes.”⁴⁷ In this respect, Islam which is formulated in the school of thought Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a asks more as a life guidelines than its ideological and political dimensions. It was, from my point of view, the Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a formulated Islam that is adhered to by the artists and the common people—as has been elucidated above.

And in a naked feature, we could not also find the Khawārij traces today. Its violence precedent, wrapped by a peculiar theological point of view, over the fellow Muslims, however, has not essentially ebbed yet. The Khawārij idea on the *kekafiran* that gave them theologically a legitimation to take the violent ways had, as stated above, made the georaphy of ‘Islamic war ethics’ upside down—where the boundaries of *dār al-Islām*, *dār al-salām* and *dār al-ḥarb* became overlapping. It is the geographical confusion that continued in 1979, as we witness,

Uproar insident. The front yard of Masjid al-Ḥarām (lit. The Sacred Mosque) fenced by a wall inundated by blood, intestines squirted, and the torn bodies.⁴⁸

This brutal violence which later on was known as *Kudeta Makkah* (the Mecca Coup) was led by Juhaymān al-Utaybī who—when the tragedy was taking place—had been in the Masjid al-Ḥarām wearing “(w)hite traditional Saudi Arabian robe, which was shortened up to half of his feet, symbolizing a rejection toward material richness.”⁴⁹ Being under the tutelage of the Wahhābīst tradition, spritually Juhaymān was greatly teased by

⁴⁷ Roy P. Mottahadeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, 20.

⁴⁸ Yaroslav Trofimov, *Kudeta Mekkah: Sejarah yang Tak Terkuak*, translated into Indonesian by Saidiman (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2007), p. 69. I cannot find the original of this book which is surely written in English. I try to make the quotation above readable in English by retranslation of its Indonesian translation.

⁴⁹ Yaroslav Trofimov, *Kudeta Mekkah*, 10.

⁴⁴ Bassam Tibi, “War and Peace in Islam”, in Sohail H. Hashmi, (ed.) *Islamic Political Ethics, Pluralism and Conflict* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 176.

⁴⁵ Harun Nasution, *Teologi Islam*, 11.

⁴⁶ See Harun Nasution, *Muhammad Abduh dan Teologi Rasional Mu‘tazilah* (Jakarta: UI-Press, 1987).

the capitalization process in this Islamic Holy Land. It was this psycho-religious state that prompted him to find an *Imām Mahdī* (the rightly-guided one), a supernatural person who is believed having the ability to lead the destruction of the strength of the *kāfir* power.⁵⁰ It was also the reason why Juhaymān took a violent action in the Masjid al-Ḥarām. To his followers, who had previously occupied the Mosque exactly as the *hajj* (pilgrimage) season was over, Juhaymān instructed, “If you see the government soldiers raise their arm against you, you could not do anything, except shooting them.”⁵¹ Juhaymān and his followers, by bribing the Mosque’s guards worth the amount of 40,000 real, several days before this bloodshed incident, had indeed smuggled weapons in a reasonable amount into the Mosque.⁵²

This case shows us the continuity of confused understanding on the boundaries that theoretically separated between the *dār al-Islām*, *dār al-salām* and *dār al-ḥarb*. By believing in a certain theological point of view, a group of Muslim had the heart to kill their fellow Muslims, precisely in the Masjid al-Ḥarām, the heart of the *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-salām* itself—as done by Juhaymān and his followers. Further, however, it is not only the geographical boundaries of ‘Islamic war ethics’ that had been breached, but also the continued imposition of the theological-based violence bequeathed by the Khawārij group. Although its metamorphosis remains to be studied, the ideas voiced by the leader of al-Qā’ida Usamah bin Ladin are the revoicing that of the Khawārij’s. If the Khawārij had ‘impersonalized’ Allah, the Prophet Muḥammad and al-Qur’ān, the same way has been taken by Usamah bin Ladin in sending criticism against the elite circles of the Saudi Arabia Kingdom. In one of his warning statements toward the Saudi government on

December 2004, Usamah said,

Governing is the contract between the imām and the people who will be ruled by him. The contract contains rights and obligations for both parties. It also has provision for cancellation and making it null and void. One of the provisions that nullify the contract is betraying the dīn (religion) and the umma. And that is exactly what you have done.⁵³

It is certain that Usamah is right by indicating the elite circles of the Saudi Arabia Kingdom are not the Prophet Muḥammad’s family and exactly not the owner of Islam. And it is certain that the government system of the Saudi Kingdom is quite problematic when looked at from its governance and modern democracy perspective. But what I want to emphasize here is that Usamah’s logic structure reminds us of that of the Khawārij ones. The Usamah’s ‘government theory’ above is in the same line with the Khawārij proposed ‘democracy theory’—that a leader should be elected the best one regardless of his tribe and regional background; but he must fulfill the ideal religious standard they set. And, like the Khawārij who ardently introduced and applied the concept of *kāfir* upon their fellow Muslims, Usamah did the same thing. In his December 16 statement quoting above, Usamah continues,

Let be known that the mujahedin (mujāhidūn) in the Land of the Holy Mosques (Saudi Arabia) have not yet started the fight against the government. If they start, they will undoubtedly begin with the head of the kāfir, the rulers of Riyāḍ.⁵⁴

Abdel Bari Atwan notes that this Usamah’s statement won support from the great part of the Saudi Arabian people. This was proved from the result of the poll conducted by Cable News Network (CNN) on December 2004 that indicated the Usamah’s popularity was higher than King Fahd himself.⁵⁵ But at the same time, we find also the ancient

⁵⁰ Yarovlav Trofimov, *Kudeta Mekkah*, 65-8.

⁵¹ Yarovlav Trofimov, *Kudeta Mekkah*, 11.

⁵² Yarovlav Trofimov, *Kudeta Mekkah*, 94.

⁵³ Quoted by Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of Al-Qaidah* (London: Abacus, 2006), 145.

⁵⁴ Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History*, 147.

⁵⁵ Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History*, 146.

ideas and nomenclatures of Khawārij used by Usamah in his terrified threatening statement above. The spirit in using these ferocious nomenclatures are undoubtedly derived from the 'warfare culture' 15 centuries ago, when the Arabian social structure just settling its transition era from the *tribe-based* toward the *ṣahāba-based* society—which put the talented war affairs *ṣahābas* into the central stage. As a result, as has been mentioned, was the steady formation of a powerful and resilient military corp functioned for the expansion of Islamic geography.

However, are the 15 centuries-old terrified threatening tune statement and the using of violent nomenclatures, such as voiced by Usamah and his followers all over the world, still valid today? Any answer to this question will certainly be debatable in nature. But I want to emphasize that the threatening statement and the using violence nomenclatures in these days have fallen into an anachronism. This is not only because the social structure—that bolstering up of the 15-centuries-old 'warfare culture'—has changed radically, but also Islam (such as been seen in the history since 7th to 15th centuries and what deeply imagined by Usamah and his followers) is not a dominant factor anymore in shaping the map of the global geopolitical system.

In its golden time, Islam was indeed acting as a dominant actor globally and thus had the right to create its own phrase on the geopolitical system. One of the phrases is *siyar*. This phrase related to the theory of the Islamic international relations which governs the rule of conduct between the rulers of Islam with the unbeliever of enemy territory or "(t)hose with whom they have established treaties of nonaggression."⁵⁶ It is the source of the Islamic geopolitical nomenclatures. In addition to the aforementioned *dār*

al-Islām, *dār al-salām* and *dār al-ḥarb*, Islam also introduces other phrases such as *dār al-'ahd* or *dār al-ṣulḥ*, i. e. the non-Muslim territorial power whose authorities recognize the sovereignty of Islam, by paying some land taxes in lieu of *jizya* (tax for non-Muslim inhabitants in the Muslim territory)—although remain maintaining their autonomy.⁵⁷ It is here we conceive other phrases: *ahl al-dhimma* and *musta'mins* and *ḥarbis*. The first and the second are the non-Muslim people within the *dār al-Islām* with the obligation of paying *jizya*. The third is the enemy's citizen. In relation to the territories of Islam, the latest position is optional in nature. In a sense that although essentially he/she is forbidden to enter into the Islamic territories, with certain conditions such regulation does not apply to them as long as he/she got guarantee of safe passage from one of the Muslim inhabitants.⁵⁸

Today we realize that the supremacy of Islamic power in shaping the geopolitical system had centuries-old declined. Not only the non-Muslim political authorities have structured themselves in the formation of nation-state, but also the Muslim political authorities (that in terms of nomenclatures are remain mentioned as the *dār al-Islām*) had been divided into 56 nation-states⁵⁹—each with its assertive distinctive rights and legal system. The vibration of the ancient al-Khawārij terrified threatening statements and the using of violent nomenclatures such as continued by Usamah bin Ladin and his followers today are felt discordant when seen from the modern perspective. On behalf of whom they launch the war appeal and a using violent path against the legitimate rulers—when both social structure and geopolitical system are no longer dominated by Islamic power? Do not these attitudes and brutal actions reflect more the displaced and

⁵⁶ M. Ruquibuz Zaman, "Islamic Perspectives on Territorial Boundaries and Autonomy," in Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.) *Islamic Political Ethics*, 92-3.

⁵⁷ M. Ruquibuz Zaman, "Islamic Perspective", 93.

⁵⁸ M. Ruquibuz Zaman, "Islamic Perspective", 93.

⁵⁹ M. Ruquibuz Zaman, "Islamic Perspective", 96.

disorganized feeling of the Muslims being confronted with a radical structural achange that is running beyond their control?

It is exactly within this perspective, I think, we find a structural foundation that persuaves us to reformulate the alternative Islamic thought based realistically on the current fabric of power, that is quite uncomparable with the Khawārij and other early Islamic movements era.

Conclusion

The formulation of Islamic thought after the Prophet Muḥammad (as the head

of state and religion) died has rendered a public constitution for several theological streams to construe the texts of the Holy Book. Such construction has inspired and transformed new cultural and political values, by the appearance of concept of democratic individual autonomy and ideal leadership model. The concept is actually a collective conscience continuance of 'reaction-action' behavior mental in the earlier theological understanding, in which such theological schools of thought tried to comprehend, and at the same time, to respond their era questions and problems.