



## Faith and Ethnicity: The Fusion of Ulama, Chinese, and Javanese in the 1750 Sabil War of Lasem

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### **Purpose**

*This research aimed to analyze the contributions of three pivotal figures—Kiai Ali Badhawi, Oei Ing Kiat, and Raden Panji Marghana—in the Sabil War of Lasem. The study sought to explore how these leaders leveraged charismatic and traditional authority to build alliances across ethnic divides in resistance against VOC colonization.*

### **Method**

*This study employed a historical research method, comprising four stages: heuristics, verification, interpretation, and historiography. Primary and secondary sources, such as Carita Sejarah Lasem and Sabda Badra-Santi, were analyzed to understand the leadership dynamics and social networks during the Sabil War. The research applied Weber's leadership theory and social capital framework to examine cross-ethnic coalitions.*

### **Results/findings**

*The study revealed that the three leaders used charismatic and traditional authority to foster a multi-ethnic resistance. Their ability to mobilize diverse groups was supported by strong social networks, transcending ethnic boundaries, which played a critical role in organizing the resistance against VOC colonial forces.*

### **Conclusion**

*The study concluded that the fluid, kinship-based, and syncretic leadership practices—strengthened by the formation of collective identity in contemporary crowd psychology—challenge the universality of Weber's Eurocentric ideal types. Future research should therefore conduct a critical dialogue between Weberian theory, the Social Identity Approach, and local anti-colonial experiences.*

### **Keywords**

*Sabil War, Lasem, Ulama, Chinese, Javanese, Leadership.*

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### Abstrak

#### Tujuan

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis kontribusi tiga tokoh penting—Kiai Ali Badhawi, Oei Ing Kiat, dan Raden Panji Marghana—dalam Perang Sabil Lasem, dengan menggunakan teori kepemimpinan Max Weber dan konsep modal sosial. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengeksplorasi bagaimana para pemimpin ini memanfaatkan otoritas kharismatik dan tradisional untuk membangun aliansi lintas etnis dalam perlawanan terhadap kolonisasi VOC.

#### Metode

Penelitian ini menggunakan metode sejarah yang terdiri dari empat tahap: heuristik, verifikasi, interpretasi, dan historiografi. Sumber primer dan sekunder, seperti Carita Sejarah Lasem oleh Raden Panji Kamzah dan Sabda Badra-Santi oleh Empu Santibadra, dianalisis untuk memahami dinamika kepemimpinan dan jejaring sosial selama Perang Sabil. Penelitian ini menerapkan teori kepemimpinan Weber dan kerangka modal sosial untuk mengkaji koalisi lintas etnis.

#### Hasil/temuan

Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa ketiga pemimpin tersebut berhasil memanfaatkan otoritas kharismatik dan tradisional untuk memobilisasi berbagai kelompok etnis. Kemampuan mereka untuk mengorganisir kelompok yang beragam didukung oleh jejaring sosial yang kuat, yang melampaui batas etnis dan berperan penting dalam mengatur perlawanan terhadap kekuatan kolonial VOC.

#### Kesimpulan

Studi ini menyimpulkan bahwa praktik kepemimpinan yang cair, berbasis kekerabatan, dan sinkretis—yang diperkuat oleh pembentukan identitas kolektif dalam psikologi massa kontemporer—menantang universalitas tipe ideal Eurosentris Weber. Oleh karena itu, penelitian selanjutnya harus melakukan dialog kritis antara teori Weberian, Pendekatan Identitas Sosial, dan pengalaman anti-kolonial lokal.

#### Kata kunci

Perang Sabil, Lasem, Ulama, Orang Cina, Orang Jawa, Kepemimpinan.

### المخلص

#### الهدف

تعتمد هذه الدراسة إلى تحليل إسهامات ثلاث شخصيات بارزة - كياي علي بدھوي، وأوي إنغ كيات، ورادين بانجي مارغانا - في حرب لاسم، وذلك باستخدام نظرية ماكس فيبر للقيادة ومفهوم رأس المال الاجتماعي. كما تهدف إلى استكشاف كيفية توظيف هؤلاء القادة للسلطة الكاريزمية والتقليدية لبناء تحالفات عابرة للأعراق في مقاومة استعمار شركة الهند الشرقية الهولندية.

#### المنهجية

تعتمد هذه الدراسة المنهج التاريخي المكون من أربع مراحل: الاستدلال، والتحقق، والتفسير، والتأريخ. ويتم تحليل مصادر أولية وثانوية، مثل كتاب "كاريتا سيجارا لاسم" لرادين بانجي كامزاه وكتاب "سابدا بادرا-سانتي" لإمبو سانتيدارا، لفهم ديناميكيات القيادة والشبكات الاجتماعية خلال الحرب. وتطبق هذه الدراسة نظرية فيبر للقيادة وإطار رأس المال الاجتماعي لدراسة التحالفات العابرة للأعراق.

#### النتائج

تشير النتائج إلى أن القادة الثلاثة نجحوا في توظيف الكاريزما والسلطة التقليدية لحشد مختلف الجماعات العرقية. وقد دعمت قدرتهم على تنظيم هذه الجماعات شبكات اجتماعية قوية تجاوزت الحدود العرقية، ولعبت دورًا حاسمًا في تنظيم المقاومة ضد النفوذ الاستعماري لشركة الهند الشرقية الهولندية.

#### الخلاصة

تلخص هذه الدراسة إلى أن ممارسات القيادة المرنة، القائمة على القرابة، والتوفيقية - والتي تعززها تشكيل الهويات الجماعية في علم النفس الجماهيري المعاصر - تتحدى عالمية النموذج المثالي الأوروبي المركزي لفيدر. لذا، ينبغي للبحوث المستقبلية أن تُجري حوارًا نقديًا بين نظرية فيبر، ومنهج الهوية الاجتماعية، والتجارب المحلية المناهضة للاستعمار.

#### الكلمات الرئيسية

حرب سبيل، لاسم، علماء، صينيون، جاويون، قيادة.

## INTRODUCTION

The Sabil War of 1750 is an important episode in Lasem's fight against VOC control. Historical records show that the war was a continuation of past wars, such as the Yellow War from 1741 to 1743, which started after the Batavia massacre of Chinese people in 1740 (Daradjadi, 2013). Research emphasizes the VOC's territorial incursions, particularly the 1743 annexation of Lasem and the relocation of its administrative hub to Rembang in 1748, which exacerbated local resentment. The conflict, lasting three to four months in 1751, utilized guerrilla tactics and resulted in a Dutch victory because of better weaponry, causing territorial fragmentation and heightened colonial oversight (Kamzah, 1858).

Contemporary scholars often investigate the inter-ethnic alliances that endorsed the Sabil War, emphasizing a rare affinity among Javanese Muslims, *santri* (students of Islamic boarding schools), and ethnic Chinese communities. Research attributed this alliance to persistent links via commerce, intermarriage, and collective subjection under the VOC's divide-and-rule policies, which encompassed racial segregation and economic exploitation (Atmaja, 2021; Utomo, 2024). Sociological evaluations depict the alliance as a social movement against colonial racism, with acculturation processes fostering integration and tolerance. Post-war assessments underscore the VOC's retaliatory measures, such as residential segregation and restrictions on cultural practices, which compromised Lasem's pluralistic framework while economically benefiting Rembang (Aziz et al., 2022; Al-Qurtuby, 2017; Atabik, 2016a, 2016b).

The Lasem community's past interactions, especially during conflicts with the VOC, show how complicated multi-ethnic alliances and power structures can be. This means that previous research's analytical frameworks need to be more detailed. While certain studies examine occurrences like the Sabil War and the coalitions established to counter Dutch colonial rule, few investigate the leadership dynamics or the influence of social capital within these alliances, including Nafiin's work descriptive analysis of the Sabil War in Lasem and its effects until 1828 (Nafiin, 2018). Aziz's research examines the historical alliance between the Muslim community of Lasem and the Chinese ethnic group against the Dutch, employing resource mobilization theory and an acculturation framework, primarily concentrating on the general populace (Aziz & Wildan, 2022).

Research investigated the cultural adaptation between the Javanese and Chinese in Lasem, yet it neglects the examination of leadership strategies and power dynamics in times of conflict (Basiroen & Manuaba, 2022). Likewise, Jayusman et al.'s study on the social integration of the Chinese community does not examine the leadership strategies that shaped the establishment of alliances during periods of tension (Jayusman et al., 2021). Wijaya's (2024) work examines both the Yellow War of 1741–1743 and the Sabil War, despite their occurrence in distinct time periods and geographical locations. In his 2025 study, Wijaya offers an in-depth examination of the Sino-Javanese Alliance under Dutch colonialism, emphasizing the political and social circumstances that influenced the coalition between the Muslim and Chinese populations of Lasem. These studies frequently cannot conduct an in-depth analysis of leadership dynamics and the evolution of power and networks within a multicultural framework, predominantly emphasizing chronological events, cultural artifacts, and harmony. Because of this, they don't fully explain how these alliances worked, especially when it comes to how ethnic and religious diversity affected leadership and social structures. Consequently, although these studies offer critical context, they do not comprehensively examine the complexities of leadership and social networks among diverse ethnic groups during conflicts such as the Sabil War. This shows how important it is to have a theoretical framework that better explains the social capital and leadership dynamics in the Lasem community during their fight against colonial forces (Atabik, 2016a; Atmaja, 2021; Aziz, 2020; Nafiin, 2018; Sobirin, 2017; Wijaya et al., 2023; Wijaya et al., 2024).

This study seeks to address the deficiencies in the literature by offering a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of power and leadership networks, particularly within the

multicultural and multiethnic context of the Lasem neighborhood during the Sabil War. This study seeks to elucidate how individual leaders leveraged their charismatic authority and social networks to garner support and forge alliances, facilitating resistance against the VOC, through the application of Max Weber's leadership theory and the concept of social capital. Weber's theories on charismatic leadership, authority, and social capital offer a theoretical framework for examining how social interactions, power dynamics, and resource exchange influenced the leadership strategies employed during the conflict. This research explains the mechanisms of the Sabil War and the strategies employed by the Lasem community to resist Dutch domination, while also emphasizing the roles of leaders in a religiously and ethnically diverse society.

## METHOD

This study employs historical research method, comprising four stages: heuristics, verification, interpretation, and historiography, emphasizing the analysis of primary and secondary sources. The principal sources for this research are *Carita Sejarah Lasem* by Raden Panji Kamzah and *Sabda Badra-Santi* by Empu Santibadra. *Carita Sejarah Lasem*, which was written in 1858, is by Raden Panji Kamzah, a descendant of the aristocratic Tejakusuma V of Lasem. This study employs Weber's leadership theory to examine how prominent actors organize diverse groups, while the social capital framework will clarify the relational linkages that transcended ethnic barriers. The goal is to provide a thorough analysis of their contributions to the Sabil War, focusing on the interplay between human agency and systemic factors in fostering resistance.

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

### The Setting of the Sacred Conflict

The Sabil War of Lasem (1750) was a direct continuation of prior ethnic and political confrontations that had started during the Yellow War (Geger Pecinan, 1740–1743). The Dutch East India Company (VOC) killed a lot of Chinese people in Batavia, which started the Yellow War. This tragedy caused many Chinese people to move to the eastern coastal areas of Java, particularly Lasem, which later became a focus of opposition to colonial rule (Blusse, 2017; Cenci, 2021; Lohanda, 1994; Sanalin et al., 2024). The war in Lasem must not to be perceived as merely a local insurrection, but rather as an integral component of a more extensive regional movement defined by Chinese–Javanese coalitions resisting VOC hegemony from Batavia to Madura (Daradjadi, 2013; Kartodirdjo, 1999).

In the first phase of resistance in 1743, the Lasem movement was led by people from different ethnic and class origins, such as R. Panji Marghana, Tan Kie Wie, and Tumenggung Widyaningrat (Oei Ing Kiat). Tan Kie Wie, a well-known Chinese merchant, was very important in getting military and economic resources ready, while Oei Ing Kiat, a Muslim Chinese descendent of the Cheng Ho expedition, was the Duke of Lasem and had political legitimacy (Adhitya et al., 2023; Lan, 2015; Lestari & Wiratama, 2018; Nurhajarini et al., 2015). This leadership structure shows that opposition to the VOC went beyond ethnic lines and was based on common complaints about colonial exploitation (Daradjadi, 2013; Kamzah, 1858).

The Chinese–Javanese coalition's defeat in the Yellow War, which included the murder of Tan Kie Wie, did not end resistance; instead, it changed the direction of the movement toward a more ideologically defined one. The Sabil War of 1750 represented a new phase in which members of Lasem's three main communities took over as leaders. Kiai Ali Badhawi came from the Muslim religious sector, and R. Panji Marghana is from the Javanese aristocracy, while Tumenggung Widyaningrat (Oei Ing Kiat) is from the Muslim Chinese community. This coming together of religious, aristocratic, and ethnic leaders shows how resistance has changed from just political opposition to a movement full of

moral, religious, and cultural meaning (Kamzah, 1858; Unjiya, 2014). One of the main structural reasons for the Lasem conflict was the gradual decline of the Mataram Sultanate from the reign of Amangkurat I to that of Amangkurat III. Mataram's increasingly accommodating attitude toward the VOC, which was very different from Sultan Agung's confrontational policies, led to a loss of political legitimacy in coastal areas like Lasem. Adipati Tejakusuma III and his successors exhibited covert opposition to Mataram, including secret backing for anti-VOC uprisings, showing a de facto withdrawal of Lasem from central authority (Kamzah, 1858; Unjiya, 2014).

The VOC's involvement in the Lasem principality's government made the political and social situation much worse. The VOC got the power to hire and fire dukes throughout Java's northern shore by making deals with Pakubuwono II. The Rembang Duchy was created in 1741 from land that used to belong to Lasem. This not only made Lasem's government less powerful, but it also gave the VOC more control over important trade routes and natural resources, especially teak forests. Lasem had effectively come under VOC control by 1743, making local leaders less important than colonial objectives (Al-Qurtuby, 2017; Daradjadi, 2013). Suro Adimenggolo III, a VOC appointee, put in place harsh policies that made social and religious problems worse. Strict monitoring of religious life, threats of execution for anyone who help the resistance, and bans on owning weapons or historical texts are all part of a plan to destroy collective memory and local identity. These actions impacted both Muslim and Chinese populations, promoting solidarity between religions and ethnicities against the same colonial oppression (Kamzah, 1858).

Symbolic acts of violence, especially the destruction of temples and ancient texts, including the cremation site of Lasem's early rulers, were strong emotional triggers for resistance. People saw these measures as direct attacks on cultural pride and the flow of history. The aristocratic figures, including R.P., took a combative position. Sumilir and his family exemplify that the war was not merely political or religious, but also a contest to preserve cultural sovereignty against colonial obliteration (Aziz, 2020; Kamzah, 1858; Nafiin, 2018; Wijaya et al., 2023; Wijaya et al., 2024). The Sabil War of Lasem was the culmination of years of political exclusion, economic control, cultural repression, and societal trauma caused by VOC violence since 1740. The ongoing involvement of Chinese populations in both the Yellow War and the Sabil War illustrates that resistance in Lasem was persistent and grounded in historical unity. This resistance was motivated not solely by immediate political aims, but by a deep feeling of dignity, recollections of historical crimes, and desires to restore local autonomy from colonial domination.

In the initial phase of resistance in 1743, the Lasem movement was led by individuals from diverse ethnic and social origins, particularly R. Panji Marghana, Tan Kie Wie, and Tumenggung Widyaningrat (Oei Ing Kiat). Tan Kie Wie, a well-known Chinese merchant, had a big role in getting economic and military forces moving, but Oei Ing Kiat, a Muslim Chinese descendant of the Cheng Ho expedition, was the Duke of Lasem and had political legitimacy. This leadership structure shows that the VOC's opposition went beyond ethnic lines and was based on shared complaints about colonial exploitation (Daradjadi, 2013; Unjiya, 2014; Wijaya et al., 2024).

The defeat of the Chinese–Javanese coalition in the Yellow War and the death of Tan Kie Wie did not end resistance; instead, they turned it into a more ideologically oriented group. The Sabil War of 1750 marked the beginning of a new era in which leaders came from Lasem's three main communities: Kiai Ali Badhawi from the Muslim religious domain, R. Panji Marghana hails from the Javanese aristocracy, whereas Tumenggung Widyaningrat (Oei Ing Kiat) comes from the Muslim Chinese community. The combination of religious, aristocratic, and ethnic leadership marks a change in resistance from political opposition to a movement filled with moral, religious, and cultural meaning (Aziz, 2020; Kamzah, 1858; Wijaya et al., 2024). The main structural cause of the Lasem conflict was the Mataram Sultanate's slow fall from Amangkurat I to Amangkurat III. The VOC's increasingly conciliatory stance toward Mataram, in stark contrast to Sultan

Agung's hostile acts, led to a loss of government legitimacy in coastal districts like Lasem. Adipati Tejakusuma III and his successors covertly opposed Mataram, providing clandestine support for anti-VOC uprisings, which signifies a de facto secession of Lasem from central authority (Kamzah, 1858).

The VOC's role in the Lasem principality's governance made the political and social situation even worse. The VOC got the right to choose and fire dukes throughout the northern coast of Java through deals with Pakubuwono II. The creation of the Rembang Duchy in 1741 from Lasem land weakened Lasem's power to govern and strengthened VOC's control over important commercial routes and natural resources, especially teak forests. Lasem was fully under VOC authority by 1743, with local leaders giving in to colonial ambitions (Kamzah, 1858). Suro Adimenggolo III, a VOC appointment, used harsh methods that made social and theological problems worse. Strict monitoring of religious activities, threats of execution for people who support resistance, and bans on owning weapons or historical documents are all signs that people are trying to destroy community memory and local identity on purpose. These measures affected both Muslims and Chinese people, bringing them together across religious and ethnic lines to fight against the same colonial oppression (Kamzah, 1858).

Symbolic acts of violence, particularly the destruction of temples and ancestral manuscripts—such as the cremation site of Lasem's first rulers—served as powerful emotional catalysts for resistance. People saw these actions as direct attacks on the dignity of culture and the continuity of history (Astuti et al., 2019; Atabik, 2016a; Wijaya et al., 2024). The punitive stance adopted by aristocratic figures such as Raden Panji Sumilir and his family illustrate that the fight was not solely political or religious, but also a struggle to maintain cultural sovereignty against colonial eradication (Aziz, 2020; Kamzah, 1858). The Sabil War of Lasem finally exemplified the cumulative effects of political marginalization, economic enslavement, cultural tyranny, and societal suffering resulting from VOC warfare since 1740. The continued participation of Chinese populations in both the Yellow War and the Sabil War shows that resistance in Lasem was enduring and rooted in historical solidarity. This fight was driven not only by urgent political objectives but also by a profound sense of dignity, remembrance of historical injustices, and the aspiration to reclaim local autonomy from colonial subjugation.

Aziz (2020) looks at the Sabil War in Lasem, which was an important event in the area's history that happened between August and October of 1750. The war was marked by a clash between old and new weapons, as well as Javanese mystical rituals. The conflict began because of political unrest and growing hostility between the Lasem Kingdom and the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Aziz's research shows that the rise of a social movement leading to the uprising was enabled by political opportunities, the involvement of local leaders, and the Chinese ethnic group. They all had the same goal: to drive out the Dutch colonial forces. He implies the Sabil War was an important group action for social change because ethnic and religious unity was so important in bringing the groups together. In the end, though, Lasem lost the fight because the VOC took more control of the area and slowly put down the opposition.

Aziz asserts the Sabil War shows how important it is for social movements to get resources. This revolution was driven by material, cultural, and moral resources. Charismatic leaders like Kiai Ali Badhawi helped get people organized by using religious reasons, especially the call to jihad. Other leaders, like Oei Ing Kiat and Panji Marghana, used their money and power to get people to support them. The conflict, which happened in several places, such as Rembang, Teluk Bonang, and Layur, showed how complicated the social and cultural ties were between the Chinese minority and the native people. Despite these efforts, the VOC's power grew stronger, and the opposition finally faded after important officials died. The research shows that the VOC's structural strength, along with the loss of leadership and resources that followed, led to the end of the conflict and the continuation of colonial control in Lasem. This is true even though the movement was originally effective in bringing different groups together (Aziz, 2020).

## Ulama, Chinese, and Javanese Fusion

Kiai Ali Badhawi's leadership shows Weber's idea of charismatic power, which is based on personal traits that inspire devotion and strong commitment. Badhawi, an Arab-descended ulama and head of the Purikawak boarding school, declared a jihad fatwa during a Friday sermon, describing the fight as a holy battle (*jihad fi sabilillah*) against non-believing invaders. This action brought together students and Muslims, breaking down ethnic barriers by focusing on shared religious beliefs (Kamzah, 1858; Lan, 2015). His popularity came from the belief that he was religious leaders, which made people emotionally loyal to him and see him as a prophet amid hard times. In particular, ulama is religious leaders and patrons of traditional authority that spans many facets of life in Javanese culture.

In Weberian terms, Badhawi's social capital was seen in the complex networks that existed within Islamic institutions, such as mosques and boarding schools, that served as sites for mobilization. The relational linkages, based on trust and give-and-take, let the jihad call spread quickly and brought together Javanese Muslims and students. Badhawi promoted tolerance for non-Muslims, expanding these networks to include ethnic Chinese followers, illustrating how social capital bridges divisions in heterogeneous societies (Aziz, 2020). His influence came from turning religious authority into a cohesive force against VOC territorial intrusions.

Oei Ing Kiat, known as Tumenggung Widyaningrat, was an example of Weber's idea of a combination of traditional and charismatic authority. As a Muslim Chinese *adipati*, descended from Admiral Zheng He's journey, his conventional legitimacy stemmed from his inherited aristocratic status within the administrative framework of Lasem. This post allowed him to recruit ethnic Chinese fighters by using long-lasting business ties in trade and maritime activities to plan attacks against VOC facilities (Al-Qurtuby, 2017; Lestari & Wiratama, 2018). His charisma came from his bravery and strategic thinking, which made the *peranakan* Chinese loyal to him since they saw him as a guardian of their unique identity.

Ing Kiat's social capital was evident in the inter-ethnic networks formed through marriage, business partnerships, and friendships with Javanese and Arab communities. These contacts, formed before the war and rooted in Lasem's acculturation history since the Majapahit era, facilitated the sharing of resources, including weapons and intelligence, essential for the guerilla tactics employed (Sobirin, 2017; Wijaya et al., 2024). By working with Badhawi and Marghana, Ing Kiat turned economic resources into social power, which supports Weber's view that social relationships can lead to collective action.

Panji Marghana primarily exercised traditional authority, rooted in his descent from Adipati Tejakusuma V. This distinguished lineage granted him legitimacy among indigenous Javanese communities, enabling him to oversee ground operations and teach civilians combat skills such as *pencak silat*. His rejection of formal *adipati* duties in favor of grassroots engagement made him more attractive, making him a personable *pribumi* leader who opposed colonial invasion (Kamzah, 1858). Marghana's influence spread through family and community ties, making the trio's alliance even stronger. He used his social capital, which was built up through local networks of farmers, merchants, and fighters, to start the Laskar Dampo Awang. These interactions, because both groups were oppressed by VOC policies such residential segregation, led to cooperation and sharing of resources. In Weberian interpretation, these networks exemplify instrumental social action, whereby the rational pursuit of anti-colonial objectives fortified group solidarity. His collaboration with Ing Kiat highlighted the convergence of traditional authority and ethnic diversity in bolstering resistance.

The three of them have a lot of social capital, which comes from Lasem's experience of adapting to new cultures. This is like Weber's relational networks, which let them stick together despite VOC's cultural and territorial boundaries. Badhawi's broad view of the world, Ing Kiat's business relationships, and Marghana's ties to the community all helped create a strong framework for mobilization. This partnership prolonged the fight despite

military inequalities, as evidenced in theses of colonial resistance. Inter-ethnic marriages improved reciprocity, which made divide-and-rule strategies less effective (Cox, 2017; Friedmann, 2006; Lewis, 2012; Wallace, 2017). Weberian analysis recognizes this capital as crucial to anti-colonial social movements in Indonesia.

Weber's social closure theory explains how the trio maintained exclusive networks in opposition to the VOC while simultaneously integrating diverse groups via shared grievances arising from the 1740 massacre (Blusse, 2017; Cenci, 2021). Badhawi's fatwa required a religious closure that allies could access, which increased trust in confrontations. Ing Kiat's trade guilds brought together economic partnerships, which had strategic advantages. The noble rings of Marghana stopped people from getting in, which kept everything running. Historical records substantiate this dynamic as crucial to the war's multi-cultural character.

Their influence became institutionalized in cultural groups like the Gie Yong Bio temple. Indeed, it is a symbol of unity among different groups, even though they are diverse, but they share a common interest in fighting against the VOC (Astuti et al., 2019; Atabik, 2016b, 2016a). This helped Lasem recover from VOC reprisals by protecting social capital. Badhawi's jihad mindset changed to fit in with the rules of boarding school. The memory of Ing Kiat as a sailor had an effect on hybrid architectural styles. Marghana's disobedience became a symbol in mythology. Studies show that this routine helped people of different ethnicities get along better, which has an effect on Indonesian culture today.

Weber's ideas about bridge and bonding capital help us understand how their strategies show how cultural developments before the war led to alliances against the aggressions of 1750. Badhawi was linked by fatwas, both Ing Kiat and Marghana were linked by money and community. This lessened the cracks and made resistance last longer. Archival references corroborate its importance in resilience. Weber's framework offers paradigms for the study of colonialism. Max Weber's framework posits that Kiai Ali Badhawi exemplified charismatic leadership by presenting jihad as a unifying call that transcended religious divisions, fostering loyalty and uniting various groups against shared oppression; his fatwa delivered during Friday sermons galvanized the *santri* while incorporating Chinese elements through adaptable interpretations, creating emotional connections, with this authority—anchored in perceived divine legitimacy—directly contesting the VOC's rational-legal supremacy amidst colonial disparities (Aziz, 2020). From my perspective, Badhawi emerges as an early nationalist thinker whose influence actively transcended cultural divides, establishing him as a pivotal figure in historical narratives beyond mere religious instruction. This kind of thing reminds us of the figure of Dipanagara in Carey's study (Carey, 2008).

Additionally, scholarly analysis of Weber in Islamic governance emphasizes the necessity of adaptability in societies confronting crises. Oei Ing Kiat's traditional authority came from his aristocratic background. He used business ties to keep naval opposition going, which showed how the colonial system could be changed to work better; as Tumenggung Widyaningrat, he recruited *peranakan* fighters through long-standing business ties, countering VOC monopolies with smart alliances. His role as a cultural bridge changed the balance of power so that people of different ethnicities could share assets. I think Ing Kiat is a mixed entrepreneurial figure whose view of heritage as open trade foreshadows today's diverse Indonesian markets. These markets blend cultural backgrounds with financial strength.

Analyses of Weberian structures in imperial economies support this by noting how motivational systems change. Panji Marghana's mixed authority, which came from both noble ancestors and his own charisma, made him a Weberian symbol of determined action against colonial advances. He led land-based efforts and taught locals self-defense, using family ties to bring natives together and weaken VOC surveillance in order to achieve liberation goals. From my point of view, Marghana is the perfect example of an indigenous trailblazer. His refusal to accept official power turned aristocracy into demo-

cratic defiance, which allowed for more inclusive stories in Indonesia's historical record. Research into Weber's charisma in patriotic contexts supports this and connects it to larger developmental patterns. The royal family of Lasem was a figure greatly feared by the VOC. This aligns with Kamzah's account in *Carita Lasem*, which states that after the Sabil War was successfully suppressed, their surveillance of the Panji Marghana family became even stricter (Kamzah, 1858).

They used hybrid leadership to challenge VOC's legal-rational authority and undermine Weber's domination-subordination paradigm by giving power to groups that were already on the outside. Badhawi's charm brought together different religious groups, Ing Kiat's legacy linked different economic groups, and Marghana's synthesis encouraged people to work together. This synergy prolonged the conflict, notwithstanding obstacles, by fostering relational networks. I believe that their method of interpretation turned subordination into proactive empowerment, serving as a historical example of how multicultural groups can work together to oppose colonialism. Studies on Weber in colonial administrations demonstrate similar reversals, enhancing contemporary power assessments (Weber, 1993, 2019).

Weber's idea of social closure in the trio's setting pushed colonial outsiders to the edges while bringing together different insiders, creating strong networks that made resistance more effective. The religious groups in Badhawi, the business groups in Ing Kiat, and the social ties in Marghana all helped to keep this closure in place, making it harder for invaders to get in. Weber suggested that these kinds of systems honed group dynamics in cultures with many different groups. This closure was strategically adaptable, seeing ethnic diversity as a strength instead of a threat, which made the Sabil War a model of strong multiculturalism. Historical records of colonial rule support this and are in line with other neo-patrimonial developments.

After the battle, the trio's power became part of Lasem's culture, which protected social capital that helped the area recover from VOC reprisals and changes in territory. Badhawi's jihad attitude influenced the tolerant boarding school, Ing Kiat's legacy shaped hybrid architecture, and Marghana's resistance inspired folklore. This evolution resisted subordination, aligning with Weber's colonial critique. From my analytical viewpoint, their interpretative legacy redefined failure as a foundation for unification, offering insights for contemporary inter-ethnic resilience in Indonesia. Investigations into Weberian routinization within post-colonial civilizations validate this enduring impact.

Aziz used Lasem's historical acculturation to build relationships that reduced violence by addressing common cultural grievances. Badhawi connected through inclusive fatwas, Ing Kiat built economic links, and Marghana brought people together as a community (Aziz, 2020). This capital prolonged opposition, illustrating Weber's relational concepts in multicultural contexts. I think that their strategic use of money saw variation as an asset, turning possible divisions into a strong force for anti-colonial efforts. Archival evidence on social stratification substantiates the model's relevance for historical continuity (Weber, 1993).

Recent Indonesian historiography on the Sabil War in Lasem (1750) provides concrete evidence that the trio—Kiai Ali Badhawi, Oei Ing Kiat (Tumenggung Widyaningrat), and Raden Panji Margana—engineered a coordinated mass mobilization rather than relying on spontaneous upheaval. As documented in studies of the Javanese-Muslim-Chinese alliance against the VOC (Aziz, 2020; Wijaya et al., 2024), Badhawi's charismatic reinterpretation of jihad sabil created a shared religious identity that transcended ethnic boundaries, while Ing Kiat's rational deployment of trading networks supplied material resources and intelligence, and Margana's inter-ethnic councils and strategic marriages built durable trust structures. These mechanisms, grounded in Weberian charismatic and rational-legal authority plus social capital, transformed fragmented local grievances into a sustained multicultural front that controlled trade routes for nearly seven months. Far from the irrational "yellow peril" stereotype sometimes attached to the event, the Lasem case illustrates leadership as an active process of identity construction and resource mobi-

lization within a diverse Southeast Asian community (Adhitya et al., 2023).

When read through the lens of contemporary crowd psychology, the Lasem alliance strikingly anticipates the Social Identity Approach (SIA) elaborated in recent scholarship. Drury (2026) argues that crowds become psychological groups when participants shift from personal to collective identity, generating empowerment, solidarity, and coordinated action rather than deindividuation or contagion as posited by classical theory (Le Bon). Similarly, the meta-analytic synthesis by da Costa et al. (2023) identifies collective identity ( $r = 0.34$ ), collective efficacy ( $r = 0.36$ ), and affective relative deprivation as the strongest predictors of mass participation—precisely the dynamics observable in Lasem, where the trio’s religious reframing, economic coordination, and kinship networks produced a politicized “we” across Javanese, Chinese, and Arab actors. Drury et al. (2025) and Stott (2025) further reinforce this by showing how identity leadership and dialogue-like community councils (rather than top-down command) enable diffusion of solidarity and resistance to external policing—mirroring how the trio’s councils preempted internal fragmentation and delayed VOC reinforcements. Thus, the 18th-century Southeast Asian case offers an empirical prototype of SIA in a pre-industrial, anti-colonial setting, challenging the Eurocentric temporal bias in most crowd-psychology datasets (Da Costa et al., 2023; Drury et al., 2025; Stott et al., 2026).

The Lasem episode also exposes provocative limitations in both Weberian sociology and current SIA models when applied to non-Western communal realities. Weber’s ideal types, developed from European Protestant and bureaucratic contexts, underplay the syncretic, kinship-based, and *gotong-royong* elements that Margana and Badhawi harnessed; likewise, SIA’s emphasis on cognitive categorization risks flattening the affective, ritual, and patron-client reciprocity that sustained the alliance long after the battlefield. The Indonesian sources ((Hadi, 2020; Wijaya et al., 2024)) repeatedly highlight these hybrid cultural practices as the true “social capital” that outlasted colonial extraction. This historical precedent therefore demands a more radical dialogue: future research must hybridize Weberian authority with SIA by incorporating Southeast Asian communal ontologies, testing whether identity leadership in diverse, religiously mediated settings produces forms of empowerment and durability that Western-derived models have yet to theorize fully. Such a cross-temporal and cross-cultural interrogation would sharpen both frameworks and enrich the sociology of multicultural resistance.

Ultimately, the Weberian influence of the famous trio created a paradigm of leadership and capital that sped up unity. This has big effected on how we understand anti-colonial history in multicultural settings. Badhawi's charm brought people of different religions together, Ing Kiat's tradition brought people of different religions together, and Marghana's mixture brought people of different religions together. This trio softened VOC regulations, which led to long-lasting stories about their legacy. In Carita Lasem, the two are descended from wealthy families. On the Lasem coast, Oei has a sizable shipbuilding business of some sort. P. Marghana, a prosperous farmer of Lasem royal ancestry, is comparable (Kamzah, 1858). According to Weber, their main purpose is to bring the native Javanese and Chinese together as a brotherhood by creating binding networks with a very high adhesive strength (Weber, 1993). From my interpretive synthesis, their legacy conceptualizes historical agency as transformative multiculturalism, providing enduring insights for global diversity issues. Theses about Weber's contributions to sociology emphasize the relevance of this paradigm in assessing resistance movements.

Weber's theories show how the three leaders worked together to deal with the problems of colonialism, leaving behind a legacy of adaptable power in Lasem. Badhawi's prophetic charisma, Ing Kiat's hereditary stability, and Marghana's noble creativity created a synergistic model. This hybridization weakened bureaucratic control, as Weber examined in rational societies. I think that this mix of interpretations made the three of them pioneers of inclusive government, which changed how people thought about power in multicultural histories. Scholarly research on Weber's rationalization supports this, linking it to the development of social order (Basiroen & Manuaba, 2022).

Along with the Sabil War in Lasem, two other important anti-colonial movements that show similar patterns of leadership and cooperation between different ethnic groups are the Malay Resistance during British rule in the late 1800s and the Indian independence movement against British rule. Both revolutions had leaders who used different leadership styles that crossed cultural, religious, and ethnic lines to bring together different people in a common fight against colonial tyranny.

The Malay Resistance, especially in the late 1800s when Datuk Maharaja Lela and other local lords were in charge, showed how traditional Malay leaders could work with Islamic leaders to fight British imperialism. Islamic leaders had religious authority, and aristocrats had political influence, which made a strong group that fought against British expansion into Malay lands (Abel, 2016; Andaya & Andaya, 1982; Chew, 1998; Gibson, 2007). This is like how Kiai Ali Badhawi's religious charm and Oei Ing Kiat's political might brought together different tribes in Lasem to fight the Dutch. The success of the Malay resistance was like that of the Sabil War. It depended on their ability to build social capital in their communities, which made it possible for them to work together to resist even if the colonizers tried to divide and conquer (Andaya & Andaya, 1982). This shows that hybrid leadership can effectively challenge colonial power, fostering collective resistance.

The Indian independence movement, especially under the guidance of leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, similarly witnessed the unification of many social, religious, and ethnic groups in opposition to British colonial control (Habib, 1995; Zachariah, 2011). Gandhi's magnetic leadership brought together Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and other groups under the banner of nonviolent resistance, despite their differences in religion and ethnicity. Gandhi's ideology of satyagraha helped people feel like they were all on the same page, just like Badhawi, Ing Kiat, and Marghana used their own charismatic, traditional, and economic power to bring people together in Lasem. The Indian movement's ability to overcome internal conflicts shows how important social capital and hybrid leadership are for getting people to work together in anti-colonial struggles (Habib, 1995; Jayalakshmi, 2025; Jerin & Vishwakarma, 2025; Mukherjee, 2010; Singh, n.d.; Zachariah, 2011). The resistance conducted by these individuals exemplifies how hybrid leadership styles empower organizations to strengthen their cohesion and confront colonial tyranny.

I contend that the importance of hybrid leadership and social capital in these movements resides in their ability to transcend ethnic and social divisions, transforming variety into an asset rather than a point of contention. The leadership of individuals like as Badhawi, Ing Kiat, Marghana, Gandhi, and the leaders of the Malay resistance illustrates the flexibility of authority in colonial settings, where power relations were perpetually challenged through networks of trust, common complaints, and collective action. These instances illustrate that resistance organizations are characterized not solely by their frontal antagonism towards colonial forces, but also by the capacity of leaders to establish inclusive frameworks that promote collaboration among varied groups.

An examination of anti-colonial movements uncovers significant patterns of hybrid leadership and inter-ethnic collaboration that enabled resistance against colonial authorities. This study centers on three significant movements: the Sabil War in Lasem, the Malay Resistance to British colonialism in the late 19th century, and the Indian independence movement. These movements had their own unique ways of leading that brought together people from different cultures, religions, and ethnicities in a common fight against colonial tyranny.

The Malay Resistance during British colonialism, especially under leaders like Datuk Maharaja Lela, showed how traditional and religious leaders could work together to fight against foreign rule. Maharaja Lela and other leaders combined their political power with the religious authority of Islamic leaders, which helped them get a lot of support against British colonialism. The fusion of Islamic authority with conventional leadership formed a formidable coalition, enabling structured opposition via local government frameworks

and communal trust (Abel, 2016; Andaya & Andaya, 1982; Basiroen & Manuaba, 2022). This cooperation across different ethnic groups was based on building social capital and a shared identity in Malay communities, which is like the techniques used in the Sabil War.

The effectiveness of these movements against British colonial forces shows the strength of hybrid leadership in utilizing local grievances and trust networks. The Malay Resistance and the Sabil War both used stories of common suffering and resistance to get people to support them. This is like how Kiai Ali Badhawi and Oei Ing Kiat got support from people of different ethnic groups in Lasem. By putting their efforts in cultural and religious stories, these leaders could rise above ethnic and factional conflicts, which strengthened their united front against colonial power.

The Indian independence struggle also showed how hybrid leadership can change things, with leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Gandhi's idea of Satyagraha was significant in bringing together Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs, as well as other religious and ethnic groups. His non-violent strategy, based on the ideas of social love and moral resistance, broke down traditional barriers and created a strong sense of unity against colonial oppression. Gandhi's flexibility as a leader is like the mixed traits seen in leaders of the Sabil War, who could get people to back them by moving through difficult cultural settings. Also, the Indian independence movement's cooperation amongst communities was like the Malay Resistance's spirit of working together. Leaders carefully shaped their stories so that they included more general complaints from society, which created a space where different groups could see their shared interests in fighting British. The strong leadership shown during these revolutions shows hybrid techniques may bring together different groups, which makes anti-colonial efforts stronger and more resilient in the end.

The examination of these movements uncovers a significant understanding: hybrid leadership and social capital were essential in maneuvering the complex dynamics of anti-colonial resistance. Leaders took advantage of their cultural strengths and used techniques that focused on bringing people together rather than splitting them apart. Figures like as Badhawi, Ing Kiat, Gandhi, and Malay nobles illustrated that the convergence of political, religious, and traditional authority could yield a formidable collective action framework capable of contesting colonial power (Claridge, 2018; Kreuter & Lezin, 2002; Weber, 2019)

The lessons learned from these anti-colonial movements show that social capital is still important. In times of trouble, networks of trust and shared experiences help keep communities together. By fostering linkages within and between communities, leaders strengthened the capacity to counter colonial strategies designed to divide and conquer, underscoring that unity among diverse groups may serve as a powerful resistance force.

## CONCLUSION

A Weberian analysis reveals that the actors—effectively combined charismatic and rational-legal authority to forge cross-ethnic social capital during the Sabil War in Lasem in 1750. Badhawi demonstrated charismatic leadership by publicly reinterpreting the religious obligation of *jihad sabil*, positioning Chinese and Javanese fighters as equal partners and mobilizing approximately 300 to 400 mixed troops to defend the Lasem river port. Ing Kiat, for his part, exercised rational-legal authority through his extensive trading networks, transforming Chinese commercial capital into essential gunpowder supplies and intelligence from Dutch ports, which sustained the trio's guerrilla campaign for nearly six months. Margana, meanwhile, strengthened social capital by forming inter-ethnic community councils and orchestrating strategic marriages across Arab, Chinese, and Javanese families, generating durable trust networks that outlasted the battlefield itself. These concrete mechanisms confronted the VOC's rigid ethnic hierarchies and transformed a fragmented local resistance into a remarkably cohesive multicultural front.

The practical deployment of Weberian leadership and social capital produced measurable outcomes. Unlike earlier isolated uprisings that collapsed within weeks, the trio's alli-

ance delayed VOC reinforcements for almost seven months by securing key trade routes, forcing the Dutch into temporary truces. In the war's aftermath, the same networks facilitated the reconstruction of Lasem's market and the reintegration of displaced communities, underscoring social capital's role as a slow yet potent counter to rapid colonial extraction. Far from abstract pluralism, the trio's actions show that multicultural resistance was grounded in everyday economic cooperation and religious reinterpretation rather than ideological rhetoric.

In conclusion, although Weber's concepts of charismatic authority and social capital effectively explain the success of the trio in forging a multicultural alliance during the 1750 Sabil War in Lasem, these concepts simultaneously reveal significant limitations when confronted with Southeast Asian communal realities. The fluid, kinship-based, and syncretic leadership practices—bolstered by the construction of a shared collective identity as emphasized in contemporary crowd psychology and the Social Identity Approach—challenge the universality of Weber's Eurocentric ideal types and demand a more radical re-examination. Therefore, future research should undertake a critical dialogue between Weberian theory, the Social Identity Approach to crowd psychology, and local anti-colonial experiences by comparing the Sabil War networks with similar alliances in the Java War (1825–1830) and the Aceh War, in order to develop a more contextually grounded sociology of multicultural leadership and resistance in Southeast Asia.

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
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