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Prolonged Elite Conflict and the Destruction of the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII)

Abstract: Even prior to Indonesia’s declaration of independence, political parties flourished as part of the political landscape of the archipelago and played a significant role in Indonesia’s struggle for independence. Instead of contributing to political development and institutionalisation, however, some political parties prove to be unable to survive the test of time. Indeed, one reason for this is internal conflict among party elites. Here I discuss the case of the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII, Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia), Indonesia’s first Islamic party, before its ultimate demise. This article argues that PSII’s destruction was the result of unresolved conflicts among the party’s elite. In fact, an examination of the party’s history reveals that party unity was fractured for decades as a result of protracted conflicts that resulted in its dissolution. Its return to politics during the newly democratic elections after 1998 remained compromised by the same chronic problem, which affected its ability to generate sufficient popular support to meet the prescribed electoral threshold.

Keywords: Islamic Parties, Party Elite, Elite Conflict, Political Party, Democracy.

Internal elite conflict within political parties is a phenomenon inherent throughout Indonesian political history. Since before independence, Indonesian political parties have sought to manage internal elite conflicts, which have often proven to be unresolvable, and which have led to party fragmentation and the establishment of new political parties. Problems of internal party conflict and fragmentation intensified, however, after independence, when Indonesia entered the multiparty era during the parliamentary democracy period. Feith writes that the period was characterised by political competition, not only between parties but also between factions within parties. Constituents readily shifted their support from one faction to another, thereby making parties vulnerable to elite conflict (Feith 2007, 126–27).

As an illustration, internal party conflict occurred in three major New Order (Orde Baru) parties in Indonesia, those being the National Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the Party of Functional Groups (Golongan Karya, Golkar), and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI). This then led to the creation of certain new parties, some of which still operate today. PPP, which was established on 5 January 1973, experienced intra-party conflict ahead of the 1999 elections. This resulted in the establishment of the Unity Party (Partai Persatuan, PP) led by Jailani Naro. PPP later fragmented further, which resulted in the establishment of the Reformation Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR) in 2004. Conflict in PPP is still on going today, with the presence of two camps of PPP, one under M. Romahurmuziy and another under Djan Faridz.

Golkar, which has been a socio-political force in Indonesia since 1964, has not been immune to the dynamics of intra-party conflict either. After the collapse of the New Order, and in the run-up to the 1999 elections, Golkar, under the leadership of Akbar Tanjung, transitioned to become the Golkar Party. It sought to distance itself from its history of close association with Soeharto’s New Order, while also delegating internal responsibilities to people within the party. Golkar’s intra-party conflict spawned Familial Cooperative Conference Party (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong, MKGR) under Mien Sugandhi in 1999. Golkar was again fragmented; a splinter faction formed the Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, PKP) in 1999, which contained retired military officers led by General Edi Sudrajat. In addition to PKP, some Golkar Party functionaries with
military backgrounds also established another party in 2002, the Nation Concern Party (Partai Karya Peduli bangsa, PKPB), led by General R. Hartono. Even before the 2009 election two more parties were born from the fragmentation of Golkar, they are People’s Conscience Party (Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura) under the command of General Wiranto, and Indonesian People Movement Party (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia, Gerindra) in 2008 under the command of General Prabowo. Another Golkar offshoot, the National Democratic Party (Nasional Demokrat, Nasdem), was also established in 2011 by Surya Paloh. Intra-party conflict in Golkar, which spawned new parties, were usually caused by political contestation for party leadership: defeated factions left to form new parties. Currently, ahead of the upcoming 2014 presidential election, Golkar is again split into two camps, namely the Golkar Party of Munas Bali, under the control of Aburizal Bakrie, and the Golkar Party of Munas Ancol, under the watch of Agung Laksono.

PDI also has its own history of conflict that has led to the formation of new parties. Ahead of the 1999 elections, Megawati founded the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P). After experiencing rapid growth since 1999, PDI-P was itself not immune from internal conflict and fragmentation. In 2002, the National Independence Fortress Party (Partai Nasional Benteng Kemerdekaan, PNBK) and the Our Indonesian Homeland Party (Partai Indonesia Tanah Airkita, PITA) were established. In 2005, another splinter faction formed the Democratic Renewal Party (Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan, PDP) (Litbang Kompas 2016).

In each case, the aforementioned formation of new parties were the result of internal dissatisfaction with leadership. Indeed, internal party conflicts have often led to a party’s demise, as was the case with PSII. When compared to internal conflicts within New Order parties, however, PSII’s internal conflict was far more complex. Indeed, the roots of PSII’s internal conflicts can be traced all the way from the pre-independence era through to the post-Soeharto Reformasi era. Unlike other surviving parties, however, PSII’s prolonged internal conflict ended differently. This is what makes it an important point of inquiry.

PSII is Indonesia’s first and oldest Islamic party. It was established in 1929, having first operated as a trade organisation by the name of the Islamic Trade Union (Sarekat Dagang Islam, SDI). SDI was established in Solo, 1905, before subsequently changing its name.
to the Islamic Union (Sarekat Islam, SI) in 1906. Elite conflict and fragmentation, however, plagued the organisation from the outset. The first internal conflict occurred after communist-oriented SI members caused SI to split into an Islam-oriented SI White (SI Putih) and a communist-oriented SI Red (SI Menah). The second split occurred in 1933 when Soekiman decided to quit PSII to establish the Indonesian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Indonesia, Patii). The third split occurred in 1936, after a difference of opinion between Agus Salim and Abikoesno Tjoekrosoejoso regarding PSII’s strategy regarding the Dutch colonial regime. Salim, consequently, established a new party by the name of Consciousness-Raising Front (Barisan Penyadaran) in 1937. Another split occurred when Sekarmadji M. Kartosoewirjo was dismissed from PSII for opposing the party’s ideology. Kartosoewirjo then founded the PSII Defence Truth Committee (KPK-PSII) in 1940.

In the independence era, conflict and fragmentation continued to plague PSII. In 1956, PSII comprised two separate camps: PSII-Abikusno and PSII Arudji/Anwar. In 1972, early into the New Order era, PSII experienced the greatest conflict in its history, which ultimately led to the party’s demise. The cause of the conflict related to PSII’s strategy in responding to the government’s political party fusion policy. The group that agreed to the fusion policy toppled the leadership of H.M.C.H. Ibrahim and Bustamam, who disagreed with the policy and opposed the government. Following government intervention, the Gobel group, supported by Anwar Tjokroaminoto, were seen as the legitimate representatives of PSII. This group also represented the SI faction of PPP after the signing of the 1973 fusion declaration.

The 1972 conflict lingered until Indonesia entered the era of democratic reform that followed after Soeharto’s presidential resignation in 1998. The fragmented PSII entered the 1999 election with two names and two flags: ‘PSII’ and ‘PSII 1905’. PSII only captured one seat, which was a result from the ‘stembus accord’ system. The decades-old conflict left the party with no chance of rebuilding either its organisation or voter base. It was abandoned by its supporters and received few votes in the 1999 election. PSII was later unable to pass the electoral threshold and electoral requirements from the Legal and Human Rights Department to be registered as a political party.

It was an ironic situation indeed: PSII, the oldest Islamic party in Indonesia and the pioneer of the first national movement in Indonesia,
was unable to maintain political operations just as Indonesia was about to enter an era of democratisation. This paper looks at the historical roots of the conflict by reviewing elite conflict within PSII from before independence until the Reformasi era. In order to do this, I look at the dominant causal factors in each period and assess their impact on the sustainability of PSII. I also suggest that the PSII’s history of conflict reflects similar elite conflict common to other Indonesian political parties during the current democratic era.

My main argument is that unresolved decades-old conflict and distrust among PSII elite brought about its ultimate demise. Some of the causes of that conflict were: different points of view with regard to ideological understanding; an inability of conflicting groups to compromise; political competition among elites; and strategic problems when facing external forces and government intervention. These causal factors were empirically present in every intra-party conflict in PSII from before 1945 until the democratisation and Reformasi era.

Factions, Conflicts, and Fragmentation

A variety of scholars have conducted studies on factions, conflicts, and fragmentation of Islamic political parties. Based on a previous study on intra-party conflict in the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), Kamarudin discovered that the factors that lead to intra-party conflict are pragmatic considerations related to the acquisition of power within the party and the involvement of the *kiai* in the political arena, which, in turn, influences the pattern and values of relations (*kiai-santri* patronage) (Kamarudin 2013). The *kiai* is an *ulama* (Muslim cleric) who is also the leader of a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school), whereas *santri* are *pesantren* students who study Islam. The presence of personal leadership, lack of compromise between conflicting groups, the inability to solve internal problems independently (which invites intervention by external forces), and the failure of cultural approaches (*islah*) to resolve conflict, has also given rise to conflict within PKB (Kamarudin 2008, 257–58). Noor writes that the failure of internal conflict resolution mechanisms and the failure to provide ideological guidance in the shaping of party policy and values caused fragmentation within PKB and PKS (Noor 2012, 7).

In line with Noor, Fickett’s study of political party fragmentation in India shows that the main cause of conflict and party disintegration...
is different points of view in ideological understanding and the presence of personal conflict among the elite. Fickett stated the importance of building an understanding of shared ideological values, which can be used as a tool to generate cohesion among party members.

In the case of PSII, Djaelani (1959), Shiraisi (1977), Rauf (1971), Noer (1980), Masyhur (1996), Rambe (2008), Subekti (2014), and Noor (2015) have discussed historical aspects and the development of the party/organisation. Djaelani, Shiraisi, and Noer discuss the development of SI/PSII since its establishment up to 1942. Rambe discusses the period between 1905 and 1942. Rauf studies the revival of political roles for young intellectual figures in PSII 1966-1970, and Subekti (2014) focuses on the internal conflict among PSII ahead of the fusion of political parties between 1971 and 1973. In her study, Subekti identifies several determining factors for conflict within PSII, e.g. weak recruitment and regeneration systems, differences in interpretation of ideology which have implications for different party strategy choices when dealing with the New Order, party leadership oligarchy, and state intervention.

Although earlier studies have discussed in detail the intra-party conflict within PSII, as intra-party conflicts continued to occur within PSII until Reformasi, this study will try to bridge the gap and analyse the causes of intra-party conflict within PSII in the Reformasi era. This paper will therefore discuss the roots of conflict throughout the PSII’s existence, from inception to its demise in the Reformasi era. In particular, this paper seeks to determine the most dominant factor in every period of conflict and the impact of conflict on the party.

Intra-Party Conflicts: Some Causes

Max Weber wrote that political parties are “the children of democracy” (Weber, 1990:35). Similarly, E.E Schattschneider identified political parties as an important factor for the operation of democracy (Schattschneider 1942, 1). Without political parties, democracy will not work (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011, 3; LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris 2010, 13). Although political parties are required to be able to build institutions in a modern way, including their ability to resolve disagreements among the party elite, the fact is that sometimes internal party conflicts are difficult to resolve.
Both Shale (2008) and Pruitt & Rubin (1994) write that intra-party conflict is triggered by factors such as favouritism (promoting one’s kith and kin), unequal sharing of resources (leader’s constituency gets lion’s share), and centralised authority (power concentrated at the top). Intra-party conflict sometimes leads to factionalism. Harmer et al. (1995) write that factionalism is a fact that is real and almost inseparable in party dynamics in various countries.

Scientific studies of factions were developed by Belloni and Beller (1978), Zariski (1960), Rose (1964), and Sartori (1976). Belloni and Beller define a political faction as a group of people who are organised, coexist with other groups, and compete for the sake of power with other groups within the same organisation (Belloni and Beller 1978, 418). Zariski defines a faction as an intra-party group in which members have the same identity and purpose and work together to achieve that goal. The objectives of the factions vary greatly, including maintaining patronage and party faction control, influencing party strategies and policies, and proposing a new set of values to the party (Zariski 1960, 30–34). Belloni and Beller’s, as well as Zariski’s, definitions of faction, are appropriate to consider as we study factions and splits among the PSII elite. In this paper, a faction is understood in the framework of political competition and political conflict that triggers internal party factionalisation. PSII’s factions could be considered elite factions because the emergence of the factions were caused by dispute/conflict among the party elite, which involved their supporters. The role of PSII founder Tjokroaminoto’s family, which wanted to continue to control and lead the party, has encouraged the emergence of factions during PSII’s conflict history.

According to Sartori, political parties tend to be divided because of disagreements, insurgencies, and fights between internal factions (Sartori 2005). The motivation to gain power or other incentives—other than power—encourages party elites with different views to form factions. Sartori considers that the phenomenon would appear and develop ahead of elections (Sartori 2005, 58–74). In addition, Zariski writes that factions may be formed after the persecution of some party leaders to protect their patron-client relationships (Zariski 1960, 30–36). Patronage, as one of the causes of faction formation, becomes very important because the patron-client relationship is a common aspect of Indonesian politics.
Pre-Independence Conflict (Pre-1945)

Intra-party conflict and fragmentation before 1945 appears to have been the result of differences in interpretation of party ideology by party members (Sartori 2005). As an open party practising the principles of democracy, dissent was a fait accompli within the PSII. Furthermore, PSII accepted new members and cadres from diverse backgrounds. They were free to study and interpret the ideology of the party and, in fact, the socio-political circumstances of the colonial era actually encouraged cadres to study various ideologies, ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left, as a way to find the ideology most appropriate for liberating Indonesia. In addition, the manner in which party strategy was implemented in order to manage the Dutch was also a cause of conflict due to the absence of common ground among groups within the party. Each group remained resolute and confident that their ways were the most appropriate way to achieve the party’s ultimate goal, that being Indonesian independence.

Sarekat Islam (SI), the pioneer of the nationalist movement in Indonesia, grew rapidly in and outside Java, under the leadership of H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto. Korver writes that, in 1915, SI members numbered 490,120 (Korver 1985, 222–24), whereas Kahin estimates SI’s membership to have been 360,000 strong (Kahin 2003, 65–66). SI membership reached an impressive 2 million people in 1919, an unprecedented number in the Netherlands Indies at the time (Benda 1985, 65; Pringgodigdo 1994, 9). It indicated SI’s effectiveness at making a vision and mission of struggle and ideology resonate with multiple levels of society. It also revealed the ability of SI leaders to develop strategic issues related directly to public interests. SI metamorphosed into the Islamic Union Party (Partai Sarekat Islam) in 1923, the East Indies Islamic Union Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Hindia Timur) in 1927, and finally, the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) in 1929 (Rauf 1971; Ricklefs 2001, 230; Subekti 2014).

Hadji Oemar Said (H.O.S.) Tjokroaminoto was a charismatic and respectable figure. His followers even perceived him as the descendant of the Just King (Ratu Adil). The song ‘Hymne H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto’, which was composed after his passing, reflects the party members’ admiration for Tjokroaminoto. The song is still sung at formal SI events. Paternalism, another form of traditional charismatic
leadership, which was introduced by Max Weber and was further developed by Karl D. Jackson, functioned in the early development of SI and PSII. This strengthened the party’s solidarity (Jackson 1990), and Tjokroaminoto was a unifying and solidifying force throughout the various SI movements and PSII subsequently.

The development of paternalism in PSII, however, failed to constructively transform or strengthen the formation of cadres and a mass base. This is because the PSII elite and cadres play multiple roles, particularly in the legislative and executive government in the newly independent Indonesia. On the other hand, PSII, as a party with modern orientation, failed to develop in a modern way. Dependence on patrons and a lack of funds for party consolidation resulted in a slow cadre development process, which further disrupted the delegation of authority and cadre regeneration.3

Throughout the anti-colonial resistance, the nationalist movement was divided between those who upheld the principle of ‘cooperation’ as a strategy against the Dutch and those who supported the notion of ‘non-cooperation’. SI itself was firmly in the non-cooperation camp as it explicitly demanded self-governance (zelfbestuur) and Indonesian independence. The elite conflict that led to the first split occurred before 1920 when SI activist Semaun began to question the ideology of Islam as the basis of SI’s struggle. Semaun wanted SI to be more radical and genuinely resist the Dutch. He also wanted to replace Islam with nationalist and populist ideologies. At that time, SI elites were becoming influenced by communism, which had been introduced into Indonesia by the Dutch activist Sneevliet. After becoming acquainted with Sneevliet, Semaun himself became a Marxist and founded the Indies Social Democratic Union (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging, ISDV). Semaun was a young activist who both led SI Semarang and was a member of ISDV. Instead of middle class people and civil servants, he recruited more workers and peasants into SI Semarang, and mobilised it as a radical mass organisation (Rambe 2008, 108–12). Marxist views grew in popularity the Netherlands Indies after the 1917 Russian Revolution overthrew Tsarist rule and conceived the first communist state in the world, the Soviet Union.

Semaun opposed Tjokroaminoto, Abdoel Moeis, and Agus Salim, who wanted to keep Islam as the ideological basis of SI’s struggle. Polarised opinions began to emerge, which led to the emergence
of a leftist faction led by Semaun and supported by ISDV. Semaun disagreed with some SI policies, including the decision to join the *Indie Weerbaar Actie* (Indies Defense Act) and *Volksraad* (People’s Council); he considered it to be a strategy of the Dutch to co-opt the national movement (Noer 1980, 128–34). On the other hand, Moeis’ leadership of SI suspected that Sneevliet was deliberately sent by the Dutch to divide the popular movement. Moeis therefore demanded that the Dutch government remove Sneevliet from Indonesia (Noer 1980, 137). Moeis’ efforts were supported by Tjokroaminoto, Salim, and Sosrokardono. Communist sentiment grew within the SI and was perceived as dangerous to the Islam-based SI struggle. At that time, another new communist SI figure, Darsono, emerged. In the end, the split became unbridgeable and SI broke into the communist SI Red and the Islamic SI White (Syaifullah 1997, 84).

By the 1930s, internal party conflict was increasingly common and caused further fragmentation within SI. At that time, conflict and factionalisation was not only the result of ideological disagreement, but, as Belloni and Beller write, also differing understandings of ideology itself, political competition, and personal issues. The second split was related to the party’s unilateral decision to get rid of prominent party figures, such as Soekiman and Soerjopranoto, who were considered to have insulted Tjokroaminoto. An investigation of the Union of Indies Pawnshop Workers (*Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Hindia, PPPH*) conducted by a team led by Soekiman, revealed allegations of financial misuse by Tjokroaminoto. The disclosure of this case resulted in the dismissal from PPPH of Tjokroaminoto’s close associate, Martodiredjo. Besides being SI leaders, Soekiman and Tjokroaminoto were also members of PPPH. Although Tjokroaminoto was not dismissed from PPPH, the investigation left him feeling humiliated. The result of the investigation, moreover, was immediately announced to the public without prior clarification at the party level (Noer 1980).

As a charismatic and highly respected leader, Tjokroaminoto was left disappointed by the treatment he experienced at the hands of Soekiman. Tjokroaminoto responded by telling party members that Soekiman had violated party discipline and ethics. Soekiman, Tjokroaminoto argued, should have brought his findings to the party’s central committee rather than announcing them directly to the public. Tjokroaminoto’s view gained support from the Central Committee; he requested that
Soekiman apologised for his actions and publish such an announcement in *Oetoesan Hindia*, SI’s newspaper. Soekiman, however, refused, which resulted in his dismissal from PSII in 1933. Soekiman’s treatment at the hands of PSII’s central committee was opposed by certain party branches in Java for the perceived harsheness of the sanctions. They believed Soekiman should have been reprimanded instead, rather than dismissed outright. Disappointed with the way in which the party treated him, Soekiman founded the Indonesian Islamic Party (*Partai Islam Indonesia*, Patii). His supporters, who also rejected the PSII’s approach, later joined Soekiman and Patii (Noer 1980, 156–58).

The third conflict and split, which occurred in 1936, was the result of a difference of opinion between Agus Salim and Abikusno. The disagreement was with regard to the party’s position on how to manage the Dutch. After Tjokroaminoto’s death, Salim assumed control of the party. Salim perceived party strategy differently. Observing the increasingly harsh treatment by the Dutch government of political parties and mass movements at that time, Salim proposed that PSII alter its approach from one of non-cooperation to a more moderate and cooperative strategy (Noer 1980). With a more moderate approach, Salim predicted that the Dutch would not be as suspicious of the party as it had been, which would help it survive as a party, while also working to achieve the ultimate goal of Indonesian independence. From Salim’s perspective, the cooperative approach was compatible with the party’s struggle because its ultimate goal was simply the establishment of an independent Indonesia.

Abikusno and other PSII cadres stood in opposition to Salim. They maintained that the PSII had to unequivocally maintain its position of non-cooperation vis-à-vis the Dutch. These differences grew more pronounced and later informed the competition for party leadership between the younger Abikusno and the elder Salim. Salim’s proposal was brought into the party’s central committee meeting and the party officially rejected it. Disappointed with the party’s verdict, Salim built a new faction within the party called the PSII Front (*Barisan PSII*). As the faction grew, it threatened to split the party. The PSII central committee regarded this new faction as an illegal movement, and later dismissed Salim and his followers. In 1937, Salim founded a new party called the Consciousness-Raising Front (*Barisan Penyadar*) (Noer 1980, 148–49).
The next split occurred in 1940 when Sekarmadji M. Kartosoewirjo was dismissed from the party and later established the PSII Committee for the Defence of Truth (Komite Pertahanan Kebenaran PSII, KPK-PSII). This committee received support from PSII branches in Central Java and was concerned with Kartosoewirjo's efforts to reinterpret the party's ideology by incorporating mystical elements, as well as teachings of militancy and radicalism. The PSII central committee was concerned that Kartosoewirjo's movement, which also sought the establishment of an Islamic state, could move the Dutch government to ban PSII (Noer 1980, 147–49).

All in all, conflicts that occurred during this period were in line with Flicker's proposal. Different ideological points of view and the presence of personal conflict among the elite were the main determinant factors of conflict. Everything that happened within PSII during this period – the elite factionalization, the conflict, and the fragmentation – had a positive and negative impact on the party. Conflict between SI Red and SI White refined the basic ideology of PSII/SI, that being Islam. Marxist-communist elements were successfully removed from SI, and SI Red then became the basis for the formation of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). Conversely, SI lost prominent militant activists such as Semaun and Darsono. Their defection to SI Red caused their supporters to likewise defect, splitting SI. One of the most noticeable effects was that SI lost support among progressive workers in Semarang, who switched their allegiance to SI Red.

Internal Conflict in the Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy Era

Both political conflict and elite fragmentation during the liberal (parliamentary) democracy era were primarily caused by non-ideological factors. As Belloni and Beller (1978) and Fickett (1976) write, political power struggles and pragmatic issues, including the interests of elite individuals, as well as personal rivalries, were prominent causes of conflict throughout this era (Sartori 2005). The multiparty system and the parliamentary system contributed to sharp competition and political conflict within and between parties (Feith 2007). PSII's decision to leave Masyumi clearly indicated a pragmatic reason regarding the ministerial position offered to the PSII. This had
a negative impact on the party’s ability to consolidate its leadership at the central and regional levels. PSII failed to develop both cadres and its constituent base. The energy of its elites was absorbed by uninterrupted conflict. Instead of strengthening its cultural base, PSII was preoccupied with elite political conflict. In contrast, fellow Islamic mass organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) used its traditional education institutes, such as pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools), to maintain meaningful relationships with the people, securing consistent and strong support.

During early independence, PSII’s aspiration to become a political party was realised when it left Masyumi and became an independent party based on Islam. PSII’s exit from Masyumi, followed by NU in 1952, indicated Masyumi’s inability to maintain its membership. A number of considerations informed PSII’s decision to leave Masyumi. Later, PSII proved that it enjoyed considerable popular support. In Indonesia’s first-ever general election in 1955, PSII received the fifth highest number of votes. This result indicated that PSII had a mass base that could be developed further. PSII received 2.9 per cent of the total electoral vote (1,091,160 valid votes). The 1955 election results put PSII in the category of small-medium parties, below the big four – Masyumi, the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI), NU, and PKI – so it could play a balancing role in the Cabinet during the parliamentary democracy era (Feith 1999, 85–90).

PSII believed that the highest laws were Quran and the Hadith. The party’s ideology was described in its Basis Program (Program Asas) and Organisation Program (Program Tandhim), both of which were developed by HOS Tjokroaminoto. The Basis Program comprised the principles of the party’s ideology of struggle as guidelines for the organisational movement. These principles comprised six strategic steps of Islamic unity, followers’ (ummat) independence, nature of the state and government, economic life, human dignity in social life and law, and true independence. The Organisation Program was a long-term program which prescribed the operational steps necessary to achieve social aspirations as specified in the Basis Program. PSII had three basic principles (Trilogi PSII): to be the purest in tawhid (acknowledgment of God’s oneness), to possess the greatest amount of knowledge, and to be the wisest strategically. In general, PSII wanted to establish Indonesian independence, a democratic political and governance system, economic
development oriented toward those in need, and the development of physical and mental well-being among the people. This is why PSII and other Islamic parties formed an Islamic bloc within the Constituant Body (Badan Konstituante) in an attempt to incorporate Islam into the national constitution (Nasution 1995). While ultimately unsuccessful, PSII worked hard to realise the party’s mission, as specified in the Basis Program and Organisatiion Program, that being the comprehensive implementation of Islam in Indonesia. Before the 1955 general election, however, internal disputes manifested as leadership conflicts, which affected party unity.

There were at least four serious conflicts leading to the disintegration of PSII.

Unlike the period prior to 1945, the causes of the conflict after independence led to more factionalisation due to political competition, dissatisfaction over party leadership, and different perspectives in implementing party strategy. The first conflict revolved around the dismissal of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and his followers, who later founded ‘PSII Abikusno’ in 1953. Abikusno Tjokrosujoso was the younger brother of HOS Tjokroaminoto, also the uncle of Anwar Tjokroaminoto, who at that time had started to become a party figure and had become an SI and PSII activist since his youth. Before Indonesian independence, Abikusno was a member of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence (Badan Penyelidikan Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan, BPUPK). Although Abikusno contributed much to the development of the organisation, the party, nevertheless, dismissed him. Abikusno’s decision to become the Minister of Public Works in the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (1953-1955), without any prior consultation with the party, was considered a violation of organisational rules, which obliged all cadres to consult with, and obtain approval prior approval from, the party before assuming a public position. Abikusno’s decision to accept Ali’s offer without consultation was considered to be an articulation of his own political stance, and one that served his own interests more than those of the party. PSII’s official position at that time was not compatible with Ali’s PNI. PSII, as a result, split into two opposing groups, those being ‘PSII Abikusno’ and ‘PSII-Arudji/Anwar’ (Noor 2015, 66–68). Previously, in the Wilopo Cabinet (3/4/1952-30/7/1953), PSII’s Anwar Tjokroaminoto was Minister of Social Affairs. Anwar resigned on 11 May 1953 (Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia 1996, 310).
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso was disappointed with his dismissal because he felt that he had done so much for the party. The party cadres remained respectful toward him and hoped he could lead the party once again. In 1955, PSII therefore agreed to end the dispute and accepted Abikusno back to the party. This decision was based on party elites’ acknowledgment of the importance of party solidarity approaching the upcoming 1955 general election.

**Electoral Votes and Seats of Political Parties**

**In the 1955 General Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)</td>
<td>8,434,653</td>
<td>22.32</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Masyumi</td>
<td>7,903,886</td>
<td>20.92</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)</td>
<td>6,955,141</td>
<td>18.41</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)</td>
<td>6,179,914</td>
<td>16.36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)</td>
<td>1,091,160</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo)</td>
<td>1,003,326</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Partai Katolik</td>
<td>770,740</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)</td>
<td>753,191</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI)</td>
<td>541,306</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islami-yah (Perti)</td>
<td>483,014</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Partai Rakyat Nasional (PRN)</td>
<td>242,125</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Partai Buruh</td>
<td>224,167</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Gerakan Pembela Panca Sila (GPPS)</td>
<td>219,985</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PRI)</td>
<td>206,161</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Persatuat Pegawai Polisi RI (P3RI)</td>
<td>200,419</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Murba</td>
<td>199,588</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Baperki</td>
<td>178,887</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Persatuan Indonesia Raya (PIR) Wongsonegoro</td>
<td>178,481</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Grinda</td>
<td>154,792</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Permai)</td>
<td>149,287</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Persatuan Daya (PD)</td>
<td>146,054</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>PIR Hazairin</td>
<td>114,644</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interestingly, Abikusno’s position as a senior cadre and a respected party leader led him to be re-elected as chair of the nominating committee at the 1962 PSII National Congress (Majelis Tahkim). Abikusno did not, however, include Arudji and Anwar’s group in the new PSII leadership board because their group was an ‘anti-SI faction’ within PSII. On the other hand, the Arudji/Anwar group accused Abikusno of abusing his authority in terms of party management by not involving other members of the committee, including Arudji and Anwar. Abikusno’s decision was unacceptable in the eyes of the Arudji/Anwar group, which, in turn, established a rival committee. Each camp considered itself to be the legitimate leadership group and conducted their own activities, such as national meetings and conferences, as well as establishing rival regional committees.

In the guided democracy era that followed the issuance of the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959, President Sukarno began to restrict political parties. He disbanded PSI and Masyumi for their alleged involvement in PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), a regional rebellion led by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein in Padang, 1958, and otherwise generally limited the number of parties and their influence on political life. Sukarno considered political parties to be a source of political turmoil and dissolved parliament after the election results of 1955, before forming the the Mutually-Cooperative House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong, DPRGR) and the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, MPRS), the members of which were appointed by Sukarno himself. Arudji’s close ties with Sukarno
led Sukarno to only recognise the Arudji/Anwar faction of PSII. Abikusno’s PSII was considered illegitimate and not allowed to conduct party activities. Abikusno was removed from the PSII leadership and his name would never again be mentioned in PSII party activities, or by other parties for that matter.

PSII, however, survived the guided democracy era and played a significant role in the DPRGR and MPRS. One of its important figures, Arudji Kartawinata, was the founder of West Java’s Siliwangi Army Division. He secured the position of the Coordinating Minister and Chairman of the DPRGR under Sukarno’s administration. With his close relations to Sukarno, Arudji played an important role in maintaining the balance of national politics, particularly to counter the rise of the PKI. Sukarno appointed another PSII figure, namely Soedibjo, as the Minister of Information and Secretary General of Front Nasional. The existence and role of PSII cadres in legislative and executive positions therefore revealed PSII’s stature as a political party that was respected by the government and other political parties. Previously, PSII cadres had merely been part of the cabinet. Arudji and Anwar’s leadership sought to consolidate PSII so that it could again become involved in Indonesian politics. Unfortunately, due to various conflicts that took place during the parliamentary era, PSII was unable to develop a good recruitment and regeneration system.

Conflicts during the New Order Regime (1966-1998)

During the New Order era, differing perspectives and positions held by the party’s young elites concerning government policies toward political parties in Indonesia was the greatest source of internal conflict within PSII. These differences of opinion were due to the heterogeneity of party elites’ backgrounds, as well as differing factional interests within the PSII. Conflicting factions anchored themselves to the two traditional figures, Arudji Kartawinata and Anwar Tjokroaminoto (Zariski 1960). These sources of conflict were then reinforced by the New Order government’s intervention into socio-political life at the time. PSII’s internal conflict during the New Order period reached its climax evidenced by the fact that this conflict continued until Reformasi.

Politically, PSII still exists as a medium-sized party in the early New Order era. The 1971 election, the first one during the New Order era, saw PSII as the fifth biggest party after Golkar, NU, Parmusi (an
incarnation of Masyumi) and PNI. With 2.39 percent of votes, PSII secured 10 seats in the Indonesian People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). Although it placed fifth in the 1955 general election, the number of DPR seats held by PSII increased from 8 in 1955 to 10 seats after the 1971 general election. This success was short-lived, however, as the government shortly thereafter compelled parties to amalgamate. In general, this policy was meant to both reduce the number of political parties and generate political stability. It had the effect, however, of generating internal conflict within PSII because of different views regarding policy. Some members rejected forced amalgamation, while others agreed.

**Electoral Votes and Seats of Political Parties**

*In the First General Election in New Order Era 1971*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>34,348,673</td>
<td>62.82</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>NU</td>
<td>10,213,650</td>
<td>18.68</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Parmusri</td>
<td>2,930,746</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>3,793,266</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>PSII</td>
<td>1,308,237</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Parkindo</td>
<td>733,359</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Katolik</td>
<td>603,740</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Perti</td>
<td>381,309</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>IPKI</td>
<td>338,403</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Murba</td>
<td>48,126</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Votes</strong></td>
<td><strong>54,669,509</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>360</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Komisi Pemilihan Umum (n.d.)*

PSII then formed its own General Election Committee (*Panitia Pemilihan Umum PSII*, PAPSI). PAPSI had the task of preparing party cadres to contest elections at the national, provincial, and district levels. PSII’s main aim was to secure as many seats as possible in the national and local legislative bodies, as well as to encourage Islamic political parties to secure a significant number of votes (Subekti 2014, 58–60). From PSII’s perspective, all Islamic parties had the same objective to advance the interests of Muslims. PSII therefore developed political communication with NU, Parmusri and Perti. Due to differing views...
on political issues and ideological perspectives, however, collaboration proved to be difficult. PSII, Perti and Parmusi, for example, all had different views on how to manage the residual votes of Islamic parties, known as ‘Stembus Accord’. Stembus accord is a deal between two or more political parties in an election to support each other by aggregating votes from the parties in order to gain parliamentary seats. With the deal, PSII hoped that the combined votes could earn a parliamentary seat to any Islamic party willing to cooperate. PSII’s willingness to collaborate in order to contest elections indicated that it was a modern and transparent party that prioritised the collective victory of Islamic parties. It also indicated a decrease in the ideological distinction between traditionalist and modernist Islamic parties.

PSII’s performance in the DPRGR/MPRS improved in the early 1960s after it recruited several young intellectuals, including Bustamam, O.J. Helmi, Wartomo Dwijoyo Wono, Zubaidah Muchtar, Muchtar Ali, M.A. Gani, Ischak Moro, and H.M.C.H. Ibrahim. These figures championed issues such as democratisation and human rights, as well as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. They also lobbied for a democratic general election, bureaucracy neutrality, anti-corruption and good governance, local autonomy and morality problems, as well as public interests (Rauf 1971). A number of important political views from PSII were represented in the discussion of the draft of the General Election Laws during 1967-1969.

The PSII fraction in the DPRGR/MPRS, which was led by Bustamam, consistently rejected the government’s proposal for it to appoint members of parliament. PSII argued that the proposal contradicted Articles 27, 28 and 29 of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution and that all parliamentary members should therefore be elected. The PSII fraction requested that the prohibition on group-F government employees becoming involved in political parties be cancelled. PSII also proposed anti-gambling, anti-vice, and anti-corruption bills. At that time, the New Order government was preparing the agenda for the development of a strong regime by directly appointing some members of parliament in order to control the DPR (Rauf 1971).

Throughout the discussion of the draft General Election Law in the DPRGR, PSII had strongly opposed the proposal to reserve seats for appointed members of the DPR. PSII therefore continued to pressure the government to administer a democratic general election (Ischak
Moro et al.). PSII also proposed that Commission III of the DPRGR establish a special body in the DPRGR to monitor the general election process (Subekti 2014, 58–60).

Between 1966 and 1971, during the early stages of the New Order era, young PSII intellectual cadres became politically revitalised (Rauf 1971). At that time, PSII operated in a more dynamic fashion as its membership, which, as mentioned, primarily comprised highly qualified young intellectuals, sought to both consolidate the party and develop a strategic external mode of political communication with the government. This generated great optimism among the party, with PSII cadres envisaging an increase in electoral votes and seats gained in the 1971 general election. In fact, PSII’s 1970 Congress expected that the party would gain 49 seats.

The results of the 1971 general election for PSII were therefore an unwelcomed surprise. PSII obtained a mere 10 seats in the DPR, with a total of 1,308,237 votes. It obtained eight seats from the electoral regions of Aceh, North Sumatra, South Sumatra, Central Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi and South Sulawesi, while two other seats were from West Java. PSII failed to secure a single seat in Lampung, one of its traditional bases. H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto had cultivated this region by sending Anwar Tjokroaminoto to live in Lampung and develop the party there.

Why did PSII fail? Internal and external factors contributed to the failure. Internally, poor financing made PSII candidates unable to finance their political campaigns. In addition, the party had failed to consolidate its organisation at the district and sub-district levels. The largest contributor was an external factor: the New Order political system itself, which focused on economic growth. Systematically, the New Order regime revised laws concerning political parties and general elections. The objective was to ensure that Golkar emerged from the general election victorious, thereby weakening the power of ideology-based parties.

The next objective was to simplify political parties through amalgamation. Nationalist, Christian, and Catholic parties were amalgamated to form the Indonesian Democratic Party, (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), while the Islamic political parties were grouped together to form the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). Even though these parties were unified
under the banner of Islam, they were unable to overcome their differing views on Islam. Within Islam there exist variants that place different emphasis on values, including modernity and traditionalism, and substantive and scriptural. The PSII elite were trapped in prolonged leadership battle between proponents and opponents of these amalgamations.

The internal dispute within PSII was leveraged by the government to generate support for its policy of amalgamating parties. Although PSII had grown used to internal disputes, government support of those in favour of party amalgamation intensified the conflict. The amalgamation policy was intended, moreover, to suppress all types of potential conflict resulting from political parties’ differing interests. In response to the amalgamation policy, PSII’s membership comprised both those who opposed and supported it (Subekti 2014, 169). The dualism was a continuation of PSII’s prolonged internal disputes. Before the fusion of the Islamic parties into PPP, H.M.S. Mintaredja, leader of the presidium, asked both H.M.C.H. Ibrahim and Anwar Tjokroaminoto to sign the fusion declaration on behalf of PSII. Of the two declaration texts, however, the one read as the amalgamation declaration was that signed by Anwar Tjokroaminoto, who then joined PPP’s first leadership board as Vice President and PSII representative.

The Soeharto administration’s policy of party amalgamation was actually a continuation of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy logic and policy (Feith 1973). Sukarno perceived political parties as a cause of instability. Likewise, Soeharto justified his creation of a monolithic system as being necessary to achieve economic growth. Another consequence of this policy, however, was the creation of a floating mass with no political affiliation, which essentially terminated the existence of any political society. Constituents’ ideological and emotional associations to political parties were disrupted by this ‘floating mass’ policy. Political power, symbolically represented by political parties that had existed since independence, such as PSII and NU, was gradually dismantled. Through the paradigm of modernisation that introduced rationalisation and cultural development, all societal forces were immobilised to support the implementation of the policy.

As mentioned, conflict appeared to be an inherent part of PSII long before Indonesia’s declaration of independence. A number of
elites could easily take over the leadership due to different perspectives. The first conflict of the early New Order era was the takeover of the PSII executive committee, *Lajnah Tanfidziah*, by Syech Marhaban in 1966. Before 1965, Syech Marhaban had been dissatisfied with Arudji/Anwar’s leadership, which he deemed too close to Sukarno and therefore insufficiently critical of Sukarno’s regime. At that time, PKI was growing and, with Sukarno’s support, it was daring to publicly articulate its increasing power. Interestingly, however, Marhaban’s actions did not gain the support of the local PSII boards and branches throughout Indonesia. This conflict was resolved at the 32nd Party Congress (*Majelis Tatkim*, MT) in Bandung. Syech Marhaban finally agreed to compromise when he realised that Indonesia was in severe political and economic crisis after the G30S/PKI coup in 1965. Party leaders at MT 32 realised the importance of party unity and integrity in the face of the apparent threat presented by communism during the 1965 coup. PSII strongly opposed any form of communism. In his book *Islam and Socialism* (*Islam dan Sosialisme*), H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto stressed that communism is contradictory to Islam and must be eradicated from Indonesia (*Tjokroaminoto 1950*). With its party conflict resolved, PSII was able to consolidate at the national and local levels. Syech Marhaban became a respectable and charismatic figure within PSII and his return strengthened party leadership.

The second leadership conflict involved a competitive struggle for power between M. Gobel-M.A. Gani and the allies of PSII leaders appointed at MT 33 in Majalaya in 1972 (H.M.C.H. Ibrahim-Bustamam). The 1972 conflict was the most severe and protracted in PSII’s history. It lasted for decades and had a devastating impact on the organisation’s development, ultimately leading to the demise of PSII as a political party.

Bustamam was appointed President of Dewan Partai (DP) PSII and H.M.C.H. Ibrahim was appointed President of Lajnah Tanfidziah (LT) PSII at MT 33 in Majalaya in 1972. Dewan Partai is the party’s top legislative body, whereas Lajnah Tanfidziah is the party’s top executive committee. The conflict grew because of the partiality of top figure Anwar Tjokroaminoto toward one of the conflicting groups. Anwar Tjokroaminoto was disappointed at MT 33 due to several reasons. First, Gobel, Anwar’s nominee to lead the party, did not receive support from MT members. Secondly, Anwar himself was not elected...
at MT PSII 33, although Anwar coveted the leadership role. The MT mainstream sought a regeneration of the leadership, something Anwar did not anticipate. A younger figure was therefore elected to lead the party. At that time, party elites, such as Gobel, Barlianta Harahap and Gani, joined Anwar’s faction. Meanwhile, Bustamam, Zubaidah Muchtar, and Muchtar Ali joined Arudji’s faction. H.M.C.H. Ibrahim was a traditional PSII cadre from Banten who started from the lower ranks and joined Anwar’s faction.

After MT 33, PSII’s internal conditions were not conducive to party consolidation. Traditional supporters of Anwar and Gobel negated the results of the MT. The Indonesian government at that time sought to restructure national political life through the amalgamation of political parties. Within PSII, however, there were no unified perspectives on the government’s proposal. Since the beginning of the New Order, young PSII cadres, who held seats in the legislative assembly (DPRGR/MPRS), had different opinions on national political issues, such as the amalgamation of political parties. The disappointment shared by senior figures and members regarding the outcome of MT 33, as well as the different perspectives toward the amalgamation policy, fuelled further internal party disputes.

The amalgamation of political parties in 1971 had its proponents and opponents in the PSII membership. Those who opposed the amalgamation deemed it undemocratic given the level of government coercion involved. Its proponents, conversely, agreed that the party had to be able to adapt. Anwar Tjokroaminoto, for example, who was President of LT PSII at that time, believed that PSII had to be accommodative to the government. As a small-medium party, PSII, according to Anwar, had to be able to adapt to the changing political regime in order to survive. At that time, however, Anwar Tjokroaminoto and Arudji Kartawinata (President of DP PSII) could understand the enthusiasm of young intellectual figures in encouraging the establishment of the democratic political system. PSII’s young figures were divided into the pragmatic proponents of amalgamation (Gobel-Gani and their group) and the idealistic opponents of amalgamation (Ibrahim-Bustamam and their group). The differing views of both groups intensified internal party conflicts because of their association with elite political and economic interests, which were closely connected to the party’s structural centre of power.
The idealistic group maintained its adherence to the party’s political ideology, while the pragmatic group was more realistic in understanding the priorities of the New Order regime. The New Order prioritised political stability for the purpose of achieving economic development, a position appreciated by the pragmatic group given that the majority of its members had a business background and enjoyed close relationships with the New Order ruler (Soeharto). The conflict finally led to a coup d’état instigated by the Gobel-Gani group against the Bustamam-Ibrahim group. The coup occurred several months before the amalgamation policy was formalised in January 1973. The amalgamation proponents were supported by the government and the coup was successful. Anwar Tjokroaminoto supported the new leadership under Gobel so that it could easily obtain legitimacy from the government. Gobel and his group were considered the new model of leadership that would be accommodating of the government and that would prioritise political stability.

Ahmad Modjo conceded that the government supported the 1972 PSII coup. According to Modjo, the coup was carefully planned by Gobel and his group and involved the government’s ‘special political operations’, including figures such as Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Hoemardhani. Moertopo and Hoemardhani were personal assistants of President Soeharto and were in charge of Special Operations and Political Issues to secure the political and economic agenda of the New Order regime. They both handled domestic political problems and were also the government’s political liaisons to political parties (Subekti 2014, 125–29). The government also interfered in the activities of other political parties, such as Parmusi and NU (Majalah Prisma 1981). PSII, Parmusi, and NU were the three Islamic political parties that yielded the most electoral votes in the 1971 general election.

After the 1972 coup d’état, the PSII leadership split into two factions. Bustamam’s group claimed to be the legitimate leaders on the ground that they were elected at the MT, while Gobel’s group claimed legitimacy as they were acknowledged by the government and PSII senior figure Anwar Tjokroaminoto. The conflict was worsened by the fact that both sides had their own separate offices. Bustamam’s office was on Jalan (Street/Road) Latumeten, Poncol, Central Jakarta (Bustamam’s group was known as ‘PSII Latumeten’), while Gobel’s office was on Jalan Matraman, Menteng, Central Jakarta (‘PSII
Matraman’). PSII Latumeten consistently held meetings and developed communications with both regional and local party administrators to ensure that PSII Latumeten was the legitimate leadership. At the same time, PSII Matraman conducted similar activities. It is interesting to note that the regional leaderships were always present at the meetings held by either the Matraman group or Latumeten group. In the 1970s and 1980s, regional PSII leaders hoped that the national leadership could be unified again. This was one of the reasons why they were always present when the two conflicting groups invited them. As time passed, however, the conflict failed to come any closer to a resolution.

The deadlock seemed to result from PSII Latumeten’s ideological belief that the Matraman group’s takeover was contrary to party ideology. PSII cadres had taken an oath not to take any action that would damage the party. The Matraman group was therefore illegitimate because it had violated that oath. The Matraman group, conversely, believed that, for the purposes of political survival, the party should have been flexible in its stance toward the new regime.

Another moderate yet notable conflict was the coup d’état instigated by Syarifuddin Harahap and his group against Gobel’s leadership in 1983 (Subekti 2014, 4). Harahap’s attempt at the leadership reflected both political and his own personal interests. Harahap had the ambition to lead PPP and the easiest way to realise his ambition was by becoming the leader of the SI faction in PPP. The Syarifuddin Harahap conflict was successfully resolved in 1985 by Harsono Tjokroaminoto, who led PSII at that time.

Conflicts continued notwithstanding the fact that PSII had already transitioned to become a civil society organisation, that being the Islamic Union (Syarikat Islam, SI), after the 1973 amalgamation. SI’s central leadership board was even divided into three after 1983: they were Gobel-Gani’s version, Bustamam-Ibrahim’s version and Syarifuddin Harahap’s version. The conflict went on until the Reformasi era. Conflict resolution was attempted at MT SI 34 in 1985 in Jakarta, MT SI 35 in 1991 in Jakarta, and continued at MT SI 36 in 1997 in Jakarta.

Harsono Tjokroaminoto was appointed as SI leader at the 1985 MT in an attempt to reunite the groups of Bustamam-Ibrahim, Gobel-Gani, and Syarifuddin. Harsono believed that disintegration over decades had weakened SI as a social organisation and, because of that,
SI could not contribute to the nation's development. The Gobel-Gani and Syarifuddin groups accepted the proposal for reunification. The Bustamam-Ibrahim group, however, rejected the unification process on the grounds that it believed it was more suited to leading the organisation. Harsono's long-standing relationship with Soeharto made the government acknowledge Harsono's SI. Harsono, at that time, was the Minister of State Apparatuses. The fact that the Bustaman group declined Harsono's proposal to resolve the conflict showed just how difficult conflict resolution was. While several conflicts before 1972 managed to be resolved, the 1972 conflict proved difficult to resolve. This raised the question of whether or not the elite realised that a protracted conflict would damage the party. The elite seemed to have prioritised personal (egocentric) interests over party interests.

After the death of Anwar Tjokroaminoto, his younger brother, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, led SI Matraman. Harsono attempted to resolve a number of conflicts in an attempt to unite the organisation. SI Latumeten, however, regularly rejected these offers because it believed itself to be the legitimate leader of the party. Harsono thought that disintegration had weakened SI as a social organisation and compromised its ability to contribute to the development of the nation. Harsono sought to reclaim the glory of SI when it was under the leadership of his father, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto.

It is interesting to note that H.M.C.H. Ibrahim and Zubaidah Muchtar of the Latumeten group had also attempted to settle the conflict with the Matraman group. They were worried about the organisation's future because the 10-year old conflict was not getting any closer to a resolution. PSII Latumeten had also held a number of albeit unsuccessful organisational meetings to discuss a solution but they failed because Bustamam and Wartomo Dwijoyuwono (Secretary General of SI Latumeten) strongly believed that their faction was the legitimate one and that the other group should therefore fall under the leadership of SI Latumeten. Other Latumeten leaders, including Zubaidah Muchtar and O.J. Helmi, held slightly different views and were willing to resolve the conflict. They realised how crucial peace and internal stability were for the survival of the organisation. At that time, Helmi was unable to directly take part in organisational activities due to his deteriorating health. The only active leaders were therefore Bustamam, Ibrahim, Wartomo Dwijoyuwono, Rahman Sjamsudin,
Ohan Sudjana, Zubaidah Muchtar, and Muchtar Ali. Ibrahim and Zubaidah secretly established political communication with the Matraman group and agreed on Harsono’s offer to resolve the conflict. Harsono had offered them to join the MT but Bustamam-Wartomo always declined. Ibrahim and Zubaidah Muchtar successfully reached an agreement with Harsono Tjokroaminoto. One of the important agreements was that the Latumeten group was willing to take part in MT 36, and Harsono would transfer the leadership of SI to Bustamam and Ibrahim.10

Unfortunately, Ibrahim passed away just before MT 36. MT 36 appointed Taufik Rusdi Tjokroaminoto (son of Anwar Tjokroaminoto) as the Chairman of the Executive Board (Lajnah Tanfidziyah, LT) of SI in 1992, while Zubaidah Muchtar, K.H. Abdullah Ridwan Kamil, and Muchtar Ali joined the Matraman group. They expected that Bustamam and his group would follow in their footsteps.

Even though SI Latumeten was weakened after a number its main figures defected to the Matraman group, they still held on to their strong beliefs. Hence, there were two leaderships of SI until the Reformasi era. At MT SI 37 (1996), Taufik Rusdi Tjokroaminoto was re-elected as the President of LT SI Matraman. Lukman Siregar led the Latumeten group after Ibrahim’s death, while K.H. Siradj led the SI Central Board (Dewan Pusat, DP) after Bustamam’s death. The Latumeten group also arranged an MT and appointed Abdul Mukti as President of DP SI and Ohan Sudjana as President of LT SI. Attempts to resolve the conflict were continually made from the time SI Latumeten figures moved to Matraman. Unfortunately, the fact that the Latumeten group persisted with its strong beliefs meant that the desired outcome was unachievable. This indicated the difficulty of reconciliation among the elites. Indeed, the prolonged conflict had been personally institutionalised. The organisations of SI Latumeten and SI Matraman failed to develop and lacked a sufficient number of cadres, with both struggling to attract talented young figures.

The national-level conflict, which persisted for over a decade, then reached the local-level provinces and districts throughout Indonesia. This further divided support at the sub-district and village levels.11 In other words, the leaders, members, and supporters of the organisation were divided into two camps. The central leaderships were weak and lacked the capacity to consolidate the branches. Consequently,
supporters at sub-district and village levels became uncontrollable. It was difficult to find the organisations’ offices in the districts. In the 1990s, for example, when an SI leader visited Gorontalo, traditionally an SI and PSII base, he had trouble locating SI members. Although there were a number of PSII figures who were loyal to the party ideology and SI, they claimed to have no on-going program or activity at all. Worse still, there were no routine organisational meetings and the management had been inactive for a considerable period of time. SI was institutionally inactive because its central leadership, which had been all consumed by personal conflicts, had failed to cultivate local resources. SI members who became New Order government employees generally switched their allegiance to Golkar (the ruling hegemonic party), whereas those who were not government employees joined PPP or other Islamic social organisations, such as Muhammadiyah and NU. PSII cadres in North and Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, South Sumatera, Lampung, and East Java followed suit. Ideologically, however, they were still loyal to SI and expected SI to return.12

Conflicts in SI also had a negative impact on the existence of SI in PPP. Anwar Tjokroaminoto’s PSII (SI) was legally acknowledged by the government to represent SI within PPP. Because of this, opportunities for active involvement in PPP for Bustamam-Ibrahim PSII figures or cadres was greatly diminished. Potential SI cadres in the Bustamam-Ibrahim group failed to contribute to the development of SI in PPP. The role of SI in PPP became marginal, as Indonesian Muslims (Muslimin Indonesia, MI) and NU dominated PPP. After the 2014 general elections, for example, the PPP only had one DPR member, that is, Ahmad Fahrial, affiliated to SI. The prolonged conflicts had complicated the consolidation of Syarikat Islam and undermined its capacity to play its expected role. Organisation solidarity was damaged and central functions, such as political recruitment, cadre formation and internal elite circulation, collapsed.

Conflicts in the Reformasi Era

As stated, conflict within PSII continued until the Reformasi era. When we look at the most influential factors of conflict, however, the conflict in this era was no longer caused by differences in perspective on party ideology and strategy against external forces. PSII conflict in the
Reformasi era has been influenced more by elite competition for party leadership positions and personal interests (Okolie 2011; Sartori 2005). This is because, during this era, PSII’s organisation became smaller and weaker. Elite competition for party/organisational leadership positions therefore grew, as did efforts by those elites to muster economic and political interests. PSII elites became engrossed in this competition, which resulted in the disintegration of party unity and stability.

In the democratisation era after Soeharto’s fall in 1998, President Habibie reinstated freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press. Hundreds of new political parties, including old political parties previously fused by the government, were established. Islamic political parties, including PSII, many of which had previously come under the PPP umbrella, decided to go out on their own. Because of ongoing internal conflict, however, the two PSII camps became two separate parties. The parties were called PSII (Matraman) and PSII 1905 (Latumeten). Both used similar PSII symbols and flags in the general election and contested for the same constituents, which had been neglected since the elite conflict commenced in 1972. Of these, only PSII Matraman secured a seat in the DPR in the 1999 general election. PSII Matraman was led by Taufik Rusdi Tjokroaminoto. It received 375,920 electoral votes, which secured a DPR seat for Ir. H. Amarudin Djajasubrata. PSII 1905, led by H. Ohan Sudjana, gained 152,820 votes and failed to secure any parliamentary seats.

As the Reformasi era continued, elite conflict also continued to plague SI. Institutionally, SI was weak in terms of organisation, cadres, and leadership. SI no longer had senior authoritative figures such as Anwar Tjokroaminoto, Arudji Kartawinata, Harsono Tjokroaminoto or Ibrahim and Bustamam, who were well respected by SI members, and no SI cadres held important public positions. SI was no longer viewed as a respected Islamic social organisation, such as Muhammadiyah and NU, since it never voiced its opinion regarding national strategic issues. Its elites’ energy was also absorbed by the conflict. In addition, during the period before Reformasi (1972–1999), SI failed to develop a cadre recruitment and regeneration system to groom new, high quality cadres with sound ideological credentials. The organisation therefore failed to develop over time and eventually developed into a minor group led by senior cadres. Several elder figures who were recruited by PSII in 1966, and involved in the conflict of 1972, remained within the organisation’s
leadership. These leaders included Zubaidah Muchtar, K.H. Mulyana, Barna Soemantri and Taufik Rusdi Tjokroaminoto, most of whom were aged 60 years or older. This showed that elite circulation and leadership were stagnant and did not operate as a vital mechanism of the modern organisation. Indeed, people might come and leave of their own accord. Not an issue exclusive to the national level, cadre recruitment and development also proved to be difficult at local levels (provinces, cities, and districts) and, therefore, the organisation faced a problem with the lack of young cadres.

A minimal number of management staff and active branches also meant that SI faced difficulties in developing its own organisation database. Upon entering the Reformasi period, SI failed to record data relating to its own management and national membership, and it lacked a vision and mission. Autonomous agencies of the organisation, such as education and religious proselytising institutions, collapsed because cadres were either not appointed to manage or failed to assume management responsibilities. SI subordinate organisations such as the Indonesian Muslim Student Union (Serikat Pelajar Muslim Indonesia, SEPMI), the Indonesian Muslim University Student Union (Serikat Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, SEMMI), and the Indonesian Muslim Scholars’ Union (Serikat Sarjana Muslim Indonesia, SESMI), were also essentially inactive due to a lack of cadres. SESMI, for example, the ‘think tank’ of LT SI, was led by Zubaidah Muchtar and Saifurobi Arudji Kartawinata, both of whom were more than 60 years of age.

They had no sustainable leadership training programs, which prevented them from recruiting new members and cadres. A lack of funding also prevented the organisation from developing itself at the national and local levels. Weak leadership also contributed to an inability to manage the contribution system of the members of this organisation. In accordance with the provisions of PSII and SI’s Basic Budget (Anggaran Dasar) and Household Budget (Anggaran Rumah Tangga), the organisation’s financial resources were sourced from membership fees collected from members at the village level and up.

Even with such internal conditions, as SI entered the Reformasi era, it still possessed the necessary spirit to take part in the development of a better democratic system in Indonesia. SI elites were also gripped by the euphoria of Reformasi in Indonesia following the fall of Soeharto in 1998. Both the Latumeten group (Bustamam-Ohan) and the Matraman
group (Taufik Rusdi Tjokroaminoto) supported the democratic reform movement in Indonesia and also responded to the political reform that followed Soeharto’s demise. They held a number of discussions on actual political issues and attempted to provide input and ideas on political reform.

From the various internal political discussions emerged a kind of longing to revive PSII in order that it might participate in the new, more democratic political system. Taufik Rusdi Tjokroaminoto, President of LT SI, and K.H. Mulyana, President of Matraman Group DP SI, established the Reformation Committee to identify the possibility of reviving the party. The SI elite wanted to revitalise PSII so that it could participate in the general election. The registration window for the general election with the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) at that time was short because the Habibie government decided the election would be held in June 1999. SI’s Reformation Committee was led by Taufik Rusdi, and included members such as Amrullah, Amarudin Djajasubrata and Barna Soemantri. Following a series of meetings, the committee’s younger and older members began to form opposing views. Senior party members, such as Muchtar Ali and Ischak Moro, believed that if PSII were to be revived, SI would no longer serve a viable purpose, while youth members, such as Djosan, Ridwan Kara and Wahab Sunair, believed, even if PSII were reactivated, SI still served a purpose because it had to protect SI cadres who were, at the time, part of the PPP leadership. Their concern was that if SI were to be dissolved, the cadres would have no organisational basis. The worst outcome would be that SI cadres in positions of leadership with the PPP would be excluded from the PPP.

With the general election of 1999 imminent, and Reformasi euphoria at its peak, an agreement to reactivate PSII was stuck. Preparation for MT 37 in 1999 in Bekasi began and it was intended to be the most legitimate of forums. Considering the urgency to reactivate PSII, the MT’s commencement date, which was initially scheduled for 2000, was moved forward. Amrullah was appointed as the President of LT SI and Djadja Saefullah as the President of DP SI. Meanwhile, the Latumeten group, led by Ohan Sudjana, which was the next generation of the Bustamam group, made similar efforts to revitalise PSII. It declined to join the sole forum consisting of the Matraman group. Instead, the Latumeten group founded PSII 1905, which was led by Ohan Sudjana.
As the 1999 general election drew near, two PSIIs, those being PSII (Matraman) and PSII 1905 (Latumeten), were in operation. It was ironic that, notwithstanding its weak state, the organisation was able to sustain decades-long conflicts; moreover, that these two parties from the same SI basis competed for the same constituency in the 1999 general election.

Although two parties with SI (PSII) origins competed in the election, in reality, the voters were no longer familiar with SI and PSII. Indeed, for over a decade, the party had failed to promote itself in any sense. SI’s name had been eclipsed by the more prominent names of NU and Muhammadiyah, which were both able to maintain the solidarity of their leadership during the New Order period. NU and Muhammadiyah had successfully adapted to the New Order’s policy on cultural Islam.

The policy of depoliticisation and simplification of political parties, which had lasted for 30 years under the New Order regime, also distanced voters from political parties in general. Party identification (party ID) weakened. In the 1999 general election, in which 48 political parties participated, PSII was represented by the two parties. PSII secured 0.36% of the total votes (375,920 votes) or the equivalent to one seat in DPR RI, while PSII 1905 only secured 0.14% of the total votes (152,820 votes) and failed to secure any seats in the Indonesian DPR. In general, fewer electoral votes were cast for Islamic political parties in the 1999 general election than in the 1955 general election. The 1999 general election results showed PSII ranked 15th and PSII 1905 ranked 32nd of 48 parties.

The drastic decline in votes for PSII at the 1999 general election was the result of a lack of voter familiarity with the party after it had failed to develop and maintain a supporter base between 1972 and 1999. The New Order’s policy of political party simplification and depoliticisation limited the movement of political parties, including PSII, which had been a part of PPP since 1973. The ‘floating mass’ policy had also prevented political parties from establishing branches at the sub-district and village levels. Golkar, being a functional group and ‘not a political party’, was the only organisation permitted to both establish organisational branches at the sub-district and village levels and to mobilise cadres with the full support of the armed forces and the bureaucracy.
In addition, the role of party ideology declined due to the limitation on political parties and the restriction of ideology during the 32 years of New Order rule. The founding of several new Islamic political parties contributed to the division of Islamic voters, whose votes were eventually split across different Islamic political parties. In general, Islamic political parties in the general election of 1999 collectively received 32.52 per cent of the vote. The strong orientation toward New Order era parties was apparent in the seats secured in the 1999 general election by the three New Order political parties: PDIP (33.74% or 153 seats), Golkar (22.44% votes or 120 seats), and PPP (10.71% or 58 seats).

Internal disputes within PSII and SI continued after the 1999 general election. Following the death of Taufik Rusdi Tjokroaminoto in 2001, PSII and SI attempted to find a new figure to replace him. As the general election of 2004 approached, SI/PSII held the next MT in Lembang, West Java, and appointed Amrullah, who happened to be the President of LT SI, to the position of President of SI and President of PSII. Once again, this was an indication of the organisation's limited human resources and leadership options. Overlapping positions gave rise to further conflicts, as some members grew dissatisfied with Amrullah's leadership, which they found lacked transparency and accountability. These conditions once again reduced the organisation's ability to develop.

In 2002, PSII held an MT in Pondok Gede, Bekasi, and appointed Rahardjo Tjakraningrat as President of LT PSII. Amrullah protested and established a new alliance with Ohan Sudjana from the Latumeten group, resulting in the establishment of PSII Struggle (PSII Perjuangan). There were now three PSII parties: PSII, PSII 1905, and PSII Perjuangan. Amazingly, a party the size of PSII had devolved into three even smaller political parties, all of which then lacked the necessary human resources to organise and manage their own members effectively.

Indeed, conflict and fragmentation continued for an extended period without resolution. It is remarkable that the elites of an Islamic party were so engrossed in conflict, so sure of their own convictions, and so adamant about their own legitimacy, that they failed to recognise the effects prolonged conflict would have on their organisation.

Prolonged conflict prevented the organisation from developing qualified human resources and material resources. It resulted in the party's failure to operate its programs. The party also failed to develop
social, political, and economic networks with external parties due to its own sporadic development. Conflict also made it difficult for PSII to collaborate with other political parties, which resulted in its own alienation from the sphere of other national Islamic organisations and a failure to achieve any productive outcomes.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that the New Order era parties (PDI, Golkar and PPP) gradually disintegrated during the Reformasi era. PDI, Golkar, and PPP cadres broke away to create new political parties. This did not, however, reduce the New Order parties’ electoral popularity, nor the popularity of Islamic social organisations such as NU. NU members founded a number of political parties that were stable and enjoyed consistent support. In contrast, the total electoral votes of ‘PSII’ and ‘PSII-1905’ in 1999 did not even come close to the votes and seats earned in the 1955 and 1971 general elections. In the 2004 general election, PSII failed to secure any seats, and, for the 2009 elections, it failed to even meet the basic administrative requirements necessary to participate and compete.

There are three categories of voters: core base voters, medial voters, and peripheral base voters. In the early stages of the Reformasi era, PSII sought to attract votes from all three categories without having any strong mass base as its core base of voters. PSII also lacked stability. Meanwhile, medial and peripheral voters had no strong reason to vote for PSII. Only a few people remembered its history.13

Modernist Muslim voters voted for a number of Islamic parties and some even voted for secular parties. With poor coordination after the amalgamation of parties in the early 1970s, the modernist Muslim camp was divided. This amalgamation resulted in PSII’s disintegration and led to poor consolidation of its core base voters. PSII was unable to maintain a supporter base for decades due to the 1971 conflict. In the 1999 general election, constituents therefore no longer identified with PSII.

It is interesting to note that in 2002, the Indonesian Union Party (Partai Sarikat Indonesia, PSI), which resembled PSII,14 was established by several elites of PSII who felt disappointed with the endless internal disputes. They felt a close association, however, to PSII. One of those elites was Rahardjo Tjakraningrat, who was a former PSII leader15 before he established PSI. PSI also sought to attract PSII constituents and a number of its legislative candidates were from PSII’s inner circle. PSI, however, failed to gain DPR seats in the 2004 general election.
PSI was precluded from participating in the 2009 general election because of its failure to be verified by Indonesia’s Electoral Commission (KPU). In collaboration with three other political parties, however, which also failed their respective verification processes, they filed a claim with Indonesia’s Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi). The Court ultimately invalidated KPU’s decision and allowed them to participate in the 2009 general election. In this general election, PSI gained 24 seats in the DPRD Kabupaten/Kota (regency/city parliaments) throughout Indonesia but failed to gain any seats in the Indonesian DPR due to an inability to meet the minimal ‘Parliamentary Threshold’ (PT). PSI did not participate in the 2014 general election because it was unable to meet the administrative requirements.

Conclusion

By tracing the history of Indonesia’s oldest Islamic political party, PSI, we can identify the primary causes of chronic internal conflict, elite factionalisation, and fragmentation, all of which persisted for decades. Indeed, this conflict among the party’s elite persisted due to a failure of PSI elites to resolve their disputes, as well as the failure of PSI leaders to better manage conflicting views held by party elites. Poor leadership resulted in disharmony, which led to the destruction and collapse of PSI. The failure of traditionally respected figures, such as Anwar Tjokroaminoto, to lead the party at the 1970 PSI National Congress exacerbated existing points of difference within the party and dragged the elite conflict into the open.

Every faction to this conflict was also persistent in its claim to political legitimacy, something common to PSI since the first elite conflict before independence up until the last conflict during the Reformasi era. Bustamam (SI Latumeten), for example, persistently claimed to be the legitimate leader since his appointment at the MT 33 in 1972, and that, therefore, SI Matraman was illegal as it had violated internal regulation by instigating the 1972 leadership coup d’état. He claimed that the cadres who had already taken an oath of loyalty in the name of Allah were obliged to keep the unity and safety of the organisation from any threat or calamity.

Bustamam’s position contributed to an inability to resolve the conflict, although SI Matraman under Harsono Tjokroaminoto did offer a compromise. The conflict continued throughout the Reformasi
era after the collapse of Soeharto’s administration in 1998. Individual selfishness surpassed the willingness of mutual forgiveness for the sake of the organisation’s survival. Eventually, SI reduced in size to the extent that it became an insignificant organisation which failed to respond to or offer its views on national strategic issues. It consequently lost popularity; moreover, its affiliated parties, both at the national and local levels, were poorly managed.

Other negative consequences included SI’s failure to promote itself internally and externally. Internally, SI failed to manage its organisational institutions and maintain a mass base throughout Indonesia. SI also failed to develop a cadre recruitment and development system. It lacked young qualified cadres, while old cadres only lingered. Until the collapse of Soeharto’s regime and even before the era of Reformasi, it was difficult to find SI regional and local offices across Indonesia. It was even more difficult to identify cadres and leaders. SI failed to muster human, political, and economic resources, which translated into an inability to obtain votes. Its traditional supporters, in turn, turned to other Islamic political parties and social organisations. Government employees also tended to vote for either Golkar or PPP.

Chronic internal conflict was a catalyst for the establishment of ‘PSII’ and ‘PSII 1905’ in 1999. Ahead of the 2004 election, another party, ‘PSII Perjuangan’, was established. All three PSII-originating parties struggled to obtain votes during the Reformasi era. In the 2004 election, for example, PSII failed to capture a single DPR seat, whereas, in the 1999 election it was able to secure a seat. PSII then failed to meet the electoral threshold requirement so that it could not compete in the 2009 general election. At present, PSII is no longer registered as a political party with the Department of Law and Human Rights, having failed to meet the administrative requirements for verification by the Department of Law and Human Rights.

Long-lasting internal factions, conflict and fragmentation in PSII caused organisational stagnation in cadre recruitment and development. It also failed to educate cadres (social, political and ideological) at all levels. Lack of human resources within the party led to its failure in responding to public issues and offering community-based alternative policies. PSII and SI also failed to provide qualified cadres for public positions. The social base represented in the form of mass organization failed to serve the expected function of empowerment in the absence of a public figure.
Endnotes

1. *Islah* is an attempt to gather conflicting groups within the Islamic tradition.
2. This study by Lewis P. Fickett (1976) can be found in Noor (2015, 20–21).
3. PSII had been absent for a long time and was only reactivated as a political party after the independence in 1946. At that time, Islamic cadres voted their political aspiration to Masyumi. Masyumi was disbanded by Sukarno in 1960. Consequently, its leaders sought other channels for their political aspiration. Top figures of Masyumi such as Dr. Abu Hanifah, Dr. Sukiman, dan Yusuf Wibisono joined PSII after MT 32 in 1966 dan led the party. See Subekti (2014, 83).
5. MT (Majelis Tahkim) is the party’s congress, held every 5 years. MT is PSII’s highest authority in deciding its national strategic policies and choosing party leaders. The MT was attended by representatives of party branches throughout Indonesia.
11. About the internal dispute of leadership in PSII, please refer Subekti (2014).
13. Although being the oldest Islamic political party, PSII had less intense political activities than NU. Even during the New Order, PSII hardly appeared since it was under PPP. PPP had successfully personified as a political party produced by the New Order regime and attempted to bury the Islamic identity. The New Order regime obliged all parties to adopt the sole ideology of Pancasila.
14. Partai Syarikat Indonesia (PSI) was established on 17 December 2002 and was led by Rahardjo Tjakraningrat. Even though it was founded by some PSII figures, PSI was not the continuation of PSII since this party had a totally different ideology. The ideology of PSI was Pancasila, while PSI dan PSII 1905 stated Dienul Islam as their ideology. See www.kpu.go.id and Kompas, Friday, 12 March 1999.
15. Interview with PSI leadership and members revealed that their engagement in PSI was due to their perception that this party was the continuation of PSII. This fact indicated the importance of self-identification (party ID) of the PSI I members to the party, which were founded by PSI cadres; it should have been utilized as an important capital for PSI if these could be managed appropriately.
16. The 2009 general election was contested by 44 political parties. Of those, 38 were national parties and six were local parties in Aceh: Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera, Partai Daulat Aceh, Partai Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh, Partai Rakyat Aceh, Partai Aceh and Partai Bersatu Aceh.

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**Interviews**
Interview with Drs. H. Raharjo Tjakraningrat, Jakarta, December 16th, 2015.
Interview with H. Barna Soemantri, Jakarta, August 19th, 2016.
Interview with Syafrudin Djosan, Jakarta, December 12th, 2014.
Interview with Syafrudin Djosan, Jakarta, December 4th, 2016.

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Submission of Articles

*Studia Islamika*, published three times a year since 1994, is a bilingual (English and Arabic), peer-reviewed journal, and specializes in Indonesian Islamic studies in particular and Southeast Asian Islamic studies in general. The aim is to provide readers with a better understanding of Indonesia and Southeast Asia's Muslim history and present developments through the publication of articles, research reports, and book reviews.

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