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Sumanto Al Qurtuby

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Islam, Media, and Social Responsibility in the Muslim World
Abstract: The article focuses on the study of public Islam in Southeast Asia, the world’s most populous Islamic region. More specifically, it examines “late modernity” and its relation to the unprecedented growth of Islam, the Islamic resurgence, and Muslim politics in the public domains of modern Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines. It also examines the history of Islam’s resurgence, the underlying factors driving the region’s Islamic boom, and the implications of the aforementioned phenomena on democracy, civil co-existence, and social relations among ethno-religious groups in these areas. Using Southeast Asia as a case of public Islam, the article’s main purpose is to revisit the strength of classic modernization and secularization theories that forecasted the decline, or even the death, of religion from global politics and public spheres. Finally, the article also aims to provide insights on the local dynamics and plurality of public Islam in Southeast Asia.

Keywords: public Islam, modernity, secularism, religious resurgence, Muslim politics, Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Indonesia

Kata kunci: Islam publik, modernitas, sekularisme, kebangkitan agama, politik Muslim, Asia Tenggara, Filipina, Indonesia.
Georgetown University sociologist Jose Casanova in his modern classic work, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, argues that religions have been undergoing a process of deprivatization across the globe. Casanova maintains that religion, as a discursive reality, has become an unquestionable global social fact and played a great role in three distinct areas of a modern democratic polity: state, political society, and civil society (Casanova: 1994, 2010). The underlying thesis of Casanova is to criticize classical secularization theory that forecasted (1) the decline of personal faith, religious beliefs and practices which compose the engine of secularization and (2) the retreat of religion from public space. Classical secularization theory, as Fenella Cannell (2010) points out, derives mainly from Anglophone sociological work conducted in the 1960s by, among others, sociologists and social theorists Thomas Luckmann, Peter Berger, and Talcott Parsons who produced various interpretations of the foundational sociology of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber which had explored the link between Western modernity and the fall of traditional religions (Berger and Luckmann: 1967; Parsons: 1967; Weber: 1993; Durkheim: 2008).

These Western theorists of classical secularization, derives from a unique Western Christian theological category—*saeculum*—which literally means an “attempt to secularize the religious” but has no equivalent term in other world religions not even in Eastern Christianity, once believed, some of whom such as Peter Berger (1999, 2008; cf. Butler, et.alii: 2010) now admit their previous theoretical mistakes, that the processes of “development” or economic modernization scattered throughout postcolonial countries would result in the shrink of religions which previously played an enormous role in state politics (of European polity), while political modernization and its attendant “democratization” would make religions retreat into private spheres. Although their initial studies and analyses chiefly refer to the cases of Western Europe and the United States, they applied this analytical approach and theoretical framework to non-European and American politics and societies, including the “Muslim world.” Daniel Lerner, for instance, whose classic book *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, dubbed as the “Bible of modernization theories”, had great influences not only among academic circles but also America policymakers, think tanks, and government officials, said confidently in the 1950s that Muslims in the Middle East dreamt of
becoming American-like secular-modern people. Lerner (1958: p. 79) says, “What America is…the modernizing Middle East seeks to become.” Lerner moreover said that Muslims in the Middle East at that time preferred “mechanization” (i.e. a process of becoming modern-secular societies like Americans) to “Mecca” (for Lerner, it meant a “religious conservatism or fundamentalism”).

Lerner’s studies and analyses in particular (other social scientists hired by the U.S. government such as Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, and Harold Lasswell also have some influences especially in the Western academia) successfully convinced not only some, if not many, Western academics but also American government (i.e. U.S. State Department) that sponsored his research and survey in six countries of the Middle East (Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, and Syria) aiming at finding strategies and tactics to weaken Communist influence in the postcolonial world.1 As a result, the U.S. government began to intensify in modernizing and secularizing Arab and the Middle East through ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural projects of what they called “development” and “democracy” hoping that by developing and modernizing “underdeveloped” societies—not only in the Middle East but also in Africa and Asia—they would become, on one hand, immune from Communism, and support Capitalism on the other. This is to say that the process of economic and political modernization in the “third world” cannot be separated from the global campaign of the United States to defeat Soviet Communist ideology (Shah: 2001).

It is true that, although U.S. involvement in the politics of Arab and the Middle East took place long before 1940s, ever since President Harry Thurman institutionalized “development” as a foreign policy in 1949 with his Point Four overseas aid program, modern technologies, mass media, educations, and economic measures began to greet the Middle East. What Lerner and other theorists of modernization and secularization did not anticipate, however, was that the processes of modernization—and secularization—resulted in the augmentation of “Islamic resurgence” and Muslim politics. The triumph of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran over U.S.-backed Shah regimes, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (r. 1970-81) in 1981, the overwhelming victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria in 1991, and most recently, the rise of the Arab uprisings in a number of Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and Africa, all provided
a compelling evidence of the unintended impact of U.S.-sponsored political and economic modernization in the areas. It is significant to underline that the rise of Islamic renewal did not emerge in a vacuum or simply a product of theological understandings and interpretations of political Islam. But, more importantly, these Islamic boom and revivals were deeply rooted in the preceding social, economic, and political processes in the societies.

As Said Amir Arjomand aptly points out, socially and economically, “Islamic rebirth” in global politics had profound roots in (1) the process of urbanization in which Muslims moved steadily from small villages to industrial towns for pursuing a better life, economically and socially, (2) the increase of literacy and education, and (3) the expansion of public sphere by the media of mass communication. Moreover, politically, the phenomena of Islamic resurgence and “public Islam” in the Middle East and North Africa in particular were, in Arjomand’s (2010: pp. 173-174) phrase, “decisively conditioned by state- and nation-building and modernization, and especially by political mobilization and the need it created for culturally rooted political ideologies.” Most, if not all, of economic and political programs sketched above that preceded the modern “Islamic resurgence” and the appearance of public Islam in the Middle East and Africa were initially set up in the 1950s by the U.S. government. Classical theories of modernization that posited secularization as its main impact on the decrease of religion thus hindered our understanding of the contemporary invigoration and transformation of Islam and Muslim societies. To put it differently, the politics of modernization and secularization resulted in, and contributed to—directly or indirectly—the politics of Islam, namely the emergence of Islamic upsurge and public Islam.

Southeast Asia, as well as Indo-Pakistan and Afghanistan, have rather different historical and social dynamics from their Middle Eastern and African counterparts with regard to the U.S. participation and the processes of Islamization of state politics and public spheres (see e.g. Zaman: 2012; Barfield: 2012; Houben: 2003; Wolters: 1993; Osborne: 2000). However, what is striking—and unfortunately supporters of modernization and secularization theories failed to notice—is that religion did not disappear from global politics and public arenas, notwithstanding massive programs of economic development and modernization that took place in the region. In fact, in Indonesia in
particular, the “politics of secularism”, to borrow the term of Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2004, 2010), and of “national developmentalism” (Heryanto: 1988) set forth by the New Order rule, gave rise to the appearance of Islamic militancy and political Islam in the post-Suharto Indonesia that could challenge civil coexistence, social relations, democratization, and, more importantly, foundational pluralist ideology and Constitution of this archipelagic state (see e.g. Bruinessen: 2002, 2013; Pringle: 2010; Azra: 2006; Kunkler and Stephan: 2013).

Contemporary Southeast Asia, furthermore, not only witnesses the surge of Islam in state-non-state politics and public domains but also the rise of Buddhist, Pentecostal, and Catholic revivals. Since the last decades, as anthropologist Robert Hefner has remarked, Southeast Asia has undergone an unprecedented upsurge in religious ritual, association, and observance that in turn defies a “century of forecasts by secularization and modernization theorists of religion’s immanent privatization and decline” (Hefner, 2010: pp. 1031-1047). Indeed, unlike previous modernist or secularist forecasts of the “death of God,” Southeast Asia, as for the United States but a rather different from Europe (see Berger, et. alii: 2008), has been marked by a resurgent religion. In the once securely Catholic Philippines, for instance, the past generation has seen dramatic conversion to evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity. In response to the rise of Pentecostalism, some groups of Filipino Catholics created a sort of “quasi-Pentecostal rebranding”, namely a Pentecostal-inflected movement but is officially Catholic such as El Shaddai, with has membership of some 10 million followers, making the group as the world’s largest charismatic Catholic organization (Howell: 2008).

In the Theravada Buddhist lands of Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand, the past generation has also witnessed a steady expansion in lay devotion as well as the augmentation of “radical-fundamentalist” Buddhism such as the monk-led “969” anti-Muslim Buddhist movement (Yegar: 2002). As well, Muslims in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Mindanao region of southern Philippines, over the past generation, have experienced a dramatic religious revitalization, typified by, among others, the rise of “macrocosm-minded Islam” and transnational religious movements. Arab-inspired Salafiyyah conservatives, Indian-typed Tablighi Jamaat “piety movement,” Hizbut Tahrir internationalists, and Muslim Brothers move rapidly across
the region (van Bruinessen: 2013; Mutalib: 2006). Not only Islam, contemporary Indonesia has also witnessed the speedy growth of U.S.- linked Evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity as well as the rise of the Syrian Orthodox Church.

This present article, however, is intended neither to explore resurgent Buddhism and Christianity in Southeast Asia nor to provide thorough critical assessment of modernization and secularization theories since there is a plenty of studies on the subject. But rather, by presenting and focusing Southeast Asia’s public Islam, it aims chiefly to rethink or re-examine the rigor, not to say “stubbornness,” of some theses and postulates in modernization and secularization theories, particularly those dealing with the role of religion in global politics and public realms. Notwithstanding immense critiques and revisions from both resisters and former advocates of secularization and modernization theories (see e.g. Berger: 1999; Shah, Stepan, and Toft: 2010; Butler. et. alii: 2010), secularization theory does not fade away. It still structures much of our study, analysis, and understanding of the role of religion in global politics and world affairs. It does so in part because, as Timothy Shah (2010: pp. 2-3) aptly argues, many of the foundational concepts and conceptual distinctions on which it was founded has undergone, in Berger’s and Luckmann’s (1967) term, a process of “internalization”; consequently remain firmly lodged in the minds of scholars, social scientists, as well as political analysts and policymakers. For many, if not most, of these particular intellectual groups, the meaning of such concepts as “secularism,” “modernity,” “power,” and “public life” was juxtaposed with those of “religion,” “tradition,” “faith,” and “private worship”.

As an outcome of lengthy injection of modernization and secularization theories, they divide the world into two un-reconciling, opposing concepts: “secular-public” versus “spiritual-private”. For them, there is no—and never would be—“spiritual-public” or “secular-private”. This is to say that for classical theorists of modernization and secularization, building on Western models and experiences of the church-state separation, the worlds of religion and politics would and should separate or interrelate. For them, the hermetic isolation of religion from public areas—or privatization of spirituality—is necessary for the flourishing of secular democracy, while the decline of faith is expected for the achievement of development and “progress”.

The assumption behind this postulate is that religion is considered to be (1) the hindrance of modernization, development, democratization, civilization, and other “Western-secular products” and (2) the major force of radicalism, terrorism, authoritarianism, and underdevelopment or “backwardness” which contradict Enlightenment-Western ideas of democracy, modernity, and secularism, despite the fact that religions and Islam in particular could work hand-in-hand with democracy and modernity. A number of eminent scholars of Islam such as Azyumardi Azra, Robert Hefner, Asef Bayat, John Esposito, Leonard Binder, Augustus Richard Norton and many others have long examined the reciprocal linkage between Islam and democracy, civil society, and development (see Azra: 2006; Hefner: 2000, 2005; Bayat: 2007; Norton: 1996, 2005; Esposito: 2011; Binder: 1988).

Although there has been much study on the contributions of world religions in politics and democratic polity, secularization thesis—and modes of thinking—of binary oppositions between religion vis a vis politics prevail. The outcome of this stringent and one-way boundary maintenance has been the long-standing exclusion of religious beliefs, discourses, institutions, and actors from the systematic study of world politics. This in turn has created a paradoxical situation: on one hand religion, as in the case of Southeast Asia and elsewhere, has become one of the most influential factors in world affairs, including in peacemaking and democratization process in the last generation (see e.g. Appleby: 2000; Philpott: 2012) but remains one of the least examined factors in the academic analyses as well as policy and professional studies and practices of world affairs (Shah, 2010: pp. 1-4; Tofts, Philpott, and Shah: 2011).

By presenting evidence from Southeast Asian Islam, this article, once again, will challenge some foundational theses of modernization and secularization theories. The term “public Islam” in this article, recalling the seminal work of Jose Casanova (1994) depicted earlier, refers to the phenomena and processes of “deprivatization” or “publicization” of Islam away from private domains. It is a term that signifies the role of Islam, either for ill or good, in global politics—state or non-state polity—and public arenas. The term also refers to the phenomena of a raising Islamic consciousness among Muslims in both state and society, politics and cultures and so forth. It is obvious that as the societies of Southeast Asia went through an era of rapid modernization and globalization, Islam became more publicly visible.
Muslim insurgency in the Southern Philippines (as well as in Southern Thailand and Burma), Islam Hadhari and political Islam in Malaysia, and various forms of Muslim politics and Islamic movements in Indonesia, all are exemplars of public Islam in a modernized, globalized, and secularized world. The phenomena of public Islam in Southeast Asia did not have to be interpreted necessarily as antimodern, anti-Western, antisecular, or antidemocratic reaction. I am also not claiming that, despite the presence of “public Islam,” Muslims in Southeast Asia are now becoming “more Islamic” and “more pious and observant”. I am arguing only that religions, especially Islam (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand) but also Buddhism (Burma and Thailand), Confucianism (Singapore), and Christianity (the Philippines), have been a global trend and an undisputable social fact in the Southeast Asian polity. The common element in contemporary Southeast Asia is that religion is the key for understanding the state, society, politics, ethnicity, law, culture, etc.

While some, if not many, scholars tend to depict “Islamic resurgence” in a quite negative sense identifying it with militancy, violence, terrorism, radicalism, anti-democracy, anti-Western society, among others, I maintain the term in a neutral way. Indeed, looking at Southeast Asia’s public Islam, such a biased term of “Islamic resurgence” can be misleading partly because the manifestations, local dynamics, and micropolitics of public Islam differ from place to place. While Indonesia experiences very dynamic, democratic public Islam and is marked by vibrant debates between Muslim supporters of secularism and of Islamism, Malaysia is quite “calm” and listless, let alone the antagonism between Anwar Ibrahim and his followers versus Mahathir Mohamad and his supporters or the anti-Shi’i and Ahmadi campaigns. Unlike in Indonesia, Malaysia’s public Islam is a contest between mainly two Muslim groupings for claiming an “authentic Islam”. Furthermore, whereas Mindanao’s public Islam is symbolized by, among others, the appearance of transnational Islamist/Islamic groups (like Indonesia), the phenomenon of public Islam in Southern Thailand is remarkably absent from this international feature. Unlike Indonesia, where local ethnic identities of Muslims is less-significant in public Islam, issues of native ethnicity is crucial in the public Islam of Malaysia (Malay), Southern Thailand (Malay), and Southern Philippines (Moro). It is impossible to discuss public Islam in Malaysia, Southern Thailand,
and Southern Philippines without questioning issues around ethnicity. This article thus tries to trace historical and sociological roots of the emergence of public Islam in these specified regions, notably the Philippines and Indonesia, in order to comprehend “local dynamics” and plurality of resurgent Islam in this world’s most populous Muslim area.

**Southern Philippines: Muslim Insurgency and Islamic Identity**

On October 15, 2012, the historic peace accord that marked the end of decades of violent conflicts between Muslim secessionist groups in Southern Philippines and the Government of the Philippines was signed by Marvin Leonen (the Government’s chief negotiator), Mohagher Iqbal (Moro Islamic Liberation Front/MILF peace panel chair), and Tengku Dato’ Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed (a peace accord mediator/facilitator from Malaysia) at the Malacanan Palace in Manila. The signing of the peace agreement was witnessed by several top religious leaders and high-ranking bureaucrats including President Benigno Aquino III, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, MILF Chairman Al Haj Murad Ibrahim, and Secretary-General of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu. The peace deal outlines general agreements on major issues, including the extent of power, revenues and territory granted for the new Muslim autonomous region. The new name of “Bangsamoro” (the Moro peoples) as an autonomous political entity was granted by the Government of the Philippines, replacing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which President Aquino described as a failed political experiment.

The 2012 peace pact between Muslim Filipinos and the Philippine Government reopened new hopes for Muslims in the Southern Philippines, comprising the islands of Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, and Palawan, to live peacefully with their religious neighborhoods and focus on pursuing a better life economically, socially, and politically. It is significant to note that the 2012 peace treaty between the “Muslim rebels”, a term borrowed from Thomas McKenna (1998), and the Philippine administration was not the first time in the history of this only Christian-majority country in Southeast Asia. Many peace initiatives, plebiscites, and ceasefires have been initiated to put the violent conflicts to an end, including those initiated by foreign mediators from Muslim-majority countries. But all of these peace initiatives have
not brought any modicum of conciliation to the Muslim regions in the South. Accordingly all elements of societies, local, and international which are concerned about the “Christian-Muslim” just-peace process in the region, hoped that the 2012 peace deal would be the last official reconciliation effort between various groups of Muslim separatists and the Philippine authorities.

Muslim politics has a long history in the Philippines. The politics of Muslims in the Philippines has taken place for centuries ever since or perhaps before the Spaniards colonized the archipelago in the 16th C. Long before Spaniards captured the territory, Muslims already existed there making Islam as the oldest world religion to be established in the Philippines, a name given by the first Spanish colonial ruler in the archipelago, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, as a tribute to his sovereign in Spain, Philip II. Historian Anthony Reid (1988, 1995; cf. Yegar, 2002: pp. 185-212) said that Islam appears to have first reached the Sulu archipelago in the late 14th century by way of the extensive trade networks of the Malay—also Arabs—with a Muslim Sultanate becoming established in Sulu by about 1450. In fact explorer Ferdinand Magellan, who landed in today’s Philippines in 1521, was killed by a Muslim chieftain, and Manila was originally Islamic until Miguel Lopez de Legazpi conquered it. During colonial times, Muslim Filipinos, whom the Spaniards called “Moros” (Moors), a pejorative term used in the Medieval Spain (Andalusia) referring to “Muslim invaders” from Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and others, were engaged in anti-colonial resistance against Spain (1565-1898) and United States (1898-1946), and continued in the post-independence period (George: 1980; Majul: 1985, 1999; Man: 1990).

Although Muslim Filipinos have long involved in political-religious resistance since colonial eras, the modern manifestation of resurgent Islam and Muslim politics in the archipelago began to come into view since the late 1960s, where a small group of students and intellectuals, headed by former Cotabato Governor Datu Utong Matalam, organized Mindanao Independent Movement (MIM) to seek for a better life and treatment of the people of Mindanao by the Manila government. In 1971, MIM paved the way in the organization of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that sought for the independence of Bangsamoro people and homeland that comprised the regions of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. From late 1972 until early 1977, under the headship of Nur Misuari
Sumanto Al Qurtuby

(b. 1939), MNLF, whose membership was dominated by partisans from Misuari’s Tausug tribe and other Sulu-based ethnic groups, turned to become the largest group of armed separatists fighting bitterly against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

A negotiated ceasefire held for most of 1977, but by 1978 fighting has resumed, albeit at a somewhat reduced intensity. By 1977, following a leadership dispute and ideological differences, Salamat Hashim (1942-2003), graduated from Al-Azhar University of Egypt, broke away from the MNLF and established Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) based in Mindanao. In the mid-1980s, a new faction of the Muslim separatist group emerged by the name of Mujahidin Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) (also known al-Harakat al-Islamiyyah—“the Islamic Movement”) spurred by the group’s opposition to the ideas of the peace talks posed by Nur Misuari. For the founding chairman of MCFF, Abdurrajak Janjalani (1958-1998), who was an Afghan War veteran and (ex)-member of MNLF, the sole objective of the Muslim struggle was the establishment of an Islamic state, and not autonomy, independence, or revolution as proposed by MNLF. By 1991, Abdurajak Janjalani, a charismatic preacher in mosques and madrasas of Zamboanga and Basilan, renamed MCFF Abu Sayyaf Group or Jama’ah Abu Sayyaf (see e.g. Man: 1990; Yegar: 2002; Gunaratna: 2002; Abuza: 2005; Rabasa: 2007; Wilson: 2009; Powell: 2010).

Queries concerning the nature of the Muslim politics and Islamic insurgency appear among specialists of the Philippines and scholars of conflict and peace studies since the separatist/Islamist groups in the region expressed their struggle in different ways. Whereas Nur Misuari seems less interested in pursuing an “Islamic end” for his struggle (in fact his MNLF is overwhelmingly a secular movement and he himself was trained in political science, not in Islamic studies), Salamat Hashim and Abdurajak Janjalani took a more Islamic root for their resistance against what they called “Christian Filipinos,” rather than the Philippine Government. Unlike Abdurajak Janjalani and his groups who took more violent measures of resistance, including terrorism, and desired to transform the entire southern regions of the Philippines into an Islamic state, Salamat Hashim and his devotees merely wanted to make Mindanao become an autonomous region under the banner of Islam. For Salamat Hashim the “Moro conflict” which since the beginning of the 1970s resulted in some 50,000 to more than 120,000
casualties are only the most recent phase of a continuous struggle that date back in 1521 when “Spain invaded Bangsamoro homeland.” For that reason, he described the Bangsamoro’s struggle for freedom and self-determination as “the longest and bloodiest in the entire history of mankind” (Collier: 2005, p. 155; Man: 1990).

It is interesting to know whether Salamat’s expressions above represent a statement of historical fact (of the “Bangsamoro grievances” since the Spanish and American colonialism, for instance) or merely a sort of new “invention of tradition” in the service of, to borrow Benedict Anderson’s (2003) phrase, an “imagined community” of Muslim Moros. Certainly, the “modern myth of Morohood,” namely the idea that a single, transcendent identity was forged among the Muslim Filipinos (which originally meant Spaniards born in the archipelago and was classed well above the native called “Indo”) in the course of a “four-century old history of Christian-Muslim bitterness” finds far-reaching support among Muslim scholars and activists of the Southern Philippines. Such an idea has also been widely cheered by the partisans of Bangsamoro cause, and strongly resonates with “primordialist notion” of, in the phrase of Samuel Huntington (1993), innately “civilizational fault lines.”

However, looking at more closely toward the Southern Philippines strife, one will find the plurality and complexity of factors and actors engaged in the violence, not simply about the Moro identity and separatist/Islamist groups. There have been at least two competing Muslim elites in the region, these are (1) underground separatist leaders, Islamic clerics who publicly advance the moral and political program of the rebels, and Muslim politicians allied with the separatist front; and (2) a set of Muslim leaders aligned with the Philippine state, including the established Muslim aristocrats (the datus) who traditionally enjoyed social, political, and cultural power and privileges. The latter faction mostly opposed the separatist Muslim groups. These two competing elite alignments “control separate kinds of political resources and make different sorts of appeals to the Muslim urban poor” in particular and Muslim Moros in the south in general (McKenna, 1998: pp. 8-9; Wilson: 2009). Southern Philippines is not alone in this regard. Violent conflict in Indonesia (van Klinken: 2007), Afghanistan (Barfield: 2012), India (Brass: 2003), Arab and the Middle East (Gelvin: 2012) and elsewhere always involves various contending local actors.
More importantly, the fact that the establishment of MNLF—the oldest separatist group in the country—was only in 1971 can delegitimize the Islamist/separatist groups’ historical claims over the exceptionality of the ethno-religious identity of Bangsamoro. 1971 was the year that coincided with the national elections and the Southern Philippines, which historically and sociologically Catholics and Muslims uneasily coexist (George: 1980; Majul: 1999) due to a lengthy historical process and a vibrant ethno-religious group, had become an arena of elite competition, notably the two national political parties: Liberal and Nacionalista, as the centralizing regime of Ferdinand Marcos sought to tighten its grip on a rapidly expanding constituency in the South. Marcos, elected president under the banner of Naciolista in 1965, competed with a long-standing Liberal Party activist Salipada Pendatun (see Hedman: 2006). The southern electorates became a major rivalry for Christian elites because Muslims are no longer the dominant populace in the southern Philippines. As part of central government’s policy, heavy migration of Christian communities from densely settled areas in the north and central to the southern region took place since 1946. As a result, the Christian influx reduced Muslims from 60% to 28% of the population of the Cotabato region; from 91% to 61% of the Lanao region; and from 62% to just 13% in the Zamboanga region. The surge of Christians in the South no doubt inflamed Moro hostility.

Driven by local socio-political conditions that un-favored Muslim communities, a number of displaced Muslim politicians—most prominently the former Congressman Rashid Lucman and ex-Senator Salipada Pendatun who served as Bangsamoro Advisory Council—and the datus, local elite Muslim aristocrats who held religious authority on the basis of ancestral ties to the Prophet Muhammad, which were previously excluded from power in the elections of 1967-71, embraced symbols of a new form of politics built on the basis of religion (Islam) and ethnicity (Bangsamoro) championed by a new generation of radicalized young Muslim activists and students such as Nur Misuari, Salamat Hashim, and Abdurajak Janjalani. Some, if not many, of these Muslim students were, unfortunately, the products of the government’s educational policy. Spurred by the declaration of martial law in 1972 by President Marcos, an armed separatist insurgency broke out throughout the South directed by a new array of those young Muslim leaders (McKenna, 1998: pp. 138-169; Qurtuby: 2010; Hedman: 2006).
Although a peace treaty between Manila and Moro which called for the creation of a Muslim autonomous region of Mindanao was signed in 1976, renewed violence emerged as a result of the Marcos administration’s inconsistency towards the Tripoli Agreement. Against this local socio-political backdrop, added with political discrimination and coercion of the Marcos regime, the founding of the pro-autonomy groups can be understood. This is to say that the Morohood identity posed by leaders of the Muslim separatist groups is not naturally invented, but rather socially constructed within the frameworks of local socio-political settings. Such politics of ethnic and religious identity has served not only as a vehicle of popular Muslim emancipation but also a means of obscuring the mechanisms of class and ethnic domination, which are intertwined in the brokering function of the datus and their modern sultanistic counterpart (McKenna: 1998; Collier: 2005; Man: 1990). By misinterpreting greed as grievances, both Muslim elites of Bangsamoro and post-colonial authorities of the Philippines have definitely shared an interest in perpetuating these modern myths of Morohood.

The data presented above certainly challenge essentialist understandings of Muslim Filipinos as bonded by a deeply felt and commonly shared primordial identity and support for the Bangsamoro struggle. Contrary to the common belief that the Morohood identity stemmed from the Spanish colonial era, McKenna (1998: pp. 86-112; cf. Collier, 2006: pp. 63-70) discovers the fact that the notion of a shared Muslim Filipino or Moro identity first gained currency in the southern Philippines among prominent educated elites encouraged by their American teachers and patrons to overcome the “backwardness” of the Muslim population through “enlightened” leadership. In other words, rather than emerging from the crucible of anti-colonial resistance against Spaniards, McKenna (1998: p. 88) finds that “a new transcendent ethno-religious identity as ‘Moros’” developed gradually under the auspices of the United States “with the active encouragement of colonial agents.”

The United States captured the Philippines in 1898 as a prize of the Spanish-American war (Yegar: 2002; Majul: 1999; Powell: 2010). Since that time the United States saw the disunity and fractiousness of the Muslim polities rather than any oppositional solidarity among them. Accordingly “ruthless pacification” was accompanied by paternalistic accommodation. It was in the Americans’ interest to unite the Moros
under their traditional leaders in order to initiate development and
to “encourage and promote” Islam, for it was Islam that bound the
Muslims to their leaders, who were inclined, for the most part, towards
coopération (McKenna, 1998: pp. 105–106). The establishment of the
Moro Province in 1903 marked the first effective unitary state authority
in the history of the southern Philippines. For American colonial
points of view, the politics of identity of “Morohood” was to keep the
Muslims “integrated” into the larger Philippine body politic through
the co-optation of “brokering” Muslim elites. As political brokers
mediating the worlds of Muslim populace on the periphery and (post)
colonial metropole, those established datu (lit. “he who has vassals”) were invaluable channel of control for state-builders in Manila, and a
reassuring buffer between Muslim indigenes and the massive influx of
Christian migrants to the southern frontier in the 1950s and 1960s (see

To conclude, the modern myth of Morohood and Islamic sentiments
echoed by the Muslim separatist groups are a form of present-day political
mobilization or social movement for Muslim separatism by exploiting
ethnic, cultural, and religious identity (cf. Collier: 2005). Mobilization
either based on ethnicity, religion, or race, is the capacity to tie together
resources, including material, and cultural or symbolic resources as well
as organizations and solidarity, in an attempt to achieve some collective
objectives (Olzak: 2007: p. 1465). In the case of the Southern Philippines’s
mobilization, moreover, these collective objectives vary ranging from the
creation of the region’s autonomy, federalism, to the establishment of
an Islamic state. Besides ethno-religious mobilization, the “Moro case”
also can be defined as a sort of nationalist movement since the region’s
political actors commonly articulate their claims over the legitimate and
legal right to rule a specific geographical area (Olzak: 2007).

The Southern Philippines conflict makes clear that actors of
nationalist movements in claiming sovereign rights do not always
depend on race or “shared grievances” (of colonial or post-colonial past,
for instance) as commonly occurred in world’s nationalist movements.
The nationalist movements, as those of the Southern Philippines, can
also be built based upon, and claimed over, ethnic identity (Morohood)
and religious identity (Islam). Accordingly, recalling Olzak’s (2007)
theoretical framework, the violence of the Southern Philippines is a
sort of ethno-religious nationalistic movement in the sense that the
movement has utilized or “exploited” religious and ethnic markers to support its sectarian nationalistic movement. Ethnicity as well as religion can be transformed into a sort of nationalist movement when ethnic and religious actors make “specific historical claims and attempts to administer the group as a political community” (Olzak, 2007: p. 1466).

Although political and economic factors, as explained by most scholars of the “Mindanao conflict,” are clearly present in the strife, dismissing completely issues of religious identity will hinder us for comprehending the dynamics and complexities of the violence and separatism in the region. Such explanations also fail to capture the history of Islamic reformism and religious militancy, the rise of political Islam, and the dynamics of Muslim politics, ones that contributed to intolerance (anti-Christianity) and radicalism among Muslim Filipinos that in turn could provide a fertile ground for the fighting to erupt. As well, depictions of merely political economic dimensions of the conflict fail to notice various motives of political-religious actors—both Muslim/Christian elites and masses—engaged in the turmoil and separatist movement. Whereas some elite members of the movements might use or manipulate religious narratives as a tool to achieve political and economic aims, ordinary masses might consider politics and economy as a camouflage for the “true” religious ends (cf. Duncan: 2013). In brief, although political-economic issues are certainly significant, religious motivations cannot be neglected in analyzing the “Mindanao mayhem” as T.J.S. George (1980: pp. 4-5) has observed, “While the flares in the south could hardly be compared with the Crusades of European Christendom or the jihads of Arabian Islam, they had ingredients which persuaded many Muslims in the Philippines and elsewhere that they were a divine reminder, a timely extension of Islam’s historical struggle to preserve and proselytize.” In an interview with Nida’ul Islam magazine in 1998, Founder of MILF Salamat Hashim expressed his deep concerns of “Christian injustice and hostility” against Islam and Muslim communities of Mindanao that might underline his prolonged resistance. He states, “The Philippines has inherited [by ways of colonialism] and developed a deep hatred against Islam and the Muslim people. After annexing the Bangsamoro homeland, a systematic design to liquidate Islam and to destroy the Islamic identity of the Bangsamoro Muslim was launched.”12
Salamat’s (and other Moro separatist leaders) claims that the Muslim rivalry against Christian Filipinos has a prolonged deep historical root, a claim that was refused by most scholars of the Southern Philippines conflict (e.g. McKenna: 1998; Collier: 2005), cannot be overlooked. Colonialism—Spanish and American—undoubtedly shaped much of Filipino history, including the position and role of Islam in the archipelago. One might remember that the arrival of Ferdinand Magellan in 1521 in an island what is now known “the Philippines” was marked by his planting of a wooden cross on a hill and henceforth declaring that all lands of the archipelago would now become the property of [Christian] Spain. His planting of the cross also signaled Spain’s Christianity mission in the Philippines, which arguably, sowed the Christian-Muslim conflict (Mutalib, 2006: pp. 64-69). Spanish colonialism (unlike Dutch, French, or British), as historian Azyumardi Azra (2008: pp. 9-21) has shown, was strongly motivated by “religious passions” to conquer and defeat Muslim societies. Spaniards saw colonialism as a continuation of Christian-Muslim wars in the Medieval Spain or, say, an “extended Crusades”.

Notwithstanding a lengthy Muslim opposition to Catholic Filipinos that took place since the Spanish colonial era, however, Muslims in the Philippines underwent dramatic changes of Islamic understandings and religious practices from “nominal Islam” to “devout/strict one” that might contribute to a process of radicalization of Islam and Muslim societies only in the post-independence period. Traditionally, Islam in the Philippines, like Catholicism, has absorbed indigenous/local traditions and cultures. As in Java (Geertz: 1976) or Egypt (Lane 1836/2004), Muslim Moros/Filipinos historically or customarily performed ritual meals and made offerings to ancestral spirits. They believed that the spirits (diwatas) can and will have an effect on one’s health, family, and crops. They also included pre-Islamic customs in ceremonies marking rites of passage—birth, marriage, and death (cf. van Gennep: 1961). While many contemporary Muslim Filipinos/Moros have abandoned these rituals and religious practices, some still maintain these local cultures. Although they share the essentials of Islam, specific religious practices vary from one Moro group to another.

Since the World War II, due to the widespread resurgence of Islam worldwide, Muslims in the Philippines have a stronger sense of their unity
as an ummah (Islamic community) than they had in the past. Since 1970s, more overseas Muslim teachers and preachers have visited and taught various forms of Islam the Southern Philippines, making this region now home to a variety of international Islamic organizations such as Jama'ati Tablighi, Hizbut Tabrir, Jamaah Islamiyah, among others. Conversely, more Muslim Filipinos have gone abroad—either on pilgrimage (hajj) or on scholarships—to Islamic centers in Arab and the Middle East, Indo-Pakistan, Malaysia and elsewhere than ever before. When they returned home, realizing that local Muslims have not yet practiced Islamic shari’ah “properly”, they began to “inject” particular forms of reform Islam they received overseas which they considered “more Islamic” to their fellow Muslim Moros. They also strengthen the ties of their fellow Moros with the international Islamic community. As a result, Muslims have built many new mosques and religious schools, where students (male and female) learn the basic rituals and principles of Islam and learn to read the Quran in Arabic. A number of Muslim institutions of higher learning, such as the Jamiatul Philippine al-Islamia in Marawi, also offer advanced courses in Islamic studies.

The process of radicalization of Islam or “militanization” of Muslims started especially since the return of Muslim students and activists from the Middle East, Indo-Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Among the influential Muslim activists and (former) students that contributed to the shape of “Islamic militancy” and the transformation of more reform Islamic understandings and practices in Mindanao included Salamat Hashim, Abdurajak Janjalani, Abdulbaki Abubakar, Omar Pasigan, and Mahid Mutilan. Salamat Hashim studied at Mecca under the auspices of Sheikh Zawawi (first at Masjid al-Haram and then at the Madrasah al-Sulatiyah al-Diniyah). From 1959-1969, Salamat studied at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, where at that time became a center of political activism in Arab and the Middle East. During his studies at Cairo, Salamat was active in the Philippine Muslim Student Association, where he served as its president. He also clandestinely organized a core group among Bangsamoro Muslim students aiming at creating an Islamic revolution in his homeland. Former Secretary-General of the Cairo-based Association of Asian Students and an admirer of Islamist ideologues Sayyid Qutb and Abul ‘Ala al-Maududi, Salamat began to transform himself from an Islamic scholar to Islamic revolutionary after reading the works of Qutb and Maududi and engaged in Islamic
activism. His superb knowledge in Islam and Arabic and lengthy experiences in Islamic activism made him become a charismatic leader who was able to recruit and influence thousands of Muslim Filipinos to join his movement (about 15,000 Muslim militants joined his MILF as active members and thousand others as sympathizers—see Gunaratna: 2002; Abuza: 2005).

Another vital figure was Abdurajak Janjali, founder of Abu Sayyaf Group. A veteran of the Afghan War, Janjali befriended with Osama Bin Laden who wanted him to establish Al-Qaeda’s branch in Southeast Asia. Janjali, along with some 500 young Muslim radicals from the Philippines and many others from Muslim-majority countries, were received military training from American CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and Pakistani ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence) in Northern Pakistan and Afghanistan during the Afghan War aiming to defeat the Soviet Communist army (Abuza: 2005). Moreover, Abdulbaki Abubakar, Omar Pasigan, and Mahid Mutilan might be considered the supreme Islamic scholar of their respected ethno-linguistic groups: Tausug, Maguindanao, and Maranao. Abubakar is closely associated with Nur Misuari and MNLF, Pasigan is a Grand Mufti of Cotabato, head of the Philippine Darul Ifta (House of Opinion), while Mutilan is the chairman of the Ulama League of the Philippines and leader of Islamic political party Ompia (Reform) (Collier, 2006: pp. 65-66).

The influx of resurgent Islam and reform Muslims since the early 1970s has undoubtedly shifted the nature of Islam in the Philippines, and since then divisions along generational lines have emerged among Muslim Moros. Many young Muslims, dissatisfied with the old leaders—the datus, sultans, and the “vanguards of local traditions”—asserted that Moro modern Islamic society was no longer need them. It is worth mentioning that the old-young division is not unique Mindanao. Muslims in Indonesia, especially in Sumatra (Abdullah: 2009) but also in other parts of the country such as Java, Lombok, and the Moluccas, also experience the same dynamics: “young reformists” versus “old traditionalists.” In Mindanao, more specifically, the young reformers were divided between “moderates” who worked within the government for their political goals (the datus—local Muslim aristocrats)—also mostly took the same politics, working with—and part of—the
government) and “militants” who engaged in guerrilla-style warfare. To some degree, the government managed to isolate the young radicals, but Muslim reformers, whether “moderates” or “militants”, were united in their strong religious adherence and identity and shared the same economic-political grievances.

This bond was significant, because the modern Muslim Moros felt threatened by the continued expansion of Christians into Mindanao, either as a product of central government’s migration policy or a spontaneous transmigration from heavily populated regions in the North and Central Philippines, and by the prolonged presence of Philippine army troops in their homeland. Distrust and resentment also spread to the public school system which is regarded by most Muslims as an agency for the propagation of Christian teachings. Christian-Muslim tensions in the South not only produced Islamic militancy, but also Christian radicalism. By 1970, a terrorist organization of Christians called the Ilagas (Rats) began operating in the Cotabatos, and Muslim armed bands, called the Blackshirts, appeared in response. The Christian militant groups of the Ilagas also attacked Muslim communities in the Lanaos, where the Muslim Barracudas armed group began fighting them.

The description sketched above suggest that, first, the “Mindanao conflict” is not simply a story of “Muslim violence”, “Islamic nationalism or separatism”, or “Islamist terrorism” as many observers and analysts said but also about “Christian conflict and aggression.” Second, Islamic identity, as well as Christian one, clearly appears in the public discourses of Christian-Muslim violence, signifying the vitality of religion in the shape of conflict (as well as peacebuilding). In fact, both Muslims and Christians utilized their religious discourses, narratives, symbols, institutions, and networks in support of their movements and oppositions (and reconciliation obviously albeit this subject is not the focus of this article). The third remark, more importantly, the “Mindanao case” entails that religion is not obsolete or disappear from public domains. Instead of dying, as wrongly predicted by classical secularization theorists, religions—in this case Islam and Christianity—demonstrate their vigorous energy supporting Muslim (and Christian) politics in the public arena and social field of Mindanao.
Whereas the surge of Islam in the modern Southern Philippines came into view since the early 1970s, unprecedented Islamic resurgence in contemporary Indonesia took place especially since the 1980s. There are at least four main factors that contributed to the “revival” of Islam in Indonesia, namely (1) the local history of Islamic reform that occurred since the mid-19th century, (2) the changes in the country’s culture and society such as the rise of Islamic activism and “Islamic piety”, particularly since the New Order sponsored the national developmental programs and policies, called “Pembangunan Nasional” (lit. national development), (3) the transnational Islamic networks (especially Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia connections, later added to the list: Indo-Pakistan, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Turkey), and most importantly (4) the role of Suharto-led New Order in sponsoring programs that boosted Islamic development by means of mass education, print media, dakwah (proselytization) movement, religious policies, among others.

The story of Indonesia’s resurgent Islam started when the country experienced anti-communist campaigns of 1965-66 (McVey: 2006), which marked the end of one chapter in modern Indonesian history and the beginning of another. These anti-communist campaigns, which took some two million casualties, have changed dramatically the country’s politics and social history, especially the history of religion and Muslim politics and cultures. Indeed since the incidents of anti-communist violence, a big move regarding the nation’s religious map and development occurred in the country in part because the New Order obliged all of its societies to embrace one of Indonesia’s official religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hinduism (now Confucianism adds to the list).

The fear of being accused of atheism and communism drove the Javanese abangan (lit. the “red people”—nominal religious followers)—as well as adherents of Confucianism and other local religions—to convert to Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism. In short, increased pressure for all citizens to profess a recognized national religion, the institution of mandatory religious instruction in all schools, and the discrediting of many Javanese leaders for their association with leftist organizations and networks had all enhanced the appeal of Islam for Javanese Muslims and at the same time contributed to the damage of abangan groups and practices during the course of the New Order.
Robert Hefner’s studies of East Java’s Tengger regions has pictured well this prolonged process of Java’s Islamization, religious transformation, and “great conversion” from local religions—Hindu, Budha, abangan, etc.—to Islam\(^{14}\) (Hefner: 1987a, 1987b, 1989; cf. Beatty: 1999). This is to say that religious conversion is not simply about a theological change, but also socio-political one. The political economy of religious culture ensures this massive conversion and transformation process and asserts the nature, existence, and function of religion as both belief system and institution.

These anti-Communist campaigns, furthermore, provide insights into the challenges faced by Indonesians, both Muslims and non-Muslims, hoping to develop the cause of pluralism and democracy that was previously destroyed by Sukarno-led Old Order. Having been marginalized from national politics and economic life in the final years of the Sukarno rule, Muslims looked with high hopes toward the new regime of the New Order. However, unfortunately, from early on the new President Suharto was unwilling about Muslim political organizations and civilian politics as a whole. However, despite Suharto’s ruthless treatment and discouragement of political Islam and Muslim politics, particularly during his early careers of presidency in the 1970s, his political, governmental, and developmental polices contributed greatly to the rise of “Islamic boom” in modern-day Indonesia. As a result, since the 1980s and early 1990s, the country’s religious map underwent dramatic changes in part due to the exceptional growth of the “grassroots Islam” and the spread of “Islamization,” namely, to borrow the phrase of Vincent Houben (2003: p. 163), “a bottom up process of growing religious identification and piety by people of all generations and backgrounds.”

Prior to explaining the role of Suharto in the rise of resurgent Islam, let me state briefly, that the augment of modern Islamic revitalization and formal Islam has a deep root and a lengthy history in this country. The nineteenth-century Indonesia in particular had been the turning point of the surge of Islamic reform. Later on Muslim reformists (reform-minded Muslims) who were the products of this Islamic reform became one of the main players in the nation’s history of politics and democracy. There were at least two main channels of the flow of Islamic reform in the country during the 19th and early 20th centuries on which the Dutch contributed in great parts, namely the pilgrimage to the Holy Lands of
Mecca and Medina, and Islamic schooling. The Dutch’s initial plan in support of pilgrimage for Indonesian Muslims in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century was in order that these Muslims to be “pious” so that they would be busy conducting religious activity and rituals, and forgetting political activism, an assumption that was unfortunately wrong because the hajj, along with kiais and reformist Muslims, became one of the main leaders of rebellions against the Dutch such as the “Banten Revolt” in 1888 (see Kartodirdjo: 1966, 1972). The pilgrimage provided a great opportunity for Indonesian Muslims to learn and study Islamic teachings from the main centers of Islam: the “Haramain” (Mecca and Medina). After coming back to Indonesia, these pilgrims began to establish religious schools (madrasah) and Islamic seminaries (pondok pesantren) that later became the primary vehicles of Islamic reformism and revivalism in the archipelago (see Azra: 2004; Ricklefs: 2007, Laffan: 2003, 2011; cf. Hefner and Zaman: 2007).

This Islamic reform, however, did not constitute a single monolithic Islamic group that had similar views of Islam and how Islam should be performed. As in Mindanao, Indonesia also witnesses the division between the “old group” (kaum tua) and the “new group” (kaum muda) (see Abdullah: 2009). Despite their characters as reform-minded Muslim groups, these new groups have had different features, interpretations, and understandings in terms of how Islam should be implemented in a society and state. These two competing religious groups were quickly defined into doctrinal lines (Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, Sarikat Islam, al-Irsyad, Jan’iyatul Washliyah, Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, among others), and were frequently involved in religious disputes and tensions, not only in the field of religious practices, understandings, and interpretations, but also in the arena of political and public life. Some, if not most, modernist-reformist Islamic organizations established Masyumi, Islam-based political party during the Sukarno reign. Nahdlatul Ulama in the beginning also became its active member before deciding to break up from it in the early 1950s due to political and religious disputes (Feillard: 1999). At first, Sukarno gave “fresh air” to Masyumi but later he cracked down the party due to the involvement of (some) its leaders in the country’s separatist movements (see e.g. Effendy: 2003).

Driven by his worries about the reemergence of political Islam, communism, and Sukarno-linked nationalist movement, Suharto
restricted, if not destroyed, political activities of the supporters of these ideologies. Not only that, throughout Suharto’s New Order, political parties and organizations linked to Muslims or non-Muslims that opposed the authority of Indonesian government had been severely pushed back. During the early period of the New Order, Suharto also severely turned to control Islamist elements, albeit these Muslim groups contributed in setting up Suharto into power by participating hand-in-hand with then-the New Order to destroy members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party (Qurtuby: 2012). Suharto’s “divide-and-rule” strategy was obvious throughout his 32-year-old reign.

Suharto did not necessary differentiate Muslim groups that used peaceful means from those that employed violent ones. For him, all Muslim organizations that advocated an Islamic state or expressed desires of political Islam was viewed as a political threat, thereby he undertook efforts to depoliticize Islam, arguing or claiming that limiting political activism of Muslims was needed for development, stability, and peacefulness of the country (Hwang, 2009: pp. 47-49). Suharto’s policy of depoliticizing Islam reached its climax towards the mid-1980s, when all parties and associations were forced to get rid of all loyalties to ideologies outside Pancasila. Due to Suharto’s dissuasion toward civilian politics and his ruthless treatment toward the devotees of political Islam and Islamism, Indonesian Muslims began to shift from the sphere of politics to culture. They realized that political activism will suffer Islam and Muslim societies. Muhammad Natsir (1908-1993), the most prominent leader of reformist political party, Masyumi, also decided to devote his energies to *dakwah* rather than politics. Early in 1967 he established the *dakwah* council called Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) focusing on education and missionary efforts (see e.g. van Bruinessen: 2002; Bubalo and Fealy: 2005).

In brief, as a result of the New Order’s rebuff toward political activism, added with Arab and Middle Eastern influences, including the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, since the 1980s Indonesia has witnessed the emergence of a new form of Islamic groups such as, first, the “renewalists” who were concerned about the ideas of cultural renewal (e.g. education, social movements, Islamic democracy, etc). The second Muslim group was “Islamic resurgents” which were concerned with the deepening piety (“individual piousness”) and the implementation of
the pillars of Islamic faith. Suharto’s New Order contributed to the growth of these Muslim groupings as it adopted a mixed regimen that combined, in Hefner’s phrase, “severe controls on political Islam with guarded for Islamic spirituality.” Regime strategists, Hefner added, looked to organized religion as a “ground for public morality, a shield against Western liberalism, and an antidote to communism” (Hefner, 2000: pp. 58-9).

Animated by this fervor, the New Order not only tolerated depoliticized forms of religion (particularly Islam) but also encouraged their penetration into all corners of society becoming “pious” Muslims away from political activities. In other words, while the New Order repressed and marginalized Islamist mobilization, it endorsed personal piety, spirituality, and cultural displays of faith. This peculiar tactic of suppressing Muslim politics while encouraging Muslim piety offered more room for Muslims than other society-based organizations. Muslim associations, including campus-based Islamic organizations, then became centers for discussions of politics and public morality which later contributed to the emergence of Islamist organizations and Islamic groupings (see e.g. van Bruinessen: 2002; Noorhaidi: 2005; Hwang: 2009).

The role of the New Order in the rise of Islamic revivals, furthermore, can be seen through the government-sponsored national developmental policy (the Pembangunan Nasional) since early 1970s (Heryanto: 1988). This ambitious state-backed Pembangunan Nasional can be broken down into three major programs; these are (1) building-up program (pembinaan), (2) schooling or mass education, and (3) dakwah (“proselytization”) movement. Initially intended to eliminate the influences of communism (as U.S. economic modernization programs in Arab and the Middle East since the 1950s), the “building-up movement” greatly influenced to the shape of “Islamic ideals” and “proper Muslims” away from political activism. The New Order’s impressive and extensive Islamic education programs plus the dakwah movements boosted to the production of “Islamic piety” and “revivalist/puritan Muslims.” Through the Department (now Ministry) of Religious Affairs, the New Order sponsored Islamic dakwah movements by, first, building mosques, religious schools, madrasah (Islamic schools) and other religious institutions across the country. Hence, in East Java, the number of mosques increased from 15,574 in 1972 to 17,750 in

The second medium of dakwah the New Order initiated was the publication of (non-political) Islamic books and pamphlets, and the third channel was the deployment of Islamic preachers (da'i) and religious schoolteachers to Indonesian towns, villages, and transmigration areas outside Java. Since 1975 in particular there has been a spectacular increase in government-sponsored dakwah (see e.g. Hefner: 1987b). Thus by 1985, in East Java alone, the Islamic bureaus of the propagation of the faith were “present in all thirty-seven districts and in permanent contact with agents for the transmission of Islam…. Being a total of approximately sixty-five thousand people…” (Hefner, 2000: p. 92). Bureau speakers crisscross the province of East Java (one of the main targets of the dakwah movement), presenting over five thousand sermons each year. They control regular broadcasts on radio and television and published a steady stream of books and pamphlets. The main theme of their programs is a Javanese belief in guardian spirits embraced by the abangan which they dubbed “backward” and “irreligious.”

These facts have proved that the New Order was not “anti-Islamic” as some scholars or political commentators might think. Indeed, the regime pushed back Muslim political parties and Islamist social groupings by prohibiting Masyumi and other radical Muslim groups (especially those associated to the Komando Jihad and Jama’ah Islamiyah), but the New Order greatly sponsored those Islamic dakwah activities. Thus, while it was cracking them down with one arm, it was building mosques and schools with the other. Despite its repression of Muslim political initiatives, the New Order continued to make significant concessions to Muslim organizations on matters of religious education and “building up.” The state-sponsored massive national development stimulated the growth of the nation's economics and prosperity which later caused the increase of a new middle class. The growth of a Muslim middle class allowed for the appearance of a new type of Muslim leaders and intellectuals whose views on Muslim politics owed as much to mass education, new print media, and the encounter with Western social theories as it did to Islamic boarding schools and classical legalism.
Buoyed by these developments, Muslim community in the 1980s experienced a social renaissance unprecedented in modern Indonesian history. By the 1990s, as a result of the rise of this Islamic resurgence since the 1980s, Indonesia became a “green state” as many Muslims became pious and observant, and Suharto himself, to perform his piety, began to shift his Islamic style from a Javanese-kebatinan-Muslim to a kind of devout Muslim by going to Mecca for hajj, and sponsoring the founding of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (ICMI, Association of Muslim Intellectuals in Indonesia). The case of Suharto in changing religious style since the 1990s can be interpreted that the regime did not hesitate to reverse itself, embracing devout Islam while sacrificing “popular Javanism.” Some analysts have argued that the change was primarily driven by the shifting phenomena in the Indonesian history and politics due to the influx of Muslim resurgents.

Against this backdrop, thus, seeing Islamic revivalism and resurgence separate from local political authority is misleading because, as Martin van Bruinessen (2002: 27) aptly points out, “it was Suharto’s turning against some of his erstwhile Chinese and Christian allies and co-opting a large part of the educated Muslim population through the establishment of ICMI that strengthened radical political Islam.” The logic of Suharto’s rule, Hefner once notices, was not blind opposition to political Islam but a “determination to centralize power and destroy all centers of civil autonomy and non-state authority” (Hefner, 2000: 93). Thus during the reign of Suharto the purge of New Order allies was not limited to organized, political Islam. Military reformists were also silenced and popular Javanist associations that longed for ideological independence were also banned. Even the big losers under the New Order era, over the long term, were not santri Muslims (i.e. devout Muslims) but populist Javanists, namely those who embrace a complex form of Javanese mystical-spiritual-ethical-cultural beliefs—both abangan and kebatinan (lit. “inwardness”).

It is central to remember that in the final years of Sukarno era the folk Javanist community had provided the bulk of support for both Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the left-wing of the Nationalist Party (PNI). In the aftermath of the anti-communist violence of 1965-66, one of the first ambitions of Suharto regime was to destroy and neutralize left-wing associations among Javanists (e.g. in its first two years, Suharto banned more than one hundred left-wing mystical
organizations, including all those linked to the Communist Party or openly anti-Islamic in their ideology). Suharto’s bitter treatment toward the popular Javanist groups was intended, first of all, to pacify radical-conservative Muslims who were demanding the banning of all mystical sects, and second to make the remaining Javanist organizations dependent on regime protection.

Furthermore, Suharto’s developmental programs have brought a number of unintended outcomes including (1) the increase of high literate peoples and, this is the most crucial part, (2) the growth of Muslim moderates and democrats that later pioneered the reformation process and contributed to the collapse of Suharto’s New Order though a dramatic and historic People Power movement in May 1998. Although Suharto tried to build an alliance with Islamist elements (e.g. by establishing Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam [KISDI, Indonesian Committee for World Islamic Solidarity]) and blamed Christians and Chinese as the main actors of Indonesia’s multiple crises, he failed to cease the surge of civil society-led democratic movements and political reforms (cf. Hefner: 2000). These Muslim moderates and democrats, in collaboration with non-Muslim intellectual-activists, became the gate of the rise of political reformation and democratic movements since late 1990s. Such Muslim moderate and democrat forces succeeded in bringing the New Order down, and in turn laid the foundation of the country’s democracy and civic pluralism, an experience that was unique Indonesian political experience distinct from other Muslim-majority countries (see Kunkler and Stepan: 2013).

Unfortunately, however, Suharto’s collapse, hit by Asian economic crisis since the mid 1990s, not only brought democracy to the country but also Islamic militancy. Despite some notable social, political, and economic developments, post-Suharto Indonesia has also been marked by the influx of trans-national Islamists and local conservative Muslim groupings that have greatly changed and challenged the image of Indonesian Islam and the existing perception of Indonesian Muslims as tolerant or moderate, compared to their co-religionists in the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan, or Arab and the Middle East. The increase of these groups, directly or indirectly, was the product of political reformation and democracy that greeted the nation since the downfall of Suharto. During the early period of the New Order, as described above, Suharto severely controlled and ruthlessly treated
Muslim reformist groups and supporters of Islamism. Suharto’s collapse was thus seen as a momentum for the Islamist and conservative groups to express their political and religious interests, and democracy which guarantees civil liberty provides a further avenue and rationale for the Islamist groupings and Muslim hardliners to flourish. In the name of democracy and civil liberty, the conservative Muslim groups establish Islamic centers, organizations, and schools. However, paradoxically, although these groups enjoy living in a democratic system, they use these Islamic institutions to disseminate anti-democratic ideas and thoughts of religious hatred and intolerance, and to oppose democracy which they saw as a Western secular product. As a result of the growth of Islamist groups, the modernist and liberal views echoed by progressive Muslims are increasingly rejected and challenged (see e.g. van Bruinessen: 2013; Pringle: 2010).

Although political efforts to change the country’s secular-pluralist constitution (UU D 1945) and state ideology (Pancasila) to become national “Islamic ideology and constitution” failed and did not receive majority support from political elites and high-ranking bureaucrats in the national parliament and central government, the conservative Muslims’ agenda, however, have gained some support from a number of local governments, both provincial and district levels, to insert elements of, or even the application of Shi‘ah (Islamic Law) in their regional laws (i.e. Perda Shariah) (see Hefner: 2011). The growth of Islamist and conservative Muslims has indeed raised worries among religious minorities and moderate Muslims for they could be challenging Indonesian democracy and pluralism. The rise of these Islamist groupings also provoked tensions and collective violence in some regions of the archipelago. The religious violence have no doubt threatened Indonesia’s plurality and civility that need to be taken into consideration by those concerned about the future of democracy, pluralism, civil liberty, and peace of this nation.

The good news is that, notwithstanding the rise of Islamic militancy and political Islam, post-Suharto Indonesia remains by far a stable, consolidated democratic country. When the long-ruling dictatorial regime Suharto collapsed, which marked Indonesia’s political transition, Western observers of Indonesian politics forecasted in rush that this world’s largest Muslim-majority country, would soon become the next Balkans. At the time, the term “Balkanization” of Indonesia,
a word used to depict a process of fragmentation or breakup of a country into smaller independent states like the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, was indeed common in use in discussions, media, policy reports, and scholarly articles to describe the future of Indonesian state and politics. The crumbling of Suharto, followed by the rapid spread of political mobilization and communal violence, some of which took separatist form, seemed to open Pandora’s Box of state disintegration resembling the previous Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Surprisingly, however, unlike these two countries in which the decentralization processes led to more than twenty-five independent states, Indonesia, let alone East Timor, survived from separatism while implementing decentralization policy.

No doubt, after fourteen years of political transition, many have changed positively in the country. Since the fall of Suharto’s military dictatorship in 1998, liberty has been a “cheap thing” in which people can freely express their political desires. Since then, political parties, NGOs, and other civic organizations have mushroomed across the nation because freedom of expression, speech, and association was guaranteed by the law and constitution, an impossible feat in the past Indonesia when this country was governed by a tyrannical rule. This archipelagic country, for instance, has dozens of political parties which compete to win the heart of the voters in both national and regional elections. This is indeed good news for Indonesian people, who had lived over 32 years (1967-1998) under the control of a state-backed political party (The Party of the Functional Groups [Partai Golongan Karya, GOLKAR]) and under brutal state intelligence agencies. Moreover, post-Suharto Indonesia has been marked by the remarkable features of “democratic ideals” which were entirely absent during the Suharto reign such as, for instance, the transformation of the military and demilitarization of governments, the rise of many independent political parties, the increasing participation of women in public affairs, the widespread presence of CSOs, the production of many “pro-people” laws, the increase of civilian regimes, the growth of free press, and the implementation of free elections, among others.

Post-Suharto Indonesia’s economy has also made a remarkable comeback from being Southeast Asia’s economic basket case in 1998 to an emerging market whose economy has been growing annually at
more than 6.1 percent for several years, driven by both a commodity boom, with a doubling of palm oil prices and tripling of the gold prices, and domestic consumption (Buehler: 2013). In an economy riding an Asian resources-driven boom, with China as the locomotive, Indonesia is rapidly minting a millionaire class currently numbering 104,000 in one survey, a figure expected to double by 2017. The Bank Indonesia, moreover, also stated that the middle class has been growing significantly since the collapse of Suharto, comprising some 60.9% of Indonesians (Gunn: 2013).

More importantly, Indonesian Muslims nowadays in general are more favor of “secular democracy” than “Islamic monarchy”. After more than a decade of democratization, in which three national parliamentary elections (1999, 2004, 2009); two direct presidential elections (2004, 2009); plus hundreds of provincial and district/municipality executive elections have been held since 2005, there is increasing and compelling evidence that neither anti-democratic Islamist (pro-Islamic state) parties nor Turkish-style “Muslim democracy” won the heart of Indonesian Muslims. Instead, the political democracy that is being consolidated in the country is a secular democracy in which Muslim parties of all kinds—Muslim Brotherhood-inspired urban parties, rural patron-client parties, programmatically secular parties with Muslim organizations with their mass bases—have lost support to fully national-secular – based political parties (see Mujani and Liddle: 2009). The defeat of Islamic political parties does not mean that secular political actors have suppressed and isolated religious ones. Conversely, today’s Indonesia witnesses what Alfred Stepan (2010: 55-72) calls “twin tolerations”, namely toleration of democracy by religion and toleration of religion by democratic leaders.

This convincing evidence of Indonesian polity could provide a solid foundation for the consolidation of democracy in the years to come, as well as make, in the phrase of respected scholar and renowned historian of Islam Azyumardi Azra (2006: p. 6), “the realization of an Islamic state in Indonesia only a remote possibility.” Last but not least, the Indonesian case makes clear that the participation of religion in public, political domains does not necessarily defy or transgress secular, democratic practices so that John Rawls’ (2005) warning to uproot religion from politics in order to establish a liberal democracy has lost an empirical ground.
Concluding Remarks

Few conclusions can be drawn from this narrative and analysis. The rapid growth of globalization, modernization, and secularization does not make religion die as the secularization theorists once predicted. It survives and more likely continues to endure in this modern world. It is true that in some societies, for instance, in Europe (see Bruce: 2002) secularism persists but, again, the world does not only experience secularization but also a process of “religionization” or, in the words of Peter Berger (1999), “desecularization.” As in the societies of Southeast Asia, religion (Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, Catholicism, more specifically) has long been an important ingredient and an enduring source of politics, state, democracy, law, culture and the like. It is almost impossible to discuss state and society in the region without taking into consideration of religious entity. Even in the United States (Berger, et. alii: 2008) as one of the birthplaces of secularism, religious societies (not only Christianity but also other faiths) or “communities of believers” have grown rapidly since the last decades, notwithstanding harsh critiques from secular groups, either agnostics or atheists. The increase of modernization, technology, and Internet, does not bother the societies to express their faiths and religious identities in public spheres.

As in the United States, public religion is also incredibly widespread in the Southeast Asian societies. Whereas some societies publicly express their faith and religious identity in violent, intolerant ways (e.g. radical and insurgent Muslims in Mindanao, Indonesia, or Southern Thailand; extremist Buddhists in Burma or Southern Thailand; Christian fanatics in the Philippines, among others), others articulate their religions in peaceful, productive, and democratic ways (e.g. Muslim progressives and democrats in Indonesia or Malaysia, Singaporean Confucianists, Buddhist peacemakers in Burma or Thailand, Christian conflict resolution practitioners in the Philippines, Indonesia, and elsewhere). Moreover, the cases of Mindanao’s Muslim insurgency and Indonesia’s Muslim democracy (and militancy) provide another compelling evidence of the “paradox expressions” of public Islam.

Notwithstanding the differences and specificities of public Islam and Islamic revivals in the region, Southeast Asian Islam provides a critical appraisal that any rigid theory of privatization that would like to restrict religion to the private domain on the grounds and that any
form of public religion represents a political threat to the public sphere or to democratic politics are no longer the case. The Southeast Asian case shows that the severe separation between religion and politics is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for world politics and democracy. In any case, as sociologist Jose Casanova (2010) and political scientist Alfred Stepan (2010) argue, the effort to build a wall of segregation between religion and politics as church-state separation in the West is both unjustified and probably counterproductive for democracy itself which guarantees civil liberties.

Last but not least, recalling the fine assessment of Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah on “God’s Century” (2011), what is remarkable about the Southeast Asian cases is not only that religion—especially Islam and Christianity but also Buddhism and Confucianism—has resurged in its political and cultural influence but it has resurged with the help, rather than the opposition, of its demise: modernization, secularization, development, democracy and open debate, rapid progress in communication and technology, and the historically unprecedented flow of people, ideas, and commerce around the region. The spread of modernization, development, secularism, and democracy have not “poisoned” or “killed” religion, faith, or spirituality but have instead provided just the open arena in which Muslim separatists in Mindanao, Muslim democrats and militants in Indonesia, Christian fanatics in the Philippines, Buddhist fundamentalists in Burma, and so forth can communicate their views and compete for power.

This article hence reminds us, once more, to go beyond the secularist discourse of religion-politics division to address the real issues of democratic politics across the world.
Endnotes

I wish to express my deepest thanks to my on-going mentors and friends: Robert Hefner, Scott Appleby, Augustus Richard Norton, Houchang Chehabi, Lisa Schirch, John Paul Lederach, David Cortright, Robert Weller, Lawrence Yoder, and John Titaley. Thanks also to the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, which provides a generous research fellowship that enabled me to complete this article. Any faults that remain are of course entirely my own.

1. It is worth noting that Lerner’s book was indeed part of the “American project” to diminish the influence of Communist ideology in the postcolonial countries. During the Cold War era in the mid-twentieth century, the United States was engaged in a strategic battle with the Soviet Union (USSR) to win the hearts and minds of inhabitants in the postcolonial world of newly independent states in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, among others. Driven by desires and eagerness to succeed in the combat against the (former) Soviet Union, American government spurred massive funding to hire leading scholars for undertaking extensive research, developing analytical and theoretical frameworks, and finally exploring ways and strategies of triumphing over the hearts of societies of what they call the “third world.” Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Harold Laswell, Daniel Lerner, to name but a few, whose ideas and techniques were central to modernization theory, joined this intellectual camp. Hence modernization, as a policy initiative, as Hermant Shah (2001: 1) rightly points out, was the “centerpiece of Cold War efforts to thwart the spread of Soviet Communism” in countries of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, including Indonesia.


3. Muslims in the Philippines comprise some 5-9 per cent of total population. Although they represent only a small percentage of the country’s population, Muslims are geographically concentrated in the southwest Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and are distinguished from Christian Filipinos not only by their profession of Islam but also by “their evasion of three hundred years of Spanish colonial domination” (McKenna, 1998: p. 2). Although Spanish colonizers had consolidated their hold on the northern tier of the country by 1600, they never accomplished the complete subjugation of the Muslim south.

4. The Mindanao Independent Movement gained a popular support and public sympathy among Muslim Moros after the 1970 eruption of sectarian violence in Cotabato, and emerged as a separatist front in response to the declaration of martial law by President Marcos in 1972. Since that year and lasting in 1976, the “Muslim rebels”—under the banner of the MNLF—were involved in bitter wars against the Philippine authorities. Under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and President Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, the Marcos rule held negotiations with the MNLF reaching a treaty known the “Tripoli Agreement” in 1976. The pact contains, among other, an agreement in which each group would stop fighting and the Southern Philippines would be granted as an autonomous Muslim region. Unfortunately, the Marcos regime never honored the accord; consequently the resistance reemerged in the following years (Kingsbury, 2005: pp. 44-5).

5. The name of Abu Sayyaf (lit. “the father of the sword”) was derived from the kunya (the honorific name in place of given name) adopted by Addurajak Janjalani when he named his oldest son Sayyaf; thereby becoming “Abu Sayyaf” (“the father of Sayyaf”).
Janjalani named his son after he met Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, who ran the training camp he attended during the Afghan-Soviet wars from 1979-1989. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (b. 1946) was a Pashtun warlord and leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (founded in late 1970s, later renamed the Islamic Dakwah Organization of Afghanistan), a radical salafi party supported by Saudi Wahabi funding. It was under Sayyaf’s patronage that key leaders of MILF, ASG, and Jama’ah Islamiyah were trained at his Afghanistan’s camps.


7. Compare the Southern Philippines’s transmigration to that of Indonesia that also provide a fertile ground for rivalry, competition, conflict, and violence in a number of “trouble spots” such as Ambon, North Maluku, Papua, Poso, and Aceh (van Klinken 2007).

8. With few exceptions, as McKenna (1998: p. 138, 171) has observed, there had been a number of the established datu of Cotabato who denounced the rebellion and aligned themselves with the national state that had underwritten their local rule for more than seven decades. They even supported the reelection of President Marcos claiming that the most significant architectural accomplishment of the martial law period in Cotabato was the construction of the impressive Regional Autonomous Government (RAG) complex at the edge of Cotabato city.

9. Such politicians-students/intellectuals cooperation among the Muslim groups had also occurred in their Christian counterparts, for instance, Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. collaborated with students and activists to form Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People’s Army (NPA).

10. McKenna (1998: pp. 138-144) notes that there had been two government’s projects of education begun in the 1950s resulted in distinct but variously composed Muslim counter-elite by the late 1960s. The first project was a government program expressly designed to “integrate” Philippine Muslims into national life by providing a number of them with postsecondary education in the national capital (Misuari of the MNLF was the outcome of this program). The second effort was an externally funded Islamic education project designed to enhance Islamic faith and practice among Philippine Muslims by granting some of them the opportunity to study at Islamic centers in the Middle East (Salamat of the MILF was the product of this project). The graduates of these two scholarship programs constituted a new and differentially educated Muslim elite that later provided the leadership for the separatist rebellion begun in 1972.

11. When President Marcos declared martial law on September 21, 1972, the principle reasons offered for its imposition were the existence of armed conflict between Muslims and Christians and a Muslim “secessionist movement” in the southern Philippines (McKenna, 1998: pp. 156-157).


14. Hefner’s pieces have portrayed various patterns and dynamics of Java’s Islamization, transformation, and conversion processes through period of time by emphasizing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hefner (1987b: pp. 549-550) noticed that at different times Islamization within modern Javanese history has been channeled to very different sociopolitical forces. In the 19th and early 20th centuries for instance Islamization process went hand in hand with the increase of pesantren institutions, religious schools, and economic structures. While during the Old Order Islamization
was linked to aliran (lit., “social stream”) pattern of party mobilization, in the time of the New Order it strongly related to educational programs and dakwah movements. In addition, Hefner’s pieces capture the dynamics of Java’s Islamization and lengthy conversion processes from local and small-scale Javanese religions to the transnational and world religion (mostly Islam). To some degree, this immense religious change from traditional and indigenous religions to new religious beliefs resembles the collapse of small home industries by the emergence of transnational corporation (TNC) in the economic world. Hefner’s analyses, furthermore, suggest that religion is not simply a matter of individual belief and personal faith but, at some point, also a social institution which—like other institutions—depends upon “a particular social and political configuration for its reproduction” (Hefner, 1987a: p. 76) as well as religious agents as a producer of religious discourses.

15. Since the early twentieth century, the Dutch rule provided education for Indonesians as part of its new “ethical policy.” As a result, the number of Javanese and Indonesians receiving a more modern education grew significantly. Although in the light of Indonesia’s large and rapidly growing population (about 59.1 million in 1930) the number getting a modern education was a very poor performance on the part of colonial power, it contributed to the shape of tiny educated elite who played a vital role in the formation of anti-colonial and nationalist movements. During this period, Islamic organizations, whether associated with traditionalist or reformist Islam also expanded their educational activities.

16. The forms of reform Islam and reformist Muslims, according to Ricklefs (2007) varied ranging from Puritanism (purification-oriented Islam), anti Sufism faction, shari’ah-minded groups, shari’ah-based Sufism, reformed traditionalists, etc. However the basic ideas of these Muslim reformists mostly the same: the eagerness to make Islam more “pristine” as it was performed by salafus-salib (i.e. early generations of Muslims in the formative period of Islam) by avoiding local and “non-Islamic” aspects. Accordingly these reformist Muslim groups would never tolerate religious practices and communities that opposed their strict Islamic conviction and beliefs. As a result “syncretic Muslims” such as Java’s abangan had become one of the main targets of the reformists’ Islamization. Among the early reform-minded Muslim groups that still exist in present day Indonesia and constitute the vast majority of the country’s Muslim societies, are Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persatuan Islam (Persis), Al-Irsyad, Perti, al-Washliyah, and so forth. 

17. It is significant to acknowledge that before the growing emergence of the Islamic reform movements in the late 19th century, in Java in particular, there had already been substantial numbers of professionally religious groups such as mosque officials, religious teachers, guardians of holy sites, students of pesantren (Javanese-type Islamic seminary) etc. who were known collectively as kaum (“the religious folks”) or putihan (“the white people”) since the 1840s. There is no clear evidence whether such groups formed a force for Islamic puritanism, fundamentalism, or revivalism in the late nineteenth-century Indonesia. However there are some similarities among those groups in the way they perceived the Javanese abangan as ignorant, backward, impure, and impious. Some puritan groups also sometimes called themselves kaum putihan (“a group of white people”). At the same time, the abangan (sometimes called abritan which also literally means the “red people”) responded negatively to the pressures for a more purified form of religious life advocated by the putihan (Ricklefs: 2007). Thus more than one hundred years before the harsh conflict between traditionalist, modernist, and abangan (either linked to communist or nationalist groups) took place in the 1950s/1960s, Java/Indonesia had witnessed the ruthless rivalry and unhealthy conflict.
among religious groups, particularly between the orthodox and heterodox Muslims.

18. The fate of PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) was the most tragic in the history of Indonesian politics since Suharto’s New Order, allied with conservative, modernist, and traditionalist Muslims, bitterly cracked them down and murdered huge numbers of its members and sympathizers in the 1965/66. Although Suharto’s New Order did not physically and publicly kill members of Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (the Indonesian Nationalist Party) or PNI, their political activities were “bonsaied,” if not “mummified” at the corner of Indonesian history and politics under the banner of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democracy Party), a “reincarnation” of PNI but was controlled by Suharto). Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Muslim organization, had shared the same story with the PNI. NU, along with other modernist Islamic elements such as Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia), was forcibly fused by Suharto into a new Islamic political party by the name of PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan—the Development Union Party)

19. By 1984, however, NU, under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Kiai Ahmad Siddiq, declared out of the PPP (and any political party) and devoted to the “grass-roots” struggle (“bottom-up” model) or “cultural strategy,” to borrow Wahid’s term (as opposed to Amin Rais’s “structural strategy” or “top-down approach”). Under the headship of Gus Dur, NU was evolved and transformed into a powerful civil society force functioned as a means of counterbalance power of the authoritarian New Order.

20. The DDII had established close relations with the Islamic World League (Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami), of which Natsir became the deputy chairman. This fact signals international links (especially Arab and the Middle East) of Indonesian Islamic revivalism that grew significantly since the 1980s. The DDII also became the main channel of the dissemination of Islamist publications and book translations from Arabic to Indonesian.

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