

MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY FIQH OF NAHDLATUL ULAMA IN COUNTERING ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE NETHERLANDS

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Abstrak: Islamofobia menjadi isu global yang menimbulkan diskriminasi, kekerasan, dan kebencian terhadap Muslim, termasuk di Belanda. Dalam merespons hal ini, Pengurus Cabang Istimewa Nahdlatul Ulama Belanda (PCINU Belanda) sebagai diaspora Indonesia mengampanyekan moderasi Islam Nusantara melalui fikih diplomasi *multitrack*. Tulisan ini mendalami strategi fikih diplomasi PCINU Belanda dalam memerangi Islamofobia di Belanda. Sebagai organisasi sosial keagamaan non pemerintah, PCINU Belanda memiliki peran dan strategi dalam membantu diplomasi Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia dalam menebarkan moderasi “Islam Nusantara” merespons Islamofobia. Studi ini adalah penelitian empiris dengan pendekatan fikih siyasah dan *maqāṣid al-sharī’ah*. Dalam merespons Islamofobia, PCINU Belanda menggunakan strategi diplomasi *multitrack* yang berhasil menebarkan Islam yang ramah, anti teror, toleran, dan moderat. Meskipun PCINU belum sepenuhnya menggunakan semua bidang *multitrack*, namun berhasil menghadapi islamofobia dan mempromosikan Islam yang damai melalui Islam Nusantara.

Kata kunci: multi-track diplomacy; moderasi; islamfobia; Islam Nusantara; perdamaian dunia

Abstract: Islamophobia is a global issue, leading to discrimination, violence, and hatred against Muslims in the Netherlands. In response to this, the Special Branch of Nahdlatul Ulama of the Netherlands (PCINU of the Netherlands) is among the Indonesian diaspora campaigning for the moderation of “*Islam Nusantara*” through multi-track diplomacy fiqh, a holistic approach emphasizing interdependence in politics, economics, and socio-culture. This paper discusses the multi-track diplomacy fiqh of PCINU of the Netherlands in fighting against Islamophobia in the country. As a non-governmental socio-religious organization, PCINU of Netherlands play a role and strategy in assisting the diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in spreading the “*Islam Nusantara*” idea to counter Islamophobia. This article is based on empirical research with *fiqh al-siyāsah* and *maqāṣid al-sharī’ah* analysis. This study finds that, in countering Islamophobia, PCINU of the Netherlands uses a multi-track diplomacy strategy that successfully spreads friendly, anti-terror, tolerant and moderate Islam. Even though PCINU has not fully employed all Multi-track fields, it has successfully encountered islamophobia and promoted peaceful Islam through *Islam Nusantara*.

Keywords: Multi-track Diplomacy Fiqh; Moderation; Islamophobia; Islam Nusantara; world peace

Introduction

After the collapse of the World Trade Center and Pentagon Building on September 11, 2001, Islamophobia has increased in western countries, including the Netherlands (Fanani, 2011: 205). In response to this phenomenon, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia as a state actor, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), as a non-state actor in diplomacy, developed the “*Interfaith Dialogue, Empowering the Moderates*” program (Ambary, personal communication, 28 July 2020). This program aimed to introduce the notion of moderate Islam and respond to the issue of Islamophobia with the *fiqh* Nusantara approach (Harisudin, 2017; Kasdi, 2019; Yaqin, 2021). *Fiqh* Nusantara refers to Islamic law with Indonesian nuances.

After the Arab Spring struck most Middle Eastern countries in 2012, negative stigma and Islamophobia in Europe among Middle Eastern immigrants resumed and increased (Feldman, 2012). The relationship between Islam and the state has again become a serious concern. The dialectics between Islamic and secular countries was again being questioned. The Islamic State faced a dilemma between applying religious or modern secular norms in the frame of the nation-state (Iqbal & Zulkifli, 2016; Voll, 1996). Morocco was in the spotlight because the constitutional reform movement was massive, but without the fall of the regime and the great casualties (Burdah, 2017:201). Meanwhile, Indonesia and Turkey, the majority Muslim countries, have become a model where religion and secularism face each other without serious conflicts (Ahyar & Alfitri, 2019:18).

Nahdlatul Ulama, as the largest Muslim organization in the world, has a very strategic role in spreading religious moderation to the world as the manifestation of the notion of *rahmatan li al-'ālamīn* (blessing for the universe), finding solutions to conflicts in the Middle East; combating extremism; and Islamophobia in the West (Maimun & Kosim, 2019; Taufiq, 2020b: 59). NU can play a multi-role in diplomacy in synergy with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia through the network of Nahdlatul Ulama worldwide, including the Special Branch of Nahdlatul Ulama (PCINU) in the Netherlands (Siddik, 2016). In this case, NU offers the concept of *Islam Nusantara* as the

Inspiration for world civilization (Maimun, 2017: 392; Nurhisam & Huda, 2016: 152).

In this paper, the author will comprehensively review Nahdlatul Ulama's strategies in combating Islamophobia in the Netherlands by involving *fiqh al-siyāsah* and *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* as the approaches.

The Phenomenon of Islamophobia in the Netherlands

In recent years, Muslims in various parts of the world have been confronted with attitudes and behaviours that reflect feelings of fear or hatred by other parties or Islamophobia. These attitudes are not only against Muslims and their teachings but also towards their cultures. Islamophobia has become a wide-spreading term since its initiation by an orientalist Etienne Dinet. This term has continued to develop not only as a term and discourse but also as an attitude and behaviour, leading to discreditation and discrimination against Muslims, especially in the 1990s (Arif, 2015: 1). In 1997, Runnymede Trust published a book entitled: *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*. This book explains that the term has been associated with the anti-Muslim phenomenon that had grown rapidly at that time, leading to the need for a new relevant term (Khan, 2017: 5).

Phobia refers to a specific form of fear and anxiety over certain things. If someone faces certain situations or objects perceived as dangerous, he or she will feel fear. The feeling of excessive fear arises because of the desire to anticipate (prevent) an unexpected incident, which usually takes the form of avoidance (Moordiningsih, 2015: 74). Strangely, Islamophobia has emerged in what are considered democratic countries, especially in European and Western countries. It is not surprising that many argue that Islamophobia is directed towards unfounded hostility, injustice, and discriminatory attitudes towards Islam. One concrete action is removing Muslims from the political and social mainstream (Webb, 2019: 13).

Conceptually, Islamophobia began to be developed by political activists in the 1990s as part of their rhetoric to attract constituents' attention. The main issue was how to perceive Islam and Muslims in a liberal democratic country as something that caused anxiety in the surrounding community. Additionally, from a political concept,

Islamophobia has become an object of scientific-analytical study to reveal its origin, discussions and consequences to Muslim society and the world (Bleich, 2011: 1582).

Islamophobia in Europe is not a new phenomenon. Although it initially only took the form of hatred symptoms towards Islam and Muslims in the region, the hatred of the church community towards Islam began in the eighth century. The hatred was manifested in various forms, one of which was in the crusade. The anti-Islamic spirit has increasingly found its relevance after the tragedy of the detonation of an aircraft over the World Trade Center (WTC) on September 11, 2001, in the United States; and suicide bombings in London, England, and Spain in 2005, and the murder of the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn by Dutch citizens of Moroccan origin. Other incidents of terror followed this in European society. Consequently, the incidents have influenced them to view Islam and Muslims with suspicion and anxiety. Conservative right-wing groups then exploited this kind of sentiment to create a climate of suspicion, prejudice, and fear of Muslims (Arif, 2015: 2). An NGO concerned with monitoring the European Union released a report about the strong indications of Islamophobia in all European countries, even calling it an unfavorable condition (Kalmar, 2018).

Some conservative political parties in European countries have continued to develop anti-Islamic issues through media control and a government system approach with global diplomacy. Even countries without bitter incidents also spread Islamophobia. As happened in Poland, a country with a very limited number of Muslims, Islamophobia has also emerged. This condition is called *Wloch*, as quoted by Alfin (2018: 208), *Islamophobia without the Muslim community or platonis*. In this case, Western and European society's excessive fear and anxiety towards Islam is not due to physical acts, such as war and terror, but more caused by "moral panic". This moral panic is due to the disruption of freedom of expression, gender equality, and tolerance as symbols of modern society. Those are considered threatened by Muslims, who have grown rapidly in several European countries (Sayyid, 2014: 10-25).

According to Affandi, other European countries, such as the Netherlands, are not an exception. The Dutch Pim Fortuyn List's

party turned the issue of Muslim immigrants and Islamic culture into political propaganda to gain support from its citizens (Affandi, personal communication, 28 July 2020). Compared to Poland, the Netherlands, with its popular windmills, is far different regarding the number of Muslims. In this country, the number of Muslims is relatively higher. They get equal treatment, similar to other citizens, regardless of their religions. This is proven by the number of mosque buildings in almost every province in the Netherlands. Some of the mosques are from native Dutch buildings. There are even churches used as mosques. In 2018, no less than 300 mosques have been established in the country. Other sources say that around 400-500 Muslim places of worship are in the Netherlands, some in mosques and others integrated with other buildings (Nurjamal, 2018.).

It can be seen that the Netherlands is a democratic country in which both the government and its people are open-minded, especially in viewing religious plurality. As a result, Islamophobia in this windmill country is not a central issue. Even the existence of the anti-Islam party led by Geert Wilders factually does not significantly influence the issue of Islamophobia (Siddik, personal communication, 25 July 2020).

As a country with an open-minded society, it does not mean that Islamophobia is not the case. Some acts indicating Islamophobia have occurred several times, such as the vandalization of mosques, demonstrations against mosque construction, and the vandalization of Islamic schools (Siddik, personal communication, 25 July 2020). In the Netherlands, some people believe Islam is closely related to the teachings and culture of terror and other forms of violence. They see the meeting between Islam and western cultures as a clash of civilization and religion (Fox, 2001). For them, the solution is to fight against all forms of terrorism.

However, as a democratic country, the Dutch government strives to prevent racism caused by Islamophobia. One of them is by arresting the perpetrators, *“fortunately, law enforcement in the Netherlands is strong, so that the perpetrators are arrested and given a fine or punishment”* (Subadi, personal communication, 25 July 2020). It was proven in 2016 Geert Wilders, a right-wing anti-Islam politician, was brought

to the court on charges of incitement and discrimination through a speech in the media (Nursalikah, 2016).

The group campaigning against Islamophobia in the Netherlands tends to come from right-wing politicians with the support of their constituents. Nur Hasyim Subadi explained that based on his observations while living in the country, it was detected that those who tried to discredit Islam and Muslims were mostly right-wing groups (Subadi, personal communication, 25 July 2020). They openly made anti-Islam statements and provocations in various ways, which were always responded to by Muslims. Among the offensive actions are the publication of Prophet Muhammad's caricatures; the prohibition of Islamic symbols like mosques, Islamic schools, and hijab in public places; the banning of the Muslim migrants from Islamic countries who have worked in many districts in the Netherlands; and other discriminatory ideas (Subadi, personal communication, 25 July 2020).

"We don't want mosques and Muslims in our neighborhood". This sentence was displayed on a banner at a mosque built in East Holland precisely in Tevhid and targeted by right-wing extremists. *"Stay away. The Netherlands belong to us"*. The sentence was written in Turkish and Dutch and distributed through banners and social media. The responsible group was claimed to be occupying the Mosque (Observatory et al., 2018: 55).

In line with Hasyim, Siddik also said that the group that often spreads anti-Islamic discourse through political channels was right-wing. This group continues the campaign to get citizens' support. However, these efforts did not get a significant response from Dutch citizens because they accepted their nature as a multicultural society (Siddik, personal communication, 25 July 2020).

From previous consideration, it can be interpreted that the development of Islamophobia in the Netherlands always experiences ups and downs depending on the situation. Sometimes, it strengthens amid the political situation. In the observation of one source, the emergence of Islamophobia in the Netherlands is more due to media factors that deliberately back up issues around terrorism, whose perpetrators were Muslims and came from Muslim countries. *"The main reason for the media framing is that most people who hate Islam are citizens who have*

never interacted directly with Muslims in the Netherlands. They only get information about Islam and Muslims through the news and social media. On the other hand, another factor is Muslim migration to Europe. For me, to reason, a religious context is not highly potential” (Subadi, personal communication, 25 July 2020).

The media highly plays an important role in spreading positive and negative information. Following their character, the media can reach a large mass quickly and make someone popular with continuous media exposure. Some scholars state that the media often deliberately made framing, leading to misunderstanding Islam as *CNN.com*, a media representation of the West. *CNN.com* often seeks a position contrary to Islam, in opposition to *al-Jazeera.com*. Among media that tend to present Islam as balanced is *Kompas.com* from Indonesia (Yuliarti et al., 2017: 290).

Few media convey unbalanced or partial information about Islam. Therefore, Islam introduced by the mass media is not real Islam. The misunderstandings of Islam are due to the continuous framing that Islam is identical to what a small number of people represent, which is terrorism. It can be said that Islamophobia in the Netherlands and other European regions is caused by mass media propaganda. In critical media studies, it is known as “demonization”. It is an effort to create a massive and systematic perception of a particular community with imaginary manipulation techniques (Romli, 2007: 65).

On the other hand, the presence of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands and European countries—in general—also often becomes the reason for Islamophobia. Islam came to the Netherlands brought by migrant workers from the Dutch East Indies, Suriname, Indonesia, Turkey and Morocco. In 1964, the Netherlands agreed that Turkey brings labours to meet the needs of workers in the Netherlands. Furthermore, bilateral agreements were also made with non-European countries such as Morocco and Afghanistan around 1969 and Tunisia around 1970. This then led to an increase in the quantity of Muslims in the Netherlands. Lately, the agreement has become a burden to the Netherlands and other European countries because they have to bear enormous consequences politically, economically, and socially (Affandi, personal communication, 28 July 2020).

Tragedy after tragedy of terrorism occurred in Europe and positioned Islam with frightening imagery in the view of Dutch society. As Muslims, most immigrants obey the law and are responsible citizens. Still, many Muslims may hold onto extremism and have intolerant views. Unfortunately, the terrorists act as immigrants with economic disadvantages, as happened in France. They act in ways damaging a harmonious relationship between Muslims and the surrounding community. This is why Islamophobia is a serious issue in the Netherlands.

Dutch society is modern and upholds pluralism, including religious pluralism (Siddik, personal communication, 25 July 2020). In observation, the authors found that hatred incidents rarely occurred for religious reasons. As mentioned, one reason for this is the media framing and unbalanced information about Islam.

The Strategy of Nahdlatul Ulama of Netherlands in Countering Islamophobia

NU is a non-governmental socio-religious organization in Indonesia's Sunni militant group (Amal, 2020: 25-48). The organization upholds the theological thought of *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah*, adhering to four schools of thought (*fiqh*) and following *tasawwuf* (Islamic mysticism) teachings of al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and Junaid al-Baghdadi (830–910) (Masyhudi, 2007). NU was founded on January 31, 1926 (Ismail, 2011) by Hadratus Syaikh Hasyim Asy'ari (Khuluq, 2014; Syihab, 1971: 11) under the benediction of Syaikh Kholil Bangkalan Madura. His benediction—in the form of sticks and rosary (*tasbih*)—had philosophical values as a symbol of religion and state relations. The stick illustrated state power, while the *tasbih* symbolized religious observance. This implies that Syaikh Kholil wanted a symbiotic relationship between religion and the state, not establishing a religious nor secular state (Taufiq, 2019: 216).

There are two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. NU is considered a traditionalist, while Muhammadiyah is a modernist (Alatas, 2016: 255). NU is also identical to marginal people, *sarungan* (who wear sarong), and *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) (Ni'am, 2015: 111). However, NU is considered to be significantly responsive to social, economic (Ahmad, 2010) and

political problems (Kasdi, 2019: 236; Riza, 2004). Moreover, many pesantren alumni continue their studies, not only in the Middle East but also in the West. Consequently, many young NU intellectuals have emerged in the present time. These NU's intellectuals adhere to the guidelines of *al muhāfaẓah 'alā al-qādīm al-ṣāliḥ wa al-akhdh bi al-jadīd al-aṣlah* “maintaining the old matters, which are still fine, and adopting the new ones, which are better” (Niam, 2017: 352).

NU offers the idea of *Islam Nusantara* as an anti-thesis to the conflict in the Middle East. This concept has characteristics of *i'tidāl* (balance), *tawāzun* (proportional), *tawāṣṣuṭ* (moderate), and *tasāmuḥ* (tolerant), as well as holding on to the principle of *mabādi' 'khaira ummah and maṣlahah ummah* (Masyhudi, 2007). *Islam Nusantara* confirms the concept of “*fikrah al-nahdiyyah*” (Nahdlatul Ulama thoughts) (Siddiq, 1992) by preserving Islamic traditions in Indonesia (Nurhisam & Huda, 2016).

The term *Islam Nusantara* was initially mentioned at the 33rd NU conference in 2015, entitled “*Strengthening Islam Nusantara as Indonesian and World Civilization*”. Although the term *Islam Nusantara* invites *pros* and *cons* in the country (Harisudin, 2017, 2019; Ridwan et al., 2019), many foreign Muslim scholars, such as those from Lebanon and Afghanistan, attended the event conducted by the Executive Board of Nahdlatul Ulama' (PBNU). They learn how to deal with conflicts. Even in 2016, the PBNU created the 2016 International Summit of Moderate Islamic Leaders Forum with the theme “*Islam Nusantara Inspiration for The World Civilization*”. World leaders and scholars attended the forum to find a way out of conflicts and extremism. This forum produced the “the Declaration of Nahdlatul Ulama” (Nurhisam & Huda, 2016: 152).

The Nahdlatul Ulama branch was established in the Netherlands after the visit of KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) to the Netherlands after his study at al-Azhar in Cairo and Baghdad. He even founded the European Muslim Youth Association (PPME) as one of the oldest Muslim youth organizations in the Netherlands. Structurally, the official of the Netherlands branch of NU (PCINU) was officially inaugurated by *Rais 'Am* (General Chairman) of Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board (PBNU), Ahmad Mustofa Bisri on January 18, 2015, at the PPME Al Ikhlas Amsterdam Mosque. The initiative

of the Indonesian Muslim diaspora in the Netherlands possibly led to establishment of the Netherlands branch office of NU (PCINU). They comprise professionals, workers, and Muslim students in the Netherlands.

A strong desire to form the Netherlands branch office of NU (PCINU) arose among NU's *pesantren* alumni pursuing post-graduate programs in the Netherlands. One of the main objectives of the establishment of the PCINU was to preserve and protect the traditions of *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah*. Then, they formed the NU Civil Community (KMNU) after obtaining legal permission from the NU elders and seniors in the Netherlands. Its activities, such as *istighāthah*, *tahlīl*, *dibā'*, and others, are often held both institutionally in Indonesian mosques and communally by the Indonesian student community. The PCINU has been registered as an official organization in the Netherlands (PCINU Belanda, 2016).

The presence of the PCINU was expected to reduce the stigma that Islam was a religion of violence synonymous with terrorism (Subadi, personal communication, 25 July 2020). Another objective of the establishment of this organization was to introduce the wealth of Islam in the archipelago to the Muslim community in the Netherlands and the Dutch people so that they could understand that Islam is not synonymous with the Middle East. The Indonesian Muslim community in the Netherlands is also a minority compared to Turkish and Moroccan Muslim communities.

In combating Islamophobia, this organization has collaborated with the Indonesian Embassy and the Indonesian Ministry of Religion as Track 1 in diplomacy, collaborating with universities, the European Council for Fatwa & Research, and various communities in the Netherlands to conduct several activities. Among them are biannual conferences, seminars, excursions, Islamic studies, fatwa research studies and many others. The organization also established a dialogue between religious communities and has been incorporated into the Netherlands-Indonesia Consortium for Muslim-Christian Relations (NICMCR) (Siddik, personal communication, 25 July 2020).

One of the organization's major activities to counter Islamophobic narratives in the West has been the organization of the Biannual International Conference. The organization has held two conferences.

The first conference was held in collaboration with Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam in 2017 with the theme “*Rethinking Indonesia's Islam Nusantara: From Local Relevance to Global Significance*”. The second one was held in 2019, in collaboration with Radboud University, with the theme “*Seeking The Middle Path (Al Wasaṭiyyah): Articulations of Moderate Islam*” (PCINU Belanda, 2020).

Although this conference received rejection and opposition from the Islamophobic group in Nijmegen, this rejection subsided after Radboud University clarified the event. These two big events also received overwhelming response and support from the Indonesian Embassy (KBRI) in Den Haag and the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia as government authorities in “The First Track Diplomacy”.

The attitude of the Netherlands government toward protecting Muslim diversity has been exceptional. There were more than 300 mosques in this country. The Netherlands is a liberal secular state, so religious matters are not questioned as long as they do not create public anxiety. Every year, the Netherlands Prime Minister congratulates Muslim for Ramadan and *Īd al-Fitrī*. Apart from it, the Netherlands government banned and suppressed the Islamophobia movement in the Netherlands so that Muslims could worship properly (Subadi, personal communication, 25 July 2020).


According to James B. Hoesterey, these positive activities are part of diplomacy that are greatly influential in reducing the tension of the Islamophobia movement in the West (Hoesterey, 2020). The NU's strategy in counteracting the Islamophobia movement in the Netherlands is a part of multi-track diplomacy. This was a diplomatic concept developed and practiced by John W. McDonald and Louise Diamond to expand Joseph Montville's idea in 1982 (McDonald, 2003).

Multi-track diplomacy in conflict resolution for peace making and peacebuilding initially only consisted of Track 1 and Track 2 (Notter, James, 1996). Later, McDonald and Diamond added multi-track diplomacy to five tracks in 1989. Then, they expanded it to nine tracks in 1991. The nine tracks in multi-track diplomacy are (1) state actors, (2) non-state actors, (3) businesses, (4) citizens, (5) educational institutions, (6) activists, (7) religious communities, (8) funding, (9) media (McDonald, 2012: 67).

Multi-track diplomacy is a holistic approach that emphasizes interdependence in various fields, including politics, economics, socio-cultural, etc. Multi-track diplomacy does not neglect formal diplomacy, but Track 1, considered official diplomacy, is used to support the running of other tracks (Kupinska, 2010: 2-19).

Based on this theory, Track 1 is diplomacy carried out by the state, known as official diplomacy or traditional diplomacy. This track makes diplomacy an instrument of peace-making policy and peacebuilding, carried out through aspects of governance so that bilateral and multilateral relations between countries can be created (McDonald, 2012). In Indonesia, this diplomacy is carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Indonesian Embassy in several countries.

Picture 1: Multi-track Diplomacy



According to Sanders, Track 1 diplomacy allows state power to influence any negotiation direction. However, as globalization flows, the relations between countries are increasingly complex. Traditional diplomacy is no longer entirely relevant and needs renewal. The interaction among countries and individuals is increasing, without physical boundaries, and not only focused on politics. Therefore, state actors cannot fully carry out or manage diplomacy alone (Wehrenfennig, 2008: 81).

Meanwhile, NU, a religious and social organization, maintains

Track 2 diplomacy. This involves non-governmental actors and organizations and professionals to spread moderation in religion. In this track, professional non-state actors try to analyse, prevent, solve, and manage international conflicts (McDonald, 2012). This process-oriented track does not replace *state-to-state* diplomacy but rather helps build a path for communication and negotiation that drive the function of Track 1 (Kupinska, 2010: 9). Track 2 is considered to be an extension of Track 1 diplomacy (Wehrenfennig, 2008: 81).

Track 3 is diplomacy through commercial activities. In this track, the role of the NU is not yet apparent. Furthermore, Track 4 diplomacy employs the personal involvement of citizens (McDonald, 2012). In this case, PCINU has a significant role in spreading *Islam Nusantara* to counter Islamophobia in the Netherlands, as they have been in direct contact with the Dutch community.

The PCINU has also implemented Track 5 diplomacy, namely diplomacy carried out through research, training and education. In this context, the research could be linked to college programs, exchange of ideas (discussion forums); specialized research centres; training of practitioner skills such as negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, and third-party facilitation; and education from an early age to tertiary institutions. The activities involve cross-cultural studies, peace, world order and conflict analysis.

The PCINU has conducted research, training and conferences on Islam Nusantara every two years to spread Islamic moderation and counter Islamophobia. PCINU becomes a diplomatic ambassador in education, as most NU students in the Netherlands have received Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP) scholarship from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia and the 5000 Doctors program from the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia.

Activists search for diplomacy for peace in various aspects, such as social, human rights, and economic justice. Track 6 is diplomacy pursued through advocacy by activists. In this track, the PCINU actively has established a dialogue between religious communities. This is incorporated into the Netherlands-Indonesia Consortium for Muslim-Christian Relations (NICMCR).

Track 7 diplomacy involves a religious community. The community

acts with faith and is morally based, peace-oriented, and protective. In this case, the PCINU has collaborated with the European Council for *Fatwa* and Research to participate in determining *fatwa* (point of view) in Europe, specifically the Netherlands. This is also used to promote *Islam Nusantara* in Europe.

Track 8 diplomacy involves funding both by providing resources and philanthropic activities. In this context, various communities and philanthropists provide financial assistance for peace-making activities carried out by other tracks. The authors do not see the role of PCINU in Track 8.

Track 9 is diplomacy carried out through the distribution of information and communication links (McDonald, 2012: 68). According to Diamond and McDonald, the main task of information and communication technology is to provide knowledge about peace, conflict resolution, and international relations to the public. This track's public opinion is formed and voiced through printed and electronic media. Although on one side, this track helps to communicate government transparency, there is the potential for media spin to distort facts for irresponsible parties' interests. The information distribution can be uncontrollable (Kupinska, 2010: 17).

In this last track, PCINU has developed a website and social media account and built a PCINU media network throughout Europe and worldwide in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.

Table 1. Multi-Track Diplomacy and Nahdlatul Ulama Strategy

No.	Multi-Track Diplomacy	Nahdlatul Ulama Strategy
1	Professional Conflict Resolution	PCINU of the Netherlands, with the professional non-state actors, put efforts to analyze, prevent, solve, and manage international conflicts
2	Private Citizen	NU Community in the Netherlands (ranging from professionals, workers, and students) has played a significant role in spreading <i>Islam Nusantara</i> to counter Islamophobia in the Netherlands, as they have been in direct contact with the Dutch community

No.	Multi-Track Diplomacy	Nahdlatul Ulama Strategy
3	Research, Training, Education	PCINU of the Netherlands has conducted research, training and conferences on <i>Islam Nusantara</i> every two years to spread Islamic moderation and counter Islamophobia.
4	Activism	PCINU of the Netherlands has actively established a dialogue between religious communities and incorporated it into the Netherlands-Indonesia Consortium for Muslim-Christian Relations (NICMCR).
5	Religious	PCINU of the Netherlands has collaborated with the European Council for Fatwa and Research to participate in determining <i>fatwā</i> (legal opinion) in Europe, specifically the Netherlands, and promote “Islam Nusantara” in Europe.
6	Public Opinion/ Communication	PCINU of the Netherlands has created a website and social media account and built a PCINU media network throughout Europe and worldwide in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.

Every diplomacy track has strengths and weaknesses. As McDonald said, no single track can be implemented completely and independently to achieve success. It requires a joint effort using various diplomacy tracks (McDonald, 2012). Multi-track diplomacy through non-governmental institutions conducted by PCINU Netherlands has a significant influence. This is confirmed by the Chairman of the PCINU Netherlands, stating:

“Later, the people (particularly in the Netherlands and generally in Europe) understood that Islam is not synonymous with Arab or Middle East thought and principles in such a way. Any efforts aimed at introducing that (Islam) Nusantara is “a tolerant Islam”, not “a mad Islam” (Anshori, personal communication, 28 July 2020).

“In addition to diplomacy through scientific-academic activities, PCINU introduced this peaceful and tolerant Islam through art and cultural approaches. For example, in this PCINU, we have not only

LAKPESDAM but also LESBUMI. Through this latter Institute, we hold several art events, like inviting the Ki Ageng Ganjur group, led by Al-Zastrow Ngatawi to perform at the PCINU's biannual international conference. In addition, PCINU also held a photographs exhibition of the Nusantara mosque" (Affandi, personal communication, 28 July 2020).

In response to Islamophobia, the Executive Board Leader (*Rais Syuriah*) of the Netherlands PCINU adds, "*the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands have communicated with the Netherlands PCINU and expressed their appreciation with the establishment of the organization that this organization is important to reduce negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims*" (Subadi, personal communication, 25 July 2020).

Multi-Track Diplomacy *Fiqh* of Nahdlatul Ulama in the Netherlands: *Fiqh al-Siyāsah* and *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* Approach

Multi-track diplomacy of Nahdlatul Ulama in the Netherlands is an attempt to create a harmonious society with no negative stigma, avoiding suspicion of one another, restoring the Islamic image of *rahmatan li al-'ālamīn* and creating world peace. The NU's multi-track strategy is to benefit the hereafter.

In the *fiqh al-siyāsah* framework (Taufiq, 2022), the multi-track strategy is included in international relations politics (*siyāsah al-dawliyyah al-shar'iyyah*) (Hilal, 2015: 119) in accordance with *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*. It is to realize the public interest (*maṣlaḥah al-'āmmah*) (Taufiq, 2020a), prevent *mafsadāt* of Islamophobia and uphold world peace (*al-salām al-'ālamī*).

Generally, according to Al Ghazali, the guardianship of the five sharia goals is to guard the religion (*ḥifẓ al-dīn*), protect the soul (*ḥifẓ al-nafs*), mind (*ḥifẓ al-'aql*), offspring (*ḥifẓ al-naṣl*) and wealth (*ḥifẓ al-māl*). Then, Al Ghazali argues that every action contrary to the five fundamental principles is considered *mafsadāt* (Taufiq, 2019a, 2019b).

Jamaluddin Athiyah adds that the five basic concepts of the *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* can be implemented in the following areas: individual, kinship, social politics and humanity. The individual area includes soul, intellect, religion, self-esteem, and wealth. The area of

kinship lineage includes caring for posterity; establishing a peaceful family; and maintaining kinship, lineage, and family's religiosity. Social politics includes preserving the state's constitution, national security, religion and political ethics; upholding justice, solidarity, and responsibility; enhancing knowledge; and developing the nation. Finally, in the context of humanity, it can be unity, leadership, world peace, the promotion of Islam, and human rights protection (Jamaluddin, 2003: 139–172).

In addition, Jasser Auda makes a breakthrough with a philosophical approach (Auda, 2006: 156-157). For him, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* is a philosophy of Islamic law and basic methodology in classical juridical theory and Islamic law. This theory analyses new matters by considering hierarchy, multi-dimensionality, cognition, integrity, openness and purposefulness. Auda adds that this purposefulness is the core of the theory. Auda proposes shifting the classic *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* paradigm to the modern version (Auda, 2008: 54–55).

Jamaluddin Al Najjar classifies *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* into four parts. *First*, preserving human dignity includes preserving religion and maintaining human values. *Second*, preserving humanitarian materials includes protecting the soul and mind. *Third*, social protection of society involves the care of offspring and social systems. *Fourth*, preserving material value consists of preserving property and protecting the environment (al-Najjār, 2008:59).

In Nahdlatul Ulama's multi-track diplomacy, Islam Nusantara's strategy, as an anti-narrative of Islamophobia in the Netherlands, is reflected in the *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* approach. In this context, NU is a non-state actor in multi-track for the public benefit for three main reasons. *First*, the NU multi-track Islamic strategy aligns with the five basic concepts of the *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*. *Second*, The NU's strategy is to maintain human rights and social relations. *Third*, Islam Nusantara's strategy within the NU's multi-track is to maintain world peace.

In relying on the five basic concepts (*al-kuliyah al-khamsah*), Islam Nusantara's strategy in multi-track diplomacy is to preserve the characteristics and imagery of Islam (*hifẓ al-dīn*). Also, *Islam Nusantara* is to protect the minority (*hifẓ al-naḥs*) of Muslims in Europe from

the threat of Islamophobic groups. Therefore, the notions of *Islam Nusantara* and moderation in the religion or “*Wasatīyyah*” aim at preserving the intellectuals (*hifẓ al-'aql*) by giving the Muslims a true understanding of Islam. The NU's strategy to counter Islamophobia in the Netherlands also serves to protect the descendants (*hifẓ al-naṣl*) of Muslim minorities who have lived in the Netherlands for a long time. Besides, the diplomacy of *Islam Nusantara* as anti-narration of Islamophobia purposed to protect the wealth (*hifẓ al-māl*) of Muslims in Europe to sustain their rights.

Viewed from the humanitarian values, The strategy of *Islam Nusantara* in multi-track diplomacy, as an anti-narrative of Islamophobia in the Netherlands, aims to protect human rights as parts of the *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* that of Jamaluddin Athiyah and Al Najjar. To maintain social relations in the Netherlands, everyone needs to consider the values of equality of rights, togetherness, tolerance, solidarity, and responsibility. At the same time, Muslim minorities in the Netherlands and Europe were generally citizens of the same rights and obligations as non-immigrants. Therefore, Muslims, as a minority group, can contribute more positively to the Netherlands and European society (al-Najjār, 2009: 11–23).

The emergence of Islamophobia in the Netherlands affected social relations. Even according to Syahril Siddik, the Netherlands Intelligence has closely monitored the activities of the Netherlands Salafi group, considered the basis for the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) deployment. The NU's multi-track “Islamist” strategy to counter Islamophobia was aimed at maintaining world peace. However, the NU's presence with the idea of the *Islam Nusantara* strategy has been an anti-thesis of Islamophobia and an inspiration for world peace (Siddik, 2016) as Alal al Fasy states that the purpose of Islam is to reach an international consensus on the prohibition of war and the resolution of peace (Al Fasy, 2013: 29).

Conclusion

Islamophobia has been rising in the Netherlands since the Arab Spring. The presence of PCINU in the Netherlands, as an official organization with the multi-track strategy of “*Islam Nusantara*”, has been an anti-thesis for Islamophobia. Judging from the *maqāṣid al-*

shari'ah approach, this multi-track strategy aims to create a common cause and protect Muslims in the Netherlands for three main reasons. *First*, the strategy of *Islam Nusantara* is in line with the five basic concepts of *maqāṣid al-shari'ah*. *Second*, *Islam Nusantara* is NU's strategy to maintain human rights and social relations. *Third*, *Islam Nusantara*'s strategy in the NU's multi-track is to create a peaceful world. In the *fiqh al-siyāsah* framework, the multi-track strategy is included in international relations politics (*al-siyāsah al-dawliyyah al-shar'iyyah*), and in accordance with *maqāṣid al-shari'ah*, namely creating and maintaining the public interest (*maṣlahah al-'āmmah*), preventing *mafsadāt*, namely Islamophobia, and upholding world peace (*al-salām al-'ālamī*). Even though PCINU has not fully employed all Multi-track fields, it has successfully encountered islamophobia and promoted peaceful Islam through *Islam Nusantara*.

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