

Contextualizing *Fiqh al-Siyāsah* in Indonesia: A Proposed Typology of Islamic Populism

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Abstract

Amid a political atmosphere increasingly polarized by various forms of populism, this article identifies the typology of Islamic populism in Indonesia from the perspective of Islamic political law. It reveals a new horizon by showing the adaptability of *fiqh al-siyāsah* to the variants of Islamic populism typology. Drawing from different approaches to Islamic populism studies in Indonesia, the article classifies three typologies of Islamic populism in Indonesia: economic-political populism, political Islamism, and political pragmatism. Each has different characteristics and missions of struggle in the political and social context. This article argues that *fiqh al-siyāsah* functions not only as a tool of legitimacy but also as an adaptive framework that responds to contemporary political dynamics. This adaptability not only refers to the contextualization of sharia principles but also involves adaptations that shape and give birth to more inclusive and beneficial political policies and practices within the framework of Islamic populism in Indonesia. This article expands the horizon of how the integration of political principles of Islamic law in populist movements can influence the dynamics and political policies in Indonesia.

Abstrak

Di tengah suasana politik yang makin terpolarisasi oleh berbagai bentuk populisme, artikel ini mengidentifikasi tipologi populisme Islam di Indonesia dari perspektif hukum politik Islam. Artikel ini mengungkap cakrawala baru dengan menunjukkan adaptabilitas *fiqh al-siyāsah* terhadap varian tipologi populisme Islam. Mengacu pada beberapa pendekatan studi populisme Islam di Indonesia, artikel ini mengklasifikasikan tiga tipologi populisme Islam di Indonesia: populisme ekonomi-politik, Islamisme politik, dan pragmatisme politik. Masing-masing memiliki karakteristik dan misi perjuangan yang berbeda dalam konteks politik dan sosial. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa *fiqh al-siyāsah* berfungsi tidak hanya sebagai alat legitimasi tetapi juga sebagai kerangka adaptif yang merespons dinamika politik kontemporer. Adaptabilitas ini tidak hanya mengacu pada kontekstualisasi prinsip-prinsip syariah tetapi juga melibatkan adaptasi yang membentuk dan melahirkan kebijakan dan praktik politik yang lebih inklusif dan bermanfaat dalam kerangka populisme Islam di Indonesia. Artikel ini memperluas cakrawala tentang bagaimana integrasi prinsip-prinsip politik hukum Islam dalam gerakan populis dapat memengaruhi dinamika dan kebijakan politik di Indonesia.

Keywords:

Islamic Populism; Political-Economy; Islamism-Politics; Political-Pragmatism; *Fiqh al-Siyāsah*

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Introduction

Islamic populism as an expression of Islamic politics is associated by scholars with Islamic ideological activity (Ayoob, 2004), which therefore received special attention from scholars at large. They see it as an essential part of the Islamic political phenomenon. The study is not limited to historical issues, movement mapping, biographies, and thoughts of the figures but also includes the similarities and differences in various corners of the Islamic world. A profound study of Islamic populism in the Islamic world was carried out by Hadiz (2016), who found the rise of Islamic populism movements in the Middle East, Turkey, Indonesia, and several other Muslim countries. In the Indonesian context, he highlights the phenomenon of Islamic populism in Indonesia from the perspective of historical sociology and political economy (Hadiz, 2016).

For Hadiz, Islamic populism in Indonesia has emerged from the anger of Muslims over the promises of prosperity from global capitalism that have never materialized. They then frame themselves in a common religious identity to seek solutions to economic injustice by seizing resources and power in the country (Hadiz, 2014, 2016). This means that Islamic populism in Indonesia is the impact of the imbalance in the economic structure of capital and the role of oligarchs in using the identity of the "ummah" to achieve their interests. Ultimately, Islamic populism in Indonesia is understood as a new form used by oligarchic groups or political-economic elites to gain power and resources. This is partly contributed by the economic resources contestation between various parties by exploiting power, where Islamic Populism, with its mass potential, is considered promising to gain power. In this perspective, Hadiz views Islamic Populism in Indonesia based on a Marxist lens based on material structure analysis at the macro level.

A study of Islamic populism in Indonesia was also carried out by Muhtadi and Muslim (2021). Both highlight the correlation between Islamic populism and election trends in Indonesia. Studying the 2019 presidential election in Indonesia, both found that the direction of support for Islamic populism was Prabowo Subianto, which was quite surprising because Prabowo came from secularist-pluralist circles, not Islam. This, of course, correlates with massive propaganda about Jokowi as a Christian, communist, and Chinese stooge. It indicates Prabowo's success in capitalizing on the power of "Conservative" Islam as a force through very dynamic political dynamics. He succeeded in pulling the "Conservative" Islam to highlight his figure as a religious populist and savior of the marginalized Muslims from non-Muslim and foreign powers. (Muhtadi & Muslim, 2021; Zulkifli et al., 2023). The work of these two academics has a different perspective from the work of Hadiz and other scholars, both of which depart from understanding the importance of Islamic populism as a movement that is discoursed in an Islamic-political or religious-political perspective.

Apart from the two perspectives above, experts also approach Islamic populism from a pragmatic-political perspective, as Triwibowo and Martha (2021) and Azra (2021) do. The three types of work above seem to adequately represent the three perspectives used by scholars in analyzing Islamic populism in Indonesia: the political-economic perspective, the political-Islamism perspective, and the political-pragmatic perspective.

This article will, therefore, not delve into historical aspects, motives, forms of movement, or the influence of Islamic populism in collecting votes in elections in Indonesia but will be directed at classifying the typology of Islamic Populism as a religious, political movement in Indonesia, by emphasizing experts' perspectives on it. Drawing from the previous three approaches, this study will further analyse the three typologies of Islamic populism in Indonesia: political-economic, political-Islamism, and political-pragmatic. This study will further explore these three typologies by contextualizing them within the *fiqh al-siyāsah* perspective.

On the other hand, in the Indonesian political context, there are gaps (*gap*) between the ideals of *fiqh al-siyāṣah* and the practice of Islamic populism, which prioritizes group or individual interests over the general interest. This gap gives rise to significant differences in implementing the principles of *fiqh al-siyāṣah* in socio-political reality. The conflict between the ideals of *fiqh al-siyāṣah* and the practice of Islamic populism arises partly because of the presence of Islamic populism, which uses religious identity to mobilize the masses and the influence of Islamic populism on Islamic political principles and their existence in political dynamics (Hefner, 2019).

Then, we will discuss how to bridge the tension between Islamic political principles and various typologies of Islamic populism in Indonesia. This article identifies and classifies typologies of Islamic populism and examines the multiple typologies studied more comprehensively from the perspective of *fiqh al-siyāṣah*. This article also proposes alignment between the principles of *fiqh al-siyāṣah* and the reality of contemporary Indonesian Islamic populism. This paper will explain the meaning and history of Islamic populism in Indonesia, followed by a discussion of the typology of Islamic populism. Finally, it will discuss the contextualization of *fiqh al-siyāṣah* in Islamic populism in Indonesia.

Method

This study uses exploratory qualitative research (Thunbergand & Anell, 2022), which elaborates on the growing Islamic populism in Indonesia. This study collected data from field observation and library research. Regarding the various populisms studied, this article uses a comparative analysis that compares three typologies of Islamic populism to identify the weaknesses and strengths of each typology, as well as analyze its suitability and incompatibility with the principles of *fiqh al-siyāṣah*. Since Islamic populism in Indonesia is a political phenomenon, this paper will employ contextual and historical analysis to examine how populist policies have emerged and developed and influenced the dynamics of contemporary Indonesian politics. Furthermore, these methods are elaborated in an integrated manner to provide a comprehensive analysis regarding the typology of Islamic populism in Indonesia from the perspective of *fiqh al-siyāṣah*.

The Meaning and History of Islamic Populism in Indonesia

Islamic populism in world politics has received serious attention from experts. Several vital words are keywords connected by experts in discussing Islamic populism; *first*, it was associated with the word "Indonesia" as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. In this context, Islamic populism in Indonesia is widely discussed about Islamic political power (Hadiz, 2016; Azra, 2021), democracy (Syarif & Hannan, 2020; Saepudin, 2024), and fringe Muslims (Pratama, 2012; Majid, 2023). *Second*, "Islamic Populism" became a keyword commonly associated with Islamic populism and its context as a movement and religious ideological views (Shalihin et al., 2023). This means that Islamic populism has been discussed broadly, giving rise to various definitions and interpretations of Islamic populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Aslanidis, 2015). Therefore, Islamic populism is still definitively debated in social and political science discourse (Hadiz, 2016).

However, this does not mean that Islamic populism cannot be defined; in general, the author agrees with Hadiz's definition of Islamic populism as a form of cross-class alliance that is asymmetrical, diverse, and full of contradictions in the Islamic community. It has dominant and subordinate elements, united by a standard narrative and the fate of those who do not benefit from the new colonialism system (Hadiz & Chryssogelos, 2017; Hadiz, 2016). In such a nature, its existence can be maintained in a climate of conflict and controversy.

On the other hand, some experts translate Islamic populism as a dualistic worldview, separating society into two parts, namely a homogeneous entity and an antagonistic entity, confronting pure society versus corrupt elites. However, a pure society must determine the

country's political fate (Mudde, 2004). Still, in the context of a dualistic understanding, several experts place Islamic populism as an ideology that is directly opposed to the elite; they are Islamic circles disappointed with elites who are considered corrupt, and they do not trust political institutions, which leads to a massive legitimacy crisis for corrupt elites (*The status quo*) (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Oztas, 2020).

Previous experts' definitions were also attached to Islamic populism in Indonesia and the Islamic world in various corners. Characterized in political language wrapped in Islamic terminology, essential concepts of the people as oppressed by the elite are replaced by concepts of *ummah*, who are oppressed and marginalized by the power elite (Hadiz, 2016). As Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated when responding to opposing Party criticism of him in 2014, "*We are the People – who are you?*". Apart from that, the characteristics of Islamic populism are attributed to its anti-elitist and anti-pluralist nature. For populists, pluralism is contrary to the communal desires of the Muslim *ummah*, and anyone who opposes the will of this marginalized *ummah* will be positioned as supporting a corrupt power elite. The same thing is also shown by the Islamic populism movement in its various forms - not only Islam, such as Hindu populism in India, the Party Bharatiya Janata (BJP) excludes India's Muslim minority and criticizes the secular-pluralist foundations of the Indian constitution (Muhtadi & Muslim, 2021). The anti-diversity nature of populists partly attributes this.

Historically, the phenomenon of Islamic populism in Indonesia received attention in 2017 when several Islamic movements (Aksi Bela Islam) helped Anis Baswedan win the gubernatorial election in Jakarta. This movement then inspired a series of electoral politics at the local and national levels that were closely related to the use of religious identity to achieve specific exclusive goals. However, the beginning of the history of Islamic populism in Indonesia can be traced back to modern colonialism, which lasted from 1816 to 1945.

In that era, groups of Islam in Indonesia have been confined to the hustle and bustle of social, economic, and political life under globalism and neo-liberalism. Marginalized Muslims became dissatisfied with the hegemonic policies of the colonial government based on the same goals and fate; regardless of differences in social class and ethnicity, they began to unite using the term "*ummah*" to replace the idea of "the people." This idea was mainly initiated by the Pan-Islamism movement at the beginning of the 20th century as a direct reaction to the domination of Western colonialism over the Eastern region and the expansion of Western influence on the lifestyle, value system, and state ideological order of the Islamic world. (Hadiz, 2016). This movement can be called classical Islamic populism.

Classical Islamic Populism movement then experienced a decline when the ideas of nationalism and socialism hit the Islamic world, from Egypt, Arabia, and North Africa to Islamic countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia. At that time, the idea of Pan-Islamism became marginal. Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia/The Abode of Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army), and Masyumi in Indonesia are concrete manifestations of the decline of Islamic populism at that time. The Indonesian government even disbanded the last two movements mentioned in Indonesia because they were considered opponents to the state power regime in Indonesia (Putra, 2019).

At independence, precisely in the Soekarno era, an alliance of resistance against colonialism emerged, known as the slogan Nationalism, Religion and Communism (Nasakom). This idea emerged from the idea of the Proclaimer, Soekarno. Hadiz (2016) characterizes this movement as the old Islamic populism, which exists as a legacy of Pan-Islamism.

Resistance against colonialism then turned to resistance against a corrupt regime. This condition was apparent at the end of the New Order period under Soeharto's government. Islamic populism is present in the form of the Islamic student movement, which took part in bringing down the Soeharto regime, which was considered corrupt and undemocratic. Apart from that, this period was also marked by the intensification of violent political struggles

between political Islam groups and leftist nationalists as a result of the collapse of the left movement, which strengthened state repression of Islamic politics, which further strengthened the meaning of the ummah as part of the oppressed.

It is in this construction that Islamic populism is increasingly strengthening in Indonesia, in conditions where the two mainstream Islamic forces in Indonesia, namely Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), actually choose not to be involved in political movements, thus complicating the increasingly marginalized position of Islamic political movements. In this stalemate, in the end, some of them fought underground, which - sometimes, but not always, carried out through violence or fusing in da'wah and educational activities in various local Islamic organizations and networks (Hadiz, 2016). This can be seen in the reality of Islamic populism in Indonesia in the reform era.

Finally, during the reformation period, Islamic politics faced challenges due to political freedom since 1998, which caused divisions in Islamic politics. The fight between Islamic parties became normal until it resulted in the split of Islamic political power. In this development, Islamic populism hastened to adapt and became flexible. In economics, for example, they are no longer against neoliberalism because what they oppose is injustice or immorality. This can be seen in the flexibility of the Islamic masses' support in the homeland's electoral politics.

The description above shows the continuity of Islamic populism since colonialism, independence, the Old Order, and the New Order up to the Reformation period. On the other hand, there are changes and differences in Islamic populism from time to time. In the era of colonialism, Indonesian Classical Islamic populism was aimed at liberating the ummah under the DI/TII and Masyumi Islamic Movements. This goal continued in the era of independence during the Old Order, where Islamic populism was still directed at opposing colonialism under the Nasakom concept conceived by Soekarno. This became the forerunner of the old Islamic populism of the Old Order era, which was directed at opposing the corrupt regime under Islamic organizations fighting underground due to the struggle between political Islam and the Nationalists. During the reform period, Islamic populism, still fighting against a corrupt and unfair regime, seemed more able to position itself flexibly in achieving its ideals.

This means Islamic populism in Indonesia today is more flexible and moderate, focusing on fighting for justice, social equality, and liberation (Hadiz, 2016). These people are considered quite interesting on an electoral political scale because they have immense mass power in achieving electoral political victory in Indonesia (Putra, 2019).

The rise of Islamic populism in this country has given rise to anti-Chinese, anti-Christian, anti-foreign, anti-*Infidel*, and others. All of them are a form of disappointment and dissatisfaction with various government policies, culminating in anti-regime or anti-*status quo*. However, Islamic populism tends to be tolerated. It is softer than traditional Islamic populism because it no longer advocates creating an Islamic state (Hadiz, 2016). In its milder nature, contemporary Islamic populism does not pose a significant potential threat to Indonesian national politics.

Typology of Islamic Populism: Main Issues in the Debates

Observing the development of Islamic populism in Indonesia and drawing from three approaches to Islamic populism studies in Indonesia, the paper analyses three types of typology of Islamic populism in Indonesia. The typology of Islamic populism has become a topic of discussion among scholars in various scientific fields, as mentioned at the beginning of the debate. The first perspective places Islamic populism within political and economic reasoning, created among Muslims who are marginalized from power and are bound by shared political and financial interests. Hadiz (2016) used this economic-political paradigm for the Islamic context in Indonesia when looking at Islamic populism in the Middle East, Turkey, and

Indonesia. Hadiz admitted using a historical approach to sociology and political economy to develop his views. As a result, he found that there had been competition in fighting for power and material resources among the majority Muslim groups who were marginalized from power and government—*status quo* who were labelled corrupt (Hadiz, 2016).

In the political-economic context, Islamic populism also exists as a form of resistance from groups marginalized in power and material resources against what they consider to be the domination or hegemony of the neo-liberalism and new colonialism economic system carried out by the Indonesian government. This movement embraced the working and middle classes by upholding economic justice, social equality, and freedom of speech (Hadiz, 2016; Akmaliah, 2019). This movement was demonstrated in the mass Islamic mobilization in the 2017 Jakarta Pilkada, which pitted Anis Baswedan against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) and Pilpres in 2014 and 2019. At that time, presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto fought against Joko Widodo, who then succeeded in winning the general elections (Pemilu) twice in a row in periods I and II of his term of office (Hilmy, 2020).

In 2019, Islamic populism in Indonesia received serious attention as a political strategy with the emergence of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which supported Prabowo Subianto by raising religious issues (Perdana, 2019; Yilmaz et al., 2022). The large crowd displayed at that time made electoral political interests something to consider and created reciprocal relationships to gain mass support. This power opens up political opportunities for the presence of various Sharia Regional Regulations in Indonesia.

It seems that the political economy paradigm in viewing Islamic populism is heavily influenced by Western scholars who see how political economy interests are the forerunners of the battle between populists and neo-liberalist governments, as stated by scholars who put forward the struggle between populism and the government in Europe and America. They indicate that populism, whatever its affiliation, whether nationalist or religious, has emerged because of a battle of economic interests, as happened in several European and American countries; Betz, 1994; Decker, 2000; Zaslove, 2004, Mudde, 2007). Some experts, such as Hara (2018), even openly state that the emergence of Islamic populism is also caused by the progress of the neo-liberal global economy, which then triggers a struggle for power and economic assets between the Muslim community and the government. (Hara, 2018)

The second type scholars use to examine Islamic populism is political Islamism or religious-political populism. For example, this is used as a lens when Muhtadi and Muslim (2021) describe the phenomenon of Islamic populism and voting trends in Indonesia. Both found that in recent years, the global wave of Islamic populism has been driven by religious sentiment or at least political religion, as has happened in various democratic countries, which exploit religion as a unifier of society. India through right-wing nationalist parties Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the Narendra Modi government and Turkey under the Recep Tayyip Erdogan government are two examples of the use of religion-based populism to mobilize mass political power. Apart from the two countries above, Indonesia, in several cases, has also fostered populism based on religious sentiment; although it cannot be assessed in a clear left-right spectrum, it can still be classified in a clear pluralist-Islamist spectrum (Muhtadi & Muslim, 2021).

From a religious-political perspective, Islamic populism in Indonesia does not solely focus on the struggle for power and material resources, as is depicted in a political economy perspective. They focus more on upholding the privileges that should be obtained from the demographic superiority of the Muslim community in Indonesia in various fields (Hadiz, 2016). Muslims in Indonesia must receive preferential treatment compared to other religious groups in Indonesia. They have sentiments towards certain ethnicities, which are represented in anti-Chinese and anti-foreign movements, demanding that Chinese Indonesians have limited

rights compared to Indonesian Muslims in various areas of life. Finally, the desire arose for Indonesia to be regulated per Islamic sharia law (Muhtadi & Muslim, 2021).

The demand for the state to recognize Islam as a state ideology has been voiced in Indonesia for at least three decades during the New Order regime (1966–1998). (Suryadi & Bestari, 2023). Entering the reform era, Islamic parties are marginalized in the national political arena due to the lack of coherence of their political agenda with pragmatic political interests. (Hefner, 2019). Only in 2016, by taking advantage of the phenomenon of religious blasphemy cases, several Muslim groups in Indonesia united to "defend" Islam from blasphemy in their homeland. This has become a momentum for Islamist populism in Indonesia. However, these efforts have not produced significant results (Menchik, 2019) because Islamic populist parties in Indonesia do not have enough influence on the parliamentary seat quota (Hadiz, 2021). Even the mainstream Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) appears to be cautious in taking constitutional steps due to the diversity of ideologies among Muslims in Indonesia..

Not all scholars accept the Islamism paradigm when viewing Islamic populism in Indonesia. Some scholars consider that the movement of Islamic populism in Indonesia and also countries in the Middle East is not purely driven by Islamic values alone but is always related to social, economic, and political interests. (Hadiz, 2016). They see that Islamic populism is nothing more than secular populism framed in the language of political Islam (Putra, 2019), for example, by prioritizing the concept of *ummah*. Islamic populism movement in Indonesia is not purely religious; the phenomenon of Islamic populism in the 2017 elections in Jakarta shows the existence of an unholy alliance between Islamic political groups and business people. This coalition is motivated by particular political interests by modifying religious symbols and utilizing social media to encourage societal actions.

On the other hand, there is a third typology of Islamic populism presented by experts, namely the pragmatic-political typology. Triwibowo and Martha use this typology to see the reality of Islamic populism, which tends to compromise on power without targeting its attacks on certain groups. These Islamic populist circles try to stand in the middle, accommodating the "ummah" and "elites." Regarding the characteristics of the relationship between the leader and the person he represents, pragmatic-political Islamic populist leaders tend to combine direct and indirect communication using intermediaries. (Triwibowo & Martha, 2021).

This pragmatic-political Islamic populism is, for example, presented by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia, which has succeeded in adapting populist rhetoric and state demands by using Islamic knowledge and language (Oztas, 2020). State knowledge is combined with the ideas of the *ummah* to foster a sense of *ummah* solidarity and political strength. Their nature, which refers to the interests of the *ummah*, and their political flexibility make it easy to maneuver in the political arena. They can interpret religious ideas according to the specific constraints and political opportunity structures they face until, ultimately, they can play out discourses that are more popular than the original Islamic message.

Muhtadi said populism like this is like a chameleon who can change his skin to suit the conditions in which he is. If the society is correct, he will exploit the right ideology; if the society is left, he will be very left; if the culture is Islamic, he will explore Islamic identity (Muhtadi, 2021). The three typologies scholars use in viewing Islamic populism seem to have their respective weaknesses and advantages. They are challenging to use as a reference in viewing Islamic populism holistically.

Contextualization of *Fiqh al-Siyāsah* in Islamic Populism

Islam, as one of the largest religions in the world, has experienced a revival and played an essential role in global politics, as it has influenced not only public social life but also political life (Williams, 2001). Islam also has a significant influence and role in social and political life in Indonesia, a country with the most important number of Muslims in the world.

Islamic values have been applied in the social life of modern Indonesian society. The contextualization of *fiqh al-siyāsah* in the context of Islamic populism has crossed classical to modern phases. In the classical phase, Islam held significant power and influence on the world political stage (Iqbal, 2016). The first scholar to write about *fiqh al-siyāsah* was Ibn Abī Rābi', entitled *Sulūk al-Mālik fī Tadbīr al-Mamālik* as a guide for kings in running the government (Sjadzali, 1991; Helmi et al., 2024), followed by al-Ghazālī, who wrote *al-Iqtisād fī -al-'Itiqād*. Al-Farābī wrote *Ārā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah*, and other important and influential figures such as al-Māwardī and al-Baqillānī (Iqbal, 2016), whose academic works became a guide in carrying out politics for the benefit of the people, with the realities faced by society at that time and were influential in the mid to modern phase, even though in its political and cultural development, it had experienced the influence of the development of secularism (Djazuli, 2013).

From the cultural background, the principles of *fiqh al-siyāsah* have been applied in a specific cultural context. Cultural contextualization plays a crucial role in understanding *siyasah fiqh*, especially when applied by populist Islamic movements in the contemporary era. The universal principles of *fiqh al-siyāsah* of deliberation, justice, trust or responsibility (Salīm al-Awwā, 2008) are not only adapted in certain historical contexts. Still, they are also actualized to meet the needs and challenges of contemporary society, where its principles, its legal framework, and its institutions are actualized in socio-political life in an inevitable intersection with the legal field in formulating policies and social governance in Indonesia (Saleem et al., 2024). The details of the contextualization of *fiqh al-siyāsah* are reflected in various typologies of Islamic populism, indicating that its principles are manifested in political practice in Indonesia.

First, the contextualization of *fiqh al-siyāsah* in the typology of political economy can be seen in political economy practices contextualized with *fiqh al-siyāsah*. As is generally known, political economy populism in Indonesia has faced some issues regarding social welfare, economic justice, and the application of Sharia gharials. This also intersects with the context of *fiqh al-siyāsah*, especially on the principles of *maṣlahah* and *justice*. These play an essential role in formulating social welfare policies by prioritizing benefits for the wider community. This is to ensure that the production structure must guarantee the realization of equitable outcomes (Naqvi, 1994). Therefore, social inequality between the rich and the poor in economic growth must not occur (Chapra, 2006) but instead create ample opportunities to address economic disparities.

The application of the principles of Sharia economics, for example, is present in the form of Sharia banking and other sharia financial institutions, which is a responsive criticism of capitalist economic development and the socialist resource allocation system, which is suspected of tending to ignore economic justice. Sharia economics, in this case, offers human-centred economic growth, not only aiming to achieve wealth by seeking profits but also requires a particular distribution of wealth to narrow the economic inequality gap between the rich and the poor, which is concluded in the concept of social justice and economic empowerment (Hidayah et al., 2022). This concept is what Islamic banking in Indonesia is trying to present next, and it grows and develops in the spirit of providing financing to micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Properly constructing *fiqh al-siyāsah* reasoning refers to Islamic teachings on economics, especially *al-Mā'idah*: 8, about the importance of upholding justice and community welfare.

This Islamic-based political economy populism exists to respond to programs that intersect with social welfare. Furthermore, according to the environmental activism of an Islamic community organization in Indonesia, such populism has placed a sustained emphasis on economic justice and the development of ecological security (Efendi et al., 2021). Furthermore, Sharia financial instruments such as zakat, infaq, alms, waqf, issuance of shares

and sukuk, and other Sharia financing in public policy can effectively improve social welfare and reduce economic inequality.

The rapid development of the halal industry in Indonesia has great potential for developing the sharia economy. What is quite impressive is the development of the halal industry, which is rampant in Muslim-majority countries and is even multiplying in non-Muslim-majority countries such as Thailand, South Korea, Russia, Mexico, Japan, and Spain (Nusran, 2021). Based on data on Indonesian halal industry trends, the level of development reached USD 42.33 billion, with an import level of 11.10 billion per year in 2023 (Aningsih, 2024). To strengthen and maintain the development of the sharia economy, support from the community and political authorities is needed to be implemented effectively. Therefore, political instability, such as the change of power, will negatively influence its development. This typology plays a role in overseeing policies oriented towards implementing the Sharia economy and seeks to find steps to realize the common good (Hadi et al., 2023).

Second, the contextualization of *fiqh al-siyāṣah* in the typology of political Islamism. This typology opens up opportunities to apply sharia principles in the government and public policy system, covering many laws relevant to modern needs and challenges. In this context, *fiqh al-siyāṣah* is a normative reference to integrate sharia principles in government structures and policy-making in countries with a majority Muslim population (Adnan, et al., 2023). In fact, according to some experts, all fields of law accept the presence of Islamic legal principles except for Islamic criminal law (Manan, 1987). This embodiment can involve making laws that cover aspects of civil law, economic law, political law, and other aspects of sharia law. This effort has legalized Islamic law nationally through Indonesian legal instruments that can give birth to inclusivity and tolerance (Karimullah & Sarim, 2022).

In political Islamism, religious institutions, such as the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), which has given birth to fatwas on contemporary issues, have become a reference for the public in making legal or political choices. MUI fatwa products have contributed to supporting the political products of the applicable laws and regulations in Indonesia (Badruddin, 2022) and other institutions such as the National Amil Zakat Agency (Baznas), Islamic-based education, and other Islamic institutions, which have a significant role in formulating policies and laws to carry out their functions effectively in the application of Islamic legal principles.

The embodiment of political Islamism can also be seen in various state policies that strengthen sharia principles in the public sphere, such as the birth of several laws that strengthen Islamic law in Indonesia, especially after the 1998 reformation (Mardani, 2015). Regarding education, political Islamism has fought for more Islamic elements to form the character of the nation's generation, who are not only academically intelligent but also have moral integrity. Religious expression or Islamization in the public space has also flourished from the rise of Islamic TV broadcasts and the emergence of other Islamic media (Akmaliah, 2020).

Regarding public policies to actualize Islamic values in Indonesia, it appears that state power and institutions have become a means of enforcing Islamic moral and ethical values, such as restrictions on the sale of liquor, prohibition of drugs, prostitution, and gambling, deemed as having the potential to damage the morale of the nation. At certain moments, mass mobilization was carried out on religious and social issues, such as the 2016 Islamic Defense Action Movement (Sholikin, 2018). This group consistently prioritizes foreign policy matters, advocating for Indonesia to demonstrate global solidarity in influencing conflict dynamics and promoting peace efforts (Pergola, 2020). This includes support for the Palestinian cause and other Muslim-majority nations facing oppression by external states.

Islamization programs to advance personal interests and group political agendas (Lukito, 2021) still face challenges in adapting to sharia principles and current political and social realities. The emergence of diversity in the interpretation of *fiqh* among scholars has led

to some responses from people outside the ulama. This has affected the implementation of sharia policies and the need for more unification of the views of scholars for consistent implementation. It is undeniable that there are still community groups that reject and doubt the application of sharia principles in the public arena, which raises problems.

Despite this, shariatization still exists in some regions of Indonesia. This results from the ability to adapt sharia principles that allow them to coexist with customary law and be integrated into the legal system that applies worldwide (Al-Farisi, 2022). In this regard, it is necessary to have a sustainable and flexible sharia-based policy so that it can be integrated with positive law and remain relevant to the context of national law.

Third, the contextualization of *fiqh al-siyāsah* in the typology of political pragmatism. Political pragmatism in Islamic populism in Indonesia refers to a more open and adaptive approach to applying sharia principles. It has emphasized the practical results of the policy rather than the adherence to ideological doctrine. *Fiqh al-siyāsah* has underpinned the formulation of policies that are responsive to the community's needs but still maintain the principles of shariah. Several aspects of political pragmatism have been contextualized in producing policies that become effective when granted political legitimacy. This is evident in the efforts of various predominantly Muslim regions to enact Sharia-based regional regulations (Perda Syariah). However, the incorporation of Sharia principles as a form of the nationalization of Sharia, as a result of the state's accommodation strategy to gain Islamic aspirations, reflects that Sharia-based legal products remain subordinate within the national legal system (Salim & Azra, 2003).

The application of *fiqh al-siyāsah* to the typology of political pragmatism can also be seen from the integration of shariah in preparing human resources with a pragmatic approach. This ensures that existing resources have been used effectively, such as implementing the zakat management system to increase the effectiveness of social policies and ensure the distribution of zakat under sharia principles (Muqtada et al., 2024). Another opportunity is through the policy of implementing social programs by showing commitment to sharia principles and meeting the practical needs of the community, such as the Islamic microfinance model development program by applying *mushārahah*, *muḍārahah*, *wakālah* and *qard al-ḥasan* as ideal models, which if implemented appropriately can produce economic growth, reduce poverty, and increase employment, thus contribute to improving the welfare of the community (Hussain & Khalil, 2017).

In a practical context, political pragmatism seeks a compromise between sharia principles and the practical needs of the state. Some of the applications of sharia principles that are carried out according to Indonesia's positive law can be seen in the Compilation of Islamic Law, which regulates marriage and divorce with sharia principles, the rights and obligations of husband and wife, as well as inheritance, being applied within the national legal corridor (Setiawan, 2014). Likewise, the management of zakat and waqf carried out by the National Amil Zakat Agency (Baznas) and the Indonesian Waqf Agency (BWI), if managed professionally, can empower people with low incomes and transform them from *Mustahiq* to *Muzakkī*. Likewise, waqf has many benefits, especially in terms of helping people experiencing poverty to improve their welfare (Nurlaili & Fauzi, 2024)

Therefore, the implementation of Islamic sharia requires the state as an enforcement institution, as Muslims who will worship need a place of worship that cannot be separated from state regulations (Zada & Irfan, 2021). Political pragmatism seeks to accommodate various interests and specific conditions, and applying sharia with some flexibility allows adaptation to social, economic, and political changes. This reduces the potential for tension between sharia idealism and contemporary reality.

Conclusion

The contextualization of *fiqh al-siyāsah* in the three typologies of Islamic populism in Indonesia has indicated that sharia principles can be contextualized to the dynamics of the contemporary Muslim community. In the socio-political typology, *fiqh al-siyāsah* has been the foundation for formulating fair and sustainable social welfare policy and emphasizing the equitable distribution of wealth. Meanwhile, in political Islamism, religious institutions such as the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) have played a significant role in integrating sharia values into law and public policy, even though they are faced with challenges of interpretation and rejection from some people. Meanwhile, political pragmatism has emphasized the adaptation and compromise between sharia principles and socio-political realities, which has opened up space for applying sharia in Indonesia's state law to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of policies. Thus, studying Islamic populism in Indonesia is essential to understanding the current political dynamics and facilitating the search for solutions to Muslims' dissatisfaction and injustice. This effort will ensure that Islamic populism can contribute positively to society, not just a tool for the benefit of certain groups.

As a recommendation, to achieve a compelling and harmonious balance, populist policies must be evaluated by striving for the principles of *fiqh al-siyāsah* to positively improve umma's welfare, strengthening cultural identity and political stability. In addition, policies that integrate Islamic principles are also needed for policymakers to increase the integration of Islamic principles in the realm of public policy.

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