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Between Mosque and Market *the Muslim Community in Quiapo, Metro Manila*

Abstraksi: Komunitas Muslim merupakan bagian minoritas dari keseluruhan bangsa Filipina. Sensus tahun 1975 menunjukkan bahwa populasi mereka hanya sekitar 5 persen dari seluruh penduduk negeri ini. Kebanyakan komunitas Muslim berdiam di propinsi-propinsi bagian Selatan: kepulauan Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, Palawan, Balabac, Tawitawi dan sebagainya. Secara linguistik dan etnik, mereka terdiri dari Maguindanao, Marano, Iranos, Sangir, Kalagon, Tausog, dan Samal. Sejarah menunjukkan bahwa komunitas Muslim selalu terlibat dalam perjuangan melawan kekuatan-kekuatan asing, seperti Spanyol, Amerika Serikat, Jepang, dan suku-suku lain di Filipina sendiri. Sampai terbentuk negara Filipina, bahkan sampai sekarang, mereka tetap terus terlibat dalam perjuangan membebaskan diri.

Masyarakat internasional sudah mencoba membantu memecahkan konflik antara pemerintah Filipina dan komunitas Muslim. Negara-negara yang mayoritas penduduknya Muslim, seperti Saudi Arabia, Libya, dan terakhir Indonesia, telah mencoba menjadi penghubung antarkedua faksi tersebut. Bahkan negosiasi yang diadakan di Libya pada 23 Desember 1976 telah pula mencapai hasil yang tertuang dalam Perjanjian Tripoli (Tripoli Agreement) yang membahas proses otonomisasi wilayah Muslim di Filipina. Namun, perjanjian ini kandas oleh sebuah referendum yang kemudian diadakan sebagai proses awal penentuan suara. Komunitas Kristen tidak setuju kalau pemerintah pusat memberi otonomi kepada

komunitas Muslim Filipina yang populer dengan sebutan Moro tersebut. Mulai saat itu, konflik kembali pecah dan memaksa sebagian Muslim untuk hijrah ke Metro Manila.

Komunitas Muslim sudah sejak lama hadir di Metro Manila. Namun, konflik fisik yang akut di wilayah Selatan semakin kuat mendorong proses hijrah penduduknya ke kota ini. Di satu sisi, mereka ingin menghindari tekanan hidup yang berat di wilayah asal mereka dan, di sisi lain, kota Metro Manila dipandang dapat memberikan kehidupan yang lebih layak. Mereka mendiami beberapa wilayah yang tersebar di Metro Manila. Salah satu wilayah penting yang dijadikan "jendela pandang" (window display) artikel ini adalah Quiapo. Secara historis-sosiologis, Quiapo memiliki arti yang sangat penting. Quiapo merupakan tempat penampungan Muslim pendatang dari wilayah Selatan. Meskipun latar belakang etnik dan linguistik beragam, kesamaan nasib sebagai perantau dan sebagai Muslim membuat keragaman budaya ini tidak begitu menjadi faktor yang penting. Mereka disatukan oleh kesamaan identitas yang diperkuat melalui institusi agama, seperti masjid. Kontak mereka dengan orang asing, termasuk kalangan non-Muslim Metro Manila sendiri, juga intens. Hal ini lebih diperkuat lagi dengan adanya pasar Rajah Sunaiman yang merupakan aktivitas ekonomi utama komunitas Muslim setempat.

Pada tingkat tertentu komunitas Muslim Quiapo merepresentasikan karakteristik umum umat Islam Filipina. Pengalaman sejarah, struktur sosial, dan dinamika Muslim Filipina, muncul dalam bentuknya yang relatif baru. Komunitas Quiapo masih memegang teguh tradisi semangat keagamaan nenek moyang mereka di Selatan. Agama, bagi komunitas Quiapo, menjadi kekuatan integratif yang menyatukan komunitas, baik secara spiritual, kultural, maupun sosial. Secara spiritual, agama memberikan dorongan untuk menghadapi kehidupan perkotaan yang bersifat anomik. Secara kultural, agama menghubungkan nilai-nilai pedesaan-tradisional-agraris dengan pandangan dunia yang bersifat urban-modern-industrial. Secara sosial, agama juga mengembalikan perasaan memiliki yang sangat rentan bagi komunitas yang cenderung menyebar ini.

Meskipun demikian, struktur komunitas Muslim cenderung kurang mendukung tercapainya perjuangan otonomi. Fakta yang paling menonjol adalah kelangkaan suatu organisasi yang dapat menjangkau umat Islam secara nasional. Lembaga Dakwah Islam Filipina (the Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines) memang merupakan organisasi Islam bertaraf nasional. Sayangnya, lembaga ini tidak memiliki pengaruh kuat terhadap seluruh komunitas Muslim di Filipina, meskipun telah mendapatkan

pengakuan luas dari dunia Islam. Berbeda dari Malaysia atau Indonesia, setiap komunitas Muslim di Filipina cenderung berdiri secara otonom dan memiliki pemimpin sentralnya sendiri-sendiri. Keragaman ini tidak hanya dilatarbelakangi oleh perbedaan etnik atau bahasa. Pengalaman politik dan perbedaan sejarah juga memainkan peran yang sangat penting. Tradisi kesultanan di wilayah Selatan menunjukkan kecenderungan pada pola distribusi kekuasaan yang lebih luas, seperti terlihat dengan banyaknya sultan dan datu, yang masing-masing memegang kekuasaan sendiri-sendiri.

بين المسجد والسوق: صورة عن مسلمى كوييافو - مترو مانيلا

يُعتبر المسلمون أقلية ضمن شعب الفلبين. ويبين إحصاء عام ١٩٧٥ أن نسبة عدد المسلمين تصل إلى ٥٪ من عدد السكان. سكن الغالبية منهم فى محافظات الجزء الجنوبى من الفلبين وهى جزر: ميندانو، سولو، باسيلان، فالوان، بالاباك، تاوى-تاوى، وغيرها. وأما بالنسبة إلى اللغة والشعوبية فأكثرهم من ماكويندانو، مارانو، إيرانوس، سانجير، كالاغون، توسوغ، و سامال. ويبين التاريخ أن الأقلية المسلمة كانت تشتبك فى نضال ضد القوى الأجنبية، مثل الإسبان، والأمريكان، واليابان، والعناصر الأخرى من الفلبين نفسها، وحتى تشكيل دولة الفلبين، بل حتى الآن، لا يزال المسلمون يناضلون من أجل تحرير أنفسهم.

وقد حاول المجتمع الدولى المساهمة فى إيجاد حل للمشكلة الدائمة بين حكومة الفلبين والأقلية المسلمة. فقد توسطت الدول المسلمة مثل المملكة العربية السعودية، وليبيا، وأخيرا إندونيسيا بين الأطراف المعنية. وأن الاجتماع الذى عقد بليبيا فى ٢٣ ديسمبر ١٩٧٦ وصل إلى حل وكانت نتيجته الوصول إلى اتفاق طرابلس، الذى بحث فى مراحل تحقيق الحكم الذاتى بمنطقة المسلمين بالفلبين. إلا أن تنفيذه فشل بعد أخذ الأصوات عليه، وعدم موافقة المسيحيين على إعطاء الحكم الذاتى للمسلمين. ومنذ ذلك الوقت عادت المشاكل تظهر من جديد، مما أدى إلى هجرة جماعات من المسلمين إلى مترو مانيلا.

يعود وجود جماعات المسلمين بمترو مانيلا إلى زمن بعيد. ولكن ازدادت الهجرة إليها أخيرا بسبب التصادم بينهم وبين غيرهم. والسبب أولا، لأنهم يريدون تفادى الحياة

الصعبة فى مواطنهم الأصلية، وثانياً، لأن العاصمة مانىلا تبدو كأنها تغريهم بحياة أفضل. يسكن المسلمون بعض المناطق المنتشرة فى أنحاء مترو مانىلا. وستركز هذه المقالة على إحدى المناطق وستصحبنا لنطل منها على نافذة هى كويافو Quiapo.

من الناحية التاريخية الاجتماعية، فإن كويافو لها معنا هاماً، وهى كمثابة مكان تجمع المسلمين القادمين (المهاجرين) إليها من ولايات الجنوب. كما أن سكان كويافو يتمتعون بخلفيات عنصرية ثقافية أو لغوية عديدة. ولكن، جمعهم نفس المصير كمهاجرين وكمسلمين، مما قلل من حدة الاختلافات الثقافية بينهم، لقد وحدت بينهم نفس الهوية التى قويت بمرور الوقت عن طريق المجتمعات والتنظيم الدينى، مثل المسجد، واختلاطهم بغيرهم من الأجانب ومن غير المسلمين. فأكثر من هذا، هو وجود سوق رجاس سليمان الذى تتم فيه النشاطات الاقتصادية الحيوية للمسلمين.

فى مرحلة معينة، يمثل مسلمو كويافو الشخصية المسلمة بصفة عامة بالفلبين، تجاربهم التاريخية، التنظيمات الاجتماعية، ونشاطات المسلمين الفلبين، كلها تظهر فى شكلها الحديث نوعاً. ولا يزال المواطنون فى كويافو يتمسكون بتقاليد وقوة تدبّر أجدادهم فى الجنوب. فالدين بالنسبة لمواطنى كويافو، من العوامل الموحدة بينهم. سواء من الناحية الروحية، أو الثقافية، أو الاجتماعية. من الناحية الروحية، يحميهم الدين إلى مواجهة حياة المدينة الصاخبة. ومن الناحية الثقافية، يصبح الدين همزة الوصل بين القيم التقليدية التى ورثوها من القرية وحياتها الزراعية، بالمدينة المتقدمة وجوها الصناعى. ومن الناحية الاجتماعية، فإن الدين يعيد لهم شعورهم بالملكية التى تعوزها هذه الجماعة التى تميل إلى الارتحال.

برغم هذا كله، فإن المنظمات الإسلامية تبدو غير موجهة ولا تسعى لتحقيق أمل الحصول على الحكم الذاتى. وتشير الحقائق إلى عدم وجود تنظيم أو هيئة معينة يمكن أن تضم حولها جميع المسلمين على الصعيد الوطنى.

توجد منظمة الدعوة الإسلامية بالفلبين، وهى على المستوى الوطنى، لكن للأسف، ليس لها تأثير قوى على جميع المسلمين بالفلبين، رغم أنها حصلت على تأييد واسع من

العالم الإسلامى. بعكس ما هو عليه فى مليزيا أو إندونيسيا، إذ كل منطقة لها جمعية محلية ولها زعيم يصير محورها. وتعدد الزعماء إنما يكون بسبب العنصر أو اللغة كذلك تلعب مسألة الاختلاف فى التجارب السياسية واختلاف تاريخ نضال بعضها عن البعض مما له دور كبير فى ذلك كما أن تقاليد الممالك (السلطانية) بمنطقة الجنوب تظهر ميلا إلى توزيع السلطة على نطاق أوسع، كما يبدو فى كثرة السلاطين والسادة (الأعيان) حيث يتمتع كل واحد منهم بسلطة مستقلة.

The influx of Muslims from Southern provinces to Metro Manila has attracted the attention of the government as well as that of private circles. The government has provided them with the beautiful Golden Mosque, administered by the Ministry of Muslim Affairs. The Golden Mosque is also a diplomatic symbol of the Philippines' relationship with Middle Eastern Countries that offers it many economic opportunities. Most importantly it is a symbol of the national integration policy advocated by the government, in pursuit of the Tripoli Agreement 1976. The government has also provided the community with a market place in which to trade, the Rajah Sulaiman Traders' Association Market. The Market gives them access to buyers in the busy center of Quiapo.

Private circles, especially journalists, have covered the Quiapo in the news —though, unfortunately, more often than not, in a negative manner. Most of the time, the community has received unfair news reportage. The problems of poverty, common to all refugees wherever they come from, have so far not attracted the attention of the citizens. During election years e.g. 1984 political parties were interested in collecting the Quiapo's votes, and the community responded positively to all attempts to integrate them into the political machine, despite all the odds.

The Muslim community in Manila is a community in the making. They number approximately 50,000, mostly residing in the Barangay 648 in San Miguel, where this study was conducted. The other Muslim community locations, Maharlika Village and Taguig, show more characteristics of settled communities. Maharlika Village is certainly the most stable, since its population are mostly professionals working in Metro Manila. Quiapo constitutes an "emergency exit" for Muslims coming from the South, meaning that the place offers them opportunities as well as challenges.

In the first place this study is an attempt to complete a sociological study of Islam in the Philippines, namely its "window display" enclave in Quiapo, Manila. Such studies are numerous, especially regarding works on Indonesia (Wertheim: 1959; Geertz: 1971; Castle: 1967; Peacock: 1978; Nakamura: 1980), yet little has been written on Muslims in the Philippines. The relevance of the sociology of Max Weber in Southeast Asian countries has been discussed by Syed Hussein Alatas (Alatas: 1963), especially the "Protestant Ethics" thesis. The concept is popular among scholars because of its ability to explain the rise of the Islamic bourgeoisie in the modernizing world

in respective countries. The anti-Marxist flavor of the thesis seems more appropriate to the basic religious orientation of the population in the area. The Malay world, including the Philippines, constitutes the fourth zone of Islam (Nasr: 1977), which in many respects shows similarities, especially those related to the *sharī'ah* school, in which the Shāfi'ī school of *sharī'ah* is predominant.

The historical context of the Philippine Muslims is, however, very different from their Muslim coreligion in the Malay world. The reformist movement which has so far become the backbone of the Malay world's nationalism is nearly absent in the Philippines. The differences between conservative and modern Muslims that may exist do not even justify the labels, so the question of reformist psychology and "Protestant Ethics" common to the Malay Muslims (Peacock: 1978) seem to bear little relevance to the Philippine Muslims. In this case, Max Weber's sociology of religion still offers some other useful conceptual frameworks with which to work. In his discussion on Islam, Weber mentioned the existence of a "warrior psychology" that diametrically opposes the Puritan psychology (Weber: 1963, pp. 262-266). In the light of the sociology of Max Weber, we therefore want to observe whether or not such a "warrior psychology" prevails among the community being studied.

Though the Weber's description of Islam depends so much on secondary and "Orientalist" literature, it is still worthwhile looking at its relevance. As the history of the Filipino Muslims shows never ending wars of resistances against the Spanish, the Americans and the Philippines government (Majul: 1978; Gowing: 1983; George: 1980; Tan: 1977), one might wonder whether in the course of the five centuries there emerged among the Muslims a "warrior psychology", even if this psychology is not an inherent value in Islam. Currently, talk about the *jihād* (holy war) psyche is still around (Mastura in Jocano: 1983); a good indicator of the prevalence of the spirit of religious struggle. Though the *jihād* psyche in the Philippine context is more historical rather than doctrinal, the writer will take the liberty to use the Weberian concept, wherever applicable.

If it is true that the warrior psyche is relevant to the Philippine setting, how is the psyche reflected in the religious, social and economic behavior of the Muslim community in Quiapo? This preliminary study possibly offers no more than a glance at the Filipino Muslims in general. Quiapo is the only place in the Philippines where

Muslims show their reaction to the modernizing process in its full complexity and extremity. An advantage of the location is that Muslims in Metro Manila tend to be a multi-ethnic group in which ethnicity is the secondary factor after religion. Thus here we can speak of the Muslims as such, rather than the Maranao, Maguindanao or Tausog. Of course, further study might reveal how the various ethnic groups show their peculiar ethnic traits in the course of social transformation.

The second question dealt with this study is the problem of modernization, on which there is already an ample literature in the Philippines. The migration of the rural population to urban centres has resulted in the transformation of behavior among rural migrants. One such study (Guthrie: 1970) shows that if the urban condition is presented as an operant-conditioning process and the change in locality as a change in reinforcement contingencies, the modification of behavior becomes more comprehensible. It is suspected that the people under study, Muslims, will react differently to their Christian compatriots in response to the modernizing process. The Guthrie study was undertaken among the Filipino rural population who have the same cultural and religious background as urban people, but this is not the case for the Muslims. Nevertheless, it is necessary to first look at the general expectation of changed values when the rural population migrate to the city, especially regarding their religious life. Though Islam is not especially a religion of the rural population, for it was indeed colored from the first beginning by urban life (Turner: 1974, pp. 93-106), the urban character of early Islam has been transformed into a rural one in many parts of Southeast Asia. Indeed, the arrival of Islam in the Philippines was also marked by the rise of cities, yet its urban character was soon submerged by the rural background of its adherents. The ruralisation process took place for centuries so that we no longer see the urban character of Islam in its present day form in the Philippines.

Thus we can assume that the displaced Muslims of Quiapo moved from pre-industrial urban communities and rural communities to the Metro Manila metropolitan civilization with a great shock. For Milton Yinger (Yinger: 1966, pp. 17-38) who assumes that all major religions in the world originated in the rural societies, the urban setting poses enormous problems to religious adherents and institutions. Contact with strangers often results in disenchantment, as strange environments

in the cities disturbs homogeneous ideals. The same contact also results in secularization, as contact with people from different religious persuasion demands adjustments in behavior. Religious tolerance can be the beginning of religious secularization. Another problem is the loosening of kinship ties. The close-knit community in rural surroundings is broken into pieces by the urban individualizing process. This process might entail a situation of anomie, in which former institutions tend to diminish while new urbanized institutions have not been fully adopted. The birth of sectarian religions may be expected from urbanization process. In the case of Muslims it is interesting to see whether such general expectations occur. The short history of the Quiapo community might not as yet reveal such tendencies, but signs of this development might have arisen.

The urbanization process may also affect social solidarity. As city dwellers composed of the whole mass of people, the massification process occurred within formerly intact community. If in such an event the defence mechanism of the vanishing communities does not emerge, the community will fall apart, which is the distinctive quality of urban society. Urban dwellers tend to lose the desire for a community, the desire for engagement and the desire for dependence (Slater: 1971). This means that communal solidarity is replaced by a more rational type of solidarity, the kind that Durkheim called "organic solidarity". In this type of solidarity, people are organized through their interests, not through their common localities, culture or ethnic denominations. The loss of engagement is caused by the highly individualized urban setting, so that individual interests take first priority in social relationships. The feeling that there is some kind of interdependence diminishes, replaced by feelings of self-interest and self-confidence, in terms of one should be his own self before anything else.

In religious matters, the process of secularization may be both objective and subjective (Berger: 1969). Objective secularization happens, when the social institution that was formerly loaded with religious values is split into several elements, with each continuing according to its own dynamics. Such secularization is noted in economic life in which the liberated economy often becomes the major force in social affairs. Subjective secularization is a sense of personal daily experiences being unrelated to religious values. Religious feelings unsubstantiated by social facts that are experienced by individuals may be-

come meaningless. Thus the anomic quality of city life becomes a real threat to the very foundation of religion, the very meaning of life. The search for meaning is likely to lose its ground in the midst of city massification.

In general, such development is the process of change from what Weber called the *wert*rational way of life to the *zweck*rational one. If such a process has been the destiny of the Western civilization, we may legitimately ask whether such a process is not also taking place in the Eastern World. One of the most serious consequences of this change is the formation of a class society. In other words, the forces of the market have replaced the religious values related to social life. The study of the Philippine value system (Guthrie: 1980) shows that there is indeed change to *pakikisama* (communality) even in the villages. The "market situation" of each member of the community becomes the main determining force in his social relationships, thus disorganizing communal as well as religious social relationships. The question to ask is how the Muslim community—being religiously oriented—reacts to the process of rationalization of social relations.

Another important modernization phenomenon is monetization. This process involves individuals' judgement of the value of their properties, time and labor. The highest monetized sector of society is trade and industry which, in a fully monetized society, becomes the model of social behavior. In this case, the Quiapo example provides a good example for such a study, for many of its members undertake some business in the commercial center there, in the Rajah Sulaiman Traders' Association Market, selling various kinds of Southern products and imported materials. The question of whether they tend to be highly economized in such a situation is interesting to consider.

In the meantime, modernity also involves contact with legal-rational institutions, the bureaucracy and political parties. The inclusion of the community in the Metro Manila administration has made them an incorporated community with its own bureaucracy, the Barangay 658, San Miguel. The same process also occurred in the two other locations in the Maharlika Village and the Muslim community in Taguig, both in Rizal. Meanwhile, other communities, such as in San Andres, Pasay City and Dasmaraninas, are still in formation. Though these communities are in different parts of the Metro Manila, it seems that they in fact form a single large community. It is in the Barangay 648 that the typical characteristics of the Muslim community are well

represented, and where the social elements are nearly complete. Hassan has described how the social networks in the community comprise of the Barangay, the Mosque and the Market (Hassan: 1983). In addition to the Barangay bureaucracy, there is also a bureaucracy in the Golden Mosque in the commercial center of Quiapo. However, this study found that the most important development towards a rational institution is the Islamic Centre management in the Barangay, comprising of the *madrassah*, the Grand Mosque and the Jama'ah. Religious activities in the Islamic Center are organized in a way that makes it look more like a bureaucracy than a loosely-structured community institution. An association type of solidarity emerges among the community, alongside the more traditional social relations. It is interesting to see how far the associational institutions really exist in the community and also in the Rajah Sulaiman Traders' Association market.

The Social and Historical Backgrounds

The estimated number of the Filipino Muslims or the Moros in 1975 was 2,188,000 less than 5% of the whole population —despite the claim of the Moros that they were greatest in number. The comparative size of number of Moros amongst the rest of the population in selected years was: 4.19% in 1918, 4.11% in 1939, 4.11% in 1948, 4.86% in 1960 and 4.31% in 1970 (Gowing: 1979, pp. 252-258). The rate of population growth has been low, due to economic disadvantages, poor health conditions, and the prolonged social, political and military conflicts.

The Moros predominantly occupy the provinces in the Southern regions; on the islands of Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, Palawan, Balabac, Tawi-Tawi, Cagayan Sulu, Pangutaran, Sibutu and Sarangani. The Moros are a multi ethnic and multi linguistic group of people. In terms of ethnic and linguistic groups, the Maguindanao, the Maranao, the Iranon (Ilanun), the Sangir, the Kalagon, the Tausog and the Samal live in Mindanao, the largest island in the Southern provinces; the Tausog, the Samal, the Jama Mapun and the Bajao live in Sulu; the Yakan, the Tausog, the Samal, the Maranao, and the Maguindanao live in Basilan; the Palawani, the Tausog and the Samal live in Palawan; and the Molbog or the Malebuganaon can be found in Balabac (Saber: 1975, p. 5; An Anatomy: 1970, p. 12). In 1975 the population sizes of the larger groups were 674,000 Maguindanao, 492,000 Tausog, 429

Ilanun, 241,000 Maranao, 202 Samal and 93,000 Yakan (Gowing: 1979, p. 2). Though there is a demographic mixture among the groups, the principal locations of the larger groups show that the Maguindanao live mainly in the Cotabato region, the Tausog in the Sulu Archipelago (mainly on the island of Sulu), the Ilanun on the Southeastern shores of Mindanao, the Maranao in Lanao, the Samal in the Sulu Archipelago, and the Yakan on Basilan Island.

Despite their common religion, their linguistic barriers make the groups almost mutually exclusive. Oral communication is difficult, save for those who are multilingual. With this background in mind one can understand that any new place such as that of Quiapo offers a challenge to the various ethnic groups. In Quiapo the majority is Maranao and the natural language is also Maranao, both in the Barangay or in the market.

Among the displaced groups the Maranao possibly has an economic advantage. The Maranao, though agriculturalists, are famous for their *okir* or brassworks so they have something to offer to the Metro Manila market. The trading activities of the Maranao have so far been extended to most of the important cities in Luzon. The Maguindanao, who most of the time are agriculturalists, see little opportunities for them in the city, except as urban workers. This is also the case for other ethnic groups from the South, except those who have managed to become government employees or professionals, such as many of the Tausog.

The feeling of being strangers in Manila is not easily located. They were born in the traditional culture, in which kindred systems, residential ties, mosque affiliations, and attachment to legitimate authority have been their way of life (Saber *et al.*: 1975; Kiefer in Madale: 1981). In Quiapo, not only are their cultural and structural backgrounds uprooted, but they also have to find a place in the new environment as minority groups. In addition to culture they carry with them the history of the whole Southern provinces that have been marked with mutual prejudices between them and the rest of the population. Separated for four hundred years from the Northern part of the country, they now have to find a living there.

In short, the history of the Moros started with the Islamization of the Southern provinces. Literature on this process is plentiful. Saleeby (Saleeby: 1905) was among the first historians to study the *tarasila* (genealogical accounts) of the Moros. The history of the Southern

provinces was written in a definitive work by Majul (Majul: 1973). The following description of the Islamization process is taken from Sarangani (Sarangani in Madale: 1981), as it has summarized the existing literature. All the literature agrees that Islamization was undertaken in a peaceful manner, by teachers, traders or statesman. The Sulu island was the first to undergo Islamization, starting with the arrival of a person called Masha'ika who was possibly a religious teacher but about whom further details are not known. The second relevant person was Makhdum who arrived in 1380. He was an Arab who had previously served as a judge in Malacca. Then came Rajah Baginda who arrived in 1390. Rajah Baginda was a prince from Minangkabau, Sumatra, who came with a company of followers. Knowing that Rajah Baginda was a Muslim, the people received him and his company, and he was made a local chief. The Islamization of Sulu was considered decisive with the arrival of Abu Bakr, an Arab Muslim from Palembang, Sumatra, in 1450. He was appointed as the *kâdi* (judge) and the *imâm* in the Rajah Baginda court. Having no sons, Rajah Baginda appointed Abu Bakr as his successor. The rule of Abu Bakr marked the rise of the Sulu Sultanate.

In Tawi-Tawi Islamization began in 1310 when an Arab Muslim, Sayid Alawi Balpakir came to the island. In Mindanao Islamization took place about the same time as that in Sulu. Sharif Kabungsuwan arrived in Cotabato about the time Rajah Baginda arrived in Sulu. He was the founder of the Sultanate of Mindanao. His mission was continued by his brother, Sharif Alawi, who went to north Mindanao, in Lanao. The spread of Islam continued following trading activities. In the Northern Philippines, Rajah Sulaiman was noted to have been establishing a settlement in Manila in 1521, and Rajah Lakandala was mentioned to as having settled in Tondo, but no further account was found.

There is a theory that *sûfi* people had played an important role in the Islamization of the Philippines, as they had in the other Malay zones (Sarangani in Madale: 1981). However, since the existence of strong *sûfi* movements in the Philippines, the theory seems to be too speculative. The evidence that there is a kind of syncretism is not a sure indicator of the existence of *sûfi* movements. For many of the *adat* practices which do not contradict the *shari'ah* are tolerated.

The later history of the Sultanate of Sulu and Mindanao and their peoples, was a history of wars against the Spanish power. The Sulu

sultanate's resistance only terminated in 1876 when the Spanish were able to eliminate its power. Lacking organized resistance, however, the population offers only small group or individual resistance. Such resistances were exemplified by the rise of the *sabîlullâh* or *juramentado* during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The transfer of power from the Spanish to the Americans did not much change the history of the Muslims. The "pacification campaign" of the American against the *sabîlullâh* during the first part of the American occupation up to 1913 made a negative impression upon the Muslims. (Asiri in Jocano: 1983). The period of the American occupation at that time could be divided in three phases, in which the first (1899-1913) was the time of enmity towards the American military rule, during the second (1913-1935) there was a less antagonistic attitude towards civil government, and approaching the end of the American rule there was a feeling of pro-Americanism among the Muslims. This latter period was the time when the Muslims elite began to acquire Western education (Tan: 1977).

The strategy adopted by Muslims during the first part of the American rule was a continuation of the methods they employed against the Spanish. These were the *sabîlullâh*, which were desperate attacks in great numbers; the *jihâd* of small bands attacking troops or raiding settlements; and the *kutab* or fortified defense against the march of American troops (Tan: 1977, p. 63). Though the animosity toward the Americans decreased in the later years of their occupation, the policy of the Filipino rulers after 1935 was to the disadvantage of Southern Muslims. The march to the South encouraged by the Commonwealth Government for "colonization" and "development" practically lead to the deprivation of the Southern provinces' natural resources. The migration of the Northern population was given priority, partly as a solution to the economic problems in their area (Gowing: 1979, pp. 165-176).

There was some progress toward understanding in the post-guerilla period after the Japanese occupation. Gowing (1979, p. 183) noted that guerilla experiences encouraged Muslim-Christian alliance. Several Muslim leaders were appointed to high offices. Attempts were made towards greater participation of Muslims in the government. In the meantime war-damage payments and backpay awards brought economic revival to the South. The wealth was used to finance the resurgence of Islam after the war and to shift the basis of the Moro

economy from barter to cash. Discontent continued, however, as more people from the North came to the South, taking the *adat* land and exploiting economic resources.

The conflict is called "separatism" by the Philippine Government, while the Moros see it as a religious war in the context of 400 years of Muslim-Christian confrontation (Schlegel in Tiamson: 1979). The source of the conflict is both economic and religious. Economically, the Moros have been in a defensive position when the law of the Philippines did not respect *adat* traditional law on land ownership (Saber: 1975, p. 15). The occupation of all arable land by the Northern people, the closing of free trade with Borneo, and competition from non-Muslims in fishing homeland waters, has resulted in the limitation of economic opportunities. As is well-known, the government declared all unregistered land to be public or military land reserve (Gowing: 1979, pp. 188-190).

Thus there has been practically no peace in the South for the past four decades. The Kamelun Uprising took place in Jolo in 1951, only a few years after World War II ended. The present military conflict, however, only commenced at the end of the 1960's. In March 1968, 28 Muslim recruits were executed by Philippine Army personnel for no apparent reason. The event, called the "Corregidor Incident" named after the location, the Corregidor Island or the "Jabidah Massacre" (after the name of the military "Jabidah Commandos" unit), horrified the Muslim population in the South. The commandos were allegedly trained in preparation for a military operation against Sabah. The 28 executed members were against the plan, for they refused to fight their Muslim brothers in Sabah. One commando who managed to escape the killings reached safety and told the story, stirring up popular sentiment amongst Muslims.

The Southern leaders soon reacted. On 1 May 1968 former Governor Datu Udtog Matalam declared the formation of the Muslim Independence Movement in Cotabato. He intended to establish an Islamic Republic in Mindanao and Sulu. In the meantime, in 1968 and 1969, the Bangsa Moro Army was organized and guerilla warfare against the Philippine government took place on the island of Sulu. Thereafter, armed bands were organized among the Muslim and Christian populations in the South (Tan: 1977, p. 118). violence was a daily event in the South in the years of 1971-1972. On 1 September 1972, the Government announced the Martial Law with the purpose of

ending the armed conflicts, but the violence continued (Glang: 1971; Gowing: 1979; Tan: 1977).

The military resistance of the Muslims was in better shape after the foundation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), sometime in 1969, with the concept of an independent Bangsa Moro Republic. The movements recruited young leaders, like Nur Misuari of Sulu and Abul Khayr Alonto of Lanao del Sur. The military forces of the MNLF were in operation in many parts of the Southern provinces. The movement was well received by sympathetic Muslim countries in the Third World, so the Moro problem became an international issue.

Meanwhile the conflict took its toll on the lives of the people in the South. Up to the end of 1971, the "Mindanao War" had taken 800 lives and made 100,000 people into refugees, and between 1973 and 1979, 15,000 or more lives were taken (Gowing: 1979).

Many attempts have been made to solve the "Moro Problem". Early in 1913, Najeed Saleeby, the historian, had suggested a form of "indirect rule" for the Muslim minority in the Southern provinces, but thus was ignored by the American. Later, in the midst of heightened conflict, moderate Muslims took the same stand as that of Saleeby, suggesting some form of "autonomy". This was the position of, among others, Majul (1972) and Tamano (1973). In his argument Tamano (In Madale: 1981, pp. 310-322) summarized the problems of the Moro in a list of fears. These are:

1. Fear that they will be eliminated from their religion.
2. Fear that they are being displaced from their ancestral land.
3. Fear that they have no future in this country because they cannot really participate in the government nor share in the economic benefits derived from exploitation of natural resources.
4. Fear of losing their cherished values, customs and traditions.

The Philippine Government has also shown several gestures of good will. A Presidential task force group was formed in order to comprehensively study the problems and to create a master plan for reconstruction and development (*Reconstruction and Development*: n.d.). On 28 May 1973, the President issued an instruction for the establishment of an Islamic Center in the University of the Philippines (Presidential Letter of Instruction No. 82), and on 2 August 1973, the President issued a decree on the establishment of the Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB) (Presidential Decree No 264). Further a concession was

made for Muslims in the form of the establishment of the Ministry of Muslim Affairs with its comprehensive structures.

The conflict was approaching a peaceful solution when an agreement towards autonomy was signed, after the concerned Muslim countries made several attempts to render their services to the Manila Government and the Muslim groups (Gowing: 1979, p. 204; Noble: 1981). The parties met for the first time in Saudi Arabia (January 1975), then in Tripoli, Libya (December 1976 and February 1977), and in Manila (April 1977). The Tripoli Agreement dated 23 December 1976 was to become an historic document towards the solution of the conflict.

Political processes, however, caused the agreement to fail in attempting to end the conflict. The autonomy issue was defeated in a referendum, apparently because the Christian population rejected such idea (Marcos in Tiamson: 1979). This was the historical background that led to the migration of the Southern Muslim population to Metro Manila. As we shall see, these migrants are still the same.

According to Gowing (1979, p. 200), their minds are strongly imbedded with the ideas of psychological identity, the Islamic ideal of *Ummah*, and the concept of *dâr al-Islâm*. The last concept, *dâr al-Islâm*, is an emphasis on the difference between the *dâr al-Islâm* (the abode of Islam) in which Islam was made an official religion and *dâr al-harb* (the land of the enemy) (An Anatomy: 1970, p. 41).

Social Life

Looking at the development of the Muslim community in the Barangay 648 area, one may be assured that Islam can still become an integrating force, not only in uniting the people, but also in the formation of social institutions. In this community Islam really appears to provide a total, comprehensive way of life. Just as Esposito says about Islam in general (Esposito: 1980, p. ix), Islam in Quiapo has an integral, organic relationship to politics and society. The setting of Barangay 648 itself, in which you have to pass through a five meter wide alley in order to get into the Barangay behind the massive buildings, reveals an enclave community in the midst of a strange environment. The settlement reflects a struggling community in search of survival.

The Barangay has grown in stages. Although its origins go back to 1924, when the Muslims in Metro Manila purchased a plot of land of

400 square meters in Quiapo, its present location was only started in the 1950's, when 800 square meters of land was purchased from Continental Oil by the foreign Islamic Embassies in the Philippines, in particular by the then United Arab Republic. Ever since, the settlement has been administered by the Islamic Center or the Philippine Islamic Cultural Foundation Inc. The housing rent from the settlement goes to the Muslim Association of the Philippines, while the Islamic Center has been active in establishing the *madrasah*, student hostel, playground and the mosque. The Mosque in the compound, the Manila Grand Mosque, was formerly a small prayer house. It was designed to become the present mosque in 1979, and has been renovated several times. The Grand Mosque is now the second largest mosques, after the Golden Mosque which was built by the government just across the river.

The present 3.6 hectares land was settled by as many as 7,000 people in 1978 (Africa: 1978, pp. 11-12) and 20,000 in 1980 (Decanay: 1983) or possibly 23,000 according to the Barangay Captain, retired Colonel Capal Macalangcom. However the official figure in the 1980 Census (Census of Population: 1980) showed only a total of 3,819 for all the private household population. The number of households was 735. This striking difference in numbers is made possible by the temporary status of most of the area's inhabitants. Indeed, since 1969 the Barangay has virtually been a refugee camp due to the insecure condition of the Southern provinces. In early 1984, as many as 3,000 people were homeless due to a fire that occurred in April 1983. The fire victims were then sheltered in yards and inside the Golden Mosque, this place was being relatively spacious. The Quiapo area, especially the vicinity of the Golden Mosque, is now full of makeshift homes of 3 X 4 meters in size, formerly intended as stalls, but later becoming makeshift residences cum-shops. In short, the Barangay 648 and the vicinity of the Golden Mosque became one extended community, with its own religion, culture and institutions.

There is no dependable information on the ethnic composition of the Barangay 648 nor on the surrounding Muslim populace. A presidential commission survey produced certain figures, but since the census was taken from sample households, it did not really represent the exact numbers. According to Hassan (1983, pp. 67-68), 61 % were Maranaon, 29 % Maguindanaon, and the remaining 10 % Tausog, Samal, Yakan and Iranon. The Barangay captain, however, estimated

that in the Barangay 90 % were Maranaon and the remainder comprised of other ethnic groups. In fact, in the Barangay the common language is Maranaon, used in daily activities, the *madrasah* and in mosque sermons during the Friday prayer. One may not be surprised that many people do not speak Tagalog. In the market they speak Maranaon, with some broken Tagalog. Only young shop attendants try to speak English, especially when dealing with foreigners. This just emphasizes their status as an enclave community.

Talking of language, however, those who do not know Tagalog may surprise us when they speak Malay or Indonesian. The researcher found that many *hajjis* were able to speak Indonesian. The *Imâm* of the grand mosque who has completed as many as nine pilgrimages, speaks almost fluent Indonesia, having learned this while in Mecca. Fluency in Indonesian almost correlates to the frequency of *hajj* pilgrimage that a person has made. A young government officer in the post office department is able to speak broken Indonesian after only two *hajj* pilgrimages. Yet, an old *hajji* of 65 who had made the pilgrimage as many as five times speaks less Indonesian. Apparently while in Mecca they frequently visited Southeast Asian restaurants, where Malay is the *lingua franca* for Southeast Asian pilgrims. It is through such lingual contact that Muslims in the Philippines possess a sense of internationalism.

On the ethnic question, despite the fact that ethnicity still play an important role in daily life —like the choice of going to an ethnic restaurant as reported by Hassan— there is a strong will toward unity. The manager of the Rajah Sulaiman Traders' Association market, Panangan T. Pangandaman, who is also the elected Sultan for the *Ummah* in Taguig, stated his firm intention that Muslims in Manila should be the model of the unity of the *Ummah*, regardless of ethnicity; a mission that has partly been fulfilled. In this respect, the Golden Mosque shows a certain dimension of the *Ummah* integration. Administered by the Ministry of Muslim Affairs, the Golden Mosque has as its *Imâm*, a 28 year old Maguindanao from Cotabato, Ustadz Abdul Cader. His ethnicity means that the Maguindanao minority group is given equal opportunity to be involved in the running of the mosque. However, since the Golden Mosque in fact has no compact territorial base but belongs to the Metro Manila community in general, the *Ustadz* has little to do. The importance of the Golden Mosque lies more in the integration between the newly converted *umamah* of

the Northern provinces and their Southern brother, rather than uniting the inter-ethnic *ummah*. Such an integrating activity also exists in the Muslim area in San Andres with its mosque in Kalia Street, and the Tandangsora Salaam Mosque, in which small Muslim inter-ethnic communities are in the making. It is time to see whether religious solidarity could overcome parochial, class, regional and ethnosectarian cleavages (Hudson: 1980, p. 15) in the Philippines.

The Barangay is far from becoming a slum, culturally speaking, though many of its inhabitants certainly experience poverty. The housing facilities are inadequate, yet it is a reasonably clean place. Most of the houses are wooden, but some are made from a mixture of sand and cement. There are also several houses in two sites of construction. The houses are crowded, only separated between the rows by small alleys. In each house there are usually four to five families. The majority of the working population are engaged in trading, and some in government services. Many of the woman open food stalls selling Southern delicacies, and many families open restaurants in the compound. Everyday, but especially during the holidays, the Barangay looks like a busy carnival place, in which people sit on the verandas, alleys and recreation area in the Barangay, a reminder of easy village life. The Barangay is a self-sufficient kind of place, with its own restaurants, shops, services and even lodgings. Indeed, many transitory people travelling from and to the South stay in the Barangay in order to be close to the mosque and to their own folks. It is a safety valve for Muslims who have lost their old world in the South.

The usual slum vices, like violence and drunkenness (Jocano: 1975), are absent from the Barangay. The youth do not also create ganglike groups, and only ethnic groups exist. Regarding the often cited view that Quiapo is insecure, as far as police records indicate, this allegation is unfounded (Dacanay: 1983). The reality is that the area may possess strong community feelings and be suspicious of foreigners. The people's solidarity was demonstrated in January 1983 when the Barangay sent some 500 people to petition the mayor's office to discharge the allegation that their area had become the hiding place for the armed men of the Moro National Liberation Front. Any incident relating to a member of the community will be taken care of collectively. For example, the death of a Muslim—who initiated the incident—in the neighborhood of the Raja Sulaiman market on 14 April 1984, was dealt with cautious action. The body was flown to the South,

and a petition was made to arrest the Christian stabber without causing a trouble between the Muslim and the Christian communities.

The only slum-like problem strikes that the researcher is "suffering". In such a condition, however, the people still exhibit a decent moral condition; evidence of high morality and decency. Minor vices, such drunkenness, do occur among the youngsters, for which city life is mainly responsible. Their poor conditions do not prevent the community from displaying hospitality, charity and the many religiously approved virtues. The mosque is full of attendants, many of whom come from all over Manila. The mosques have become the excellent places to rest and for people to meet their kinfolks. It is the mosques that have become community centers, not beer houses as in many other communities in the cities. The contrast between the rural-religious culture of the South and the urban-secular sphere of Metro Manila is sharply apparent in Quiapo.

In the Barangay law and order is well preserved. The elected Barangay Captain has held office since 1977. He is a man of 62 with wide experience in both military and civil services, and served as chairman of the Philippine Muslim Pilgrim contingent during the 1975 *hajj* season. He has also served as General Manager of the Philippine Islamic Cultural Foundation, Inc., before this responsibility was transferred to the present manager. The Captain is assisted by six councilmen, a secretary and a treasurer. In law enforcement there is a Barangay court consisting of 20 members. Due to the orderliness of the community, the court only has to deal with quite a small number of cases. It deals with two or three cases a year, mostly minor problems, such as family disputes and quarrels between neighbors. In each case, three members of the court are in charge, assisted by the Barangay secretary.

Locally the Barangay is a self-managed community. The houses are managed by the Musaphil (Muslim Association of the Philippines) which charges 40 pesos per month. Religious activities are managed by the Islamic Center. The Captain himself is a member of the Manila Grand Mosque Jama'ah, a formal organization of the attendants of the mosque established in 1981. It is through the combination of the formal and informal institutions in the Barangay that a sense of social life is preserved in the otherwise chaotic conditions of a transient population.

As a previous study (Hassan: 1983) has shown, the largest popula-

tion in the Barangay and in the outer vicinity is that of young men between 26 and 35 years, many of whom are unmarried and driven from the Southern provinces by the prolonged military conflict. Such a young population is notable whenever one goes to the Barangay and to the two mosques. With such a youthful population that lawlessness is nearly absent is in itself a record, an attribute to the authorities in the community. Religion is certainly one form of social control that persists within the community. The community gives its members a sense of belonging that may prevent them from behaving in a way that may insult their common values, the *maratabat* (Saber *et al.* in Saber: 1975), even if the offense is only minor. For example many of the luckier members of the community regretted the behavior of the fire victims who temporarily took shelter in the Golden Mosque, making the mosque a home, because of the possible indecency that might have occurred and the possible desecralization of the mosque. They would rather have encouraged them to go to the relocation settlement made available in Dasmarinas, Cavite. Yet the problem of the distance between Dasmarinas and the market in Quiapo is the reason for their reluctance and their decision to shelter in the mosque. The Golden Mosque administration has recently attempted to speed up the process of relocation planned by the National Housing authority.

Beside the Barangay Captain, the *Imâm* of the Islamic Center Grand Mosque seems to be one of the most authoritative persons in the community. Imam Nasroddin Basman, 63, is an energetic old man, father of seven children and grandfather of 23 grandchildren. He was invited to serve as the *Imâm* of the Grand Mosque in 1977, receiving a monthly salary of 500 pesos from the mosque treasury, an amount which he apparently redonates to the ongoing mosque renovation. His influence on the community is mostly in religious matters, in which he leads prayers, especially the Jum'ah prayer, gives speeches and sermons. He is assisted by a *bilal*, whose main job is to recite the *azan* or prayer call, but as the *azan* can be undertaken by any young man available, he may also serve as the prayer leader in the absence of the *Imâm*. It is worth noting that in the Grand Mosque a sense of formal authority prevails, as in any other mosque in the Philippines. The Imam is an institutionalized position within the Muslim community.

In Metro Manila, every mosque has its own *imâm*, including even

the smallest mosque, such as the Salaam mosque in Tandangsora. The Golden Mosque has Ustadz Abdul Cader, a youngman of 28 years from Maguindanao, as its *Imâm*. It seems, however, that the *Imâm* of the Golden Mosque does not have any real influence on the community, since he is in fact an appointee of the government rather than the community. In addition, the Golden Mosque does not have a visible *jama'ah*; it is but a place to pray, without a sense of community. The lack of influence is possibly due to his ethnic background. As a Maguindanaon, he certainly belongs to the minority group within the Maranao majority. The scattered residents in the vicinity of the mosque attached themselves more to the Barangay 648 or to the daytime community in the Rajah Sulaiman market. The Golden Mosque does not have a significant societal role, quite unlike that described by Hassan (Hassan: 1983). The real Muslim community is in the Barangay 648, not in the Golden Mosque.

It is in the Rajah Sulaiman market that the authority of the Manager, Sultan Panangan T. Pangandaman, prevails. His title of "sultan" which he writes before his name is something of which he is proud. The title is given by his community in Taguig, yet it is also effective in the Rajah Sulaiman market area. In other words, he carries the title wherever he goes. The community of Taguig, some 2,000 Muslims, live in a mixed Barangay in which Muslims constitute only 40% of the total population. The Barangay majority is Christian as is the Barangay captain, which makes the local Muslim inhabitants turn to him for authority. Being an elected Sultan, he commands respect and his words are measured heavily by the Muslim community. His responsibility includes defending the rights of the Muslims, providing justice to the community when needed, taking care of harassed and other victims of unjust treatment. He had to go as far as Ilocos and Olongapo to take care of Muslims suspected by the police, at his own cost. In the middle of April 1984 he settled a legal affair between the two wives of a demised major, one being a Muslim and the other a Christian. The task was not an easy one, because he had to take into account the question of the *shari'ah*, the future of the children of the two wives, and Philippine legal codes. It was easier for him when he was asked to settle the problem of two neighbors who quarrelled over the boundaries of their land. He is also consulted on political matters. The people in the market waited for his word on whether to join the UNIDO rally to be held in the market area. His college degree and his organi-

zational experience seem to justify his position as a community leader, manager of the Rajah Sulaiman Traders' Association market, and Sultan of Taguig. His office in the market compound becomes a community center, where three to five people wait to consult him every morning.

It seems that the Muslim community in Quiapo are well aware of whom to go to and for what reason. There is a fair distribution of authority among the community leaders. From simple problems to most delicate questions there is always someone to assist. The shipment of the body of the body of the Muslim youth of the April 14th incident was taken care of by the Sultan, because the incident took place in the vicinity of the market and because he was the right person to deal with such a problem. The community leadership is united by a single purpose, the survival of the Muslim community in the midst of an inhospitable environment. In order to emphasize such unity, the community often holds religious festivals together. The Mawlid al-Nabi (the birthday of the Prophet) was celebrated in January 1982 in the market area. The celebration was arranged so as to attract Muslims and non-Muslim alike. The media provided a glorious report about the event, at a time when in the Southern provinces, reports of wars were continues.

In addition to the Barangay Captain, the Imam and the Sultan, many personalities acquire status and command respect. Though we did not have an opportunity to undertake a quantitative assessment of status and power, by virtue of common sense we could see that people with military titles, *sultans*, attorneys, *ustadz* and *hajjis* are among the most respected personalities. In the Barangay, beside the Barangay Captain, who has retired from the military service, the Secretary General and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Manila Grand Mosque Jama'ah is also a colonel, Colonel Ara D. Cabugatan Al-Haj, he is still active and resides in the military compound of Camp Crame. His influential position in the community is, among other things, indicated by his authoritative issue of certificates of Muslimness for those who are looking for jobs in the Middle East. Though such certificate could also be issued by the *Imám* of Metro Manila, Ustadz Iljas Ismail, or by other recognized Muslim organizations in the city, his military position seems to provide added value. In addition to military personnel, anybody with a permanent job in the government also commands certain respect—despite the fact that many people

blame the government for all their misfortunes. Government employees are considered to be persons of wide experience within the bureaucracy, a quality needed by the community in times of necessity. Many of the employees are elected to positions in the Barangay and the Jama'ah.

The title of *sultan* frequently appeared in the list of donators to the renovation of the Grand Mosque. These *sultans*, however, do not necessarily have any connection with royal houses in the South, but are more likely to have been village chiefs or dignitaries whose *tarasila* (genealogy) may go back to the Sultanate in the past. While the title might have been effective at their places of origin, the Metro Manila life changes much their meanings. Uprooted from its origin, the title becomes a mere label without actual authority. However, since many of the title holders are relatively older people, they have a special place in the community. At the least they command respect from the small circle who know them. In the new location their position is uncertain, even if they have better economic resources. The *sultans* are not usually refugees without a means of living. Nevertheless the displaced *sultans*, resemble the rest of the population, except for their own self-consciousness which is occasionally recognizable.

The title of *ustadz* or religious teacher is among the most respected statuses in the community, such that owner of these titles do not hesitate to use them. The most respected *ustadz* in the Barangay is *Ustadz Abdul Majid Goling*, a graduate of the prestigious al-Azhar University of Egypt. He is President of the Islamic Center and Headmaster of the *Madrasah* or the Manila Islamic Institute (Maahad Manila al-Islamie). His salary is said to have been paid by a Middle Eastern *da'wah* agency. His Middle Eastern connection makes him an invaluable asset for the community, as he can serve as the link between the community and the source of Islam. The other *ustadz* in the *madrasah*, eight people in all, including one woman, do not use the title. Their *ustadz*-ness does not as yet constitute a status, but rather is just a job. However important the task of the *ustadz* is in the community, the title is reserved for certain persons who really deserve it. Among the young teachers, are graduates of the Islamic colleges in Marawi City—the highest of its kind—who are too young to enjoy the status. Abdul Nasser M. Shariff, 23, is such an *ustadz*. He is well-versed in English and in Arabic. Upon graduation from one of the three colleges, the Maahad Marawi al-Islamie, he applied for the teach-

ing position in the *madrasah*, while waiting for employment in the Middle East, like his brother who then working in Kuwait. He works almost without salary; in fact, he hesitates to mention the amount he receives from the *madrasah*, but says that he still gets financial assistance from his parents in order to live normally in Manila. The young teachers see teaching in the *madrasah* as an Islamic calling.

Fluency in Arabic is a qualification for respect. In the speeches made in the mosque, the Maranao language is dominant, but Arabic is inserted in between sentences by both the *Imâm* and the *ustâdz*. Once in early March, a visitor, who was a former member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood but then acting as an *imâm* of an Australian mosque, came to recruit an Islamic teacher for his community in Australia. He was well received and was asked to deliver a speech before the audience at the noontime prayer (*zuhr*). At first he spoke English, then he turned to Arabic. Later the *bilâl* stood up before the audience and translated the Arabic speech into Maranao in an eloquent manner to the satisfaction of the audience and the guest. Mastering Arabic and the art of public speaking are among the ideal requirements of community leaders. This is the reason why mosques are well equipped with good loudspeakers and numerous electric fans to make them good locations for public meetings. It is through such Arabic speaking leaders that the community expressed their ideas and feelings to the world outside, and such is the task of Ustadz Goling who was then travelling to the Middle East.

Among the *ustâdz*, seniority and degree are connected to authority. The deference shown by the younger *ustâdz* to Ustadz Goling was much that they had to wait for an instruction from the Ustadz to determine whether to hold a graduation ceremony. The ceremony was due at the end of March 1984, just before the children left for vacations in the South. Suddenly a letter from the travelling Ustadz arrived stating that the graduation date had to be delayed to be held just before the coming school year. The younger instructors took it without complaint, even dutifully.

Other respected members of the community, as in any other Islamic community with a rural background, are the *hajjis*. According to the Barangay Captain, among the 23,000 people there are some 2,000 *hajjis*; a high percentage despite the apparent poverty. Further elaboration of this information will make the figure clearer. The Internal Secretary of the Grand Mosque *Jama'ah*, Hadji Ismail Pompong,

explained that 25% of the 388 registered *Jama'ah* members are *hajjis*. This is possibly close to reality, since among the list of 221 donators to the renovation of the mosque as many as 105 are *hajjis*, excluding those who do not state the title. In the Rajah Sulaiman market in 1979, when it had about 120 to 150 members, 60 people had *hajji* titles, almost half of the traders. In the *hajj* season of 1983 there were 16 pilgrims from Metro Manila, mostly from Quiapo. The large number of *hajjis* arises because they have acquired the titles before they came to Manila as refugees. Doing the pilgrimage is a big event, for the individual, the family and the community. When the researcher visited the community for the first time in late 1983, a poster to welcome the arriving *hajjis* was still posted in one of the apartments.

The large number of *hajjis* may be possible because the cost is relatively low. In the 1982 season the Philippine Pilgrimage Authority charged only 8,200 pesos for travel costs and 4,500 pesos Mutawif cost for food, lodgings and local transportation. From the later 1,500 pesos was returned to the pilgrims upon arriving back in the country. The average cost of the *hajj* pilgrimage was then around 1,500 dollars. It is relatively much less expensive compared to in neighboring countries, like Indonesia, which charge as much as twice this figure. In addition, it is worth noting that the traditional pilgrimage by boat was still cheaper. Beside the lower cost, pilgrims were able to carry merchandise to trade, so that the travel cost could partly be repaid through the profit. In the past, *hajj* pilgrimage was mostly combined with commerce, that it was not really a "waste" as its critics argue. Commercial or otherwise, the *hajjis* in Quiapo command respect, and most importantly, self-respect and self-control. The white *kafiyah* may not be there all the time, but the spirit is there.

Within the community, there are many others who hold the traditional titles of *datus* and *shayekh*. *Datu* is a title of a lesser nobility who often plays an important role in society and community in the South, especially in politics (Bonitez: 1969). *Shayekh* is a religiously learned man yet he might be too old to play any role in the new community and the new setting. Their title and names do appear in the list of the donators, but never in fact appear in the leadership of the community. The title of *sharif* or *salip*, denoting genealogical descendant from the Prophet, seems to be absent in the Quiapo community.

The question of community elites first attracted the researcher's attention when the list of donors to the renovation of the Grand

Mosque was revealed, complete with the amount of money donated. The names were written clearly on the upper gate of the mosque building. This list included only 25 names with the amount of the donations from the largest to the least. The rest of the list was displayed on the wall of the office. With ambivalent feelings about the meaning of the list in terms of the religious ethics of not revealing anything what one has donated in the name of God, the researcher tried to find a reason behind this phenomenon. The committee defended the arrangement, saying that it was just a matter of motivating people to donate and of correct documentation. What is certain is that the list accurately described the elite among the community. Seen that way, it shows that from the first 25 persons who appeared in the list—after some clarification—14 are businessmen. This means that, financially speaking, businessmen are the most supportive members in the community. This is interesting, because the records of the Rajah Sulaiman market showed a decline in business. Despite the businessmen's support to the community, however, the leadership in the community is in the hands of the educated members with access to the bureaucracy or to religious tradition.

The seed of structural transformation is reflected in the formation of associational organizations within the community. Among the youth, the most important organization is the Imustaphil (Integrated Muslim Student Association of the Philippines), established by students in the neighboring Manuel L. Quezong University (MLQ). Around 100 students residing in the Barangay and in the vicinity of the Golden Mosque are members. Many of them have migrated from the South in search of a better place to study. They joined relatives in the Barangay or in the Golden Mosque vicinity which is certainly less than a desirable place to stay. Most of them attended high school in the "English" School, not in the *madrasah*, such that they have little knowledge of religion. The MLQ University is not the best in Metro Manila, but it is there that they can afford to enroll. The organizational structure of the student association seems to be very simple, though they claim to have a nation-wide organization. It looks more like an informal organization, only having one corner of the university building as their meeting place or *tambayan*. Nevertheless, the organization appears to be effective. With merely a memo written on the available blackboard, a meeting could be held at any time. During their free time, the students integrate well with the population of the

Barangay and that of the market.

Many of the alumni of the association have worked in the Middle East. There, too, they join professional Muslim associations, such as that in Saudi Arabia. One day early in 1984, a professional who was a former student was on vacation, circulated a pamphlet dated 22 February 1984 supporting the attempts of the Secretary General of the *Râbitah al-'Alam al-Islâmî* in Makkah al-Mukarramah who was trying to unite all the Bangsa Moro Mujahedeen leaders of the southern Philippines, namely Sultan Haron al-Rasyid Lucman, Nur Misuary, Hashim Salamat and Dimas Pundito. It was stated that they were dedicated to the cause of the Southern provinces and promised to give as much as 10% of their monthly salary received in Saudi Arabia. This professional, whom the researcher met in the office—or more accurately, restaurant—of the Rajah Sulaiman Trades' Association market, was a special case. What is not openly revealed by the students is that most do pay a lot of attention to the cause of Muslims in general.

In political matters, the Quiapo residents appear to be well-informed, both through oral communication and through distribution of pamphlets. A pamphlet (dated 23 December 1983) on Islamic ideology, entitled "[from] Sultanate to Local Government: A Political Transformation toward Disunity" was circulated by the so-called Muslim Unite for Salvation (MUSA) was, however, not locally known, and no information could therefore be traced. The pamphlet itself was a sophisticated analysis of the political condition of the Southern provinces in less than four pages. Most important is the high degree of politization, despite the poor conditions.

Political socialization also occurs through visits by political leaders from the South. In April 1984 an opposition leader from the South visited the Grand Mosque and spoke to its audience. An incident occurred during the visit. When the leader was speaking, a young man tried to stop him, but the audience prevented him, and the young man left. Later, the same young man returned with a gun in his hand and climb the upper part of the mosque, shooting aimlessly at the people below. Some people were injured, but no deaths were reported. Apparently the young man was apposed to the political leader, and he was drunk before he entered with the gun. How he acquired the gun was unclear.

The specific reason behind the incident was not known, but it clearly

shows the high degree of politicization of the community. The Quiapo people and their respective influence on their home-base electors in the South has been important factor. The political tension between the government and the opposition party affects the population. The dominant feelings appear to be on the side of the opposition political parties for certain reasons. The Southern political candidates always took their time to visit the community. In the 1984 political campaign, two candidates of the UPDP-LABAN in the South had posters with their names put in the entrance of the Barangay by "Muslim Admirers in Metro Manila". Political actions occur more through personal rather than organizational contacts. Indeed many of the Southern political elites are the subjects of household discussions in the Muslim area in Quiapo. Apparently, however, there is no institutionalized political organization in the Barangay. The "Muslim Alliance" in Metro Manila took part in the UNINDO campaign in the nearby Plaza Miranda. Both the "Muslim Admirers" and the "Muslim Alliance" were names given at that time, without having permanent organizations. Support was recruited through the influence of prominent members of community, rather than through political relationships.

In order to clarify the personal nature of political inclinations, we can cite an example. The decision to support the UNINDO was in fact taken by the Manager of the Rajah Sulaiman Traders' Association, after talking to his people in the market. Only a week before the rally took place there was no talk about joining the UNINDO. When a UNINDO man came to see the Manager an agreement was made. The young man in the market finally produced posters and yellow ribbons, and joined the rally—a bit late, because they were only willing to march to the plaza after the sunset prayer (*maghrib*). In the rally, the Manager was twice invited on stage, but he himself did not show up. Apparently he avoided fully joining political life in Metro Manila. At the height of the political campaign in 1984, the community was cast into in the middle of political uncertainty. The 10 April UNINDO rally was just one of the many possibilities, reflective of the political conditions in the Southern provinces proper. On the election day, the Manager explained, the vote of the community was divided, half for their candidate in Metro Manila. Thus many people left for the South during the election day, in support of their home-base leaders.

A civic association was introduced in the Muslim community in Quiapo, the Basak Muslim Association in Metro Manila (*Bulletin Today*, January 15, 1984). It was an organization for all citizens, with a primary objective of assisting its members and, together with the government of Metro Manila, coordinating efforts towards the attainment of a peaceful relationship between Muslims and Christians. The association was not the only one in Metro Manila, but the most striking phenomenon was the list of the officers. Many of the functionaries were government employees, including military personnels, a judges and a lawyer. All the military personnels were listed complete with their titles, and the rest were preceded by the titles of *datu*. It is important to note that even those persons whose names appeared in the list of the *Jamā'ah* without any titles were listed with *datu*s in the association's list. Each *datu* seemed to be representative of his place of origin in the Basak area.

The civic character of the association was shown by the inclusion of names from both the opposition and government parties, such as Lininding Pangandaman of the opposition and Ali Dimaporo of the government party. However the induction held in the Islamic Center was not successful. The expected guest speakers, the First Lady and the Vice-Governor Ismael Mathay, did not take up their invitations. Nevertheless, a two-day seminar on "Unity for Peace and Progress" was held in the Islamic Center. No further news was heard about the activities of the association.

The community seems to be oriented to the South rather than to Metro Manila where they live. This was shown by the political candidate of Metro Manila's relative unpopularity with the common members the community. Asked whether they knew some of the candidates in Metro Manila most of the people could not mention any names. Even the Muslim candidate of the SDP in Quezon City, Firdaus Abbas, was not known to the Muslim Community here. Their Southern orientation makes them ignorant of what is a happening in the metropolitan area. The same orientation also makes them reluctant to share in the educational system in Metro Manila.

The reason for this ignorance maybe due to their occupational status, as most of them are businessmen who have no connection with politics. Indeed, the backbone of the community is its businessmen. Their businesses are spreading to the northern parts of the country. In cities such as Baguio, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela City, Bicol,

Pangasinan and Santiago, we can find Muslim communities, mostly comprising of businessmen, peddling Southern brassworks, handicrafts and imported products. Most imported products come from the barter zones in Zamboanga City and Jolo, or from Labuan, Sandakan, Sabah, Malaysia. It is known that, for the benefit of the Southern provinces, the barter traded was legalized by Presidential Decree No. 93, in which merchants are allowed to go to the barter zones as often as twice a month with no more than 5,000 pesos worth of merchandise each time. For the Metro Manila residents a smaller amount is allowed, i.e. up to 1,500 pesos worth of merchandise in direct trade (according to the Manager of the Rajah Sulaiman Traders' Association market). For the Quiapo residents, such an amount is too small to be profitable, and a petition has been raised to increase this figure. However small the permitted allocation is, the traders of Quiapo each manages to accumulate as much as 100,000 pesos worth, possibly through intermediaries (Cf. Hassan: 1983, pp. 88-89; Kairan: 1983, p. 26).

The traders in Quiapo occupy the available space in the streets of Globo de Oro and Arlequi. Since the market was opened in 1979, business had not been constantly good. Of the 179 registered merchant in 1979, only 40 to 50 stalls were still in business in January-April 1984. Many traders simply left their businesses because of the decline of the market, while others intend to return to the market after the economic recovery. Business was so poor that some traders even did not pay their taxes and also the monthly contribution to Association was barely collected.

Most of the traders belong to the Grand Mosque and the Golden Mosque. In the compound of the Islamic center itself, many retail grocery stores and restaurants are established. Considering that the community is growing, and many of the residents are bachelors without adequate facilities, restaurants are always required. The Barangay indeed looks more like a bazaar, especially during the weekends when the people get together in the restaurants or chat in the streets around the shops, homes and the mosque.

It is the same businessmen who patronize the Grand Mosque, maintaining and renovating it. It is also the traders who make *hajj* pilgrimages a life time ideal, to whom *hajj* is much more than a religious obligation, and having certain societal values (Cf. Mehden: 1986, pp. 61-67). They were able to go to Mecca several times before 1978, when

they could go by boat. The first *hajj* they made was obligatory, so none of them, would mix the pilgrimage with business. Only the second time and thereafter, these pilgrimages being only recommended, did they do business. However, such pilgrims-cum-businessmen are becoming fewer and fewer, no more than 5% of all the pilgrims, due to the lack of places on the air transportation. The Philippine Pilgrimage Authority (Philpa) has been discussing this problem with the travel company in order to solve the question of the large merchandise baggage of the pilgrims and to avoid unpleasant incidents in the departure area of Manila Airport. Considering the increasing difficulties in hajj-cum-business pilgrimages, we assume that in the final analysis *hajj* will be purely an act of faith, with whatever consequences.

We mention at length the problem of business activities in order to emphasize certain values among the Muslim community in the Philippines. Unlike the Malay Muslim community in Java, where the *priyayi* or bureaucratic elite do not usually engage in business, the Muslim business community in Philippines composes of all classes. In the Barangay 648 many people with the titles of *sultân* and *datu* are in fact active in business. Whether this is due to emergency or to a general pattern of social behavior is yet to be studied. Though we have no information on the genealogical legitimacy at their *sultân*-ship and *datu*-ship, it is certain that entrepreneurial spirit is well distributed.

The only rule to life is cleanliness. The stress on *halâl* and *harâm* in the community ethics is the only restriction set by the community. Indeed it is recorded that concerned Muslims in the community, such as the young *ustâdz* of the *madrasah*, often spotted un-Islamic practices in businesses. A small research (Kairan: 1983) notes that some businessmen in the market did engage in interest-taking activities. Only 5 people out of 38 businessmen covered by the study collected their capital in an Islamic way, that is by 50-50 profit sharing or that is called *mudhârabah* or *qirâdh* (Mastura: 1983a; Buat: 1983). Such interest dealing, however, is not easily detectable by people outside the business. It is widely practised, such that it appears quite tolerable, particularly because they carry out this vice out of necessity.

However, the more visible un-Islamic practices are punishable. The Secretary General of the Manila Grand Mosque Jama'ah recalled that in its three years of existence, the Jama'ah had taken several disciplin-

ary measures towards members who were considered to have trespassed against the *shari'ah*. Three people had been expelled from Jama'ah membership, two for drunkenness and one for breaking promises. The breaking of a promise was by a businessman who was found guilty of this malpractice after an investigation. He refused to accept the Islamic court decision and withdrew his membership.

It seems that economic activities never become an end in themselves. Hassan (1983, p. 46) tells of an old man who was peddling books on Islam in the Golden Mosque compound who said that profit was secondary for him, the propagation of Islamic faith being primary. Through this case maybe very individual, it more or less represents the sentiment of the community. Such economic ethic are hardly in accord with the economic ethic of the capitalistic society, and certain measures should be taken in order that the Muslim community is able to participate in the present economic system of the Philippines. To this effect, the Philippine Amanah Bank was established by the government in 1973 by Presidential Decree No. 265, and has been in operation since 1974.

The Philippine Amanah Bank has opened eight branches in Southern as well as in the Northern provinces. These are in Davao, Iligan, Marawi, General Santos, Cotabato and Cagayan de Oro in Mindanao, in Jolo in Sulu, and in Espana in Manila. So far there is no study on the participation of the Muslim community in Quiapo and Metro Manila in PAB Espana, a place not far from Quiapo. One can only guess that many of the traders in Quiapo do not in sufficient reason to deal with the Bank. The lack of information on the modern Islamic institution is one factor, and that they prefer private loans is another.

The only economic organization in which the businessmen feel obliged to participate is the Rajah Sulaiman Traders' Association. The association was founded in order to protect their business interests in Quiapo. The government gave the association permission to settle vendors in the 1,800 square meter location in the Quiapo area. The government wanted the area to be a shop window for the Southern cultural tradition, especially its arts and crafts. The area can accommodate 150 stalls, each being 1 X 1 X 2.10 meters in size. Yet apparently, in 1981 when business was good traders with longer capital started to move in to the site, so that the small traders had to give up their stalls (Hassan: 1983, pp. 64-81). Most of the stronger traders at

the moment occupy the best sites in the area, especially along the Alequi street. With regards to their future, however, even the richer traders are still uncertain.

Talking about business opportunities, the Manager of the market complained that at the time the free trade zone in the South intended for Muslims was no longer in their hands. The merchandise of the two free ports in the South falls into the hands of the Chinese merchants, and only 10% is still held by Muslims. The opening of the New Zamboanga flea market in the vicinity of Quiapo —no more than 500 meters from the Muslim trade location— seems to give yet more opportunity to the Chinese merchants. While the demand for Southern brassworks is in decline due to general economic conditions, free fort merchandise is hardly profitable, due to market competition.

The management of the Rajas Sulaiman market can not possibly solve the economic problem of the community. The organization itself appears to be the personal affair of the Manager, who is a very busy person. The association is more social rather than an economic organization. The Manager is assisted by 15 employees, complete with a lawyer, security staff and utility men. The formal relationship between the traders and the management only consist of the payment of a membership fee, of 5 pesos daily, and a 1 peso emergency fund for members. Such a minimal financial relationship, however, becomes a symbol of solidarity, not a mere collection. The fee entitles the members to practically everything available, friendship, consultation and leadership. The Manager also acts as the "sultan" of the traders community, a person to consult at times of necessity. Economically, the association secures nothing for its members, neither loans nor their survival.

Religious Life

That religion is the center of daily life in the community could be felt during the many times of *azân* (prayer call) in the two mosques, the government-run Golden Mosque and the community-run Grand Mosque. The Golden Mosque was built by the government in 1977 in preparation for the visit of the host of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, Colonel Muamar Gaddafi. The mosque was hurriedly built as only 40 days were need for the construction; an achievement of Philippine's

efficiency. It was designed by a Philippine architect. The only unexpected defect is the location, because the ground is not stable and thus the floor of the mosque has been sinking (Dacanay: 1982).

While the visitors will certainly admire the beauty of the building, the local population look on the Golden Mosque with an element of unpleasantness. That the mosque was built by the government for its own reasons, is cause enough for uneasy feelings. Nevertheless, the mosque is fully attended, especially during the Friday prayer. Muslims foreigners in Metro Manila prefers to visit the mosque, since the Friday sermon is given in English and or in Tagalog, or on special occasions in Arabic. Many Muslim foreign students and diplomatic corps personnel regard the mosque as the *jāmi'* (public) mosque of Metro Manila, while the Grand mosque look like local or ethnic mosque to foreigners —an allegation that is disagreeable to the community itself.

The Golden Mosque is administered by the Ministry of Muslim Affairs (MMA). The officers comprise of the Chairman of the Board, three members of the Board, an executive officer and a secretary. The present secretary resumed the office in January 1984 in the western part of the mosque compound. The daily activities of the mosque are run by 17 persons, all paid by the Ministry, but not as regular government employees. The *Imām* leads the daily prayers, the Friday prayer, arranges the *khatīb* (ceremony deliverer), and takes care of the donation box. In addition to these daily activities, he can also solemnize marriage contracts and conversions. Marriage and conversion certificates are signed by the *Imām* and two male witnesses. The 17 mosque workers comprise of the *bilāl*, the security staff and the utility men who take care of the cleaning of the mosque and the compound. As speakers for the Friday prayer, the mosque welcomes any learned man who would like to deliver the sermon, yet the main responsibility lies in the hands of the *Imām*.

The *Imām* is also responsible for the seminar hours mostly given to new converts. Sessions are held daily from Monday to Thursday, 2 hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoons. Seminars are also held on Friday afternoons and Saturday and Sunday mornings and afternoon. The scheduled seminars, however, seems to be poorly attended, so they are often delayed due to lack of attendants. New convert usually already have someone to consult, or otherwise they can purchase Islamic books made available in the mosque. Certainly

the Golden Mosque is more popular with outsiders than with local community. The use of Tagalog and English in the sermon makes it more conducive to outsiders than the seminar at the mosque in Barangay. The only shortcoming of the Golden Mosque is the absence of the committed *jamā'ah* as an institutionalized body. The attendants of the Golden Mosque regard it mainly as a place to worship, without real commitment to its well-being.

The absence of the *jamā'ah* can be felt in the way that the mosque is organized. The main resource of the mosque activities is the MMA budget, which is mainly spent to maintain the personnel. The community does not feel ownership of the mosque. One informant even questioned the legitimacy of the mosque with regards to the *sharī'ah*, since the construction was mainly for political reasons. A religious learned man would never pray in the Golden Mosque, according to this informant. Such an extreme view may be shared by many people, yet that the mosque is fully attended during Friday prayers, provides shelter for the homeless, and a place to pray and to rest for the many Muslim in the area, seems to contradict this negative statement. Indeed, many do not even raise such a fundamental question.

A Community mosque is represented by the Grand Mosque in the Barangay 648 which was designed to be a source of pride to the community. The new construction was, however, a reaction to the construction of the Golden Mosque. The construction and renovation has been managed by the Philippine Islamic Cultural Foundations, Inc., which, in addition to the community's contribution, also received substantial donations from other Islamic countries. The estimated value of the present structure is approximately 2,5 million pesos.

The present mosque comprises of the main building, a veranda and a two story *madrasah*. The dome reminds us of Middle Eastern architecture, but the style of Mediterranean window gives the flavor of a modern Philippine mosque. The interior has a marble floor with a high ceiling that makes the mosque cooler during the daytime. In addition there are many electric fans hanging from the ceilings so the mosque is cool all the time. Like rural mosques it provides the best place to rest during hot days in the summer, so the unaccustomed eyes of foreigners will be startled by the leisurely life of the community. The mosque has become a safety valve for the local community, both physically and spiritually.

Further renovation of the mosque will include the construction of domes, floor, minaret, veranda and the *madrasah*. The total cost is expected to be another two millions pesos. The proposed minaret alone will cost the community 850,000 pesos, an amount which they believe they are able to collect in a short time. The officers of the Jama'ah look forward to the completion of the mosque with great enthusiasm, such that they talk about the spirit of *jihād*. The Barangay Captain expressed the feelings of the community when he said that, despite their poverty, the community was able to collect the money because they want to "help to construct the House of God".

The daily activities of the Grand Mosque are almost the same as those of the Golden Mosque, in terms of regular and Friday prayers. Daily prayers in the day time are short, while in the evening between *maghrib* and *'isha* prayers there is a religious lecture for the *jama'ah*. Such lectures are also held on Friday, just before prayers begin. The community meet at 11 o'clock when an *ustadz* and the *Imâm* give the lectures either taken from certain books or else spontaneous. The mosque is always crowded with *jama'ah*. It is estimated by the *Imâm* that as many as 1,000 people attend the service, of whom about 300 are women. The number is not that impressive, considering that the Barangay has a population of 23,000. It is believed that the remainder of the people complete their Friday prayers in other mosques of Metro Manila. On this matter, a member of the Board of the Manila Grand Mosque Jama'ah expressed his criticism that, unlike in the South, Muslims in Metro Manila were not really good observant of religious tenets. This is one of the reasons why the Jama'ah is instituted as a formal social organization, in order to protect the *ummah* from the negative influence of city culture.

The mosque is also active in celebrating Islamic holidays. At such celebrations, usually a learned *ustadz* from outside the community is invited in order to attract people to attend. In addition songs or recitals are performed by the students of the *madrasah*. The celebration of *Mawlid al-Nabi* in December 1983 was held in the Islamic Center over three consecutive days, during which the program included *Mawlid* songs and Qur'ân reading competitions. The climax of the celebration was the award distribution ceremony and speeches by learned '*ulamâ*'. On such occasions, the community dignitaries and the '*ulamâ*' are seated on the mounted stage, while the audience either sits on the available chairs or on the floor of the mosque. The *Mawlid* celebra-

tion is usually accompanied by a reading of the *târikh al-Nabî* (the history of the life of the Prophet) or of the *barzanjî* (lyrics in praise of and the life story of the Prophet). The community, however, misses the Southern traditional festivals. One informant noted the absence of colored flags that would decorate the houses in the South at such a festivity. Decoration and flags in small quantities could, however, be found in the Maharlika Village, Bicutan, where Muslims are relatively more well-to-do than those in Quiapo. Also absent is the Mawlid celebration in household, which is common in the Southern provinces, especially among the rich. Such household celebrations are called *kandori*, undertaken with various kinds of rituals or simply with a *do'a* (supplication) (Cf. Inger Wulf in Madale: 1982, pp. 159-163). The observance of the Ramadan fasting month also takes a more simple form than that in the South, and with less symbolism. Only obligatory and recommended rituals are observed, such as the *tarâwîh* (night prayer) and the *lailat al-qadr* (twilight prayer), omitting also the kind of Southern festivities and rites (Madale: 1982, pp. 164-171). The lack of festival moods and practices is not always regretted, however. The *Imâm* of the Grand Mosque expressed his view that simple observance of religion was correct, for Islamic teachings should not entertain *bid'ah* (uncanonical practices).

People observe *'id al-Fitr*, the celebration of the end of the fasting month, in different ways. Some like to go to the South to visit relatives, but many older people prefer to stay in Quiapo, waiting for their younger relatives to visit them. The *Imâm*, for example, would stay in Quiapo, waiting for his children and grandchildren to come. For many people, travelling to the South is still considered costly, so that they are likely to stay in the city.

The *madrasah* is the most regular activity in the Islamic center, involving many people. Though this is not the only *madrasah* in Metro Manila—for there is one in Taguig and another in Maharlika Village—it is the most organized one. The Grand Mosque *madrasah* is well-attended with some 200 students from the kindergarten to grade seven. Many students take the *madrasah* as their only education, but it is expected that they will study at a public school as well. To meet the need for double education, the *madrasah* meets only at the weekends, mornings and afternoons. The total hours are said to be equal to an ordinary *madrasah*, of four school days. When the field work was conducted, about half of the students had left for vacations in the

South. The *madrasah* is much more than an educational institution, being a form of socialization and a way of life.

The *madrasah* is run by a headmaster, Ustadz Goling, and its teachers were recruited from the Southern Islamic college in Marawi City. For facilities, they are given free lodgings in one of the vacant mosque rooms. Recruitment of these young bachelor teachers keeps the *madrasah* cost very low. The teachers regard the job as part of *jihād* — as taught in a session of a Hadith class by one of the teachers. When asked about the future of the graduates of the *madrasah* in the Philippine job market, none of the teachers really had any answers. In fact, many of them were waiting for Middle Eastern job opportunities. They have their college degrees in Islamic Studies and fluency in Arabic to offer. But their future is determined by "the will of God". The young teachers do agree with some kinds of reform, which to some degree has been tested in the *madrasah*. The *madrasah* teaches general subjects, though without reference to the curriculum set by the government.

In 1984 the *madrasah* had enough class room for its 200 students enrolled in that school year. Usually there are some 30 pupils in each class, from the kindergarten to grade seven. The age of the students varies greatly. In one class, grade one, for instance, their ages ranged from 8 to 12, and some girls looked more mature than their real ages. This variety in age can be explained by the security and socio-economic conditions where the children grew up in the South. Or, alternatively, they deliberately enrolled in the *madrasah* in the later years of their public schooling. In grade seven, one could find young girl of between 6 and 17 years, who were brave enough to occasionally tease their young teachers. Indeed the class of 1984 was numerically dominated by girls and, as the average age of the girls was higher than that of the boys, they were also dominant in the daily activities. If one classroom is representative of the rest, and the summer vacation similar to other times, in grade one there were only 13 students, of which only two were boys. The regular occupants of the class numbered 40, with 30 girls and 10 boys. As the girls were older, they were also often the first to raise their hand to answer questions.

The girls in the *madrasah* are asked to wear long-sleeved blouses, skirts down to their knees, and white scarves covering their heads. The boys wear either short or long black pants and white shirts with long or short sleeves. In the summer 1984, the class was shorter, 20

minutes for each session, quite lively and relaxed. The fluency in Arabic was amazing, such that one may wonder, how such a relaxed class could teach such good Arabic. In grade one, even an 8 year old boy read with excellent pronunciation the Arabic text written on the black-board. The students also clearly understood the meaning of the text. Apparently, they had learned Arabic before joining the *madrasah*.

The cost of the tuition for the *madrasah* is kept low to suit the financial abilities of the community. For the kindergarten and Grade 1, the tuition costs 15 pesos monthly, for Grades 2 to 4 25 pesos, and Grades 4 to 7 35 pesos. This is payable to the school administration, to cover the costs of the teachers and maintenance of the school.

The curriculum of the *madrasah* is like that of Southern *madrasah* (Madale: 1982, Part IV). Arabic is taught from basic level, from the kindergarten level. The Kindergarten (Level A and Level B) subjects are Reading Arabic, Writing Arabic, Spelling Arabic, Memorizing the Qur'ân, Arabic Translation, and Arabic Grammar; for Grade 1: *Hadith* (Tradition), *Qur'ânîc Tafsîr* (Commentary), *Mutâla'ah* (Discussion, Reading and Writing), *Hisâb* (Mathematics), *'Ulâm* (Sciences), *Sirât al-Nabî* (Social Science and History), *Akhlâq* (Islamic Ethics), *Tawhîd* (Theology), *'Imlâ'* (Dictation), *Fiqh* (Islamic Law). For Grade 2 the curriculum is the same as that for Grade 1 but with the addition of *Nahw* and *Sarf* (Arabic Grammar). For the higher Grades Arabic Composition and Geography are added, which make a total of 14 subjects.

With the heavy religious subjects, it is certain that the *madrasah* system could hardly be integrated into the Philippine educational system. The teachers at the *madrasah* explain that the students in Quiapo could go to Islamic colleges in the South, or later, when a college is available in Quiapo, they can continue to study here in Quiapo. After the Islamic College in the South, they can go to universities in the Middle East, for such opportunities have extended lately. It is certain that the educational aim of the *madrasah* is to serve the Philippine labor market, in addition to the office within the Ministry of Muslim Affairs. If the *madrasah* system is to be reformed and the *shari'ah* court made constitutional, the religious school and college graduates will have many opportunities. In traditional society, the *madrasah* has been functional in the education of good Muslims and recruitment of community leaders. Abdalnasser, the English speaking teacher, representing his colleagues, cited a sentence which he believed

to be from Rizal, "youth is the hope of the country", predicting the time when Muslims will have a good education system for the younger generation.

If this young teacher was sincere, and his ideas are shared by the others, the plan of the Ministry of Education (*Bulletin Today*, 8 May 1982) to reform the *madrasah* is possibly in the right direction. The Minister said that the *madrasah* system would be retained, but would be strengthened with courses in mathematics, language, art and culture, and a "sense of nationhood". According to the Minister, the problem was that not all the teachers in the *madrasah* were college graduates. It is known that in 1982 out of 4,119 teachers in 1,500 *madrasah* in Central and Western Mindanao, only 2.3% had college degrees, 25% secondary *madrasah*, and the rest had just attended high school preparation course (*Bulletin Today*, 11 September 1982). In Quiapo, a plan to recruit qualified teachers has been established. The question is whether the Muslim community in general is likely to accept the educational reform plan proposed by the government. The answer much depends on the outcome of the political settlement of the recent conflict.

One of the most outstanding phenomenon of religious life in the community is the existence of formalized mosque attendants, the Manila Grand Mosque Jama'ah. They are recruited from the general *jama'ah*, who have been regular attendants in the mosque, but not necessarily residents of the Barangay. Such an institution is an innovation in itself, since there is no example in the traditional mosque organization. The Jama'ah was founded in 1981, in order to inculcate deeper religious responsibilities to its members. Haji Ismael Pompong, the Internal Secretary, remarked that despite the many difficulties that the community had undergone, the community aimed to be a best community (*khayr al-ummah*) — a catchphrase that is regularly heard from the community leaders.

The Jama'ah comprise of five sectors, each headed by a board of directors. The sectors are the professional sector, the *datu*, the *'ulamâ'*, youth, and the businessmen. Thus there are 25 board members in all. The General Secretary is the Chairman of the Board of Directors. He is assisted by an Internal Secretary and an External Secretary. There is also a Secretary, a Treasurer, a public relation officer and other officers. It is an all male organization, yet a chapter for the female members (Jamaatun Nisa) is projected. The Secretary General is Colonel

Ara D. Cabugatan, who lives in a constabulary camp, not in the Barangay itself.

Not everyone is accepted to be a member. They should be endorsed by the board of directors of the sector to which the candidate belongs. The members of the Jama'ah should never be involved in un-Islamic conduct. Thus in 1984 the membership was limited to 388 persons, but was due to increase over time. In order to become a full member a person is on the waiting for six months, while an investigation is conducted regarding his characters. When his application is finally accepted, he is inducted through an oath-taking ceremony. The oath-taking is usually on Friday, so that it can be witnessed by the attendants at the Jum'ah prayer. The members are expected to present the best examples of religious observance in the community. There are sanctions for transgressions of the code of behavior.

There is obvious difference between the ordinary *jama'ah* and a member of the *Jama'ah*. During Friday prayers, however, they wear different attire. Many of the members, especially the functionaries, appear in their uniforms, white *polo barong* with the "Manila Grand Mosque Jamaah" badge. Such was the attire of the Imam during Friday prayers, with *malong* and his white *haji* cap. Apparently, not all the officers feel obliged to wear the uniform, and one officer was even proud of his Malay-Indonesian *kafiyah* which he acquired while in Mecca.

The most important project of the Jama'ah is the collection of contributions for the ongoing renovation of the Grand Mosque and the *madrasah*. By the end of March 1984, 221 permanent donors were listed in the file of the committee. The contribution campaign was started in January 1984, when the permanent donors were asked to make regular contribution, twice a month, of at least 50 pesos each. It seems that all donors comply with the proposal. It is striking that even people with limited income have donated large amounts of money, as if their donations are the first priority in their lives. Many government employees appear to overspend when one sees the figures for the collection on the wall of the mosque. The "List of the 25 Most Concerned Muslim" that appear on the wall says something about the degree of the sacrifices. The Secretary General of the Jamaah, a colonel at the police headquarters, channelled around 4,000 pesos of his monthly income to the mosque during the four months since January 1984. Ustadz Goling donated 3,500 pesos monthly, and an immi-

gration officer of the Manila International Airport gave nearly 2,000 pesos monthly. A businessman who has been to Mecca nine times, donated more than 1,000 pesos monthly, while a Barangay councilman and a *bilâl* of the Golden Mosque each donated 400 pesos monthly. The Imam had given up all his monthly stipend that he received from the mosque, even adding a small amount from his pocket. Though nobody is reported to have starved himself for the sake of the renovation of the mosque, there is the feeling of a *jihâd* psyche in the way they use their money.

There are yet other examples of sacrifices that sound irrational. In the compound of the Golden Mosque the researcher met someone who had responsibility for the care of 30 new converts (*mu'allaf*). Taking care of a *mu'allaf* is much recommended, yet this man had taken way seriously. He had spent 150 pesos a day for the people under his responsibility, in spite of his wife's protests. He was certainly not a rich man, for the money that he spent, was that which he had saved after a year of contract labor in Saudi Arabia. He lived in San Andres, Bukid. Such an uneconomic practice was also undertaken by a young attorney in Metro Manila who spent some 8,500 pesos to publish an Islamic magazine, without even one centavo in return. This irrational spending are unexplainable without turning to the psychology of the Muslim community. For explanation I refer to one of *ustâdz* Abdunnasser's *hadîth* class which I attended. At the time he related a *hadîth* entitled, "The Obligation of Jihad in the Path of Allah and Its Importance". It was explained that *jihâd* is among one of the best deeds in Islam. These deeds are the belief in Allah and His Messenger, the *jihâd* in the path of Allah, and the accepted *hajj* pilgrimage. He further elaborated that there are five kinds of *jihâd*, namely the *jihâd* for knowledge, the *jihâd* for the spread of religion, the political *jihâd*, the *jihâd* with one's wealth, and the *jihâd* with one's soul. With this explanation in mind, the irrational spending of the community can be seen as acts of *jihâd* with one's wealth (*jihâd bi al-mâl*).

Other forms of spending, such as for festivities, are not noticeable in Quiapo. The many festivities that hold the community together in the Southern rural areas are absent in Quiapo. The Imam even said that in the South such practices were also of the past. He attributed the process to the decrease in *bid'ah*, though as we know, the fight against *bid'ah* has never become a rallying point for a religious move-

ment in the Philippines.

The religious observance of the community in Quiapo seems to be different from the practices of Islam in the formerly Hinduized parts in the Malay world, especially that of Java. The allegation that Islam in Mindanao and Sulu assume the nature of "Little Tradition" with divergent patterns similar to the Philippino "folk Catholicism" (Tan: 1977, p. 148) does not seem to apply to the Quiapo community. The ritualistic practices among the Yakan, especially the life cycle rituals, that remind us of a folk religion, are not observable in Quiapo. The community seems to have simplified their ritualistic practices to the minimum. Whether this trend is one of religious puritanism is hard to determine.

The puritan tendency was mentioned by the Imam in the Friday prayers. He said that "what is *halâl* (lawful) in the Qur'ân is *halâl*, What *harâm* (unlawful) in the Qur'ân is *harâm*". This is certainly the ideology of the reformist movement in the Malay world. The Imams willingness to accept the *hisâb* (astronomical calculation) for deciding the first day of the month of Ramadan also showed his leaning towards the reformist spirit. However, the question of *hisâb* and *ru'yah* (the observation of the new moon) is never a serious issue here. That is to say, there is no polarization in matters of religion. The reform movement which is common in the Malay world with consistent differences between the *kaum tua* (elder) and *kaum muda* (youth) holds no ground here.

Also absent from this community is the *sûfî* brotherhood. Religion is observed with simplicity, clarity and sobriety. Only the recommended *do'a*, *tasbîh* and *istighfâr* are recited together after the prayers. The *Imâm* explained that there is a *tarîqah* community in the Philippines, as is common in other Malay Islamic communities. An informant, however, stated that in the Maharlika Village such a group exist but considers of quite a small number of people. In Quiapo, Islam is practiced within the *sharî'ah* tradition, not within mystical tradition of sufism. This is the reason, we assume, why here is also no call for a reform movement.

The emphasis on simple and pristine Islam tenets is also shown in the way the community mourns deceased relatives. People visit the house of the deceased to chant the Qur'ân for three consecutive days, and nothing more thereafter. Excessive practices are considered *bid'ah*. Such an opinion is not only expressed by the Imam, who has com-

pleted the *hajj* nine times since 1947 thus being influenced by the Wahabi's theology, but is also shared by the younger teachers of the *madrasah*. It is possible that the relatively large *hajji* population has something to do with the simplicity and purity of the religious practices. The fact that the word *bid'ah* is not a popular catchword in the *madrasah's* classroom—I have never heard it during the many class that I attended—is a sure sign of the lack of importance of the issue.

It seems that piety and the religious knowledge are almost equally distributed within the community. There is no visible difference between the young and the old, and between various occupational groups. Unlike Javanese religious life described by the scholars (Geertz: 1960), in which there was a categorical difference between the *santri*, *priyayi* and *abangan*, in Quiapo the differences seem to be of a quantitative rather than a qualitative nature. Thus the Jama'ah association is not an attempt towards an exclusive or sectarian organization. Government employees, *datus*, 'ulamâ', young people, and businessmen share the same religious doctrines and culture.

The Warrior Ethic

To some extent the Quiapo community exemplifies the major characteristics of the Muslim *ummah* in the Philippines. The historical experiences, the social structure, and the dynamics of the Filipino Muslim community have been given a new form. Some of the Southern social and religious institutions have been retained, and many have been transformed. The urban environment poses with new problems for the community to cope with. At the same time, this case study finds that with regard to religious spirit the Muslim community is still a faithful representative of the Southern tradition. In addition, a by product of the case study is an *en passant* view on the comparative sociology of religion of Muslim communities in the Malay cultural zone.

In Quiapo religion is an integrative force which unites the community spiritually, culturally and socially. Spiritually, religion provides a reinforcement against the anomic quality of urban life. Culturally, it provides a link between rural-traditional-agrarian values and urban-modern-industrial world views. Socially, it gives back a sense of belonging to the otherwise diasporic community. However, this is its limit. The community-centeredness of Muslims in Philippines seems

to have prevented the community—and all the Filipino Muslims—from uniting in an nationwide Islamic movement.

The absence of nation-wide movements in the Philippine Islamic *ummah* is apparent. The Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, which has 23 chapters across the country and so far is largest of its kind, has never become a nation-wide movement. The Council enjoys certain recognition from the outside world and has on many occasions represented the Philippine *ummah* at international forums, yet it also lack a commanding influence on the Muslim community as a whole. The reason for this is that every community is an autonomous body, having its own central leadership. This multicentric tendency (Growing: 1979, p. 50), which is very nature of the Muslim community in the Philippines, makes the Filipino *ummah* different from their Muslim neighbors in Indonesia and Malaysia. The lack of such a nation-wide movement is due not only to ethnic difference, but also to historical experiences. The history of the Sultanate shows a tendency towards a wider distribution of power such that, especially among the Maranao, there were many power holders credited with the titles of *sultân* and *datu*, each with his own sphere of influence (Growing: 1979, pp. 47-50). Indeed, there are many title holders in the Quiapo community alone.

This multicentric tendency is revealed in its extremity in the formation of the Manila Grand Mosque Jama'ah. The Jama'ah is an autonomous Islamic community with no institutional connection with outside Islamic movement, nation-wide or local. As a social body the Jama'ah constitutes a complete institution with its own authority, hierarchy and discipline. Its merit lies in the fact that the Jama'ah is in itself as a pioneering organization, a new form of association, for the sake of an "experiment with faith". If successful, the Jama'ah movement could be adopted by other mosques. The question that arises is whether the formation of such a Jama'ah will, in the course of time, facilitate or hinder the formation of a nation-wide Islamic movement.

In the rest of Malay world, though every mosque has some kind of internal structure, an organized *jama'ah* is practically nonexistent. The task of organizing the *ummah* and the *jama'ah* which usually rests with social and religious movements or is dependent upon certain personalities, such as *kyais* or *gurus*. Thus the creation of the Manila Grand Mosque Jama'ah is peculiar to the Quiapo condition, for such an organization is absent in the South. Nevertheless, the

origin of the Jama'ah idea, is in the social structure of the Philippine Muslim community. It is known that the local community of the South is organized under the *datus* or *sultân* with their religious *shari'ah* enforced by the *agama* courts, each being composed of the local *imâm* and the *datu*. The formation of the Jama'ah in Quiapo in fact a replication of the social organization of the Southern background. In the same manner, the formation of the "sultanate" of Taguig, where the people are eager to have their own institutionalized authority, is also a remnant of old tradition. We suggest that this is evidence of the tendency towards an authority-centered community in the Southern Filipino Muslim community (Pendapatan: 1982, pp. 47 - 48).

The initiative towards the formation of the Jama'ah or of the "sultanate" of Taguig did not come from the holders of *sultân* or *datu* titles, but from the local community at large, government employees, the local intelligentsia and businessmen. Thus the new community in Quiapo had left behind the genealogical tradition at authority. In the new settlement it is the religion rather than the *adat* prescription which survives the challenge. In the case of the Jama'ah, the leadership is in the hands of rising social groups, the educated class of the community. It is important to note authority is equally distributed among the social groups or sectors within the Jama'ah, Government employees, businessmen, *datus*, '*ulamâ*' and young people. Thus it reminds us of a democratic institution. Nevertheless, it is the search for authority that generated the Jama'ah and the "sultanate" of Taguig. This confirms the historical experience, that Muslim collaboration is more of a vertical than a horizontal form (Tan: 1977, p. 95).

To the community, the attempt to establish the Jama'ah may look like elitism, in which only a selected few can become members while the rest of the *ummah* belong to the *jama'ah* of the Grand Mosque but not to the Jama'ah. In religious term, it is the creation of a brotherhood in which piety become the standard of excellence and the *shari'ah* obeisance becomes the route to a religious meritocracy. The behavioral codes of the Jama'ah and the oath-taking ceremony remind us of warrior ethics, in which courage is the standard of excellence and loyalty a route to success. If this is the case, then, a form of warrior ethic prevails among the community.

The establishment of the Jama'ah means that the organization of the Barangay alone is considered to lack an effective means of preserving the value system of the community. Likewise, an ordinary

mosque organization does not satisfy the needs of the community. The creation of a comprehensive structure like the Jama'ah is a continuation of the historically rooted tradition of a religio-civil society (*dār al-Islām*), the exclusive characteristic of the Muslim community since pre-Spanish period. The need for a legitimated power with which to enforce the Islamic *sharī'ah* is a century-old demand of Muslims Philippines. In this sense, it is worthwhile noting that there is no separation of politics and religion in the Islamic doctrine. It is important that such an institution can exist side-by-side with the legal constitutional civil organizations of the government.

The Jama'ah and the *jamā'ah* (hereafter the *J(j)amā'ah*) serve as a defense mechanism against the secular society of Metro Manila's urban civilization, which has pulled apart the very fabric of the religious and social institutions of the migrant population. The *J(j)amā'ah* provide the members with communal as well as religious solidarity. The lost of desire for community, dependence and engagement described by Slater (1971) is compensated by the existence of *J(j)amā'ah*. One may feel secure, for instance, that in case of death the *J(j)amā'ah* will take care of burials in a proper Islamic way. The community is a safety valve for Muslim struggling for their life and their faith in a strange environment. With this explanation in mind, a structured *Jamā'ah* would not be needed at the home base i.e. in rural communities which already have built-in security systems. The *Jamā'ah* is an urban-modern phenomena, or that Durkheim might call a manifestation of "organic solidarity".

Islamically speaking, the *Jamā'ah* implies that Islam need a structure in order to exist. It serves as an embodiment of and a means to the observance of religious virtues and a collective deterrent vices. It is interesting to note that the community tend to take their legal affairs, especially family matters, to the authority of the Jama'ah and the Sultan rather than going to the secular Barangay authorities. This mean that the community still prefers to live under the *sharī'ah*.

The emphasis on *sharī'ah* in the religious life in the Philippines shows a strong tendency toward an ethical religion. In an ethical religion, religion is the guardian of law and order in society —compared to a salvation religion in which religion serves as individual salvation. Of course Islam is a comprehensive system in itself, but specific historical experiences influence its observance. In this case the Philip-

pine Muslims place more stress on the ethical side, while in many parts of the Malay zone the esoteric aspects are emphasized. It is observed, for instance, that the mystical element is predominant in Java, so that even such a reformist movement as the Muhammadiyah is influenced by *sūfī* teachings (Nakamura: 1980). If history can help in the explanation, the lack of esoteric, contemplative and mystical dimensions in the Philippine Muslim community may be due to the long history of wars, most significantly the wars against the Spanish colonial expansion. In this process religion becomes more utilitarian in character in order to serve historical necessity. Here too, we are reminded of warrior ethics.

Unlike in other Malay zones, Philippine Muslim also lack reform movements. It has been observed that in Quiapo, due to the stress on the *sharī'ah*, *bid'ah* practices are absent. Tribal-traditional practices have been neglected for various reasons. There is no reason for the birth of a reformist movement. Reforms might have been taught by the '*ulamā*' on limited occasions but not as a movement such as such. For example, discouragement of the use of the drum (*tabo*) in the mosque has recently been launched by the '*ulamā*' in Maranao (Madale: 1981, p. 219), yet this never becomes an issue between the conservatives and the reformists.

The lack of nation-wide Islamic movement, though regretted, is to some extent beneficial to Muslim in the Philippines. After being torn apart by tribal and various other means of power distribution, Muslim simply could not afford further division of the community. However, the lack of at least one nationally recognized body makes it difficult for concerned parties to affect change and development programs. The attempts of the Ministry of Muslim Affairs to establish an '*ulamā*' council in the Philippines is hard to realize, considering the multicentric tendency of Muslims here. The suggestion of the formation of a monolithic structure designed after the Catholic Church (Tan: 1977, p. 154) is only partially acceptable, since such a monolithic structure is not compatible with Islamic teachings which do not give room for the existence of clerical authority. Attempts of the Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines have resulted in a federation of local Islamic bodies. A national umbrella organization, whether government or community based, so far seems to have faced difficulties.

Such difficulties can also be seen in the reform movement of the *madrasah*. The *madrasah* in Quiapo is shaped after the Southern *madrasah*, but it is an independent educational institution without any organizational link to those in South. Presently, there is no nationally recognized educational system for Muslims. The *madrasah* curriculum in Quiapo is also inspired by such institutions in the Middle East, being brought in by the *madrasah* headmaster who is graduate of al-Azhar University in Egypt. It is more of a personal or community effort, rather than part of the educational system.

Despite the uncertain future, enrollment in the *madrasah*, in Quiapo as well as in other parts of the Philippines, is quite high. Pandapatan (1982) argued that this high enrollment rate has a rational justification. Economically, the *madrasah* enrollment is increasing because of the expansion of the job market in the Middle East. Socially, the influence of parents, *datus*, religious teachers, leaders and peer groups are such that training increases students status in the community. Culturally, the teaching of Arabic serves as the natural symbol of educated people in a religiously oriented community. The fact that many of the children enrolled in the weekend *madrasah* of Quiapo are also studying at public schools is a sign of a new path an emerging in education. So too is the fact that the *madrasah* itself is held at the weekends. Public schools in Philippines often give unacceptable teaching materials to Muslim children (Madale: 1981, pp. 248-255) in order to discourage their enrollment. Thus the Quiapo experiment is a pioneering effort towards a solution of the dilemma between faith and progress. It is also a step towards fair distribution of resources within the present economic system in order to make Muslim manpower marketable in the national economy.

The problem of manpower marketing is crucial to the position of Muslims in national community. The bureau of Economic Affairs of the ministry of Muslim Affairs has made great efforts to involve Muslim in a variety of vocational training in Metro Manila. It seems that the real problem of Muslim, in economic terms, is not between Muslims and Christian government, but between Muslim community and the free enterprise economy. The economy ideology of the Muslim community does not match the present capitalistic economic of the Philippines. Even if the present solution, based the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, were successful, resulting in some kind of political autonomy in the South, many political economy problems are still likely

to arise. Muslims will never enjoy a competitive advantage in economic affairs (Mastura: 1983, p. 12), remaining an "out-group" of corporate wealth and holding low economic status.

The Muslim community's lack of economic competitiveness is due to their inability to accumulate capital. Lengthy wars have certainly affected the underdevelopment and the drain on the savings of Philippine Muslims. Observers may also blame *hajj* pilgrimages as a waste of economic resources, for example, Castle (Castle: 1967, p. 90) regarding Indonesia. The former explanation may offer the best answer, since in the past the Southern provinces were economically well developed due to trading activities.

The second allegation, despite having some benefits (Mehden; 1986) as seen from the present arrangements is only partly true. In the past, one may imagine that *hajj* pilgrimages may have resulted in a boom in the travel industry, not for the benefit of foreign capital, but for Muslim community itself. In the present situation, the transfer of wealth from pilgrims to travel companies, could be prevented if proper arrangements were undertaken. In this case, Islam might envisage an economic system of its own. It is the principle of an Islamic "middle economy" (*ummatan wasatan*) that is confronted by the present economic paradigm based on productivity and the creation of capital (Mastura; 1983a). The Quiapo traders, and the *Hajjis* can be expected to be *homo economicus* of the capitalist type.

There is nothing in religion that prevents Muslims from engaging in economic activities, except for the prohibition of *ribâ* or interest-taking. Unlike Javanese Muslims, where the *priyayi* have the certain norm against trading activities, in Quiapo the *sultân* and the *datus* do not abstain from business. Trade may even be their main occupation. This means that in the Muslim community in the Philippines bureaucratic ethics could never present an obstacle to an enterprise spirit. There is no sharp distinction between bureaucratic elites and business elites. This reminds us of the combination of warrior activities and trading activities that occurred in the past, when *nakhuda* (ship captains) undertook the role of both warriors and traders (Gowing: 1979, p. 52). A successful *nakhuda* enjoyed certain favors from the Sultan and received bureaucratic appointments as rewards.

This is the economic ideology of the enclave of the Muslim community in Quiapo. The Rajah Sulaiman market is a real and symbolic

presentation of the Filipino Muslim economy within the capitalist economy. The free ports of Zamboanga and Jolo are a concession given to Muslim after a long period of "illegal" trading activities. However, this is certainly not an economic solution for the Muslim community, since such a concession only makes them more alienated. Moreover, the largest share of the free ports trade is now in the hands of Chinese merchants, so the free ports certainly do not benefit the community. In the midst of a free market, the Rajah Sulaiman 'Traders' Association can never become like the merchant guilds of the middle ages. It cannot protect its members from the many ailments of a competitive economy.

That the enclave community, enclave religion and enclave economy find their own reasons to exist in an inhospitable environment has been clearly manifested in the social and religious life of the community. The *jihād* psyche that they possess resembles the civil counterpart of the militancy of MNLF. Echoing Matsura (in Jocano: 1983) we share the optimism that there is a certain compatibility between the *jihād* psyche and developmental efforts. By the same token, we share optimism on the convergence between the ideology of the "rebellion of the poor" of the Marcos government and Islamic ideals (Cruz in *Forum*, July 19, 1982). This can be undertaken through a mature understanding of the religious, social and economic values of the Muslim communities.

The Quiapo experiment is a step towards the fulfillment of Islamic duties. With Majul (1983, p. 61), we can say that Allah promises Muslim the following:

"You are the best community (*ummah*) that has been raised for mankind. You enjoin correct conduct and forbid indecency; and you believe in Allah".

This is indeed the very *āyah* (sign of God) that the Sultan of Taguig and the Secretary General of the Manila Grand Mosque Jama'ah often cited as the Qur'ānic justification for the establishment of the model communities.

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