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The Struggle for Recognition: Embracing the Islamic Welfare Effort in the Indonesian Welfare System


Meskipun demikian, UU No. 38/1999 tetap melindungi jarak antara Islam dan negara. Sebagai contoh, undang-undang tersebut memberi keleluasaan masyarakat Muslim untuk membayar zakat, tetapi tidak memberikan sanksi apa pun bagi yang tidak melakukannya. Di samping itu, keterlibatan aparatur pemerintah di dalam proses pengambilan keputusan, pendirian dan pengelolaan lembaga BAZIS, tetap dominan. Terlepas dari adanya beberapa catatan, UU tersebut telah memberi landasan bagi integrasi sistem kesejahteraan sosial Islam ke dalam sistem kesejahteraan sosial nasional. Integrasi ini telah menempatkan Indonesia sebagai negara berpenduduk mayoritas Muslim yang secara terbuka menerapkan model kesejahteraan sosial campur tan (welfare mix atau welfare pluralism).

Artikel ini mendiskusikan proses tarik-menarik antara aspirasi masyarakat Muslim Indonesia dan kepentingan politik negara di dalam pembangunan sistem kesejahteraan Islam. Dengan menelusuri sejarah pembentukan sistem kesejahteraan Islam di Indonesia sejak masa kolonial, masa awal kemerdekaan, Orde Baru, dan Reformasi, artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa sistem kesejahteraan sosial Islam semakin mendapat tempat di Indonesia tanpa harus dibingkai oleh sistem kenegaraan Islam. Dalam konteks nation-state Indonesia, sistem kesejahteraan Islam tidak hanya muncul dalam struktur pemerintah, lebih dari itu negara juga membuka pintu bagi partisipasi masyarakat untuk terlibat dalam pembangunan sistem kesejahteraan sosial Islam. Ini semua merupakan titik tolak bagi kemajuan sistem kesejahteraan sosial Islam yang melibatkan seluruh unsur masyarakat Muslim.
The Struggle for Recognition: Embracing the Islamic Welfare Effort in the Indonesian Welfare System

Sirojudin Abbas

خللاصة: تسجل هذه المقالة جزءًا من عملية الصراع الاجتماعي والسياسي والإيديولوجي الذي دام فترة طويلة بين الإسلام والدولة في إندونيسيا حول سبيل تحقيق الرفاهية الاجتماعية من وجهة نظر الإسلام، وكان العمل بالقانون رقم 38 لسنة 1999 عن إدارة الركاة إيجادًا بإقبال الحكومة على العمل بنظام الإسلام في تحقيق الرفاهية الاجتماعية، وهذا القانون من القوة بحيث وضع نظام الإسلام في محو السياسات والأنظمة القومية الخاصة لتحقيق الرفاهية الاجتماعية.

ومن الأهمية القول إن جهود المجتمعات الإسلامية بإندونيسيا في إدخال النظام الإسلامي في الأنظمة القومية الخاصة لتحقيق الرفاهية الاجتماعية يبدو أنها لم تكن متاحة بدرجة كبيرة بالإنجازات الاقتصادية الإسلامية كما ظهر في عدد من الدول الإسلامية مثل الباكستان والسودان والمملكة العربية السعودية واليابان بقدر ما كانت مروية عن فترة أوائل استقلال البلاد عندما نشأت الرغبة القوية نتيجة للصراع السياسي حيث جاهد الساسة المسلمون على تطبير الشريعة الإسلامية كدستور جمهورية إندونيسيا؛ وتعتبر إدارة أمور الركاة من أجمل تحقيق الرفاهية مستندة من متلازمة في الدولة، وفي تطور لاحق احتلت قضية النظام الإسلامي في تحقيق الرفاهية وخاصة فيما يتعلق بالركاة شعورًا في الصراع السياسي بين الإسلام والمروعة الأندونيسية.

ولقد بدأ النظام الإسلامي يأخذ مكانه في الدولة في أواسط السبعينات عندما بادرت محافظة جاكرتا العامة على سبيل المال بإنشاء هيئة الركاة داخل الهيكل التنظيمي للمحافظة، وهي خطوة تبعتها فيما بعد الملاحظات الأخرى في السبعينات والثمانينات، ولكن لم تكن الهيئة التي أضيفت إليها فيما بعد

Badan Amil Zakat

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مهما جمع الضرائب والسدادات سند قانوني قوي حتى التصنيعات إلا أنها مقبولة عند الحكومات المحلية وأنشئت في مستويات الإدارة بح.

وكان من أهم النظريات في هذه الصدد ما حدث بعد سقوط نظام الحكم الجديد، فقد وافق مجلس الشعب والرئيس برهان الدين يوسف حبيبي (B.J. Habibie) في عام 1999 م على صدور قانون عن إدارة الركاة وهو القانون رقم 38 لسنة 1999 م بمثابة أعلان سند قانونياً لوجود هياطات الركاة لدى الحكومات والتي أنشأها الجماعات الإسلامية عملياً، وكان من عوامل صدور هذا القانون ما كانت تتسم به السياسة الإسلامية من قوة نتيجة بروز حيل من المسلمين ذوي الاجتهاد التغيدي.

وكان من نتائج التأسيس الفاعل للجميع في رابطة المتقدمين المسلمين الإندونيسيين فقد جعل حواررة إلى اتخاذ مهته في تقريب الإسلام من خلال العوامل الثقافية خلافاً لما عليه سلفهم في أوائل فترة الاستقلال عندما يدعون إلى تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية، وقد رحب هذا الجيل المشروعات التحديبية والتنموية التي قام بها نظام الحكم الجديد.

وفي الوقت ذاته نشأ أخبار جديد لدى المجتمع يمثل في ظهور مؤسسات حرة إسلامية تستهدف تمكن المجتمع الإسلامي من الناحية الاقتصادية من خلال مؤسسات إدارة الركاة والنزاعات والصدمات التي أقامها المجتمع للحرة، ورغم أن هذه المؤسسات قد بدأت نشوءها في أواضع الثمانينيات إلا أنها شهدت ازدهاراً كبيراً في التصنيعات وذلك بظهور مؤسسة صندوق الضمانة (Dompet Dhuafa) التابع لصحيفة ريبوبليكا التي آتت بأسلوب وباحة جديد في إدارة الأموال الخيرية من أجل تحقيق الرفاهية الاجتماعية وذلك بأسلوب الاحتراف والشفافية في الإدارة حتى أسهبت كذلك في صدور القانون.

ومع ذلك فإن القانون رقم 38 لسنة 1999 م بقيت تحتفظ بالمسافة القائمة بين الإسلام والدولة، فقد نص على سبيل المثال على أن المسلمين أن يؤدوا الركاة ولكنه لم ينص على الجزاء على من لم يؤددها بالإضافة إلى ضرورة اشتراع الحكومة في اتخاذ القرارات الخاصة بإنشاء هياطات الركاة وإدارتها؛ ويفترض النظر عن هذه الملاحظات فقد أسهم هذا القانون في إعطاء سند قوي وجديد للتكامل بين النظام الإسلامي والاقتصادي من أجل تحقيق الرفاهية الاجتماعية على مستوى الدولة، وهذا التكامل قد وضع إندونيسيا كدولة ذات سلطة إسلامية ضمن الدولة التي تطبق التعددية في نظام تحقيق الرفاهية الاجتماعية؛ وما ينبغي القيام بدراسته مستقبلاً هو البحث في أي مدى أسهمت تلك الهياطات والمؤسسات في الارتقاء مستوى معيشة المجتمعات الفقيرة بإندونيسيا.
This article traces the struggle of Indonesian Muslims to integrate Islamic welfare programs into the statutory social welfare policy and provisions in Indonesia. Indonesian Muslims have gone through a long process of political struggle and negotiation to be able to embrace religious-based social welfare programs as one element of a pluralistic social welfare system. The enactment of Law number 38/1999 on zakat administration and its utilization for social welfare purposes signifies the formal accommodation of Islamic welfare efforts into social welfare policies in Indonesia.1

Islamic welfare consists of the collection and utilization of “Islamic welfare funds” which, in Indonesia, have been abbreviated into “ZISWA” (zakat, infaq, shadaqah and wakaf). The formal institution that administers the collection, distribution and utilization of Islamic welfare funds is called the Governmental Islamic Welfare Committee (Badan Amil Zakat, Infaq dan Shadaqah, BAZIS). Its non-governmental counterpart is the Voluntary/Non-Governmental Islamic Welfare Committee (Lembaga Amil Zakat, Infaq dan Shadaqah, LAZIS). The term “Islamic welfare organization” is a synonym for both BAZIS and LAZIS. The term “Islamic welfare efforts” is used to signify both Islamic welfare funds and the Islamic welfare organizations.

The article is divided into five sections. The first section reviews the debate among Muslim intellectuals concerning the Islamic welfare system and the idea of an ideal Islamic State. Many Muslim intellectuals argue that the existence of an Islamic state is a prerequisite for the establishment of an Islamic Welfare system. However, their arguments were developed more on an ideological and doctrinal basis. The second section focuses on the Islamic welfare policy in Indonesia. The discussion is located within the context of social and political relations between Islam and the state to elucidate the characteristics and orientations of the Indonesian Government’s policies concerning Islamic welfare efforts. The policies, it is argued, are determined by the pattern of social and political relations and negotiations between Islam and the state. The third section reveals the current trend of the Indonesian welfare policy that is heading toward welfare pluralism by the enactment of the law on zakat administration. The shift of the political relation between Islam and the state contributes significantly to the acceptance of Islamic welfare efforts as an element of the Indonesian welfare system. The article ends with a discussion reiterating that political struggle and negotiations have opened new possibilities for Indonesia to establish a more pluralistic social welfare policy and practices by incorporating Islamic welfare efforts.
The Islamic Welfare System: Myth or Reality?

In most developing countries, social welfare policies and practices have largely been adopted from European and North American social welfare traditions through the long process of diffusion (Midgley, 1981). However, existing social policies and services have not successfully served a large portion of the poor (Tang, 1996; van Ginneken, 1999; van Ginneken, 2003; Fuchs, 1988). The current observation of social welfare policy and services in South-East Asia since the economic crisis of 1997, such as Ramesh and Asher (2000), records the retrenchment trend in budget allocations for social welfare provision.

The above development has led the social welfare policy discussion in developing countries to reconsider the contribution of informal social welfare efforts in the form of self-help groups and organized charities or philanthropies that can complement statutory social welfare services (Zacher, 1988). Considering the potential contribution of informal social welfare efforts, some social policy analysts suggest the importance of developing linkages between informal and private welfare systems with statutory social welfare efforts as a strategic policy option to extend the coverage of social welfare services (Benda-Beckmann, Gsanger & Midgley, 1997).

In some Muslim countries, the failure to adopt the European social welfare model has stimulated the emergence of aspirations to reinvent the spirit of an Islamic economy and of an Islamic social welfare system (Pfeifer, 1997). This reaction is understandable since, Islam possesses a social welfare system that consists of different elements of gift-giving related to the concept of wealth redistribution, social security and to poverty alleviation. These elements include zakat (alms, religiously obligatory tax), infaq and shadaqah (voluntary giving, charity), waqaf (philanthropic endowment) and qurban (sacrifice).

Muslim social scientists promote the idea of an Islamic welfare system within the context of reviving social, political and economic agendas of Muslim societies through the waves of Islamic resurgence in the early twentieth century. This development inspired the need to redevelop an economic doctrine based on Islamic ethics, values and traditions. This doctrine became known as "Islamic economics." Islamic economists developed their argument convincingly in the early 1940s and this, in turn, inspired the implementation of this new economic concept. This development was particu-
larly motivated by the poor economic performance of many post-colonial Muslim states (Weiss, 2002a).

The idea of reviving Islamic economic and Islamic social welfare systems was advocated by Indian-Muslim scholar Abu al 'A'la al-Maududi (1903-1979); Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian (1906-1966); and an Iraqi, Muhammad Baqir Sadr (1931-1980) (Kuran, 1993). The main argument of the "Islamic economists" is that the practice of zakat in the early period of Islam, particularly in the Medinan period, was a genuine example of the way in which zakat should be implemented in modern society. They maintain that the future of Muslim society is not in the Western capitalist system, but in the Islamic social, political and economic systems of the past. They advocate the re-development of the Islamic economic and social welfare system as a method of regaining the strength of Muslim society. The source of this inspiration can be found in the early history of the Islamic State, that is "the period 622-61 C.E. which spans the latter part of Prophet Muhammad's helmsmanship of the Muslim community and the tenure of the 'rightly guided' Caliphs" (Kuran, 1993).

According to the scholar Mohammad Assad, the materialization of the Islamic economic and Islamic social welfare systems requires the existence of an Islamic State. This is because only within an Islamic State can Islamic economic and social welfare systems gain appropriate political support and social significance. Assad (1985) maintains that an Islamic State is a political institution that completely applies the values of Islam as the basic tenets of both the "life of the nation" and "in the constitution of the country" (p.1). In other words, an Islamic State should implement totally the mechanism of Islamic law in the whole life of the state, whether political or social (Kahf, 1991). Based on this assumption, Islamic economists promote the agenda of Islamic economic and social welfare as part of the package of redeveloping an Islamic State.

Islamic economists argue that the short period of the Prophet in Medina was the best example of the Islamic State. This period contains a genuine example of how a state addressed economic inequality and poverty. S.A Siddiqi (1984), for instance, argues that if zakat was used to overcome economic inequality in the period of the Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs, zakat could also be implemented to address the poverty and inequalities of modern society. He asserts that because this idea has a historical precedent in the early Islamic State, contemporary society can learn from it (p. v-vi). Other economists, such as M.A. Mannan (1970), add that an-
other example of the implementation of Islamic economics and social welfare can be found in the Abbasid period in Baghdad. This period, according to these economists, reflected the culmination of the applied Islamic economy.

However, other Islamic social scientists disagree with the above argument. They maintain that the state-administered social welfare system, particularly through the implementation of the zakat system, only materialized in the very short period of the Prophet’s life in Medina (Siddiqi, 1984). Furthermore, although there had been attempts by the Islamic State (under the leadership of the Prophet) to implement zakat, there was no adequate evidence that zakat had successfully eradicated poverty and guaranteed a just economic redistribution of wealth among members of the ummah. Even within the short period of the Prophet in Medina, zakat alone was never effective in alleviating poverty. In a rather critical statement, Islamic economist Monzer Kahf said that “until the end of his life, the Prophet (pbuh) himself needed to borrow from his family food and similar needs, and he died under debt for such loans” (Kahf, 1999; p. 4). This assertion suggests a low level of confidence in the effectiveness of zakat in alleviating poverty in the period of the Prophet’s life. In other words, even in the period of the Prophet, the existence of the zakat system was far from sufficient to alleviate poverty (Bonner, 2002).

According to Kahf, the limited function of zakat was one of the reasons why the Prophet urged Muslims to supplement zakat with voluntary contributions such as infaq, shadaqah and wakaf. The importance of these voluntary contributions is also repeatedly mentioned in the Qur’an and the Sunnah (prophetic tradition), particularly “within the context of supporting the poor, and funding the activities of the government and the military” (Kahf, 1999; p. 4). Other casual revenues such as war booties also supplemented zakat. Therefore, since the early period of Islam it has been realized that zakat revenue alone is not sufficient to eradicate poverty.

Moreover, the violent struggles over Islamic leadership two decades after the death of the Prophet weakened the state’s ability to administer zakat. The unclear role of the state in Islamic social welfare administration continued until the period of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphaties. Disbursement of zakat in Islam’s early history, then, occurred in a decentralized manner, and relied mostly on individual discretion (Kuran, 2003; Mattson, 2003).

The existence of an Islamic State as a condition for the implementation of an Islamic economy and welfare system therefore is
more likely to be aspiring Islamic fundamentalism than historically justified economic theory (Kuran, 1997). Timur Kuran (2003) maintains that the Islamic economists’ argument concerning the historical exemplar of the Islamic economy is weak. There was no such clear example in early Islamic history that represented the ideal experiment of economic and social justice based on the Islamic economic and welfare system. Kuran (1992) concludes, “Islamic economics is as much a response to contemporary grievances as it is a nostalgic escape into the imagined simplicity, harmony, and prosperity of an ancient social order” (p. 305).

Islamic Welfare Policy and Political Negotiation in Indonesia

The absence of an ideal Islamic State does not necessarily prevent contemporary Muslim society from implementing Islamic welfare programs. Muslims in many countries have attempted to rebuild the Islamic welfare system as a means for social welfare provision and poverty alleviation, despite the fact that they do not live in an ideal Islamic State. These efforts may prove to be helpful complements to limited statutory social welfare programs. Current studies conducted in Muslim societies have noted that the Islamic welfare effort is practiced in Muslim communities, both in the so-called “Islamic State”, and the non-Islamic State. Holger Weiss (2002a), for instance, reveals in his observation on the development of the Islamic social welfare efforts in Muslim world:

Since the 1980s, two discourses within the Muslim world are clearly identifiable, one where the role of the state and one where the role of non-governmental organizations is underlined. Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan have tried to introduce Islamic economics and to establish an Islamic social welfare system, whereas especially in non-Muslim countries, Muslim NGOs have taken over the role of the Islamic state. The collection and distribution of zakat is a cornerstone in both systems, it is through zakat the system and its operations are financed (p. 20).

This observation reveals that for many communities, the existence of an ideal Islamic State is not the primary requirement for the implementation of Islamic welfare programs. There are some states that are trying to implement the principles of an Islamic economic and social welfare system, but in other non-Islamic states, Muslims remain active in developing a form of an Islamic social welfare sys-
tem without state involvement. Therefore, the performance of the Islamic welfare effort cannot be seen as a monolithic phenomenon but rather a pluralistic one, insofar as it concerns both state-sponsored and non-governmental welfare activities.

Weiss (2002b) classifies the types of Islamic welfare efforts according to the level of involvement of the state institution. From this perspective, there are two types of Islamic welfare activities, namely "governmental" and "non-governmental" Islamic welfare institutions. However, Kahf (1999) argues that within the "governmental" division there is also variation according to the principles of zakat payment. Some Muslim States impose obligatory principles for its citizens to pay Islamic welfare funds to state agencies (institutions which function as bait-al-mal). Other states suggest voluntary payments to the government institution.

With regard to the contemporary Indonesian Muslim, the question to be posed here, then, is how do Indonesian Muslims collect and utilize Islamic welfare funds? Does the Indonesian state impose on Muslim citizens an obligation to pay zakat and other Islamic welfare funds through government institutions or does it allow Muslim citizens to pay zakat voluntarily at their own discretion? What is the position of the Islamic welfare within the statutory social policy and provisions in Indonesia?

I will approach the discussion in this section by locating the Indonesian Islamic welfare policy within the context of the social and political relationship of Islam and the state. It is assumed that the pattern of relations between the two determines the type of Islamic welfare policy that exists. A historical review is needed to understand the development of the relationship between Islam and the state over time. It is also assumed that certain policies were related, and in fact generated, in response to particular social and historical contexts.

Colonial Policies and Islamic Welfare Efforts

The practice of Islamic welfare in Indonesia prior to colonialism has not been sufficiently explored. Some writers state that the practice of zakat, infiq and shadaqah were in existence in many Muslim communities prior to colonialism because zakat, in particular, is one of the conditions of being a Muslim. Fauzia and Hermawan (2003) and Hasanah (2003) noted two general patterns of Islamic welfare effort disbursement: namely direct payment to the mustahiq (people who are entitled
to receive support from *zakat*) and payments through local religious leaders within the community. The direct Islamic welfare payment (*zakat, infaq* and *shadaqah*) was usually practiced among family or community members who already knew each other. The direct method of payment allows the *muzakki* (i.e. the payer of *zakat*) to control the flow of funds to the appropriate recipients. This practice confirms the function of family and community as the immediate institution of social protection.

The second method of payment was through local religious or community leaders. The religious leaders themselves acted as *amil* (*zakat* administrators) responsible for receiving the *zakat, infaq, shadaqah* and *wakaf* funds that were paid voluntarily. The most common functions of the Islamic welfare funds were to support Islamic education and the welfare of the community. In many places in Indonesia these funds were used to build mosques, *Pesantren* (traditional Islamic community education centers) and *madrasahs* (Islamic schools). These buildings were usually built on land given by Muslims (individually or collectively) as *wakaf*. The funds for the physical construction and maintenance of these building were also collected from community Islamic welfare funds (Ali, 1988, p. 32; Fauzia, 2003, p. 162-165).

The two patterns of Islamic welfare collection and utilization remain in existence in the present day, with some modifications in the method of collection. An anthropological study in a village of Hila, Maluku, for example, conducted in the late 1980s reveals the two patterns of collection are still practiced by the Muslim community, particularly in the payment of *zakat a-fitrah* (*zakat* paid at the end of *Ramadhan*) (Benda-Beckman, 1989). In urban Muslim communities, many urban-based religious institutions have taken progressive initiatives to actively encourage the payment of Islamic welfare funds through their institutions. They actively send blank money order forms to Muslims in the month of *Ramadhan* to encourage donations. This method has been successful in generating funds for modernizing religious schools (*madrasahs, pesantrens*) and for providing social welfare. Abdullah notes (Abdullah, 1989) that these urban-based religious organizations collected more Islamic welfare funds than the formal government’s administered *amil* system (The Governmental Islamic Welfare Committee, BAZIS).

The central government’s interests in Islamic welfare administration in Indonesia can be traced back to Dutch colonial policies concerning religious life. The Dutch colonial administration set a
clear demarcation between public and private life. Religious practice resided in the domain of one’s private life only and wasn’t to be entwined with issues in the public domain, such as politics and the economy (Suminto, 1985).

The Dutch colonial policy concerning Islam was, in part, consistent with this idea of religion-state separation. The policies were intended to facilitate Muslims in performing their rituals as long as they were able to maintain a neutral position when involved in public life (Suminto, 1985). C.S. Hurgronje, a Dutch colonial special adviser for Islamic affairs, realized that Muslims could become a serious threat to the colonial administration if their ritual practices were tampered with. Therefore, his advice to the colonial administration was to allow Muslims to perform religious rituals on the one hand, but to restrict them from bringing religion into the political and social arenas on the other (Benda, 1958, p. 22-24).

The policy concerning zakat is the most obvious example of separation of religion from wider social life. In 1893 the Dutch colonial administration issued a regulation to prevent appointed religious officials (*penghulu, naib*) from engaging in Islamic welfare collection and utilization. *Penghulu* and *naib* were the arms of the colonial administration responsible for dealing with Islamic affairs, particularly in marriage, divorce, and mosque-activities. The other reason behind the regulation was that there was a tendency for *penghulu* or *naib* to misuse the zakat, *infaq*, *shadaqah* and *wakaf* funds. This regulation sought to prevent such an occurrence (Daerah Khusus Ibukota, 1987; Fauzia, 2003). Based on the advice of Dr. Hurgronje, the colonial administration released a new regulation (*Bijblad 6200*) in 1905 that strengthened the previous regulation. This regulation forbade local authorities at the level of regency (*priyai*, traditional elite class) from intervening in *zakat* management.

To maintain law and order, however, the Dutch colonial administration often intervened in religious practice. The main concern of the Dutch colonial administration was that there was a potential threat of power consolidation within the Muslim communities by collecting Islamic welfare funds in mosques. This was in part because Muslims usually paid their *zakat*, *infaq*, *shadaqah* and *wakaf* through local religious leaders associated with mosque activities. The colonial administration set further guidelines concerning what kinds of activities could be financed by funds collected in mosques and what kinds of activities could not. Mosques were also strictly forbidden from amassing Islamic community welfare funds that
exceeded the maximum amount sufficient for maintaining subsistence activities. Bupatis (regent) were given the responsibility of overseeing this policy (Suminto, 1985, p. 162).

In the short period of Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the administration did not make momentous changes in Islamic welfare administration. During Japanese occupation the efforts to include zakat administration in government administration were pursued by Muslim organizations, particularly the High Islamic Council of Indonesia (Majelis Islam A’la Indonesia, MIAI). MIAI was a pre-war federation of Islamic political parties and mass organizations supported by the Japanese administration. In 1943 MIAI established a Java-wide bait-al-mal, with the primary intention of preparing a social foundation for the reconsolidation of Islamic political forces in anticipation of a post-Japanese administration (Noer, 1973). Although MIAI initiated the establishment of several branches of the bait-al-mal throughout Java, they were dissolved in late 1943 (Abdullah, 1989, p. 58). This signified the end of MIAI’s efforts to establish a government-administered Islamic welfare organization.

In the meantime, in Sumatra the Japanese administration instituted a policy that supported the establishment of mahkamah syari’ah (Islamic courts), which impacted indirectly on Islamic welfare practice. The mahkamah syari’ah was part of the Japanese-sponsored Islamic Council for the Support of Great East Asia (Majlis Agama Islam untuk Bantuan Asia Timur Raya). The Council consisted of most of the influential ulama in Aceh. The Islamic court was entrusted with governing Islamic affairs, including the administration of zakat, infaq, shadaqah and wakaf. However, according to Abdullah, (Abdullah, 1989) “the main target of collection was zakat fitrah, which was also used for the renovation of mosques, dayah (religious boarding schools) and madrasah” (p. 58). Although the mahkamah syari’ah was dissolved after Indonesian independence, the all-Aceh bait-al-mal already existed, making Aceh the first province to manage zakat collection and distribution (Idris, 2002).

Islamic Welfare Policy and the Ideological Challenge

In the early period of independence, there was no specific policy discussion concerning the management of Islamic welfare. In this transitional period, Muslim political activists were involved in an intense ideological debate concerning the fundamentals of the In-
donesian State Constitution. Elite Muslim political activists struggled to insert a clause promoting the inclusion of Islamic law (syari'a) into the Indonesian Constitution. Although this attempt failed, this struggle paved the way for further debate on the relationship between Islam and the state (Boland, 1983), thus affecting the state's political attitude towards Islamic welfare policy.

The ideological debate began in March 1945 when the Japanese administration facilitated the formation of an Investigative Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan, BPUPKI). A draft of the "pancasila", or the five foundations, the philosophical foundation for the Indonesian Constitution proposed by Sukarno in June 1945, had generated ideological divisions between Muslims, liberal-nationalists, communists and Christians. The Pancasila, however, was generated to help mend ideological differences between Indonesia's diverse population; it reflected a "unique synthesis of nationalist, Muslim, Marxist, liberal democratic and populist Indonesian ideas" (Hefner, 2000, p. 41-42). The Pancasila consists of five basic principles regarding the state, namely, belief in God; civilized and just humanity; Indonesian unity; consensus guided by the principles of democracy; and equitable welfare and social justice for all Indonesian citizens.

The first principle concerning "belief in God" raised heated debate. Muslim factions in particular insisted on adding to the first principle of "belief in God" a more specific reference to Islam as the largest religion of the country. The committee, then, compromised by adding another phrase to "belief in God," which reads: "belief in God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law". The pancasila document with the additional phrase is known as the "Jakarta Charter". This additional clause encouraged the implementation of Islamic law among Indonesian Muslim citizens.

If the Jakarta Charter were maintained as part of the Indonesian Constitution, the administration of Islamic welfare activities would automatically become part of the state's responsibility, as the obligation of Muslims to pay zakat is one of the fundamental principles in Islamic law. However, liberal-nationalists and non-Muslims seriously objected to including the Jakarta Charter in the constitution, since it favored the Muslim majority, and could lead to an Islamic State. The committee members, particularly Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta (co-declares of Indonesian independence), yielded to opponents' appeals and eventually dropped the Jakarta Char-
ter from the preamble to the Indonesian Constitution on August 18th 1945, a day after Indonesia’s declaration of independence. As a compromise to Muslim objections, particularly from traditionalist Muslim leaders of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Sukarno and Muham-
mad Hatta changed the first principle from “belief in God” to “be-
lief in the one God” (ketuhanan yang maha Esa) (Hefner, 2000, p. 42;
Hefner 1998, p. 304-305). This wording was close to the Islamic prin-
ciple of “radical monotheism” as defined by the term “tauhid” (the
oneness of God).

However, this compromise did not satisfy Muslim activists. The
political crisis in the first five years of independence, particularly
with the return of Dutch colonial military forces reasserting au-
thority over the archipelago, created further constitutional crisis.
From 1950 the new Indonesian State operated under a provisional
constitution until the legitimate Constituent Assembly developed
a new definitive constitution. The only hope remaining for Muslim
political activists to insert the Jakarta Charter into the constitution
was through the Constituent Assembly, known as “Konstituante”.
This would only happen if Muslims won the election and obtained
the majority vote of members of the Constituent Assembly.

The Assembly was created as a result of the second round of the
1955 general election. Muslim political parties were expected to ob-
tain a majority of the vote since they promoted the agenda of rein-
serting the Jakarta Charter back into the constitution. However, no
party came out as the winner in the election; the votes were shared
almost equally among four large parties. Two were Muslim parties
that promoted the Jakarta Charter’s integration into the constitution.
These were Masyumi (Indonesian Muslims’ Consultative Council),
which won 21 percent of the vote; and NU (Awakening of the Tradi-
tional Teachers and Scholars) which received 19 percent of the vote.
The other two parties were the Indonesian National Party (PNI, found-
ed by charismatic leader Sukarno in 1920) with 22 percent of the vote,
and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) with 17 percent.

Therefore, although Muslims comprised about 90 percent of the
Indonesian population, Muslim political parties obtained only 40
percent of the total votes. This meant that Muslim political parties
failed to reach the majority of votes within the Constituent Assem-
bly to endorse their agenda of reinserting the Jakarta Charter into
the constitution. This situation sharpened the ideological divide
because political forces, which were almost balanced between Muslims,
nationalists, and non-Muslim blocks (Feith, 1957). The main ques-
tion to be resolved by the assembly was whether or not Indonesia should become some sort of Islamic State. Although the Assembly made some progress, Islam’s position within the constitution was not resolved.

The constitutional uncertainty coupled with economic deterioration, and the challenges from Sukarno’s military and Muslim rivals, made Sukarno determined to restore political stability. In 1957 he proposed the idea of returning to the 1945 constitution. The idea was put into practice two years later by a presidential decree in 1959 that cancelled all the achievements of the assembly and attempted to overcome political divisions by incorporating them into one diffused ideological union. This decree put an end the debate on state ideology (Nasution, 1997).

This political initiative not only cancelled the hope of Indonesian Muslims to include Islamic law in the state constitution, but also forced them to unite with their ideological rivals, namely the communists and the nationalists under the banner of “NASAKOM” (nasionalis, agama dan komunis). But Sukarno’s close relationship with the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) prevented the success of this forced ideological consolidation (Liddle, 1973). Masyumi, the largest and the most influential Muslim political party, was outlawed in 1960. The growing influence of PKI within the central power circle and the outlawing of Masyumi closed the door for Muslim political activists to establish Islamic law within the constitutional framework of an Indonesian State.

Islamic Welfare Policy under the New Order Regime:
The Politics of Ambivalence

The significant leap toward direct state involvement in the administration of Islamic welfare after the failure of incorporating the Jakarta Charter into the State Constitution of 1945 occurred in the early period of the New Order (orde baru) Regime (1966-1998). The new regime was built upon the emotional and intellectual residue of the political crisis of the post-September 30th 1965 movement that led to the massacre of thousands of Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) followers. PKI, which was actually a powerful supporter of Sukarno, was accused of attempting a preemptive coup that had resulted in the death of six top military officials.

The violent response of the military and some Muslims towards PKI-associated followers, created a tremendous crisis throughout
1965-1967. PKI members had become the prime target of hatred, anger and blame for the economic deterioration in Indonesia during the first half of the 1960s (Cribb, 1991). Student activists demanded the government reduce the price of basic commodities, ban PKI, and improve economic conditions. The most horrific situation was the killing of PKI members by the army together with Muslim and Christian militias. General Suharto, in his capacity as commander of Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD), was appointed by Sukarno to restore law and order in March 1966. The “Letter of March 11” not only mandated that Suharto restore law and order, but also banned the PKI; this eventually led him to assume power as acting president, alienating the influence of Sukarno.

Immediately after his formal appointment by the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, MPRS) in 1966, Suharto reversed the orientation of the country in the opposite direction of the former regime or “Old Order” (orde lama). If the first regime of Sukarno attempted to be more accommodating of different ideologies, particularly Islam, socialism and liberalism, the new regime abandoned rapprochement. These ideologies were considered serious threats to the existence of the new regime. Suharto, who established his regime as the “new order” to distinguish his ideology from that of his predecessor, chose economic recovery, modernization and development supported by political stability as his new path. Although Suharto gained tremendous support from the traditionalist wing of Islam, Nahdatul Ulama (NU), in diminishing the influence of PKI, the relation between them remained cautious and “ambiguous” (Hefner, 2000). Until the end of his regime, Suharto consistently maintained distance from Islamic influences.

In the meantime, Muslim activists perceived the political transition as an opportunity to revive their aspirations to reinclude the Jakarta Charter into the constitution. They proposed a draft on zakat legislation. On July 5th 1967, Saifudin Zuhri, Ministry of Religious Affairs with letter number MA/095/1967, proposed to the Mutual Help People’s House Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong, DPRGR) a draft of a law on zakat administration. However, the DPRGR refused to include the draft on zakat law in its legislative agenda.

On July 14th 1967, he delivered the same draft to the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. In letter number MA/099/1967, the Ministry of Religious Affairs asked the two minis-
tries to provide an opinion concerning the draft of a law on zakat, since zakat is a potential source of revenue for the Indonesian Government to finance social welfare programs. The Ministry of Social Affairs did not respond to this inquiry. However, the Ministry of Finance advised that zakat is the private business of Indonesian Muslims and not part of the state’s responsibility. Therefore, the regulation of zakat did not necessarily require the passage of formal legislation, but would be implemented only with the Minister’s decree. The DPRGR refused to file the draft of the law on zakat administration in the legislative agendas.

The most critical moment in the effort to set up centralized zakat administration under the New Order Suharto regime occurred between 1968 and 1969. This period determined the basic structure of formal Islamic welfare organizations until 1991. On June 29 1968, Ahmad Dahlan, the new Minister of Religious Affairs who represented the Islamic faction, delivered a speech in a forum commemorating the Jakarta Charter.

Dahlan argued that after the Presidential Decree of 1959, the Jakarta Charter, while not formally written into the preamble of the constitution, was in fact embedded in the spirit of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. According to Dahlan, the charter was not only the core spirit of the constitution but also automatically the source of law. He asserted that the statement concerning the responsibility of the state to protect the freedom of religious life (Constitution 1945, chapter 29) and the first principle of Pancasila, “belief in the one God”, implied that Muslims were tied to the obligation to fulfill Islamic law (Salim, 2003; p. 151). The centralization of zakat administration was intended as “the first step to toward the application of the Jakarta Charter principles” (Salim, 2003, p. 154).

Two weeks after the speech Dahlan released Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Decree (Peraturan Menteri Agama, PMA) Number 4, on July 15th 1968. Dahlan did not propose the law but set the legal basis of zakat administration under his own authority within the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This decree urged the government at the levels of province, regency and district to establish a Zakat Administration Committee (Badan Amil Zakat BAZ) as the government body responsible for collecting Islamic welfare funds. Furthermore, on October 22nd 1968, the Ministry released a second decree on zakat administration, Number 5/1968, regarding the regulation of the institutionalization of the House of Assets (bait al-mal), in all levels of government bureaucracy. The House would be responsible for
the distribution and utilization of the funds to enhance the social welfare of Indonesia’s citizens. This second decree outlined the more specific procedure of government and society’s involvement in administering Islamic welfare efforts.

Apart from the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ initiative, eleven influential ulama of Jakarta advised President Suharto on September 28th 1968 that it was important for him as the head of state and government, and in his capacity as an individual Muslim, to set an example for the whole nation by being willing to pay and organize zakat for social welfare improvement. The ulama suggested that the zakat institution was relevant to the country’s development (DKI Jakarta, 1978). When delivering his official speech at the Prophet’s Ascension Celebration (Isra Mi’raj) at Merdeka Palace on October 26th 1968, he confirmed the advice of the ulama by suggesting that Muslims should fulfill this religious obligation. He also stressed the importance of organizing zakat administration nationally. In his capacity as a “Muslim private citizen”, he would take the initiative to lead a massive national zakat collection activity, and would submit an annual report on its collection and distribution. On October 31st 1968, three days after his speech, this idea was actioned. Three high military officers, Major General Alamsyah Ratuprawiranegara; Colonel Azwar Hamid; and Colonel Ali Affandy, were appointed to take the necessary steps required for nation-wide collection.

Unfortunately, both the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Decrees and the Suharto initiative were poorly coordinated. Suharto delivered his initiative without regard for the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ initiatives that had been in effect since July 15th 1968. In essence, the two initiatives were contradictory. The Ministerial decrees urged the formal involvement of the state authority, through the network of government bureaucracy, to establish a special committee to collect zakat funds and distribute them through a new bait al-maal. Conversely, the presidential initiative urged the establishment of a purely private institution without any involvement from government institutions. Despite the fact that the president had delivered his ideas, on October 29, or two days after the speech, the Ministry of Religious Affairs released a Guide for the Implementation of the Ministerial Decree (Pedoman Pelaksanaan Peraturan Menteri Agama) Number 4, 1968. This guide specified the status of the Zakat Administration Committee (Badan Amil Zakat, BAZ) as a permanent semi-government organization. With this status, the permanent BAZ would be attached to governmental bureaucracy. How-
ever, it would not be managed totally by the government bureaucracy because it would also involve private citizens in its management.

It is hard to believe that a policy released by the Ministry of Religious Affairs lay outside the president's knowledge. However, within the context of political antagonism between Islam and the state since the early 1960s, the two different policies concerning zakat administration are certainly understandable. The Ministry of Religious Affairs regarded the president's policy as an integral part of the realization of the Jakarta Charter. On the other hand, the New Order regime of Suharto attempted to establish a secular state divorced from any religious influence. Therefore, the two policies represented two contesting ideological orientations.

The issue finally ended with the postponement of the implementation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs' Decree Number 4. This decision was taken after the Ministry received a letter from the Cabinet Secretary on December 16th 1968, stating that the Minister of Religious Affairs should consider the president's initiative regarding zakat administration. The letter from the Cabinet Secretary was one of the main considerations in postponing Decree Number 4 (Salim, 2003, p. 159) for an undetermined period.

The postponement of the implementation of the Ministerial Decrees can be interpreted as another failure of Muslim aspirations to implement the Jakarta Charter. Thus, it can also be understood as the success of the new government in setting a boundary between the state and religion. The accommodation of Islamic aspirations would be channeled through Suharto's personal initiative to orchestrate the nation-wide private zakat administration system. This initiative would not represent religious penetration into the state, but would facilitate the need of Muslims to establish a formal nation-wide Islamic welfare organization.

However, the spirit of the Ministerial Decrees' ideas was not totally diminished by their postponement. Instead the two streams of policy orientation were used as foundations for the establishment of a semi-governmental Islamic welfare organization. Jakarta's Special Province Governor, Ali Sadikin, initiated the establishment of the Zakat Administration Committee (Badan Amil Zakat, BAZ) on December 15th, 1968. The Governor's decision number Cb.14/8/18/68 includes both the Ministry of Religious Affairs' Decree Number 4 1968, and the President's personal suggestion to support the administration of zakat. The Jakarta Governor's initiative, therefore,
to some extent reconciled the Ministry’s and President’s ideological differences by making them a base for the establishment of a semi-government Zakat Administration Committee (BAZ).

In 1973 BAZ Jakarta was enlarged to include other forms of Islamic welfare funds, particularly *infaq* and *shadaqah*. The name of the organization was changed to become the *zakat, infaq* and *shadaqah* Administration Committee (*Badan Amil Zakat, Infaq and Shadaqah, BAZIS*). The organization’s inclusion of other Islamic welfare funds effectively eliminated the tension between the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ decree and the president’s personal suggestion. The establishment of BAZIS by the Jakarta provincial government, in fact, motivated other provinces to establish similar organizations in their respective territories. East Kalimantan established BAZIS in 1972 followed by West Sumatera (1973); West Java (1974); South Kalimantan (1974); South Sumatera (1975); Lampung (1975); Irian Jaya (1978); North Sulawesi (1985) and South Sulawesi (1985). These organizations, however, are not entirely similar with the BAZIS of Jakarta. While in some provinces BAZIS collect *zakat, infaq*, and *shadaqah*, others collect only *zakat* (Abdullah, 1991; Hasanah, 2003).

In the late 1980s, there was a Muslim initiative to establish a Non-Governmental Islamic Welfare Committee (*Lembaga Amil Zakat, Infaq dan Shadaqah, LAZIS*). LAZIS represents community participation in managing Islamic welfare funds by establishing a formal organization in the form of a community foundation (*yayasan*) (Tulus, 2003). LAZIS collects *zakat, infaq, shadaqah, hibah, waqaf*, and *qurban*. LAZIS is different from BAZIS and the traditional direct-payment tradition to local religious leaders. While BAZIS is run by part-time civil servants working for the provincial governments, LAZIS is managed by full-time staff. Instead of developing their program in line with the government’s social programs, LAZIS develop their own programs according to the needs of the communities they serve (Saidi, 2003). LAZIS also differs from local religious leaders’ collection and distribution of *zakat*. Local religious leaders usually collect Islamic welfare funds incidentally and without transparent reports of their utilization. The funds are used mostly for the construction of religious facilities. LAZIS is a professional organization dedicated to Islamic welfare collection and utilization. The funds are mostly used for promoting the welfare of the community, supporting the poor and providing scholarships for children from poor families.

Many Indonesian corporations have also established their own LAZIS or *bait al-mal* within their management. The initiative was
started in 1986 when there was legal opinion from Indonesian ulama (religious scholars) that income based on salary was also subject to zakat (BAZIS DKI, 1986). Some corporations began to collect zakat from their employees and established special organizations within the corporation responsible for the collection and utilization of the funds. These corporations include the establishment of bait al-mal within the companies as part of "corporate social responsibility" to support social welfare programs, particularly poverty alleviation (Sudewo, 2000).

In the meantime, the personal initiative of President Suharto to lead the nation-wide zakat administration effort did not materialize until 1982, or fourteen years after his speech at the Prophet's Ascension Celebration (Isra Mi'raj). On February 17, 1982 Suharto, in his capacity as a private citizen, established a foundation called the Foundation for the Dedication of Pancasila Muslims (Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila, YAMP). YAMP carried the message that the involvement of President Suharto as its founder and chairman was not to serve Islamic interests but national interests as represented in the Pancasila.8

This foundation collected zakat, infaq and shadaqah, particularly from Muslim civil servants, military officials and from Muslim-owned corporations. However, this foundation lacked any connection with the existing BAZIS. According to Sjadzali (1990), YAMP efforts were dedicated primarily to building or renovating Muslims' mosques. Until July 1990, Sjadzali (1990) notes, YAMP had built 400 mosques throughout the country, having collected about 83 billion rupiah in total. In the 1990s, YAMP enlarged its programs. In cooperation with the Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars (Majlis Ulama Indonesia), YAMP sponsored the spread of Islamic preachers to various settlements in many locations outside Java. YAMP was responsible for providing salary and living costs for the preachers for a limited period (Ismail, 1996).

Until 1991, BAZIS existed in almost all provinces without an adequate legal basis. This was because of the Ministerial decrees that urged the establishment of BAZIS and the bait al-mal had been postponed for an undetermined time. Furthermore, the president's suggestion to establish a purely private Islamic welfare organization carried little legal consequence because he acted in the capacity of a private citizen.

The legal basis for the establishment of BAZIS was eventually provided in 1991 through the joint ministerial decree of the Minis-
try of Religious Affairs (number 41, 1991) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (number 29, 1991). The position of the Ministry of Home Affairs was strategic. The structure of government bureaucracy (Governor, Major and Head of District), to which the BAZIS organizations were attached, was under the coordination of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The joint decree reiterated the relationship of BAZIS with the Government. It mentioned that BAZIS is a “private self-help organization” established by Muslims according to the needs of their communities (Joint Decree, 1991, Chapter I: article 1; Chapter 3, Article 3). The decree mentions nothing about the previous Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Decrees Numbers 4 and 6, 1968. However, this policy clarified the ambivalent position of BAZIS. Although it was stated that BAZIS was truly a private Muslim organization, the governor maintained a central position in decision-making; its executive management responsible for overseeing the daily program consisted of civil servants appointed by local government authority. This joint decree was provided only to justify the existence of BAZIS and did not cover the status of LAZIS.

Some observers viewed that the joint decree signified changes in the New Order’s attitude toward Islam (Effendy, 1993; Anwar, 1994). The joint decree showed that the regime was becoming more accommodating of Islamic aspirations. However, I believe that the joint decree was made possible, in part, by the success of the regime in overcoming political and ideological challenges impeding an Indonesian State based on Pancasila ideology.

Since the early 1970s the New Order Regime attempted to minimize political threats from both Islamic and Nationalist parties. Between 1973 and 1975 the New Order Regime imposed the policy of restructuring political parties with a maximum of three political parties (Law No. 3/1975). Muslim-based political parties were forced to fuse into one party, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP); the nationalist and Christian parties became the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI). The government and the military sponsored the establishment of the Functional Group Party (Golongan Karya, Golkar). This party was the main political vehicle for the regime.

Law No. 3/1975 had been successful in minimizing potential political threats to the government. This was evidenced by the results of the first two general elections after 1975. The Golkar party won an absolute majority (above 60 percent) and had the majority
of members in the People’s Consultative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). PPP and PDI support declined significantly.\footnote{This trend remained consistent in the subsequent elections of 1987, 1992 and 1997. Golkar domination was commensurate with the strong domination of the New Order Regime.} The New Order Regime also overcame the ideological threat by establishing Pancasila as the sole ideological basis for every political party and social organization in 1985. Until 1985, PPP and PDI and other organizations were based on specific ideologies, such as Islam, liberalism and socialism. But Law No. 3/1985, that amended the Law No. 3/1975, required political parties (PPP and PDI) and Golkar to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological basis (asas tunggal). On June 17 1985, the House of Representatives once again approved the law requiring all Indonesian mass organizations to adopt Pancasila as their fundamental ideology (Law No. 8/1985). “Any rejection of Pancasila by any political party or mass organization would result in their dissolution by the government” (Ismail, 1986, p. 17). Tremendous objections and critiques from Muslim factions both before and after the enactment of the two laws did not prevent the New Order Government from enacting them a year later.

These laws generated tremendous political change with regard to the relationship between Islam and the state. Both PPP and other Muslim mass organizations lost sufficient ground to enable them to stand politically and ideologically against the government to pursue Islamic aspirations. Therefore, the implementation of the two laws marked the end of the ideological debate between Islam and the state that had been persistently embedded in the Indonesian social and political domain since independence. The threat of Indonesia becoming an Islamic State thus ceased.

The joint decree between the two ministries in 1991 that provided for the first time a formal basis for the establishment of BAZIS was therefore not a political victory for Muslims. The establishment of BAZIS did not represent the generous accommodation by the regime of Islamic aspirations; rather, it was the logical consequence of the disappearance of the Islamic ideological threat. The practice of BAZIS was not based on Islamic principles, but Pancasila, an amalgam of ideologies purporting to represent the ideology of Indonesia.
Inserting Islamic Welfare Efforts into the Statutory Social Policy

Although the joint ministerial decrees provided the legal justification for the existence of BAZIS, Muslims wished for a stronger legal basis for BAZIS and LAZIS. A law would have greater social and political impact than a ministerial decree. It would formally include Islamic welfare activities in statutory social welfare legislation. Therefore, although the law would not be motivated by Islamic ideological interests, Muslims still considered the inclusion of the Islamic welfare effort into statutory regulation as a strategic step that would guarantee its existence and practice.

The legal basis for the implementation of Islamic welfare activities was eventually achieved in 1999. Law No. 38/1999 on zakat administration signified a new phase of Indonesian Islamic welfare policy. This was the first formal legal basis in the form of legislation through which Islamic welfare organizations were recognized and their existence strengthened. This law was made possible, in part, by the collapse of the New Order Regime in 1998. Furthermore, the implementation of this law was influenced by President Habibie, who replaced Suharto in 1998. President Habibie campaigned on behalf of Islamic aspirations. While he was President, he was also the chairman of the influential Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiaan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI), an organization that united new Muslim social forces. In the last years of the New Order Regime of Suharto, particularly between 1992 and 1997, ICMI was one of the most powerful social groups whose aspirations were usually listened to by Suharto. In early August 1999 the Minister of Religious Affairs Malik Fadjar submitted a draft of a law on zakat administration to the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). The draft needed only a month to gain approval from DPR before finally being signed by President Habibie, on September 23rd 1999.

The birth of the law on zakat administration was related to the emergence of a new group of Muslim intellectuals and a new middle class during the New Order Regime. These two groups adopted different social strategies from previous Muslim political activists. They firmly refused the idea of “political Islam” to pursue an Islamic State, and pushed for the adoption of the Jakarta Charter as was advocated by senior Muslim activists, particularly by members of the ex-Masyumi (Muslim political party banned by Sukarno in 1960) such as Muhammad Natsir. The New Order Regime had banned any kind of ideo-
logical discussion except concerning economic development. The New Order Regime perceived this action as a necessary condition to ensuring political stability, in turn allowing the acceleration of economic development and modernization.

Instead of challenging the new regime, the young educated modernist Muslim generation has chosen to participate in the regime. They cast off their political identities and joined both government organizations and non-government organizations. This strategy allowed them to participate in the process of governing the country. Until the early 1980s there was a significant increase in the number of newly educated middle-class Muslims. They gained a better education and were ready to hold important positions in politics, business and government. Some researchers noted this development as an indication of increasing Muslim resurgence that gave Muslims political bargaining power against the New Order Regime (Hefner, 1993; Anwar, 1994).

In the early 1990's, the new Muslim intellectuals and the middle class formed ICMI. As mentioned above, the association selected Habibie, an influential figure within the government and known to have a very close relationship with Suharto, as its chairman. Many observers perceived the period between 1990 and 1997 as the honeymoon period between Islam and the state (Hefner, 1993). During this period, ICMI launched many social, economic and political programs that directly and indirectly benefited Indonesian Muslims. Among these programs was the establishment of an Islamic banking system; the publishing of an Islamic newspaper (Republika); and the establishment of a center for micro-economic development.

With regard to the Islamic welfare effort, one of the most important contributions of the new Muslim middle class associated with ICMI was the birth of "Dompet Dhuafa Republika" (DD) in July 1993. Although DD was not initiated formally by ICMI, it was born in the Republika Newspaper, which was an instrument for voicing ICMI interests. Parni Hadi (editor-in-chief), Sinansari Ecip (senior editor), Haidar Bagir (chief executive officer, CEO) and Eri Sudewo (secretary to the editor) who sponsored this initiative were among the important elites of ICMI. DD initially collected zakat, infaq and shadaqah from Republika employees for the purpose of supporting community development programs in the poorest district[s] of the Yogyakarta province.
DD’s attachment with the *Republika* newspaper allowed DD to break ground in methods and approaches of the collection and utilization of Islamic welfare funds. This allowed DD to reach a larger group of *muzakki* (Muslims whose wealth exceeds the *zakat* exemption rate) from more diverse social and economic groups. *Republika* facilitated a special column for DD to publish *zakat* advertisements to encourage Muslims to pay *zakat*, *inhaq* and *shadaqah*. Regular publication of program reports, audited financial reports and the profiles of beneficiaries through public advertisement increased public confidence in DD activities. DD initiatives made the practice of Islamic welfare efforts that used to operate almost entirely underground become openly accessible for the public. The existence of both BAZIS and LAZIS used to be almost unknown. A few years later, innovations in the methods and approaches of DD’s collection, utilization and public accountability placed it as a leading organization among BAZIS and LAZIS (Sudewo, 1998).

DD has also played strategic leadership roles in BAZIS and LAZIS. This can be seen, for instance, in its initiative to facilitate a seminar on *zakat* among corporations in 1997. The participants of the seminar mostly came from LAZIS that were a part of private and state-owned corporations. Only a few participants represented BAZIS and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. At the end of the seminar, participants recommended establishing a forum to enhance their quality of service and to solve various problems related to Islamic welfare activities. This recommendation was followed up by the institutionalization of the *Zakat* Forum (Forum *zakat*, FOZ) on September 19th 1997. FOZ facilitates consultation, coordination, information exchange and cooperation among LAZIS and/or BAZIS. Initially FOZ was supported by eleven LAZIS-and BAZIS, but it now has more support from other LAZIS and BAZIS. DDR played a direct role in the institutionalization of FOZ, a reflection of DDR’s leadership role among BAZIS/LAZIS.

Soon after its establishment, FOZ became an important civil society force that assisted the promotion of Islamic welfare activities. One of the most important contributions of FOZ in its first year was its initiative to resubmit a draft of a law on *zakat* that had been previously proposed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the early 1990s. This was apparently congruent with the social and political stream initiated by ICMI and Habibie. It was FOZ that consistently approached the House of Representative (DPR) and ICMI regarding a legal basis for the inclusion of Islamic welfare activities into
the Indonesian State administration. FOZ gained adequate support from Malik Fadjar, the Minister of Religious Affairs, who was also a member of Muhammadiyah, the modernist-associated Muslim organization, and ICMI. The political relationship between Islam and the state in the post-Suharto regime was conducive for Muslims to advocate the law on zakat. It is logical, therefore, that the draft law on zakat administration obtained tremendous support from the House of Representatives and the President (FOZ, 2001).

Law number 38/1999 provides the legal basis for the existence of Islamic welfare organizations. The law automatically canceled the joint ministerial decree between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs that had provided the legal basis for the existence of BAZIS since 1991. The law clearly defined the position and the extent of State involvement in zakat administration. Article 3 of the law states that the Indonesian Government is obligated to provide protection, guidance, and service to muzakki (people who pay zakat), mustahiq (zakat recipients) and amil (administrators). The law reiterates the obligatory principle for every single Indonesian Muslim, and every institution owned by Muslims, to fulfill the obligation of paying zakat (article 2). Chapter II article 5 states that zakat administration aims to enhance administrative services for Muslims to pay zakat as a fulfillment of religious obligation; to enhance the functions and roles of religious institutions in the promotion of social welfare and social justice; and to enhance the effectiveness of zakat administration.

Direct state involvement can also be seen in the role of zakat administration. Chapter III article 6 mentions that only the government has the authority to establish institutions of zakat administration. Although this chapter acknowledges the existence of two kinds of zakat administration (government and non-governmental), these administrative systems still need government authorization. The government's zakat organization is called the Zakat Administration Committee (Badan Amil Zakat, BAZ). The non-government zakat organization is called the Zakat Administration Institution (Lembaga Amil Zakat, LAZ). The name of BAZ for the government's zakat administration is similar to the name of the zakat institution proposed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs postponed Decree Number 4, July 15th 1968. There was no official explanation as to why the law prefers the abbreviation of BAZ/LAZ to the already widely used abbreviation of BAZIS and LAZIS. However, the roles and functions of BAZ/LAZ are exactly the same as BAZIS/LAZIS.
BAZ is formed and established by the government with respect to the proposal from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The central BAZ is authorized by the president; BAZ-Daerah (province) is authorized by the governor; BAZ at the regency level is authorized by the regent or mayor (Bupati/walikota); and BAZ at the district level is authorized by the head of the district or borough (Camat). This organizational structure reveals the dominant position of the government in zakat administration. BAZ at all levels is responsible to a head of government that authorizes its establishment. The establishment of LAZ does not require approval from the local government but from the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Both BAZ and LAZ collect zakat and other forms of Islamic welfare funds. These include infaq, shadaqah, hibah, wasiat (promise to give certain goods after the subject dies) and kafarat (obligatory payment of a fine for Muslims who violate religious obligations) (article 13). In the Islamic legal system these types of funds can be used for financing social welfare activities. Both BAZ and LAZ are allowed to collect zakat from several items of zakat-able wealth (article 11). These are gold; silver; and other forms of currency; wealth from corporations; agricultural products; livestock; mining; income-based on wages and services; and deposited wealth (money or other valuable goods). However, the law does not enforce Muslims to pay zakat; there is no sanction for those who do not fulfill their obligations (article 14).

The law has also improved the position and contribution of Islamic welfare to Indonesia's social welfare. The Ministry of Religious Affairs' Decree Number 8/2001 stated that Islamic welfare funds could be utilized for social development and poverty alleviation programs. According to the decree, the priority for zakat fund utilization is to provide for the basic needs of the poor. If there are funds remaining, they may be used for other activities. The utilization of other Islamic welfare funds should be prioritized for community development programs.

This regulation facilitated the joint effort of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs to pursue community economic development activities for poverty alleviation. The joint effort was institutionalized through joint decree number 293/2002 and 40/PEGHUK/2002 concerning empowerment of the poor and needy through zakat funds. This decree allows direct cooperation between BAZ/LAZ and the Ministry of Social Affairs to pursue productive social development programs. The decree stipulates
that BAZ/LAZ could deliver their social welfare programs within the framework of the Ministry of Social Affairs' programs so that Islamic welfare efforts could directly contribute and be in accordance with statutory social welfare provisions. This cooperation signifies formal recognition of zakat and other Islamic welfare funds and the Islamic welfare organizations (BAZ/LAZ) as social welfare agents.

Another important breakthrough facilitated by the establishment of law number 38/1999 is the inclusion of zakat as an item of deduction from wealth subject to tax. In 2000 the government passed law number 17/2000 concerning the amendment of law number 7/1983 regarding income taxes. The new law recognizes that zakat has a similar function to tax insofar as it is a means of wealth redistribution. The law states that tax can only be withdrawn from the total wealth subject to tax after it is deducted by the amount paid for zakat (article 9). However this regulation pertains only to income tax, not to tax on property, luxury goods or profits resulted from corporate economic activity. The law also mentions that funds collected by BAZ/LAZ from zakat, infaq, shadaqah and other sources of Islamic welfare funds are not subject to tax (article 4). This law avoids the problem of double taxing. The problem of double taxing has been one structural burden for Muslim in fulfilling the zakat obligation (Permono, 1992c). This law, therefore, has not only overcome the problem of double taxing, but also provides incentives for people to pay zakat.

The law on zakat also permits the central government to establish the National Zakat Administration (Badan Amil Zakat National, BAZNAS) at the national level. According to law No. 38/1999, the establishment of BAZNAS, as an umbrella for BAZ institutions at the lower government levels, should be based on presidential decree. BAZNAS has existed since 2002 and has been involved in both collection and utilization of Islamic welfare funds (Subianto, 2002). BAZ institutions now exist along government bureaucratic lines from the central government level to village levels. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), which is responsible for coordinating, regulating and monitoring Islamic welfare activities, reports that there exists one BAZIS at the national level; 24 BAZIS at the provincial level; and 9 LAZIS that have been certified (Tulus, 2003). Other reports also describe about 277 BAZIS at the Regency level; 3160 BAZIS at the District level and 38,117 BAZIS at the village level (Saidi, 2003). However, in actuality, existing LAZIS outweighs the
number of LAZIS described in the government's report. Forum Zakat (FOZ, 2001) reports that there are at least 28 LAZIS that are members of the forum (Forum Zakat, 2001).

The rise of the new-middle class Muslim therefore, facilitated the birth of the law on zakat, law number 38/1999. This law stands on the assumption of a Pancasila-based political system rather than an Islamic one. Since Muslims have accepted Pancasila as the sole ideological basis of the nation, the existence of the law on zakat administration does not necessarily reflect the revival of Islamic ideology. Instead, the law confirms the freedom of Muslims to practice their religious obligation within the Pancasila-based state. This position can be seen, for instance, in article 2 in which it is stated that zakat administration is obligatory for every Muslim but the law does not provide a mechanism to punish those who violate this obligation. It is clear that this ambiguous article is related to the effort to maintain the "neutrality" of Indonesia as a secular (non-religious) state.

Conclusion

It is true that the predominant social welfare policies in developing countries, including Indonesia, did not spring from their own social and cultural roots. Instead, these were adopted from exogenous influences, particularly through the long process of Western social welfare system diffusion during colonialism, and during the formation of social, political and economic systems in early independence (MacPherson and Midgley, 1987). Some observers argue that the phenomenon of underdevelopment of social welfare policies in developing countries was due, in part, to an inappropriate adoption of the exogenous system provided by Western European and American experts (Midgley, 1981; 1984). The exogenous social welfare system was an integral part of the larger external support particularly within the context of economic development and modernization (Midgley, 2001).

However, in many Muslim countries, there were efforts to reinvent the Islamic economic and social welfare system. This was a strong reaction to the domination of the Western economic and social welfare system in Islamic countries. Some of these countries even attempted to establish an Islamic State, since they regarded an Islamic State as the primary condition for achieving a just economic and social welfare system. Although there is not adequate
theoretical, historical, or empirical evidence to support this, some Muslim countries have preserved traditional Islamic welfare systems. Contemporary Muslim societies have implemented Islamic welfare in three different ways.\textsuperscript{13}

Indonesian Muslims have been involved in a long political and ideological struggle to gain proper recognition of the existence and contribution of Islamic welfare. Muslim aspirations concerning Islamic welfare efforts occurred within the context of the implementation of the Jakarta Charter urging Muslims to practice their religious obligation of charitable giving. The Islamic welfare efforts developed shape during the New Order Regime (1966-1998).

Although there was no sufficient legal basis for Islamic welfare efforts, the Government Islamic Welfare Administration (Badan Amil Zakat, Infaq dan shadaqah, BAZIS) was established in most Indonesian provincial governments in the early 1970s. The legal basis for the existence of BAZIS was developed later in 1991 by the joint decree between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs; it was strengthened later by the enactment of law number 38/1999 on zakat administration. The joint ministerial decree and the law signified formal recognition and linkage of the Islamic welfare programs and Indonesia’s statutory welfare policy.

Indonesian Islamic welfare policies facilitate the existence of both the Government Islamic Welfare Administration (BAZIS) and Non-Government Islamic Welfare Administration (LAZIS). The law maintains that zakat should be paid voluntarily on the basis of individual discretion. Despite the fact that the law facilitates further recognition of zakat pertinent to poverty alleviation programs and tax incentives, the law places an extensive authority on government bureaucracy in collection, utilization and controlling voluntary/non-governmental Islamic welfare organizations (LAZIS). Instead of being responsible to society, BAZIS is responsible to the government. This feature generates an impression that the law on zakat administration serves the interests of the government to intervene in Islamic welfare systems—more than the law serving the interests of the Muslim community to implement Islamic ideology. Despite the fact that the current policy on the Islamic welfare efforts serves more government interests than Muslim political, economical and social interests, the Indonesian Islamic welfare policy reveals a progression toward welfare pluralism.

Previous studies have sought to include Islamic welfare programs in contemporary social welfare scholarship. Midgley is one of the
prominent social welfare policy scholars who attempts to acknowledge the potential for indigenous or traditional welfare activities, such as zakat, to be linked up with the statutory welfare efforts as a strategic endeavor to include a larger part of the "deserving" communities. Some practical examples illustrate this potential. Case studies of indigenous support regarding social security in Kenya (Benda-beckmann, Gsanger and Midgley, 1997) reveals some of the strengths and potential of the contribution that indigenous welfare institutions can make.

This study suggests the potential contribution that Indonesian Muslims can make to enhance society's welfare through utilizing Islamic welfare efforts. It suggests the need for Indonesia to further develop a social welfare system that facilitates co-existence and interdependence of various welfare institutions to continuously provide a high quality of social welfare service.
Endnotes

1. Indonesia's case is unique insofar as the overwhelming majority of Indonesian citizens are Muslim (about 85 to 88 percent), but the state system is secular and the statutory social welfare policies and practices have been adopted from the Western social welfare traditions.

2. In European and North American welfare systems, the idea of linking informal, private and voluntary welfare systems with the statutory social welfare system has just recently been acknowledged in the social policy debate (Midgley, 1997). The acknowledgement of the roles of the private, informal and voluntary social welfare efforts has stimulated the emergence of the concept of welfare pluralism or welfare mix. Welfare pluralism advocates the linkage among the four different social welfare sectors: the statutory, the voluntary, the commercial and the informal (Johnson, 1987; Gilbert 2000). The concept is based on the principles of decentralization and participation in the provision of social welfare services.

3. Malaysia, Pakistan and Sudan are among Muslim countries that have attempted to develop Islamic economies and Islamic social welfare systems.

4. The early ideas of the Islamic economy have been promoted since the end of the World War II. However, the aspiration to further develop Islamic economic system was launched after the Conference of Islamic Leaders in Morocco (1969), Islamabad (1973) and Mecca (1981). These conferences also criticized the failure of the Western economic system in Muslim countries in achieving economic justice and the welfare for its citizens (Rahardjo, 1989).

5. Peace be upon him (writer).

6. The 1955 general election was considered as the first free and democratic multi parties election in Indonesia since independent.

7. Besides economic crisis due to political instability, armed conflict with the Dutch aggression, and regional conflict with Malaysia, several Muslim factions had also attempted to establish an Islamic State separated from the Republic of Indonesia. Among others were PRRI led by Mohammad Natsir (Masyumi Leader) in Sumatera and Darul Islam (DI) in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh led by Kartosuwirjo, who was also close friend of Sukarno.

8. Pancasila is the five basic principles or ideology of the state; namely, belief in God; a civilized and just humanist; Indonesian unity; consensus guided by the principles of democracy; and equitable welfare and social justice for all Indonesian citizens.

9. Such as the Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Parmusi); the Awakening of Islamic Scholars party (Nahdlatul Ulama, NU); the Indonesian Islamic United party (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, PSII); and the United Islamic Education party (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah Indonesia, Perti).

10. Such as Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nationalis Indonesia, PNI), Indonesian Catholic Party (Partai Katolik Indonesia, Parkindo)
11. In 1982 election Golkar obtained 62.3 percent; PPP 27.8 percent and PDI 7.9 percent. In the people consultative assembly, the Golkar members increase from 232 in 1977 to 246 seats in 1982. While PPP members drop from 99 seats in 1977 to 94 in 1982. PDI experienced a similar situation with winning 24 seats in 1982, or 5 fewer than in 1977.

12. The eleven organizations are Dompet Dhuafa-Republika; BAZIS-Jakarta Province; Bait al mal PT. Pupuk Kujang; Bait al Mal PT. Pupuk Kaltim; Bait al Mal Pertamina; Bait al Mal Telkom Jakarta; Bait al Mal Bank Bumi Daya; Bank Muamalat; Islamic Dakwah division of Hotel Indonesia; PT. Internusa Hasta Buana and Sekolah Tinggi Ekonomi Indonesia (STIE), Jakarta.

13. These diverse approaches of Islamic welfare efforts administration is not surprising since there has never existed single source of authoritative interpretation of how should Islamic welfare funds be collected and distributed. The system of Islamic welfare administration “has never been applied consistently over either time or space” (Kuran, 2003, p. 275).
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Studia Islamika, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005


SAGE Publications.


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السنة الثانية عشر، العدد 005

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