STUDIA ISLAMIKA
STUDIA ISLAMIKA
Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies
Vol. 12, no. 1, 2005

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STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-0492) is a journal published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UII Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta (STT DEPPEN No. 129/SK/DITJEN/PPG/STT/1976) and sponsored by the Australia-Indonesia Institute (AII). It specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular, and South-east Asian Islamic Studies in general, and is intended to communicate original researches and current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from scholars of related disciplines.

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STUDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of National Education, Republic of Indonesia as an academic journal (SK Dirjen Dikti No. 23a/DIKTI/2004).
Annual subscription rates from outside Indonesia: US$ 60.00 (institution); US$ 45.00 (individual), and US$ 30.00 (student). The cost of a single copy ordered from outside Indonesia is US$ 20.00. Rates include international postage and handling.

Please make all payment through bank transfer to: PPIM-CENSIS, CITIBANK Jakarta, Indonesia, account No. 3000212848 (USD), ABA No. 021 000089, ABA Routing # 10995291 Swift Code: citiidjx

All subscriptions, orders and changes of address should be sent in writing to: STUDIA ISLAMIKA Gedung PPIM-UIN Jakarta, Jl. Kertamukti No. 5 Pisangan, Cirendeu, Ciputat 15419 PO Box 225 Jakarta, Indonesia.

Harga berlangganan di Indonesia, satu tahun: Rp 60.000,- (lembaga), Rp 45.000,- (perorangan) dan Rp 30.000,- (mahasiswa).
Harga satu edisi Rp 20.000,-
Harga sudah termasuk ongkos kirim. Pembayaran melalui PPIM-CENSIS Citibank, Jakarta No. Rek: 3000212831
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Menyikapi kebijakan politik rezim Soeharto, Masyumi dan Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang terbagi dalam tiga kelompok. Pertama, kelompok yang pindah ke gerakan dakwah dan mendirikan Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII) dengan M. Natsir, Muhammad Roem, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Anwar Haryono dan Yunan Nusution sebagai tokoh sentralnya. Setelah dilarang untuk beraktivitas dalam dunia politik, mereka melihat celah lain untuk berkiprah di masyarakat, yakni dengan berdash-


Greg Fealy and Bernhard Platzdasch

The Masyumi Legacy:
Between Islamist Idealism and Political Exigency
الطبيعي أن حدث اختلاف في سياسات تنظيمية بين الماشومي وتلك المنظمات.

واستجابة لسياسات النظام الحكومي لسوهاردوتو (Gueharto)، يقسم موقف الماشومي وأسرة "القصر والنجح" منهما إلى ثلاث فئات. فالفئة الأولى تميل إلى حركة الدعوة. وبعد أن منع الماشومي من النشاط في المجال السياسي، وجدوا فرصا مفتوحة لدعوة أفراد المجتمع إلى الإسلام. والفئة الثانية لا تزال متبقية النشاط في المحيط السياسي. وأما الفئة الثالثة فهي فئة الاختصاصيين الذين ساروا على اتجاه براهمي (نفعي). وإلى جانب الفئات الثلاث، فهناك فئة قليلة من أعضاء ومعتنقي الماشومي توارت في حركة إسلامية راديكالية، مثلها مثل حركة إنشاء دولة إسلامية إندونيسية. وفي الوقت نفسه واعتبارا للحركة الراديكالية ظهرت فئة أخرى كانت تعتمد بحركة تجديد الفكر الإسلامي، وروّاد هذه الحركة نور خالص محمد (Nurcholis) ودوام راهارجو (Jimno) وأحمد واهب (Madjid).

وعصر الإصلاح بإندونيسيا هو الحوزي الأساسي الثاني للبحث في هذه المقالة. وتشابه مع روح الإصلاح والشعور بالنشاط الديموقراطي، حاول كثير من الناشطين المسلمين في المجال السياسي إحياء شهيرة الماشومي. وعملوا على جمع صفوف أسرة "القصر والنجح" الكبيرة في وعاء الحرب السياسي. وهذه المحاولة الفعلية أتيت مجلس الدعوة الإسلامية، وهي منظمة وحيدة باعتبارها تجسد جديدا للماشومي في الوقت الحاضر. وبالطبع أن هذا الاقتراح تعتبره عدة مشاكل تمثل في أن مؤيدي الماشومي ومعاطفيه من ناحية قد تشقوا في القوى السياسية والديموقراطية، حيث أن كثيرا من رجال محقية وحيدة الطلاب المسلمين قد ارتحوا بالتحاول بحزب الحداثيين وغيرهم من الأحزاب، ومن ناحية أخرى تظهر مشكلة القيادة.

وعلى الرغم من ذلك، بيد أن للأشكال التي السباقين علاجهما بتنصيب يوسريل إيرا ماهنيدرا (Yusril Ihza Mahendra) زعيمًا لهذا الحزب السياسي. ويرجى أن يكون رجلا شابا قادرا على تحمل مسئولية تحقق القسم والآمال الماشومية. وفضل تأييد مجلس الدعوة الإسلامية، أنشئ حزب جديد وهو حزب القصر والنجح (PPP) وعين يوسريل رئيسا له. وإلى جانب هذا الحزب، فهناك أحزاب أخرى وردت الروح والآمال الماشومية، أولا وهو حزب الاتحاد التنموي (PPP) وحزب العدالة (PKS)، مع اختلافهما في مستوى التوريث. ويمكن القول إن حزب القصر والنجح يعتبر تجسيدا جديدا للماشومي، ومن ثم أصبح وليدا مشروعا له.
Masyumi still lives in the minds of the Muslim community. I don’t think it will ever disappear because it set a true example of how Muslim politicians should behave.

Yunan Nasution

What remains of Masyumi are memories. [It] therefore cannot be used to reach the masses in our times.

Deliar Noer

Only old people understand Masyumi’s symbols. Those who are active [today] know [them] but don’t really understand what Masyumi was. Why? Because there was no socialisation... from the Old to the New Order generation. Therefore it is not possible to use Masyumi’s symbols and obtain many votes.

Djayadi, PII Chairman

Masyumi’s name and symbol have an enduring appeal, particularly to modernist Muslims. Although the party was disbanded in 1960, Muslim intellectuals, activists and politicians continue to invoke its name and identify themselves as being part of the Masyumi heritage. For example, no less than four parties at the 1999 general elections used symbols based on Masyumi’s bulan bintang (crescent moon and star) logo and they jostled among themselves for recognition as the party most representative of Masyumi values and tradition. Many of these modernists felt bound by an associative spirit to the Masyumi ‘family’, which was commonly referred to as the Keluarga Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon and Star Family).

Despite the seeming popularity of the Masyumi name, there is much debate among scholars and modernist leaders about the precise content of the party’s ideology and its influence upon contemporary Islamic politics. The proliferation of parties bearing Masyumi’s name or symbol and the growing fragmentation of modernist politics are evidence of these divergent views. Some see Masyumi as a beacon for Muslim politics, one which provided luminous guidance for subsequent generations in how to think and behave as politically active Muslims. Others, while drawn to aspects of the Masyumi tradition, see it as anachronistic to present political conditions in Indonesia. This chapter will explore the meaning of Masyumi for contemporary politicians and activists. It will examine the party’s history and ideology in the 1940s and 1960s before tracing current perceptions of Masyumi. Of particular interest is the ‘remembering’ of modernists, of whether their understanding of Masyumi is historically accurate and reflective or whether
they have idealised if not mythologised the *bulan bintang* tradition. Furthermore, do politicians regard Masyumi as a relevant model or cynically wield its name and symbols for political advantage? In short, what is the nature of Masyumi’s legacy?

We argue that there is little consensus in the Bulan Bintang Family over Masyumi values and traditions, beyond a small number of very general traits. Furthermore, understanding of the party’s history and support within the Islamic community is low. In recent years, there has been an attenuation of the Masyumi legacy, as successive generations of modernist politicians have become more distant from the party and their grasp of Masyumi’s ideology and history has weakened. While Masyumi can be said to retain potent symbolic value, it can be said to have only minimal influence on modern politics.

Masyumi’s History

Masyumi’s life as a political party spanned just fifteen tumultuous years, from 1945 to 1960. Shortly after the granting of independence, the government called on political and community groups to form parties. Accordingly, in November 1945 a conference attended by almost all major Islamic organisations agreed to transform Masyumi from a socio-religious organisation into a political party. Masyumi had been established in 1943 by the Japanese administration to facilitate the mobilisation of the Muslim community for the war effort against the Allies. Indonesia’s two largest Islamic organisations, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama and modernist Muhammadiyah were the main components.\(^4\)

There were two widely held expectations of Masyumi: it would be the sole vehicle for political Islam; and it would dominate Indonesian politics. Neither of these was realised. The principle of Muslim brotherhood and solidarity (*wahabah Islamiyah*) was central to Masyumi’s ideology and the party’s founding conference resounded with declarations that the *ummat* (Islamic community) would speak with one voice. The party’s 1945 constitution said that Masyumi was to be the ‘one and only Indonesian Islamic political party’\(^5\). Given that Islam was the religion of the great majority of Indonesians, Masyumi leaders (and indeed many of their secular nationalist and communist rivals) expected that the party would be the clear winner at any future election. Islamic unity proved ephemeral. From the outset, the small Sumatran traditionalist organisation, Perti, refused to join and established itself as a rival party to Masyumi. In
1947, the PSII split from Masyumi in protest at the latter’s failure to join the left-leaning Amir Syarifuddin cabinet. Changes to Masyumi’s leadership and organisational operation in 1949 alienated NU and it eventually seceded in 1952 after the party’s board refused to allocate it a seat in the Witojo cabinet. NU became an independent party soon afterwards and formed the Indonesian Muslim League (Liga Muslimin Indonesia) with Perti and PSII as a rival grouping to Masyumi. NU’s departure was an irretrievable blow to Masyumi’s claim to represent the entire Islamic community. The overwhelming majority of traditionalist Muslims identified with NU and most left Masyumi after the NU split. This left Masyumi a predominantly modernist Muslim party.\(^6\)

Masyumi also fell well short of its goal of political dominance. Far from securing large majorities, the party never held more than one-quarter of parliamentary seats. In the proto-parliament (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat: KNIP) of 1946-9, Masyumi was allocated 60 seats, the most of any party, but this never amounted to more than 15% of the total seats.\(^7\) Similarly, unelected provisional legislature of 1950-55, the composition of which was determined by a consensus of the political elite, Masyumi was the largest party but had only 21% of seats. Indonesia’s first general election in 1955 also failed to deliver the hoped for sweeping victory. Masyumi won 20.9% of the vote, only just above NU’s 18.4% and behind PNI’s 22.3% (though, because of the nature of the electoral system, PNI and Masyumi ended up with 57 seats each in the parliament). The party’s vote was also concentrated in the outer islands, unlike the other three major parties, whose support came mainly from Java. Masyumi served in all but one of the seven cabinets of the 1950-57 period (i.e., the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet) and provided prime ministers for three of these governments (Mohamad Natsir, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo and Burhanuddin Harahap). The coalition nature of these cabinets meant that Masyumi was often frustrated in its ability to achieve its policy objectives.

Masyumi’s role in politics during this time had a number of hallmarks. First, of all the Islamic parties, it was the most emphatic advocate of the implementation of Islamic law. Although other Islamic parties supported the Jakarta Charter which would provide constitutional recognition of the shariah, Masyumi invested far greater intellectual and political capital in the campaign for Islamic law. Second, Masyumi was, with its Socialist Party (PSI) ally, the leading advocate of technocratic policy settings. This was consistent with their perception of Islam as a faith which enjoined ‘ratio-
nal' approach to political and economic problems. It eschewed the more populist approach of NU and much of PNI and argued for economic and social policies based on technical expertise rather than on public sentiment. In Feith's terms, they were the archetypal 'administrator'. Third, Masyumi was the most staunchly anti-communist of the major parties. It was implacably opposed to Communist Party (PKI) involvement in government and consistently refused to join proposed cabinets that contained PKI members or their sympathisers, even when parties such as NU and PNI were inclined to accommodate them. Fourth, it arguably held the strongest commitment to Western-style democracy and rule of law of any of the four major parties. Fifth, Masyumi championed the economic and politics interests of the outer islands against those of Java. It was highly critical of the Java-centric orientation of governments in the late 1950s and argued for more equitable distribution of income between provinces and greater regional autonomy.

The strength of Masyumi's commitment to these positions was evident in its response to a series of political crises from 1956 to 1960. These included the transition to Guided Democracy, the deadlock over constitutional revisions and the regional rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, in which numerous Masyumi leaders at both the national and provincial level played a prominent role. In each of these cases, Masyumi was prepared to place itself at considerable political risk to uphold its principles. It resisted Sukarno's moves to dismantle parliamentary democracy and replace it with the authoritarian Guided Democracy on the grounds that it effectively disenfranchised the electorate and would also result in significant leftist representation in government. Masyumi led the Islamic parties in the Constituent Assembly in their insistence that the 1945 Constitution could only be revived if it contained the Jakarta Charter. Furthermore, many national and regional Masyumi leaders joined or defended the rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi as an expression of outer island hostility to the political direction of Jakarta governments. In each case, Masyumi was defeated and pushed further to margins of Indonesian politics. Eventually in September 1960, Sukarno announced his intention to ban Masyumi, following which the party leadership dissolved the organisation rather than have its assets seized by the state. In 1962, many of the party's most senior leaders, including Mohammad Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap, Mohammad Roem and Sjarifuddin Prawiranegara, were arrested and jailed without trial till 1966-7.
The Greater Masyumi Family

Since the early 1950s, Masyumi was often referred to in the context of a broader constituency known as the ‘Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang’ or Greater Crescent and Star Family. This included not only Masyumi members but also the members of affiliated or sympathetic organisations—in other words, those people who identified with Masyumi and its values and probably voted for the party in elections. This group was overwhelmingly modernist in persuasion and key ‘member organisations’ were Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Islamic Association), al-Irsyad, the Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement (GPII), the Indonesian (Tertiary) Students Association (HMI) and the Indonesian (Secondary) Students’ Association (PII).

Masyumi leaders and publications often referred to this Bulan Bintang Family as if it was a cohesive group, but in reality it was an amorphous and shifting category. The GPII provides a good example of this. It is often seen as the youth wing of Masyumi and the chairman of GPII usually sat on the party central board. Clearly, the GPII was the major channel for cadre entering Masyumi with one in five of the party’s parliamentarians in 1956 coming from the organisation. Yet GPII was never formally tied to Masyumi and the two severed relations in 1958 when the party objected to GPII’s involvement in the army-sponsored anti-communist Military-Youth Cooperation Body. HMI and PII also avoided formal organisational relations with Masyumi out of concern that they would no longer be seen as representing all Islamic students (i.e., both NU-linked traditionalists as well as modernists). Though closer to Masyumi than other parties, HMI in particular strived to maintain good relations with NU and often disagreed with Masyumi policies. Most organisational ‘members’ of the Bulan Bintang Family adopted a pragmatic approach to Sukarno’s Guided Democracy regime and sought to adapt to the ideological and political climate lest their organisations face the banning and execration that befell Masyumi. Although these organisations chose not to confront the regime, many of their leaders and members admired Masyumi’s stand on Guided Democracy and remained quietly supportive of the party’s ideals.

Thus, even at Masyumi’s highpoint in the 1950s, attitudes towards the party and its policies among the modernist community varied markedly. While there were general principles to which most members of the Bulan Bintang Family adhered, the details of policy and strategy were frequently a source of internal friction. These dis-
agreements over direction would multiply and deepen during the mid- to late 1960s as the Bulan Bintang Family sought to position itself vis-à-vis the new Soeharto regime. Masyumi leaders had expected Soeharto to be well disposed towards them, given their trenchant anti-communism and opposition to Guided Democracy. These expectations were soon dashed when the regime did not immediately release the jailed Masyumi politicians and furthermore refused to allow the rehabilitation of the party under its old name and leadership.

Faced with a powerful and hostile regime, Masyumi and the Bulan Bintang Family split into three main streams. The first is the dakwah or ‘propagation’ stream, led by Mohamad Natsir. Natsir was the most charismatic and intellectually dominant figure in Masyumi and he served as the party’s chairman from 1949 to 1958. He, and other key Masyumi leaders such as Mohammad Roem, Sjarfruddin Prawiranegara, Anwar Haryono and Yunan Nasution, decided that they should devote themselves to predication in order to create a more Islamic society in Indonesia. This was not only a reaction to the New Order regime’s restrictions on Islamic politics but was also due to a perception that many of Indonesia’s Muslims lacked a proper understanding of and commitment to the teachings of the faith. Proof of this could be found in the fact that only a minority of Muslims had supported the Jakarta Charter and Islamic parties in elections. Accordingly, this group founded the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council; DDII) in 1967, which went on to become a major source of dissent against the regime. Dewan Dakwah always regarded itself as the embodiment of the Masyumi spirit, even though it was not overtly involved in politics. This was due in no small measure to the fact that most of the senior Masyumi leaders from the 1950s joined the organisation. Even after the last of these leaders died in the late 1990s, many of their replacements drew their legitimacy from having served on the staff of Masyumi leaders or having gained their blessing to assume high office in Dewan Dakwah.

The second stream was focussed on the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (usually known as Parmusi or PMI), which was the nominal replacement of Masyumi. Formed in 1968 on condition that it excluded the former senior Masyumi leaders, Parmusi became the main vehicle for modernist politicians outside the regime’s party, Golkar. These politicians regarded it as important to maintain formal political representation for the Islamic community, indepen-
dent of the New Order’s corporatist network. Parmusi was subject to extensive manipulation by Soeharto’s political and security agencies and in 1970 was forced to accept as chairman the regime-friendly Mohamed S. Mintareldja. The party gained just 5.4% of the vote at the 1971 elections. In 1973, Parmusi was pushed by the New Order into an uneasy amalgamation with NU, PSII and Perti to form the United Development Party (PPP). For much of the next 25 years, the regime stoked rivalries between PPP’s Parmusi and NU elements, ensuring that the former held leadership of the party in order to counterbalance the larger and more critical NU. Although, at times, PPP served as effectively the main opposition party to Golkar, its modernist members were forced to accept the narrowly circumscribed role set out for them by the regime. On issues such as the 1973 Marriage Laws and the 1978 Kepercayaan Laws, PPP had some success in resisting what they saw as regime attempts to undermine the position of Islam. But on the broader issues of the Jakarta Charter and Islamisation, the party was obliged to follow the New Order’s Pancasila-based orthodoxy. PPP’s performance in the five post-1973 New Order elections ranged from a high of 29.3% to a low of 15.9%.

The third stream was that of the ‘technocrats’. This consisted of former Masyumi members and sympathisers who forsook the party’s Islamist agenda and pursued their bureaucratic or political careers via Golkar or one of its many regime-endorsed affiliates. Many of these technocrats were attracted to the New Order’s developmentalist policies and there were numerous parallels between Soeharto’s brand of economic ‘rationalism’ and the policies of Masyumi in the 1950s. A large number of HMI cadre moved into Golkar and the bureaucracy from the late 1960s, willingly suppressing their Masyumi-derived ideological inclinations. Some retained an aspiration to Islamise the regime and society, albeit gradually, while others were content to adopt Golkar’s secular creed without reservation. By the early 1980s, the officials and politicians of Bulan Bintang background had become an influential force and were one of the early groups to benefit from Soeharto’s embracing of Islam from the late 1980s.

In addition to these the three main streams, there were also small splinter groups within the Bulan Bintang Family which emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These included radical elements which became involved with the underground Darul Islam (later known as Negara Islam Indonesia or NII) and various other mili-
tant offshoots,\textsuperscript{14} and also a liberal movement led by young intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo and Ahmad Wahib. This liberal movement was initially known as Gerakan Pembaharu or Reform Movement but more recently is referred to as ‘Cultural Islam’ because it pursues its aims via intellectual, educational and cultural means rather than through politics.\textsuperscript{15}

The Post-Soeharto Fragmentation

Following the downfall of Soeharto in May 1998, many modernist politicians hoped to revive the Masyumi party and to bring together as much as possible of the Bulan Bintang Family under the one political banner. Not surprisingly, Dewan Dakwah cast itself in the role of chief initiator, but from the outset, it faced significant obstacles in reuniting modernist politics.\textsuperscript{16} Key elements of the Bulan Bintang Family questioned the wisdom of re-forming Masyumi and were, for various reasons, reluctant to support the move. To begin with, many in Muhammadiyah, HMI and PII felt Masyumi would be an anachronism in the ‘era reformasi’. Not only did they doubt the ability of any new party to present a coherent and relevant image, they were also pessimistic about the electoral attraction of the Masyumi name and symbol. Such sentiments were particularly strong among younger activists from these organisations. Many considered that the risks of joining Masyumi outweighed the advantages. HMI and PII, for example, had well-established patronage links with Golkar and to a lesser extent PPP and they were reluctant to jeopardise these. HMI also had developed since the early 1970s a tradition of liberalism and organisational neutrality on political issues and, as a matter of principle, few in the organisation wants formal ties to any party. Muhammadiyah also had members spread across much of the political spectrum and it saw little point in returning to the single political affiliation of the 1945-1960 period. Furthermore, it would prove difficult to draw experienced Bulan Bintang-linked politicians from existing parties such as Golkar and PPP.

Another problem was leadership. By 1998, Anwar Haryono was the sole remaining Masyumi figure who had held high office in the party in the 1950s. He was, however, in poor health and lacked the authority of Natsir. Many younger Bulan Bintang activists also regarded him as too staid and quietist. Few of the newer generation of Dewan Dakwah leaders, such as Hussein Umar, Kholil Ridwan,
Ahmad Sumargono and Afandi Ridwan, had the intellectual stature or personal qualities needed to give them broad appeal in the Islamic community. Many Muslims outside DDII viewed these figures as outspoken hardliners. The only well-credentialed prospective leader within Dewan Dakwah was Yusril Ihza Mahendra, an urbane law professor at the University of Indonesia and son of a 1950s Masyumi politician. His lack of political experience and the fact that he had worked as a speechwriter for Soeharto, counted against him.17

Recognising its dearth of popular leaders, Dewan Dakwah sought to persuade Amien Rais, the chairman of Muhammadiyah and professor of international relations at Gadjah Mada University, to accept the chairmanship of the new party, with Yusril as his secretary-general. Amien was member of the DDII board from 1993 and was often featured in Media Dakwah, where he was promoted as a future leader of the umat.18 He had several attractions for Dewan Dakwah. He was a charismatic figure with strong support in Muhammadiyah and student circles. Moreover, he was seen as one of the few leaders who could unite some of the more disparate elements of modernist politics.19 Amien was initially tempted by the DDII offer but eventually declined, after modernist leaders rejected his proposals for the new party to have a ‘non-Islamic’ name and for the board to contain non-santri colleagues.20 He later declared PBB to be a party ‘too narrow’ for his agenda and went on to establish his own party, the National Mandate Party (PAN).21 Amien’s refusal to lead a new Islamist party was a heavy blow for those who hoped for a revival of strong, united modernist force in politics. One bitter Dewan Dakwah leader commented:

Amien Rais is a clown when it comes to politics. He’s so inconsistent ... and that is dishonourable. If Amien had led PBB, it would have been a large party because Muhammadiyah people would have supported [it]. Amien’s final decision was driven by [his search] for popularity.22

Spurned by Amien, DDII then agreed on Yusril as chairman of the new party. This party was eventually launched on 26 July 1998 with the name Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent-Star Party; PBB).23 Anwar Haryono, speaking at the launch, directly invoked the spirit of Masyumi:

The Bulan Bintang [Party] is like one side of the coin with Masyumi on the other. So, with the Bulan Bintang Party, we want new blood and new freshness in
order to continue the great ideals from the past. This Bulan Bintang Party indeed has an emotional connection with Masyumi (italics in the original), but nowadays we take a quite rational approach. There is a reason for this emotional [link].

PBB attracted strong support from organisations such as al-Irsyad and Persis as well as from some older generation former PII activists like Hartono Mardjono and Abdul Qadir Djaelani. The GPI also backed PBB. Overall, though, it remained a small, under-resourced party which conspicuously failed to attract more than a tiny minority of Bulan Bintang family members to its cause. In the 1999 election, it gained only 1.9% of the vote, making it the seventh-ranked party. Yusrii, aware of the limited appeal of Masyumi, tried to make the party attractive for a wider constituency. Shortly after the launching of PBB, he said:

If one considers the number of Masyumi voters in 1955, only a very small number of these voters are still alive today ... and they are now very old. Therefore, this new political force [i.e., PBB] has a commitment to Islamic values and its support is not limited to the descendents of [original] Masyumi supporters... If the grandparents are Masyumi, it's not certain that the grandchildren will be Masyumi.

Adian Husaini, the former deputy secretary-general of PBB and one of the Bulan Bintang family’s more outspoken activists was of a similar view to Yusrii:

Islamic leaders, especially the former Masyumi followers, have to be aware that one of the things they sell is a proud past. But the more time passes the more this [pride] declines. So, over time, the new generation no longer knows what Masyumi was. They don’t know who M. Natsir, Sjafruddin were. But [the ] Bulan Bintang [Party] still perpetuates Masyumi’s idealism... [But] Masyumi’s symbols are, after all, fractured. The image of Masyumi is fought over by so many people.

Many members of the Bulan Bintang family chose to retain their existing political allegiances. All but a handful of Partisus leaders remained in PPP, among them Faisal Basir and DDII chairman A. M. SaeFuuddin. Also, few of the PII and HMI cadre in Golkar left the party for PBB. Moreover, a significant minority of DDII activists founded or joined new parties. For example, the DDII notables Tamsil Linrun, A. M. Lutfi, A. M. Fatwa and Yahya Muhaimin became inaugural members of Amien Rais’s PAN, despite the fact that it was, in ideological terms, a religiously neutral party which eschewed the use of Islamic symbols and terminology. At the other end of the spectrum, Abdullah Hehamahua established the Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (Indonesian Islamic Political Party Masyumi; PPIIM) due to a conviction that Masyumi’s name and original
program should be revived. Other DDII activists such as Abu Ridho, Mashadi, and Mutammimul ‘Ula played a key role in establishing the Partai Keadilan (Justice Party; PK), which attracted a solid following among campus-based Muslim groups.

Thus by the time of the 1999 general election, members of the Bulan Bintang Family were dispersed across at least seven parties: PBB, PPP, PAN, PK, Golkar, PPIIM and Deliar Noer’s Partai Umat Islam (Islamic Community Party or PUI). Far from being a time for reuniting the broader modernist Muslim community, the post-Soe-harto period saw unprecedented fragmentation. Worse was to follow the 1999 election. PBB suffered a major split during the party’s first congress in 2000, when a group of 16 prominent dissidents, including Hartono Mardjono, Kholil Ridwan, Eggi Sudjana, Fadli Zon and Abdul Qadir Djaelani, left in protest over Yusril’s leadership style and management of the party. In particular, they wanted an investigation into allegations Yusril had used one billion rupiah from then president Habibie to buy the support of PBB branches, and complaints over the chairman’s private life.27 Both Hartono and Qadir Djaelani insisted that they represented the ‘real’ PBB and went on to form rival parties — neither is likely to pose much threat to PBB.28

PPP also experienced internal divisions. In late 2001, the party’s deputy chairman and popular preacher, Zainuddin M. Z., led a group of dissident cadre in forming PPP Reformasi, later called Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reform Star Party; PBR).29 Though initially seen as a major threat to PPP, Zainuddin has failed to harness effectively anti-Hamzah sentiment within the party and his PBR is unlikely to win many votes. From 1999, Parmusi elements in PPP also began reorganising themselves into what was effectively a formal faction within the party, complete with its own structures and caderisation process and leaving open the possibility of Parmusi becoming a separate party.30 Those PPP leaders driving Parmusi’s revival, claimed that they had taken their action out of concern at the ‘scattering of the potential of the greater Bulan Bintang family’ and the need for a new ‘vehicle for the Islamic community’s struggle as a continuation’ of Parmusi element within PPP.31 In mid-2003, Parmusi unsuccessfully challenged NU’s Hamzah Haz for the PPP leadership and many of its senior figures were later excluded from the new party board.32 There have also been efforts to bring together the smaller Islamic parties into a coalition capable of surmounting the 3% threshold for contesting the next election.33
The reasons for this growing segmentation within modernist Islamic politics are a source of much debate. Many modernist politicians believe a major factor is the continuing effects of New Order repression of Islamism. They argue that the regime's interference in and restriction of Islamist organisations severely disrupted their development and caderisation. Many talented younger cadres were deterred from becoming too closely involved in organisations such as Dewan Dakwah for fear it would harm their careers or lead to problems with the security services. The ability of DDII to promote understanding of its ideological agenda both within and without the organisation was circumscribed, with the result that only a small number of members were well informed about Masyumi's philosophy and legacy. These factors made it difficult to build settled, merit-based career structures and solid ideological foundations. Anwar Haryono was not surprised by this fragmentation and observed that: '[The Bulan Bintang Family] is like a river which was sealed for decades; now as the seal has been removed, the water runs everywhere'.

Other factors, such as rising educational levels, the expansion of the Muslim middle class and globalisation, have also played a role in the splintering of political Islam. A far greater number of Muslims now have access to and an understanding of a much wider array of Islamic ideologies and practices than did their counterparts in the 1950s. Most of the burgeoning Muslim middle-classes have tertiary qualifications and a good many are receptive to new ways of applying Islam to contemporary life. In numerical terms, probably as many are drawn to Islamism as are attracted to liberal Islam. Moreover, their embracing of new technologies such as satellite television and the Internet has quickened the flow of information from elsewhere in the Islamic world, particularly the Middle East. Thus new concepts and approaches enter the Indonesian ummat at an unprecedented rate. Such developments are more likely to drive political diversification than cohesion.

A final element has been the image of Dewan Dakwah itself. Over the past three decades, it has developed a reputation as a bastion of intolerance and sectarianism. Its obsession with Christianisation and strident anti-Jewish conspiracy theories have alienated many Muslims who might otherwise have identified with the doctrinal position and missionary activities of DDII. Interestingly, DDII's paranoia towards minority religious communities stands in contrast to Masyumi, which cooperated closely with the Catholic party during the 1950s.
Impact of the Masyumi Legacy

There are multiple difficulties in assessing the impact of the Masyumi legacy. One problem is defining who or what should be regarded as Masyumi. As we have seen, the 'Masyumi community' has often been seen in the past four decades as synonymous with the Bulan Bintang Family, but this is clearly problematic. This is a community without precise boundaries. At its fringes are people who may have loose familial links to Masyumi or who admire the values for which the party stood. But these 'members' may have many other influences in their lives which hold far greater sway than their identification with Masyumi. Clearly, at the core of the Bulan Bintang Family are activists who regard 'Masyumi values' as central to their personal and political lives, but this group is numerically small and has only a minor voice in the nation's affairs. Furthermore, there is the problem of disentangling commitment to Islamist ideology from allegiance to Masyumi per se. Many modern-day Islamists espouse an Islamic state but have come to this view not via an understanding of Masyumi's struggle but through their reading of contemporary Middle-Eastern sources. They may be largely ignorant of Masyumi but have ideological positions similar to that of the party.

Despite the problematic nature of this exercise, various conclusions can be drawn about Masyumi's impact on contemporary Indonesian politics. First, Masyumi values and policies do find expression, most particularly through PBB. Of all the parties that claim a stake in the Masyumi heritage, PBB is the only one which consciously seeks to follow, in a comprehensive way, the Masyumi example. This is manifested in a number of ways. First, its unswerving commitment to the constitutional inclusion of the Jakarta Charter marks it out from the Charter's other proponents, PPP, PDU and PK. PBB, on principle, refused to compromise in pressing for the Charter's adoption. Whereas as other parties withdrew their backing for the Charter motion at the 2002 Annual Session of the MPR, PBB members continued to advocate the Charter's insertion. PBB members knew that the motion would be rejected by a large majority but they continued believing that it was their moral obligation as Muslims to strive to implement the Shariah and also that it was their democratic right to do so. A good example of this thinking came from the PBB secretary-general, M. S. Ka'ban:
Up till now, the Islamic community is infected with the disease of SECULARISM. This sickness is a chronic epidemic. The implications of this paradigm are the loss of ethics, the collapse of morality, the absence of a clear sense of responsibility and the lack of moral norms that bind mankind. With secularism, there are no limits to what is permitted and prohibited, everything is permissible... because with the secular paradigm, there is no absolute truth, everything is relative... There is no other way except for the Islamic community to return to the new paradigm [sic]: worldly affairs are religious affairs, religion must regulate (menagatur) the state, community [and] individuals... We should] begin by re-opening the Jakarta Charter discourse. This is not just an historical obligation but more importantly it [aims] to save the nation which is beset by the storms of crisis. (Bold font and capitalisation as in the original article.)

Like Masyumi, PBB leaders also believed that Islamic law was more suitable to the Indonesian context than the current Western-derived civil law. They argued that Islamic law had preceded the arrival of European law in the archipelago and closer to the culture and spiritual sensibilities of the indigenous population that ‘alien’ civil law.

PBB also exhibits Masyumi’s uncompromising opposition to communism. This was evident in its resistance to proposals to lift the ban on the Indonesian Communist Party and its frequent insistence that communism continued to be a latent threat to Indonesia. It also is opposed to high-level military involvement in politics. It supported the elimination after 2004 of appointed Armed Forces and police representation in parliament, though it has been pragmatic about the presence of retired military officers in cabinet and senior bureaucratic positions. Yusrii directly linked these attitudes to Masyumi example. He told party cadre that: ‘We reject vehemently (habis-habisan) two things: militerism and communism. We follow Masyumi guidelines. In the past, the Masyumi Party had clear position. They were able to cooperate with everyone; the only one they couldn’t work with was the PKI. There are signs that communists are emerging again.

Lastly, PBB sees itself as continuing Masyumi’s high ethical standards in public life. As Anwar Haryono said at PBB’s launch, ‘upholding morals in politics’ was a Masyumi trademark and this quality would also be a priority within the new party. PBB leaders often refer admiringly to Masyumi’s reputation as the cleanest and most transparent of major parties in the 1950s. Indeed, some PBB leaders worried that their party might not live up to the lofty standards set by Masyumi. Ka’ban, for example, admitted that one reason for not naming the new party ‘Masyumi’, was that ‘we believe the name Masyumi was too great a psychological burden. It was
too big for us'. He feared that PBB might not be able to uphold Masyumi's high standards and would therefore be be vulnerable to attack.40 These concerns were soon to be realised. The controversy over Yusril's disbursement of the Habibie donation in 1999 provided the first instance of this. One of Yusril's opponents attacked his actions saying: 'The problem is that we claim as a party to be the legatee of Masyumi but in Masyumi things like this never happened.'41 Yusril was also attacked over aspects of his personal life. Sections of the press and some PBB dissidents claimed that he had improper relations with a number of women.

Overall, PBB is a small party whose influence on general politics is limited. Indeed, it relies increasingly on the high public profile of Yusril, PBB's sole representative in cabinet, to bolster the party's standing.

But PBB's devotion to the Masyumi cause should not, however, be overstated. In many aspects of policy, the party's leadership took a pragmatic stance, which included downplaying Islamist goals when they thought that it might cost them votes. This was most evident in PBB's emphasis in the 1999 election campaign upon general political reforms rather than on policies with specifically Islamic themes. Yusril, in particular, made constitutional reform a central element in the party's campaigning; significantly, he made scant reference either to shariah or the Jakarta Charter in his many statements on amending the constitution. Party leaders saw this priority to democracy and constitutionalism as in keeping with Masyumi's tradition, but they were also anxious to avoid being labelled extremists or radicals who were out of step with the mood of the era reformasi. They went to some lengths to persuade the public that PBB was a tolerant party capable of working with other Muslim groups and religious minorities.42 In this regard it sought to distance itself from the perceived sectarianism of Dewan Dakwah and to emphasise the Masyumi's supposed good relations with other religious parties in the 1940s and 1950s. Thus, PBB attempted project itself as continuing Masyumi's 'undogmatic' qualities.

This 'soft-peddling' on Islamist issues was sharply attacked by PBB more doctrinaire leaders, who accused Yusril of abandoning a key aspect of Masyumi's struggle. The former party deputy chairman, Kholil Ridwan, complained that: 'Masyumi the way Yusril understands it is a secular Masyumi. In reality, Masyumi wasn't like that. Its view was, in fact, like Jamiat-i Islamiyah [in Pakistan] ... and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt ... which strove for Islam
by bringing into effect the Shari‘ah through parliamentary struggle, democratically.⁴³

On the Shariah issue, there is also an important distinction between PBB and Masyumi. Although PBB has championed the cause of enforcing the shariah, particularly through the Jakarta Charter, it has invested little effort into elaborating on the concept of Islamic law and the details of its implementation in Indonesia. During the 1950s, there was a rich and sophisticated discourse within Masyumi on the issues of an Islamic state, shariah law and the Jakarta Charter. Writers on this subject displayed deep intellectual engagement with the subject matter and drew upon a wide array of sources and argumentation in presenting their views. By contrast, the debate within PBB (and even more so, PPP) is superficial. No party leaders wrote in a substantive way on the Jakarta Charter issue and much of PBB’s discourse had a mantra-like quality in which the virtues of implementing Islamic law were taken as self-evident. Many PBB officials spoke the mere enforcement of shariah would act as panacea for Indonesia’s manifold social, political and economic problems. Particularly noticeable was the lack of debate about how to overcome major disagreements within the broader Muslim community over the content of any future wider-ranging application of Islamic law. For example, traditionalists and modernists differ markedly on sources of law, with the former seeking to apply Syaffi‘i school teachings, and the latter preferring law more directly upon the Qur’ān and reliable Prophetic example. In many ways, this neglect of practical aspects of the Jakarta Charter’s implementation reflects a realisation by PBB leaders that there is little prospect of the Charter being included in the constitution.

The Masyumi legacy within PPP is less obvious than with PBB. There are several reasons for this. The first is that NU was a major if not majority component of the party that clearly did not see itself as part of the Masyumi tradition. Secondly, although Parmusi (MI) held the party chairmanship from 1973-1998, regime intervention ensured that this was always in the hands of pliable leaders rather than those who had an assertively independent or Islamist outlook. The first two PPP leaders – H. S. Mintareja and Jaelani (Johnny) Naro – were not highly regarded in the Bulan Bintang community; Hasan Ismail Metareum, the third chairman, did have a more substantial modernist pedigree but was also seen as too compliant to the regime’s wishes.⁴⁴ These appointments and the continual state interference in policy making, resulted in PPP suppressing much of
its Masyumi-derived agenda, including such issues as the Jakarta Charter.

Nonetheless, PPP did mount strong opposition to New Order policies that were seen as inimical to the interests of the Islamic community. It was particularly outspoken on policies that were seen as diminishing the authority of Islam and further secularising the legal and political systems. Good examples of these policies included the 1973 Marriage Bill and the 1978 Kerpercayaan Bill, which the government was forced to water down following vigorous PPP and Muslim community protests. The party also resisted what it saw the regime’s efforts to give Pancasila a quasi-religious interpretation. It objected to government’s late-1970s reformulation of Pancasila as the ‘source of the Indonesian soul’. PPP leaders argued that Pancasila, as a human construct, should not be sacralised and that religion, not the state ideology, formed the ‘soul’ of the nation. Moreover, they were critical of the New Order’s determination to impose its own interpretation on the Pancasila. The party’s stance on these Pancasila-related matters resembled that of Masyumi.

In the post-Soeharto era, PPP has become a leading proponent of the Jakarta Charter. The Parmusi faction has featured prominently in this, though many NU leaders have also backed this stance. While Parmusi members saw the party’s stance as reviving Masyumi’s struggle for Islamic law, they were also undoubtedly driven by practical political considerations. PPP leaders used the Jakarta Charter issue to help re-establish the party’s Islamic credentials after having developed a reputation for being too submissive towards the New Order regime. The party was also keen to differentiate itself from its main competitors, the National Awakening Party (PKB) and National Mandate Party (PAN), both of which have a Pancasila-based, religiously neutral platform. Despite championing the Charter, PPP leaders were less steadfast in their commitment than PBB. Their flexibility on the Shari’ah issue was apparent during the 2002 Annual Session of the MPR, at which the PPP relented on its call for the Charter’s inclusion into the constitution after gaining concessions on Islamic education issues.

The Masyumi spirit can also be seen, to some extent, in the popularity of Muslim Brotherhood teachings among campus dakwah groups and middle class Muslims. Masyumi leaders, via the Dewan Dakwah, played a critical role in disseminating and popularising the neo-revivalist thought of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jamiat-i Islami which became the foundation of new ‘cam-
pus Islam' phenomenon. Masyumi leaders, and Natsir in particular, had always been attracted to neo-revivalist thinking. In the early 1950s, Natsir held senior positions on a number of international Islamic organisations which brought him into close contact with Middle-Eastern and South Asian Muslim leaders such as Maududi. During this time, Masyumi publications wrote approvingly of the struggle of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamiat-i Islami.

In the 1970s, two DDI initiatives were to have far-reaching effects: first, Natsir directed that the organisation give high priority to proselytisation on campuses; and second, younger Dewan Dakwah activists began translating and publishing neo-revivalist works, such as those of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Maududi. The al-Banna and Qutb books in particular proved highly popular and went into numerous reprints. It was through such publications that many young Muslims and intellectuals became familiar neo-revivalist literature. Neo-revivalism was an offshoot of Egyptian-based Islamic reform movement led by Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Its hallmarks were a rejection of Western culture and philosophy, a reassertion of an emphasis on individual piety and social action as the most effective way of Islamising the community and state. Elements of this thinking made its way into seminal dakwah programs such as Imaduddin’s LMD at Bandung’s Salman mosque. When the New Order sought to shut down campus political activity in the early 1980s, many Muslim student groups adopted the Muslim Brotherhood organisational methods such as the use of cells (usroh) led by murobbi. It was from this environment, that many of the Justice Party’s leaders and cadre are drawn. While DDI was not the only catalyst in this campus dakwah movement, its role in popularising such approaches was significant. In the words one key Justice Party official,

What is clear, in concrete terms, is that campus mosques were the monumental achievement of Pak Natsir. So it was Pak Natsir who guarded the flourishing of campus mosques, beginning with Salman. And Natsir once declared ‘one day we will see Islamic cadre multiplying on campuses’.48

Although PK leaders readily pay homage to the role of DDI and former Masyumi leaders, they also question the relevance of Masyumi legacy for modern-day Indonesia. A frequent criticism is that the Masyumi and DDI approaches are anachronistic. Mutamimmul ‘Ula, a PK leader from a Bulan Bintang family background, commented that the Masyumi legacy ‘was not so important any
more' because 'history and political models have changed'. An- other PK leader said that 'PK was not Masyumi in its thinking' and disparaged PBB as 'Masyumi nostalgia'. Many in PK felt that DDII had stagnated from the late 1980s, particularly with regard to its heavy concentration on 'external' threats to the Islamic community such as Christian campaigns to convert Muslims, Sino-Indonesian economic domination and global Jewish-American conspiracies against Islam. While such views would be shared by many in PK, in general they are less prominent in the party's discourse. PK cadres prefer to place greater emphasis upon the development of personal morality and piety of Muslims and are less openly aggressive than DDII in responding to threats from non-Muslims. PK leaders also observed that there was little Masyumi or DDII cadresisation throughout the New Order period. One party leader commented that:

The old [Masyumi] figures always neglected cadresisation. The most they did was public lectures but there was nothing systematic. Nalasir never gathered together people to win new cadre. Hence, the various 'Masyumi' parties did not get many seats. I think that is major reason why Masyumi is only a historical remnant with a big name.

Though smaller in terms of parliamentary seats than PBB, PK has arguably had a greater impact on community consciousness and political culture. PK leaders have figured prominently in public discourse on a wide variety of issues and have often distinguished themselves by attempting to offer a more substantive intellectual contribution to policy debates than many of the politicians from other Islamic parties. They also have had much greater success than PBB (or PPP) at mobilising large numbers of people for rallies and demonstrations on issues such as opposition to US war in Iraq and proposed fuel and electricity tariff rises.

Conclusion

The prevalence of Masyumi symbols and references to the party and its ideology give a false impression of the impact of Masyumi's legacy upon contemporary politics. There is a widespread admiration for Masyumi's role in national politics during the first fifteen years of independence, particularly the party's record of defending the principles of constitutionality and democracy, maintaining high standards of piety and morality and striving to put Islam at the
centre of public life. This ‘remembering’ of Masyumi’s qualities underpins the network of the Bulan Bintang family. There is, however, significant disagreement among Bulan Bintang notables about the specific content of Masyumi’s policies and their application to modern-day Indonesia. Moreover, the internal discourse about the finer details of these policies is, for the most part, superficial, indicating that many Bulan Bintang members are content for Masyumi’s legacy to be symbolic rather intellectual or ideological.

The 1999 election showed that the Masyumi legacy had limited appeal for the great majority of Muslim voters. Seemingly, in the minds of most modernist Muslims, Masyumi, despite its famous name and symbol, was of marginal relevance to their political considerations. Awareness of this fact inclined the leaders of PBB, putatively the main inheritor of Masyumi’s mantle, to play down the more dogmatic aspects of the Masyumi agenda.

A critical issue in assessing the Masyumi legacy is the disaggregation of shari’ah issues from that of Masyumi. Historically, Masyumi was the strongest pro-shari’ah Islamic party and by virtue of this, it has a special status in the perception of contemporary Islamists. Nonetheless, these days it is the shari’ah issue itself that is far more potent than the memory of Masyumi. It is likely in the 2004 elections that the shari’ah will be a more significant campaign issue for Islamic parties than for any election since 1955. Meanwhile, references to Masyumi are likely to diminish.
Endnotes

This article is based on a paper delivered to the 'Dynamics of Political Islam in Indonesia' conference in Melbourne in August 2003.

1. Interview with Greg Fealy, Jakarta, 5 June 1992.
7. The size of the KNIP was increased several times during the course of the Revolution. Masyumi's 60 seat allocation took effect from 1946, when the KNIP had 407 members. When the total KNIP membership rose to 536, Masyumi's numbers did not alter. Sekretariat DPR-GR, Seperempat Abad Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia, no publisher, Jakarta, 1983, pp. 15-17.
9. GPII was eventually banned by Sukarno in July 1963 after some of its members were accused of involvement in an assassination attempt on the president's life. For a detailed account of GPII, see Lukman Hakiem, Perjalanan Mencari Keadaan dan Persatuan: Biografi Dr. Anwar Haryono, S.H., PT Abadi, Jakarta, 1993, pp 69-160.
10. Masyumi formally severed links with all of its organisation members in 1959 in order to protect them from any government retaliation against the party. IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Ensiklopedi Islam Indonesia, Penerbit Djambatan, Jakarta, 1992, pp. 626-8.
12. Following the creation of the United Development Party, Farmusi and its three PPP 'partners' were required by the regime to drop any reference to their former status as separate parties; thereafter they were known as 'elements' (unsur) within the merged party. Thus, Farmusi's unsur name was changed to Muslimin Indonesia (MI).
13. PPP's electoral results during the New Order period were: 29.3% in 1977; 27% in 1982; 16% in 1987, 17% in 1992; and 22% in 1997.
16. Initially, a DDII's congressional decision in June 1998 decided to delegate authority to the Kongres Umat Islam which then had to formalise a Masyumi successor party. Leaders of splinter parties like PPI Masyumi chairman Abdullah Hetamahua insisted to follow this process. However, by the time of the Kongres Umat Islam, PBB and PPII Masyumi had already been launched. Bulan Bintang leaders regarded the congress as infiltrated by the military and associates in Majelis Ulama Indonesia, with the goal of hampering the re-establishing of Masyumi. See, for example, "Sekali Diberi Kesempatan, Mega Malah Menguat", Suara Hidayatullah, September 1999.
17. Yusri was widely seen in DDII circles as an academic rather than a political leader. His writings on Masyumi's history and ideology as well as his commentaries on constitutional law were well regarded within the Bulan Bintang family.
20. Overtures to Amien were made from June 1998. Amien wanted the new party to be named Partai Amanah Bangsa. After rejecting the PBB offer, Amien was courted by PPP and had formally agreed to become the chair of the party’s Majelis Pakar (Council of Experts). He then withdrew from PPP and went on to launch PAN on 23 August 1998.
24. Profil Partai Bulan Bintang, no number or date given (but probably 1998), p. 5.
27. The media had differing accounts of the sum Yusril received from Habbie. Some papers reported the figure to be Rp 1.5 billion (‘Tidak Benar PBB Terima Rp1,5 Miliar dari BJ Habbie’, Pelita, 28 October 1999; and ‘Pensalurah al PBB Diumumkan’, 16 May 2000) but most put the sum at Rp 1 billion (see for eg, Republika, 16 May 2000; Jakarta Post, 9 May 2000; and DeTAK, 9-15 May 2000). Yusril was accused not only of money politics within PBB but also allegedly channelled some of the money into his law firm, Yusril Mahendra and Partners.
29. For details of PPP Reformasi and PBB, see Suara Merdeka, 25 November 2001 and 7 January 2002; and Kompas, 21 January 2002; and Jawa Pos, 7 April 2003. Zainuddin claimed to have an NU background and to have campaigned for the NU party in the 1971 election (Suara Merdeka, 21 January 2002). Though casting himself as a traditionalist, Zainuddin relied on several key modernist figures to launch PPP Reformasi.
30. The revived Parmusli was revived as a ‘social organisation’ (ormas), rather than as a formal political party. Hence, the new organization was Persaudaraan Muslimin Indonesia (Brotherhood of Indonesian Muslims), but the acronym was unchanged. Key figures in launching Parmusli included Bachtiar Charmsyah, Faisal Basir, Husni Thamrin, Husein Umar, Aisyah Aminy, Lukman Hakim and Ali Kiasi Hardi Demak. Its first congress of the post-Soeharto era was held in August 2002. Pengurus Pusat Persaudaraan Muslimin Indonesia, Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar 1 Parmusli, no publishers, Jakarta, 2002, and Jawa Pos, 23 August 2002.
31. Pengurus Pusat Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar 1 Parmusli, p. 49. The original quote has ‘Bintang Bulan’ rather than Bulan Bintang. Curiously, this reverse word order is used repeatedly in the congress report with no explanation.
33. These efforts included the Partai Keadilan, the Partai Nahdatul Ulama, the Partai Islam Indonesia Masyumi, the Partai Kebangkitan Umat, the Partai Baintan Reformasi, the Partai Islam Indonesia and the Partai PAS Indonesia. Decisive is the position of PK, the largest of these parties. “Partai Tak Lolos “Electoral Threshold” Susun Strategi Hadapi Pemili 2004”, Kompas, 21 February 2002; “Belum Saatnya Kampanye di Lingkungan Kampus”, Suara Merdeka, 22 February 2002.


37. Reference was often made to the implementation of shariah law within pre-colonial states such as the sultanates of Aceh, Banten, Demak, Tidore and Deli. See, for example, ‘Syariat Islam: Solusi Krisis Bangsa’, *Forum Keadilan*, no. 15, 28 July 2003., pp. 44-5.

38. Speech to PBB cadre in West Java, reprinted in *Bulan Bintang*, no. 3, 15-30 September 1998, p. 5. Anti-communist feeling still runs strongly in many Indonesian Islamic organizations, but PBB is among the more fervent in its opposition to any easing of restrictions on communism.


40. Interview with Bernhard Plattdasch, Jakarta, 19 September 2000.

41. Fadli Zon, quoted in *Saksi*, 17-30 May 2000, p. 36.

42. Notably, we can find no reference to the Jakarta Charter or other Islamist issues in PBB’s *Buletin Bulan Bintang* from August 1998 and early 2000. It was only in mid-2000 that party leaders began to take up the Shari’ah issue.

43. Interview with Bernhard Plattdasch, Cibubur, 8 November 2001.

44. Naro was the epitome of a regime lackey. He had a nominally traditionalist background, coming from the Jamiyatul al-Wasliyah, but was installed as chairman in 1979 by Ali Moertopo, Soeharto’s main political manipulator of the period. He was eventually voted out of the chairmanship in 1988 and replaced by Metareum, a former HMI chairman.

45. Kepercayaan is a common term to describe highly syncretic forms of Javanese Islam. The bill proposed that Kepercayaan join Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism as officially recognised religions. Islamic parties rejected the Kepercayaan proposal on the ground that it was as polytheistic.

46. Panitia Tridasawarsa Masjid ARH UI, *Masjid Kampus untuk Ummat dan Bangsa (Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim UI)*, LKB Nusantara, Jakarta, 2000. Key DDII figures in driving this popularising of Muslim Brotherhood writings were Abu Ridho and Rahman Sahjudin. Rahman, an UI politics professor, was a prolific translator of Brotherhood works for Dewan Dakwah.


49. Interview with Bernhard Plattdasch, Jakarta, 4 September 2000. Mutammimul was a PII chairman in the mid-1980s and close to DDII.

50. Fahri Hamzah in interview with Bernhard Plattdasch, Jakarta, November 2000.


52. Mashadi in interview with Bernhard Plattdasch, Jakarta, 9 November 2000.

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PPIM-CENSIS, CITIBANK Jakarta, Indonesia,
account No. 300212831 (USD), ABA No. 021 000089,
ABA Routing # 10995291 Swift Code: citidjx

داخل إندونيسيا (روبية):

PPIM-CENSIS Citibank, Jakarta No. Rek: 300212831

قيمة الاشتراك السنوي خارج إندونيسيا:

- سنة واحدة: 45 دولاراً أمريكياً (للفرد)
- 45 دولاراً أمريكياً (للطلاب)
- قيمة العدد الواحد: 20 دولاراً أمريكياً

قيمة الاشتراك السنوي داخل إندونيسيا:

- سنة واحدة: 300,000 روبية (للفرد)
- 45,000 روبية (للطلاب)
- قيمة العدد الواحد: 20,000 روبية

والقيمة مشتملة على النفقة لإرسال بريد الجزوى.
ستوديا إسلاميكا
مجلة إندونيسية للدراسات الإسلامية
السنة الثانية عشر، العدد 2، 2005

هي الأشراف عام
م. قريب شبيب (الجامعة الإسلامية الحكومية جاكرتا)
(وفقًا للمؤسسة الإندونيسية للعلوم)
نور أ. فاضل لويس (الجامعة الإسلامية الحكومية سومطرة الشمالية)
م. ش. ركليف (جامعة ميلبورن)
مارتين فان بروينس (جامعة أترغردة)
جوهن ر. بروين (جامعة واسبنجتون، س. ت. لويس)
م. عطاء مظاهر (الجامعة الإسلامية الحكومية جو كجاكرتا)
م. كمال حسن (الجامعة الإسلامية العالمية كوالالومبور)

رئيس التحرير:
أزوماردي آزرا

المحررون:
سيف الجانبي
جهانى
جاهاند برمان الدين
عثمان فتح الرحمن
فؤاد جليل
سكريتير التحرير:
جيه نور

تصميم ومراجعة اللغة الإنجليزية:
لوسي رودرين مارتين

تصميم ومراجعة اللغة العربية:
نور صمد

تصميم الفلافل:
س. برنسكا