A Genealogy of Moderate Islam: Governmentality and Discourses of Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy
Ahmad Risky Mandhatillah Umar

Islamic School and Arab Association: Ahmad Sürkati’s Reformist Thought and Its Influence on the Educational Activities of al-Irshād
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Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar

A Genealogy of Moderate Islam: Governmentality and Discourses of Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy

Abstract: This article analyses the political construction of ‘Moderate Islam Discourse’ in contemporary Indonesian Foreign Policy. Since 2004, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has campaigned for ‘Moderate Islam’ as the main image of Indonesian Islam. Within this discourse, Islam is conceived as ‘moderate’ and ‘tolerant’ as well as inherently compatible with democracy. However, in a more critical perspective, ‘Moderate Islam’ also contains a political and discursive construction. By using a genealogical approach, I argue that the articulation Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy is influenced by the ideological underpinnings of each political regime as well as the hegemonic discourse operating in international politics. Furthermore, I argue that there have been three discourses of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, as articulated by different political regimes, namely (1) Islam as religious identity; (2) Moderate Islam from below; and (3) Moderate Islam as a part of the Global War on Terror project.

Keywords: Moderate Islam, Indonesian Foreign Policy, Governmentality, Discourse, Identity, Global War on Terror.

On September 11 2001, two hijacked planes were crashed into the biggest skyscrapers in New York, the World Trade Centre (WTC) buildings. Many claimed that this terrorist attack – later known as “the 9/11 Tragedy”— was the biggest incident in US history in 21st Century and marked the start of a focus on terrorism, both in domestic and international politics (Chandler and Gunaratna 2007; Mueller 2014). The main suspect of this attack was the network of radical Al-Qaeda network, which was supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Following the attack, the US government –in the name of “saving ourselves and our children from living in a world of fear”— started a global war to fight the terrorists and destroy their bases (Bush 2001d). This Global War on Terror (GWOT) has also been followed by the establishment of a global alliance to fight terrorism as well as the emergence of US security aid for countries who were involved in that global agenda (Hadiz 2006a).

The 9/11 tragedy did not only transform US foreign policy, but also the broader global politics. Following the launch of GWOT, the US President George W. Bush sent a message to Muslim countries, “Over time it’s going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity. You’re either with us or you’re against us in the fight against terror.” (Bush 2001c). From this viewpoint, the war on terror has defined a new discourse in global politics, dividing the world in terms of “US-ally” and “US-enemy”, thus distinguishing many states in terms of good (those who were with “us”) and bad (those who were against “us”) (Steger 2008; Sukma 2004). When it comes to Islam, the “War on Terror” has created a new profile of “Good Muslim” and “bad Muslim,” which are based on liberal subjectivity and US political interests (Mamdani 2002). That new profile of “Muslims” was central to US foreign policy. As notoriously stated by President George W. Bush, “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends... our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.” (Bush 2001c).

The division of “Good Muslim” and “Bad Muslim” has also transformed the foreign policy of many Muslim-majority countries. Among of them was Indonesia —the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. After 9/11, Indonesia was trying to insert Moderate Islam as their image in world politics (Sukma 2012, 86). As a country on the path to democracy, Indonesia attempted to sell
its moderate and democratic image of Islam to gain external support. This Moderate Islam project began after the 2002 Bali Bombing and became one of priorities in Yudhoyono’s foreign policy (Weatherbee 2013).

The emergence of the moderate Islamic discourse after the Bali Bombing thus marked a new pattern in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Before 2002, Indonesia rarely used “Islam” as a main source of its foreign policy. Even the New Order and Soekarno’s Guided Democracy has marginalised Islam from being articulated in Indonesian Foreign Policy, having considered it as merely a variable in *Nasakom* — Soekarno’s post-1959 political discourse—or Soeharto’s technocratic foreign policy (Madinier 2015; Sukma 2003).

Therefore, from this point of view, the use of Moderate Islam can be seen as the re-emergence of identity (in particular, Islamic identity) in Indonesia’s foreign policy. More specifically, it is arguably important to consider that the notion of Moderate Islam is, in fact, a political interpretation that tries to put Islam in a liberal democracy discourse (Hashemi 2009). The insertion of Islam into liberal democratic discourse then differentiated “Good Muslim” —those who fit in the liberal democratic discourse— and “Bad Muslim” —those who were against liberal democracy and hence categorised as the enemy by the US government—in order to distinguish between “radical” and “ordinary” Muslims (Mamdani 2002).

Against this backdrop, this article will unpack the articulation of Moderate Islam in contemporary Indonesia’s foreign policy. By using the concept of “governmentality”, this article argues that the idea of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy is produced through an intersection between knowledge (about Islam) and the practice of politics that underlies it in global level, and furthermore, the nexus between domestic politics and international trajectory (Kiersev 2009; Larner and Walters 2004; Wight 2009). Both trajectories involved “Islam” as the most important variable, because of its position as the main religious/political identity in Indonesia. Therefore, Islam will be seen as a political discourse that is reproduced through political articulations—in this case, political articulation by each regime in Indonesia. A genealogical analysis, which will be placed within the agent/structure debate in International Relations, will be conducted to explain the intersection between “power” and “particular knowledge about Islam”
in Indonesian foreign policy, as well as to understand the extent to which the “good/bad” Muslim discourse is reproduced as a political discourse in foreign policy (see Mamdani 2002).

In making that argument, the analysis will be organised into four sections. The first section will provide a theoretical explanation of the relations between Islam and foreign policy studies. The second section will analyse the transformation of Indonesia’s foreign policy from the New Order to the post-9/11 era. The third section will analyse the genesis of the Moderate Islam discourse in Abdurrahman Wahid’s foreign policy. The fourth section will assess the relations between moderate Islam, Indonesia’s foreign policy, and the US-led global war on terror since the bombings in Bali (2002).

Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: Contending Perspectives

Issues related to Islam and Foreign Policy are not commonly discussed in foreign policy studies. Since Graham Allison published his Essentials of Decision (1971), which analysed the US foreign policy-making process in the Cuban missile crises, foreign policy studies have been long dominated by one particular approach, namely the decision-making approach. This approach tends to analyse the foreign policy-making process from three layers in the state structure, namely the rational actor, bureaucratic polity, and governmental politics layers. Strongly influenced by a behaviouralist approach that believes International Relations are a static, unchanging and rationally explainable realm, this approach believes that the foreign policy-making process is merely a “game” within the state structure and that state functionaries play a key role in deciding foreign policy (Allison 1971; Hill 2003; Korany 1984).

Within this approach, foreign policy is seen as a problem that should be solved by decision-makers. A decision-making process is thus conceived as a rational process that operates under the banner of the state-defined “national interest” (see Burchill 2005). Accordingly, foreign policy is defined only as a product of the bureaucratic process and influenced by political forces who articulate their interests in the parliament. This perspective believes that foreign policy is made in the rational analysis of a state’s position in the regional or global environment. In the Indonesian context, particularly during Soeharto’s New Order (1966-1998), foreign policy was made to aspire to international leadership as well as to maintain a strategic position at the
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regional level (Sukma 1995). The position of Islam, in this approach, only matters in foreign policy if it can be transformed into a “national interest” that constitutes a way of thinking about political institutions.

Therefore, this approach is limited in explaining the role of Islam in foreign policy, particularly in the case of Indonesia. Not only because “Islam” has never emerged as a state ideology in Indonesia, but also because “Islam” does not provide a rational explanation for the state to behave in international politics. However, from this perspective, Islam can play a significant role only if it is an ideology shared by decision-makers and, in certain cases, informs the decision-makers what they have to do in international politics (Haynes 2008). Thus, this approach seems to reduce Islam to merely an instrument for the state to interact with other countries, and therefore this approach has failed to provide adequate analysis of the construction of Moderate Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Another approach was raised by Adeed Dawisha in his edited book, Islam in Foreign Policy (1983). This work provides case studies on the position of Islam in several countries foreign policy, including Indonesia. The chapter about Indonesia, written by Michael Leifer, covering the position of Islam in New Order foreign policy, elucidates some points to the complexity of Islamic politics in Indonesia’s New Order. In his essay, Leifer argues that Islam has never been the main source for Indonesia’s foreign policy, since the New Order itself had stated that “the Republic is neither a theocratic nor secular state.” It means that the New Order regime had further not allowed their foreign policy to be dictated by Islamic considerations (Leifer 1983).

However, it was also evident that Islam constitutes the main identity in Indonesia, since more than 180 million of its citizens (looking at 1980s population statistics) were Muslims, the majority of the population. Therefore, Leifer also noted that Islamic factors have, in some events, influenced Indonesia’s foreign policy. The dialectics between Muslims and other political forces occurred, for example, in some issues related to the Israel-Palestine conflict and various issues in the Middle East (Leifer 1983; Sukma 2003). In this case, Soeharto was evidently using religious arguments to reject Israel’s occupation of Palestine.

Leifer’s argument—later expanded by his apprentice, Rizal Sukma (2003)—reflects another approach to understand the relations between Islam and Indonesia’s foreign policy, namely the state identity approach.
Rizal Sukma expanded Dawisha’s analysis by tracing the origin of “dual identity” in Indonesia’s nation-building process, which at best placed Islam at the periphery of national politics (Sukma 2003). Even though there was a consensus between the “Islamic forces” and “nationalists” around the creation of the Constitution in 1945, yet Soekarno’s and Soeharto’s administrations still marginalised Islam from the decision-making process. The authoritarian setting in both Soekarno’s Guided Democracy and Soeharto’s New Order, opposition from Islamic political forces, as well as the strong position of bureaucrats and technocrats within the political system have evidently constrained the articulation of “Islam” as a primary source within the foreign policy making process (Amir 2012). This then leads to a dilemma of dual identity in Indonesia’s foreign policy (Sukma 2003).

However, this approach also possesses at least two weaknesses. First, this approach is too essentialist in analysing Indonesian politics. By contrasting “Islam” with other ideologies or political ideas in the decision-making process, this approach seems to reduce Islam to a single, unitary entity and thus neglects diversity within Islam itself. In Indonesia, for example, there are several faces of Islamic political forces from 1945 until the present (NU, Masyumi, PKS, PPP, PAN) who hold different ideological positions on many political issues, including foreign policy (see Effendy 1998). The many faces and articulations of Islam and politics, in this context, should be addressed and critically analysed in order to understand Islam more comprehensively (Ayoob 2000). Both Sukma’s and Leifer’s analyses, in this regard, have fallen into the essentialist trap and neglect the plural faces and articulations of “Islamic politics” in Indonesia.

Second, this approach has also been limited in its understanding of the use of “Islam” in certain cases. Sukma, for example, argues that in Megawati’s era, there was a return of the state identity dilemma due to the strengthening of nationalists among Indonesia’s decision-makers.
In this case, he argues, Islam was neglected in the foreign policy making processes. However, it is also evident that the Moderate Islam project was first proposed during her presidency. Commanded by Hassan Wirajuda, a senior diplomat who became the Foreign Minister in Megawati’s administration, the public diplomacy agenda was settled to promote the moderate and peaceful face of Islam through several series of interfaith dialogues as well as promoting several religious leaders on the international level. If these events are taken into account to understand Islam in Megawati’s foreign policy, we can say that Sukma’s analysis of Islam was not necessarily accurate.

There are several important studies that attempt to overcome some problems embedded in previous approaches to understanding Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Several contributions from Hoesterey (2014, 2016), Alles (2015), and Fogg (2015) are remarkable in providing new approaches to understand the issue. Departing from Sukma’s recent works, Alles argues that after 1998, Islam has evidently been articulated in Indonesia’s foreign policy, primarily through some efforts by transnational and national Islamic non-state actors. Their role in influencing foreign policy was made possible, among others reasons, by democratisation (Alles 2015). From a historical point of view, Fogg (2015) also argues that Islam has not necessarily been neglected in Indonesia’s foreign policy. During the revolution era (1945-1949), Islamic values appeared in Indonesia’s foreign policy, primarily through some Indonesian Muslim leaders and the “Middle East” network, which mobilised crucial support for Indonesian independence (Fogg 2015). Finally, from an anthropological viewpoint, Hoesterey (2014, 2016) argues that the uses of Moderate Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy should not simply understood as a “Western hegemonic project”, but also a manifestation of multiple voices from Indonesian Muslim communities who have developed their own discourse on Moderate Islam. NU’s concept of Islam Nusantara or Muhammadiyah’s notion of Islam Berkemajuan exemplifies this argument (see Hoesterey 2016).

These contributions have opened up another perspective to understand Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy not only through “state identity”, but also from the multiple underpinning of Indonesian Islam enrooted in Indonesian religious non-state actors. While this article partly agrees with the idea that Moderate Islam should be understood from a non-state perspective, this argument misses the
“international dimension” of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Neglecting this dimension would make such analysis “reductionist”, such that it simply put the state (or the multiple identities that constitute it) as the only basis to understand International Politics (Hobson 2000; Wendt 1987). It is therefore important to put state/non-state relations within “agent-structure” relationship in International Relations. Within this relationship, one could not separate state's behaviour in international politics without relating it to a particular historical and political structure that operates in international politics (Wendt 1987; Wight 2006). Even though state identity is shaped by domestic articulations between state and non-state actors in a democratic political sphere, its articulation in International Politics will also be influenced by its interaction with other states and, furthermore, the prevailing political regime. This article thus suggests that providing a more structural analysis of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy would be able to remedy such this problem.

Thus, it is important to provide a “historical” and “structural” analysis to remedy the essentialist or reductionist problem in the previous understanding of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. To that end, this article will introduce another approach in foreign policy analyses, namely the governmentality approach. Originally introduced by Michael Foucault in his writing (see Foucault 1991), this approach has recently been developed by several critical International Relations scholars (Joseph 2010; Kiersey and Stokes 2011; Larner and Walters 2004; Neumann and Sending 2010). More specifically, this approach is aimed to push studies on Politics and International Relations “outside” the nation-state and onto new theoretical and political territories (Larner and Walters 2004). It then seeks to rethink the concept of governance by putting emphasis on power relations between the actors instead of the juridical institutions. Thus, this approach sees every governance and policy-making processes as a “political product” that should be conceived politically by scholars who study politics and International Relations (Foucault 1991).

According to Foucault, governmentality engages with “the disposition of things”, which refers to the employment of tactics to govern rather than the imposition of laws in a particular society. It even use “laws” as a tactic to arrange and dispose a particular society in a certain way (Foucault 1991, 95). Governmentality, therefore, deals with the question
of power. The goal of “governmentality”, in contrast with “sovereignty”, is to establish control and order over population in particular society through governmental rationality and technique (Foucault 1991, 101). Several International Relations scholars thus expand this notion into broader context of global politics, Sending and Neumann (2010) defines “governmentality” as governing at distance (see also Joseph 2010). By “governing at distance, Sending and Neumann refers to the establishment of particular rationality that govern the practice of the state and non-state actors in global politics, which was transcended from the form of “state-centric” international relations in the 19th and 20th century until the shifts in the late 20th century, with the emerging role of Non-Governmental and Inter-Governmental Organisations in global politics (Sending and Neumann, 2010).

Within this perspective, foreign policy is neither understood as a “product” of bureaucratic polity nor the reflection of state identity, but rather as a result of power relations operated at the global and national levels. The relevance of foreign policy in international politics is arguably enabled by the “governmentalisation of state” in 19th and 20th century’s international politics (Neumann and Sending 2010). Therefore, the structure of international politics does matter in understanding foreign policy. To understand foreign policy as a political product, it is important to analyse how and by what means the foreign policy is produced. Therefore, two important things need to be considered. First, foreign policy is not only produced by “internal mechanisms” within the state, but also as a result of contestations at the international level. Therefore, the foreign policy making process should also be linked to the hegemonic power relations that constitute global politics as well as domestic demands that are articulated around the foreign policy making process. Bringing along domestic actors, the state, and international political structure would be important to understand how such ideas in foreign policy (in particular Moderate Islam) are produced.

Second, governmentality is also genealogically produced through historical processes. Therefore, we should also take into account the historical trajectories and mutations of rule when considering foreign policy (Rojas 2004, 99). It is in this context that the term “genealogy”, as introduced by Foucault (1978), is useful to understand Islam as an “idea” and “knowledge” within political processes. Genealogy as
methodology means that the history will be read in relation to the making of “present” – not merely as the “past” (Bartelson 1995). In this perspective, Islam is considered as a discourse that is articulated through political processes. Furthermore, to say that Islam is a political discourse, we have to identify how it is articulated in the political arena and to what extent it creates a new mode of subjectivity in Indonesia’s foreign policy (see Sayyid 1997).

The governmentality approach could provide a solution to the twin problems of essentialism and reductionism in the study of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Through this approach, Islam would be seen as a discourse that is articulated by certain actors to articulate their interests in Indonesia’s foreign policy. In this context, foreign policy is clearly seen as a “political” project, in the sense that it has served as an instrument to articulate a particular project in international political realms (Cox 1981; see also Persaud 2001). However, in contrast with the realist interpretation (Allison 1971; Sukma 2003), this article argue that foreign policy is not merely underpinned by “the state” but also by (1) contestations between social forces in domestic politics and (2) a state’s articulatory practices in global politics. Even though the state remains an important actor in executing foreign policy, its interests do not merely reflect the self-defined “national interest”, but rather they are also constituted through their interactions in international politics (see Doty 1997; Wight 2006).

From this viewpoint, Indonesia’s foreign policy is constituted by the nexus between international and domestic politics. This nexus shall be traced historically through particular ideas that emerge in Indonesia’s foreign policy, how this nexus locates and perceives “Islam”, and how this interpretation of Islam is articulated in the broader international political sphere. Therefore, it is safe to say that the importance of “Islam” in Indonesia’s foreign policy is determined by both (1) how the state and its apparatuses behave in international politics (that is, the diplomatic agencies who represent the state) and (2) how the “social forces” within the state participate in influencing state interest through the practices of democratisation, close relationships with state elites, or transnational networks (Alles 2015; Fogg 2015; Wirajuda 2014).

In this case, Asef Bayat’s notion of “the socialisation of the state” could be offered understand the position of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. In his analysis on political Islam, Bayat (2007) argues that social
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movements (or to put it more broadly, non-state actors) have played important role in defining the state through their participations (or opposition) with the state, since the political legitimacy of a state (even though the authoritarian one) requires the interaction with societies within its boundaries. However, different with Bayat, this article also finds that international politics also plays important in shaping state-society interactions in domestic and foreign policy. In understanding Indonesia’s foreign policy, for example, one should consider the configuration of power in International politics. After the World War II (and primarily after the Cold War), it was the United State’s foreign policy and its “(neo) liberal governmentality” that plays important role in underpinning 20th century world politics (see Cox 1981; Neumann and Sending 2010). This “international” dimension has enabled non-state actors to articulate their discourses in the state institutions, therefore make the governmentality works in a particular global setting. I argue that both actors in domestic and international politics important in determining the position of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

The arguments that follow will be therefore drawn from a genealogical perspective to understand how Moderate Islam—as a political discourse—was constructed in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Islam will be understood as a discourse that is articulated by each political regime in its interactions in international politics. Moreover, this article also draws arguments from the agent/structure problematic in International Relations, which analyses the relationships between state, domestic actors, and international structure at the heart of foreign policy analysis. Through this methodological basis, this article shall draw the historical trajectory of Indonesia’s foreign policy and, more specifically, explain how each political regime has articulated and interpreted Islam in its foreign policies. It would be started by understanding the origin of “Islam” as a discourse in Indonesia’s foreign policy and how it was located during two foreign policy regimes: Soekarno and Soeharto.

Islam as Political Instrument in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy

In 1945, Indonesia declared its independence and, after a period of revolutionary struggle (1945-1949), obtained status as a sovereign state acknowledged by international society. At that time, Indonesia’s foreign policy was marked by two important trends: the emergence of nationalism and postcolonial consolidation (Hatta 1953; Sukma
It was Hatta, the first Vice-President, who coined the term “Free-and-Active Foreign Policy” as the main principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy. This term was basically used to demarcate Indonesia’s positions in the rising tension of international politics between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to Hatta, Indonesia’s government resolved not to be an object in international politics, and should instead be actively involve to secure the country’s primary national interest, that is “the full independence of Indonesia” (Hatta 1947). This position was taken in order to secure Indonesia’s economy, which was weakened by military confrontation with the Dutch, and to made it possible to interact with other third world countries (Hatta 1953).

Under this idea, Soekarno successfully became a leading actor in international politics and diplomacy. However, there remained a question: what was Islam’s position in Indonesia’s foreign policy? At a glance, several analysts argue that the third world nationalist platform did not provide any space for Islam to be articulated in Indonesia’s foreign policy, because of—in Indonesia’s case—its lack of mobilising popular forces to wage war against imperialism (Sukma 2003).4 Even though a very different situation occurred in Egypt, where Islam went hand-in-hand with nationalist forces to mobilise people in their war against British neo-imperialism, a different case occurred in Indonesia (see Hayashi 1964). Nevertheless, Islam was—from that perspective—considered to be absent in the decision-making process. The fact that Soekarno was in opposition to Masyumi, Indonesia’s biggest Islamic political party, also led some analysts (such as Sukma, for example), to suggest that “Islam” did not play significant role in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

However, it was also evident in this era that Soekarno’s government interacted with many Muslim-majority countries, such as Pakistan and Egypt. In the Pakistani case, Soekarno used Islamic rhetoric to express his solidarity in the 1965 Kashmir war and to try to manage the relationship with the spirit of a “Muslim-majority country”. It was stated in the Joint Communiqué that “Islam remained the primary basis of Indonesia-Pakistani relations” (Wicaksana 2013). This case showed a particular discourse of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, which put Islam as a “religious identity” that was utilised to justify interstate diplomatic relations. Another case also appear in the involvement of

2003; Wicaksana 2013).
the community of Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia during Indonesia’s revolution (1945-49), who helped the independence diplomacy in the Middle East and therefore put Islam as the important aspect of Indonesia’s foreign policy at that time (see Fogg 2015). These cases show how Islam as religion shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy during Soekarno’s presidency.

The case of Indonesia-Pakistan relations in the 1960s thus reflects a discourse of “Nationalist Islam” in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The government was evidently trying to incorporate Islam to the hegemonic nationalist discourse in Indonesia’s foreign (and domestic) policy at the time. In other words, even though Soekarno did not present Islam as a symbol nor identity in his foreign policy, he still needed Islam to legitimise, at certain events, his policies to other Muslim-populated countries. Since Islam was the biggest religion in Indonesia and it influenced many other states as well, Islam was used as a cultural tie for diplomatic relations.

However, there was a changing political context in the mid-1960s. After a failed coup blamed on the Communists, the military took control of the state and successfully forced Soekarno to hand his political power to General Soeharto in March 1966. The so-called “New Order” era had begun. These political changes redirected Indonesia’s foreign policy. Soon after taking over the power, Soeharto dismantled the “third world nationalism” discourse and introduced a more “Western-friendly” foreign policy (see Sukma 1995; Weinstein 1976). For example, Soeharto initiated ASEAN in 1967, stopped the military confrontation with Malaysia in the same year, and opened many spaces for investment and foreign capital. Indonesia was also developing and modernising its domestic infrastructure and thus maintaining its relationships with developed Western and capitalist states, particularly the United States (Weinstein 1976).

Soeharto’s preference for technocracy in the decision-making process, as well as his emphasis on regional politics rather than getting involved in international conflict (i.e., the Cold War) thus put the aspirations of the Muslim community at the periphery in the foreign policy making process. However, in several cases, Soeharto also used Islam to maintain cooperation. Indonesia was actively involved in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and contributed several times in the Palestine and Bosnian conflicts (see Suryadinata 1995). Given its status as the most populated Muslim country in the world, Indonesia brought
along its “Free and Active Foreign Policy” to organise several formal and informal meetings to cooperate with many non-communist states. Nevertheless, Indonesia's involvement in the OIC and its growing use of “Islam” was not evident until the 1990s, where Soeharto started to improve his relationship with modernist Islamic group in Indonesian politics, therefore allowing, albeit with limited influence, “Islamic” identity in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Thus, from this viewpoint, we can argue that Islam is used in its instrumental function to legitimise a particular foreign policy in Indonesia. The instrumentalisation of Islam can be seen as the result of a particular hegemonic discourse that operated in Indonesia’s political order, namely the “nationalist” political order. Even though Soekarno and Soeharto held a different ideological positions in their articulation of nationalist discourse (Soekarno tended to be left-leaning while Soeharto was on the right), they shared a similar position on how to see “Islam”. In their era, Islam was only articulated as a “signifier” when Indonesia established communication with other Muslim-majority countries. The “master signifier” –following Sayyid’s argument— was still nationalism, albeit with different political contexts and regimes (see Sayyid 1997). This therefore prevented some articulations from Muslim politicians, particularly those who believed Islam should be the basis of the state, to articulate Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

From this analysis, the idea of Moderate Islam was not yet articulated in Indonesia’s foreign policy. There are two explanations for this. First, it is the strong institutional role of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in formulating foreign policy that constrained the articulation of such ideas in foreign policy. Since Adam Malik (1966-1977), President Soeharto has preferred academics and career diplomats to be his Minister of Foreign Affairs (for example, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas). Assured by Soeharto’s strong and conservative leadership, these ministers tend to prefer a rational, non-religious stance in responding to international politics, thus did not give “Islam” an important place in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Second, internationally, “Islam” did not have great importance in the growing Soviet-American rivalry in the Cold War. Even though both states (USSR and USA) attempted to establish alliances in Muslim countries (for example, in the Middle East), they did not construct any particular reference to “Islam” as an identity (see Walt 1987). Even in the
Middle East, where Islam constitutes an important subject in regional politics, the articulation was limited only to reinforce “Pan-Arabist” sentiment or merely to justify Arab Nationalism, therefore prevent further articulation of “Islam” as an ideological source in international politics (Al-Bazzaz and Haim 1954; Halliday 2003; Sayyid 1997).

It is also visible, from this case that the meaning of Islam was merely as a ‘religion’. Both Soekarno and Soeharto did not refer to “Islam” with a particular religious interpretation. Rather, they only signified Islam as a religion of the majority of the Indonesian people. Therefore, Islam was not fixated to a particular term. This occurred because both Soekarno and Soeharto tried to incorporate Islam into their “nationalist” interpretation, thus reducing the meaning of “Islam” to its religious meaning. It was during Abdurrahman Wahid’s short presidential term a different interpretation of Islam is articulated in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Constructing Moderate Islam from Below: Lessons from Wahid’s Foreign Policy

However, in 1998, the New Order was toppled down by series of protests following the economic crisis that hit Indonesia a year before. It was followed by democratisation, which led to further political changes in domestic politics. Indonesia successfully held its first democratic General Election in 1999. Abdurrahman Wahid, the long-standing chair of Nahdlatul Ulama, was elected President. His Vice-President was Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of former President Soekarno and a long-standing opposition leader during the New Order. During the New Order, Wahid also led non-partisan opposition through the Forum Demokrasi, maintaining a rivalry with ICMI, its “modernist” counterpart (Hefner 2000). According to Greg Barton, Wahid was a prominent Islamic thinker in Indonesia who, dissimilar to other Muslim intellectuals, was renowned for his campaign for pluralism and democracy since the 1990s (see Barton 2002). The election of Wahid, who was nominated by the “Central Axis” coalition consisting Islamic political parties, gave an opportunity for the articulation of Islam in the foreign policy process.

This article argues that the democratisation processes after the fall of New Order has changed the way Islam is articulated in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The emerging democratisation processes has opened
up the articulations of competing discourses in Indonesia’s foreign policy, albeit with some limitations due to the continuing strong role of bureaucratic institutions in determining Indonesia’s foreign policy. This competing articulation is evident during Abdurrahman Wahid’s short presidency (1999-2001). Even though only survived for two years, Wahid’s foreign policy could be seen as an attempt to break from previous “style” of doing foreign policy that put importance on state’s rational interest articulated by strong bureaucratic rule, and furthermore rearticulating “identity” in state’s foreign policy. For example, he appointed leading Islamic intellectual Alwi Shihab as his Foreign Minister. To some extent, it could be seen as an attempt to reinsert Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. However, Wahid did not attempt to articulate “Islam” as the main signifier in his foreign policy. Rather, his attempts to articulate his “moderate” yet controversial thought on Islam led to many controversies and domestic pressures that questioned some of his ideas on foreign policy (He 2008).

For example, President Wahid proposed “a look toward Asia” as his foreign policy priority. This proposal was aimed to build a more strategic regional environment as an alternative to US hegemony (He 2008; Smith 2000). Wahid’s proposal was also followed by another proposal to build “civilizational dialogue” between Indonesia and other countries, and, to set this agenda, Wahid organised tours to 26 countries in the four months after he took office. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that this agenda was conducted “in order to rebuild the good image of Indonesia in the eyes of the international community” (Smith 2000, 505). Moreover, Wahid also initiated dialogue with other entities in international politics, for example through the plan to initiate an economic (not diplomatic) relation with Israel, which was welcomed by a series of demonstrations from Islamists in Indonesia (Smith 2000, 520).

Wahid’s foreign policy showed an attempt to articulate Islam on Indonesia’s foreign policy. Wahid in fact attempted to articulate Islam in its moderate meaning (Barton 2002). Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, for example, explained that Wahid’s idea in opening further bilateral relations with Israel was aimed “to have Indonesia recognized as the largest country with a majority of Muslims who were moderate, although led by a kyai (religious teacher)” (Shihab and Wahid 1999). Wahid’s endorsement to moderate Islam was also inherent with his
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religious background as the chairman of the biggest traditional Islamic organisation in Indonesia who had been involved in Indonesia's democratisation process since 1990s (Barton 2002).

Wahid’s articulation of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy can be seen as the model of Moderate Islam that departs from his distinct interpretation of Islam and its role in public policy, which could be interpreted as “constructing Moderate Islam from below.” As a religious scholar (he was educated in traditional pesantren in Indonesia and at higher education institutions in the Middle East), Wahid has, since the 1980s, developed an “inclusive” interpretation of Islam which is based on the unique combination of liberal views with traditional Islamic interpretations in Indonesian society (see, for example, Rumadi 2015; Wahid 2002). In explaining his foreign policy choices, Wahid asserted that he attempted to “maintain the separation between Islam and the State” (Smith 2000). He also historically had committed to pluralism and democracy since his first chairmanship in the Nahdlatul Ulama (Barton 2002). As Rumadi (2015) argued, Wahid’s introduction of “post-traditionalism” in Nahdliyyin Islamic discourse was also important to explain Wahid’s unique articulation of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. It can be seen that Wahid attempted to articulate his vision of an “inclusive” society, which was embedded in his reinterpretation of Islamic values, by dealing with complex international issues. Therefore, Wahid’s articulation of Moderate Islam was in fact unique and can be regarded as an attempt to articulate Moderate Islam from below.

Nevertheless, the international environment should also be taken into account. By articulating Moderate Islam in Indonesian foreign policy, Wahid also evidently attempted to improve Indonesia’s image in international politics, which was getting worse after the East Timor, Moluccas, and 1998 riot incidents. The rationale behind Wahid’s visits to 26 countries his first four months as President clearly indicates that Indonesia was at that time struggling to improve its image other countries. On the other words, Moderate Islam was articulated by Wahid as an instrument to gain support from the international community regarding Indonesia’s position in world politics.

However, Wahid’s attempt to articulate moderate Islam was limited by domestic pressures. His “progressive” ideas was constrained by strong oppositions in the parliament, even from those who support him in...
the presidential race. For example, Assembly Speaker Amien Rais, who endorsed his candidacy in the presidential race, strongly reject Wahid’s plans to open economic relations with Israel due to “the absence of strong reasons” (Republika 1999). This rejection thus paved the way, along with other issue to Wahid’s disposal from presidential position. In early 2001, Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached by the Parliament due to his “incompetence and inability” to manage Indonesia (He 2008). His impeachment was followed by the inauguration of Megawati Soekarnoputri as Indonesia’s fifth President. Megawati, the third daughter of Soekarno, was supported by nationalist forces that were oppressed during the Soeharto era. Wahid’s impeachment marked the end of his experiment in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Why has Wahid’s “experiment” in articulating his own “Moderate” Islamic discourse—based on a post-traditionalist religious interpretation—in Indonesia’s foreign policy been limited to his short-lived presidency? This article argues that his failed articulation was due to his inability to mobilise support from international audiences, as well as a lack of support from the broader Muslim community at the domestic level. Even though Wahid has developed a distinct approach to Moderate Islam by his attempt to rearticulate dialogue with other civilizational entities, his unusual style has prevented from obtaining support from either the domestic or international level. His experience was also similar with that of Khatami, whose proposal of “inter-civilizational dialogue” was rejected by conservative religious leaders in Iran (see, for example, Bayat 2007; Petito 2007).

This point thus resonates with Jeremy Menchik’s argument that Indonesian Islam in fact lacks “liberal values” (although purportedly “tolerant”). The lack of “liberal values” despite some “tolerant” claimed by its proponents makes the articulation of Indonesian Islam was marked by some conservative tendencies that tend to exclude “non-Muslim” or “heretical” others (Menchik 2016). Indonesian Islam, however, is not a single-faced entity. It contains dynamics and contestations between “conservative” and “progressive” camps, who continually struggle to grasp and identify the meaning of Islam (see Bruinessen 2013). Wahid’s case has shown that some articulations of Moderate Islam have been prevented by a more conservative (and Islamist) discourse, which rejects, for example, Indonesia’s economic relations with Israel as betraying Indonesia’s commitment to Islamic values.
Interestingly, as this article shall show in the following section, the idea of Moderate Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy was reintroduced during Megawati’s and Yudhoyono’s administrations. This was not because Megawati or Yudhoyono continued Wahid’s experiment in designing foreign policy (both Megawati and Yudhoyono preferred to have an active diplomat as their Foreign Minister), but because of another “turn” in international politics. Following the 9/11 tragedy in New York, the US government declared the Global War on Terror, calling for Muslim-majority countries (and all others) to be either America’s “friend” or its enemy (see Bush 2001c). Besides that, the United States has also given aid (both technical and financial) to all Muslim-majority states to endorse moderate Islam. It was the Global War on Terror that rearticulated Moderate Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, albeit with a different manner and discourse. The re-articulation of Moderate Islam in Indonesian foreign policy was reflected in several public diplomacy attempts proposed by Presidents Megawati (2001-2004) and Yudhoyono (2004-2014).

**Constructing Moderate Islam from Above: Islam, Global War on Terror, and the Limits of Moderate Islam**

In 2001, a special meeting of Indonesia’s Assembly of Representatives (MPR-RI) impeached Abdurrahman Wahid as the President of Indonesia. Since his election, Wahid had controversial relations with the press and the parliament due to his policies. He was then replaced by his Vice President, Megawati Soekarnoputri. A daughter of former President Soekarno, Megawati shared a strong nationalist view in her policies. However, her presidency was also marked by a several domestic and international challenges, such as heated political tensions, with a separatist movement in Aceh and the Global War on Terror.

Soon after declared President by the parliament, it was visible that Megawati did not attempt to continue Wahid’s experiment in foreign policy. Rather than continuing Wahid’s proposals, particularly the proposal of a shift towards Asia, she admitted (via Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda) that it “will be very difficult to launch many initiatives with the current fragile stability” (Wirajuda via He 2008). Having appointed Hassan Wirajuda (a senior diplomat within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as her Foreign Minister, Megawati tended to focus her foreign policy on regional and domestic affairs. Megawati then engaged
with some regional initiatives, such as launching the so-called ASEAN Community at the 2003 ASEAN Summit (Weatherbee 2013).

Nevertheless, the most significant international event in Megawati’s presidency was indeed the war on terror. In 2002, a group of terrorists, who claimed to be affiliated with the al-Qaeda network, detonated suicide bombs at several notable pubs in Bali, the most popular tourist site in Indonesia. These attacks were subsequently followed by international pressures and harsh responses from the Indonesian government (Sherlock 2002). Following the terror attacks, Megawati signed some cooperation agreements related to defense and security with the US government, thus leading Indonesia to become a part of the US-led Global War on Terror (see US Department of State 2001).

Involvement in the US-led war on terror gave momentum to Indonesia’s foreign policy. Through the ratification of Law 15/2003 on the Crime of Terrorism, Indonesia had been actively involved in investigating terrorist activities in Southeast Asia. The US and Australia, two major victims of the Bali bombing, provided wide-ranging support to Indonesia’s activities in combating terrorism. The US assisted Indonesia’s counter-terrorism programs through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, providing civilian security and providing technical assistance to Indonesia’s anti-terrorism task force, as well as securing US$150 million in economic assistance for Jakarta (Capie 2004; US Department of State 2001). Indonesia soon became an inseparable part of US-led war on terror in Southeast Asia (Hadiz 2006b).

Indonesia’s involvement in the war on terror reflected a shift in Indonesian foreign policy, particularly in the position of Islam. This shift, according to Rizal Sukma, has placed Indonesia in a “dilemma of dual identity.” On the one hand, Megawati had to respond to terrorist attacks through security acts, involving the eradication of radical Islamists’ networks in Indonesia. However, on the other hand, she also had to deal with the Muslim communities which would be affected by her policies towards terrorism, since the terrorists used Islamic symbols to justify their acts. It was in this context that Megawati embraced the idea of Moderate Islam (a move subsequently followed by her successor Yudhoyono). By involving Indonesia in the Global War on Terror to combat “terrorism” in Southeast Asia, Megawati tried to promote Moderate Islam as the “official” face of Indonesian Muslims while at the same time joining in the harsh battle against radical Islamist networks.
This agenda can be seen in the public diplomacy project initiated by the Foreign Minister. After 9/11, Indonesia was trying to assert Moderate Islam as their image in world politics (Sukma 2012, 86). As a country with a growing democracy and the biggest number of Muslim citizens in the world, Indonesia attempted to construct a moderate and democratic image of Islam to gain external support. This Moderate Islam project was initiated through interfaith dialogues, inter-civilizational dialogues, and hosting the International Conference of Islamic Scholars that sought to promote moderate aspects of Islamic Civilization, organised under the supervision of the Directorate General of Public Diplomacy within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The reintroduction of Moderate Islam in Megawati’s foreign policy, albeit with different references, has opened up some new spaces for the articulation of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy. Even though the driving factor did not solely come from the “internal” discourse of Indonesian Islam, the growing expectation to articulate and promote Moderate Islam has given momentum for some Islamic groups to involve themselves in the campaign. For example, Indonesia facilitated the 1st International Conference of Islamic Scholars in Jakarta on 23-25 February 2004. This conference was initiated by Nahdlatul Ulama, the biggest Muslim organisation in Indonesia. This conference declared that “the teachings of Islam uphold the values of human dignity and recognize the equal opportunity of human beings in inter-personal relationships, in maintaining harmonious interfaith relations and in the entire process of international decision making” (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia at Australia 2004). Following the conference, this declaration was welcomed warmly by many world leaders who attended the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2004 (see ASEAN Secretariat 2004).

Even though the Conference was related to religious issues and attended exclusively by Islamic scholars, the response came from the ASEAN Regional Forum, which is in fact a forum for security cooperation in the region. The ARF Chairman stated, in relation to the Conference, that, “Moslem scholars from all parts of the world stressed the fact that the campaign against terrorism can only be won through comprehensive and balanced measures” (ASEAN Secretariat 2004). The statement also said that the conference “condemned acts of terrorism with any religion, in particular Islam, and any race.”
Therefore, this statement clearly shows the link between ICIS—as a campaign for Moderate Islam—with the counter-terrorism project at the global level.

In 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono replaced Megawati as the President after winning Indonesia’s first direct presidential election. He soon continued Megawati’s project on Moderate Islam by initiating the first Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation in Yogyakarta, 6-7 December 2004, in cooperation with the Muhammadiyah Central Board and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia. This event marked a continuation of “promoting Moderate Islam” as a part of the public diplomacy agenda. Afterwards, several series of interfaith dialogues were organised by the Indonesian government, as well as the annual ICIS.

Promoting Moderate Islam was central in Yudhoyono’s foreign policy. It even became one of the pillars in Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine, which aimed to seek “zero enemies and a million friends” at the international level (see Umar 2011). Through interfaith dialogues and Indonesia’s promotion of democracy in the Yudhoyono era, Indonesia tried to build its image as “the largest Muslim Nation that practices a true democracy” (Yudhoyono 2011). Indonesia also aimed to be a model of a country where Islam and democracy exist hand-in-hand with no contradiction between the two. He believed this would therefore prove that the practice of democracy, as well as promoting moderate-democratic Muslim leaders, is a better strategy to minimise the terrorist threat than a mere violent militaristic invasion.

This endorsement of moderate Islamic discourse as an image has therefore marked a new discourse in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Unlike Abdurrahman Wahid, who tried to articulate the same discourse in his proposal of a shift towards Asia and his “economic” foreign policy, this image was spread through public diplomacy. Yudhoyono’s proposal in endorsing interfaith dialogues was for the Western community, which wanted to spread liberal Islamic discourse in the Muslim world. It was also reflected in the Indonesia-US Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (Rabasa 2007).

The discourse of Moderate Islam as constructed by Megawati’s and Yudhoyono’s administrations was driven by two inter-related factors: the emerging Global War on Terror which prompted some countries (including Indonesia) to articulate a “moderate” vision of Islam to counter the “radical narrative”, and subsequently the emerging
international involvement of Indonesian Islamic organisations in international cooperation, particularly with the Western world. Firstly, the re-articulation of Moderate Islam was made possible by Indonesia’s involvement with the Global War on Terror. After the first Bali Bombing in 2002, Indonesia was also affected by jihadist groups and decided to tackle the “terrorist threat” through various programs. These programs involved the combination of a “security-based” approach and counter-radicalisation programs, which were embedded in Indonesia’s public diplomacy to counter “radical” Islamic narratives in Indonesia (Sukma 2011).

Therefore, one can see that the idea to endorse Moderate Islam was driven by inter-related domestic and international factors. The international side can be traced to a similar agenda, projected by the US government, to promote Moderate Islam to combat terrorism. As critically analysed by Mahmood Mamdani, the Global War on Terror has produced a subjectivity of “Moderate/Good Muslim” as the antithesis of “Radical/Bad Muslim”. On one occasion, George W. Bush stated that what the US was doing was merely to combat “terrorists” who had broken American lives, and thus it had nothing to do with Muslims who were practising their Islamic faith. For Bush, “Islam is peace... When we think of Islam we think of a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world. Billions of people find comfort and solace and peace.” (see Bush 2001b). According to Bush, what the US did in Afghanistan (and Iraq) was not a declaration of war on Islamic civilization, but instead against America’s enemies only. He stressed that “the United States of America is a friend of the Afghan people, and the friends of almost a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith” (see Bush 2001a).

From these passages, we can conclude that in terms of the Global War on Terror, Bush was trying to distinguish “Good Muslims” —or those who practice the Islamic Faith based on peace, harmony, comfort, etc.— from “Bad Muslims” —who were trying to harm the American people with terrorist acts. This categorisation furthermore divided the world into “Good Muslims” and “Bad Muslims”, which was indeed a political project (Mamdani 2002). This projection can be seen from US support to build a moderate Muslim network in the world through building civil society network, giving grants through donor organisations, and public diplomacy (Rabasa 2007). We can explain
Yudhoyono’s articulation of moderate Islam from this “international” background. The emergence of “moderate” Islamic discourse is internationally enabled by the growing cooperation from either US Government or US-based organisations (such as Ford Foundations or The Asia Foundation) with “moderate” Islamic organisations who wished to articulate the more moderate version of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy (Alles 2015; Hoesterey 2016).

Secondly, the rearticulation of moderate Islam was also made possible by growing “non-state actors” involvement in public diplomacy and international cooperation. The role of the US in promoting Moderate Islam comes into play here. For example, in Indonesia, the US government gave assistance to create links among the moderate Muslim network that had existed since early 2000s, such as Liberal Islam Network (JIL), the progressive elements in Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, moderate Islamic scholars from IAIN (later changed to UIN), and many other moderate entities in Indonesia. The US government did not directly assist the network, however; there were many donor organisations involved in disseminating the moderate Islamic platform to Indonesia’s civil society institutions (Rabasa 2007). Even though the original aim was to counter radical ideas, this process has brought some new dynamics in Indonesian Islam, which witnessed the emergence of some “liberal ideas” (propagated by Liberal Islam Network and its counterpart in Muhammadiyah, the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network) and further dynamics in Indonesian Islamic discourse during the 2000s and early 2010s (see Ariëanto 2012).

The appearance of moderate Islamic discourse in the US-led global war on terror and the growing involvement of Moderate Islamic non-state actors in Indonesia paved the way for the re-emergence of “Islam” in Indonesia’s foreign policy during Yudhoyono’s administration. Without international support, such project will not be fairly articulated in Indonesia’s foreign policy, which was historically built upon a strong technocratic rule in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also explains why Wahid’s intellectual experiment in his foreign policy failed and why a similar project, although with different political aims, succeeded under Megawati and Yudhoyono. International dimension matters. The Global War on Terror has made it possible to talk about Moderate Islam in international politics and, moreover, in Indonesia’s
foreign policy. This furthermore shows how the moderate Islamic discourse gained its prominence in recent Indonesian foreign policy, at least through Yudhoyono’s administration.

In this sense, we can see that Wahid, as well as Yudhoyono and Megawati, attempted to articulate Moderate Islam as a political project in their foreign policy. However, there are some differences on the ideological sources and social-political background that shaped their projects. While Wahid attempted to articulate his own project based on his intellectual understanding of Islam, Megawati’s and Yudhoyono’s attempts were highly influenced by the US-led Global War on Terror project and politically located the Moderate Islam under a particular form of global governmentality projected by the US. This then differentiates Wahid from Megawati and Yudhoyono in terms of external support; while Wahid had to face domestic constraints and a lack of international support, Megawati and Yudhoyono seems more successful in projecting Moderate Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, particularly due to strong international support.

However, even though Megawati’s and Yudhoyono’s efforts in endorsing Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy has obtained several achievements in improving Indonesia’s image in international politics, particularly to encounter Islamic radicalism in global politics, the idea of Moderate Islam has only played a little impact in the Muslim world. For example, the idea of Moderate Islam has no influence in resolving crisis in the Middle East, the growing Saudi-Iran rivalry, or Israel-Palestinian conflict, although Indonesia (through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has tried to involve as mediators in such crises. This limitation occurred due the absence of involvement of state or non-state actors in resolving broader Muslim World problems. Moderate Islam was focused primarily to locate Indonesia’s position in the US-led global war on terror. Therefore, in international context, it only locates the idea of Moderate Islam in terms of encountering Islamic radicalism (through deploying some languages such as “Human Rights, Tolerance, or wasatiyyah). The limitation of this idea is that it did not deal with broader structural problems in the Muslim World, such as interstate conflict resolution or the question of Palestinian independence. A strong “structural” vision Indonesia’s foreign policy, such as Indonesia’s active participation in mediating the conflict in the Middle East is therefore important to resolve this problem.6
In addition to the lack of structural vision to engage with broader problem in the Muslim world, the idea of Moderate Islam was also unable to reach all Muslim countries, due to its diverse religious interpretations. We can see, for example, different articulation of Muslim communities in the Gulf, Shia communities, or African Muslim countries whose religious nature differs each other. So far the idea of Moderate Islam was limited to English-speaking communities and has not yet translated in the Arab-speaking communities (as well as African and Persian Muslim countries), thus proved another limitation in “diplomatic” attempts to use Moderate Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. To resolve this problem, it is equally important to acknowledge the plurality of Islamic ideas in world politics, and furthermore, engages in a more constructive dialogue with other Muslim communities in world politics.

**Conclusion: Three Discourses of Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy**

This article has analysed the discourses of Islam in contemporary Indonesian foreign policy. Drawing upon the genealogical perspective, introduced by French philosopher Michel Foucault, this article found that there have been three discourses of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy since Soekarno. The first discourse articulated Islam as a religious identity. This discourse, articulated by Soekarno and Soeharto, understood Islam in its loose meaning as a religion. Neither Soekarno nor Soeharto attempted to project “Islam” in any particular meaning. Islam, according to their articulations, was simply interpreted as “religion”. Both of these regimes used religious proximity merely to legitimise international cooperation with Muslim countries or to respond to international issues related to the Muslim world. Therefore, in these administrations, there was no such term as Moderate Islam nor any attempts to articulate Islam in a moderate way in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

The second discourse attempted to articulate Moderate Islam as a political project as based on Indonesia’s Islamic intellectual tradition. This discourse was articulated by Abdurrahman Wahid during his short-term presidency (1999-2001). In his presidency, he attempts to open diplomatic relations with Israel (which was criticised by Islamists for neglecting Palestinian aspirations), formulating a proposed shift towards Asia, as well as diplomatic visits to more than 26 countries.
Wahid also put forward several controversial ideas such as recognising Confucianism as a religion and opening some inter-civilizational dialogues. These attempts, however, were constrained by domestic pressures and a lack of international support, and ended when Wahid resigned as Indonesian President in 2001.

The third discourse articulated Moderate Islam as a political project and included it under the banner of the Global War on Terror. This discourse was articulated by both Megawati and Yudhoyono. Through their public diplomacy agendas, both Megawati and Yudhoyono attempted to project Moderate Islam as the profile of Indonesian Muslims at the international level. They also initiated several interfaith dialogues and shared Indonesia’s experiences as the biggest Muslim democracy. However, one could also see that this agenda was working in line with the Moderate Islam campaign initiated by the US government, thus locating Moderate Islam under the global governmentality project of the United States.

Having said that, this article suggest that analyses of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy should also incorporate both political underpinnings in domestic politics and their linkage to the hegemonic discourse that operates in international politics. From this study, it can be concluded that governmentality practice is manifested discursively by using particular instruments such as foreign debt or donor involvement. Through these instruments, the United States successfully cooperated with Indonesia in promoting moderate Islamic discourse and, furthermore, created a particular Muslim subjectivity that is in line with US interests (or, “Good Muslims” according to Mahmood Mamdani). It is in this case we should critically understand foreign policy not only as a product of bureaucratic processes, but also as a political practice involving global and local forces.

Moreover, it is important to critically understand Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy as the nexus between domestic politics and international relations. One should reject the assumption that Islam was totally absent (or at least facing a dilemma) in Indonesia’s foreign policy due to dual state identity (see Sukma 2003). In fact, Islam various discourses of Islam was articulated by successive political regimes in Indonesia. The articulation of Islam as a discourse in Indonesia’s foreign policy, particularly after Reformasi, does not simply involve “the state” but also emerging non-state actors, alongside domestic or transnational actors...
However, the articulation of Moderate Islam cannot be separated from the international context within which it is articulated in foreign policy. Wahid’s experiment in promoting Moderate Islam, to some extent, has failed due to the lack of domestic and international support. However, it is the US-led Global War on Terror project that enabled the re-articulation of Moderate Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, which coincided with the rise of “liberal” Islamic activism, which was previously marginalised in Indonesian politics. The US-led promotion of Moderate Islam has paved the way for the re-articulation of a Moderate Islamic discourse in Indonesia’s foreign policy and, furthermore, the consolidation of Moderate ideas within Indonesian Islam.

This is not to say that Moderate Islam is merely a product of US-led foreign policy. Moderate ideas have existed in Indonesia’s Islamic thought for centuries. However, Indonesia’s attempt to counter “radical” ideas has made the articulation of this idea in foreign policy more possible. Therefore, even though Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and political elites have endorsed “Islam” since the early independence era (and before), its articulation in Indonesian foreign policy was made possible through the promotion of similar ideas under the banner of a Global War on Terror. This is also supported by the awakening “moderate voices” and progressive Muslims in Indonesia during the 2000s.

Finally, this reflection has to be linked with current developments in Indonesia’s foreign policy. With the changing political context after the 2014 General Elections, it is important to see whether Moderate Islam is still articulated in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Although Jokowi’s administration (2014-present) tends not to prioritise Moderate Islam in his foreign policy agenda, which to some extent signals a return to the first discourse of Islam as previously mentioned, one can also see that non-state actors (particularly NU and Muhammadiyah) have played their own agenda to promote their moderate ideas to the world, which is, to some extent, facilitated by the state (Hoesterey 2016). The extent to which their agenda could succeed is subject to further inquiries.
Endnotes

- An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1st Studia Islamika International Conference, organised by Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM), Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta, Indonesia 14-16 August 2014. The Author wishes to thank Professors M.C. Ricklefs, James Hoesterey, Noorshahril Saat, and other conference participants for their insightful comments at the Conference. Generous financial support from the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP) in finishing this project is gratefully acknowledged.

1. By “discourse”, this article refers to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal's Mouffe definition of discourse, namely “the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice of a subject.” By this definition, this article regards Moderate Islam as a discourse that is resulting from the articulatory practice of Indonesia’s foreign policy makers, which is exercised through public diplomacy, official relationships with other states (particularly the United States), engagement with non-state actors, and other forms of articulatory practices. See Laclau & Mouffe (1985).

2. The author wishes to thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this point.

3. For a different historical interpretation on the significant role of Muslim activists and Islamic grass-root leaders in mobilising revolutionary politics, see Fogg (2015; 2012).

4. By “economic” foreign policy refers to President Wahid’s attempts to build alternative economic cooperations through his bilateral engagements and visits to many countries, therefore put “post-crisis economic reconstruction” at the heart of Wahid’s foreign policy. See Smith (2000).

5. By “structural vision”, this article refers to a foreign policy articulation that also addresses political and economic dimension of diplomatic practices, such as inequality, global solidarity, or interstate conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. It does not meant “Islam” is put aside in the foreign policy, but instead reinforce the Islamic value with progressive agenda in world politics. It therefore requires a reorientation of Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine as well as a reinterpretation of Moderate Islam in a more progressive interpretation.

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Submission of Articles

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The journal invites scholars and experts working in all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences pertaining to Islam or Muslim societies. Articles should be original, research-based, unpublished and not under review for possible publication in other journals. All submitted papers are subject to review of the editors, editorial board, and blind reviewers. Submissions that violate our guidelines on formatting or length will be rejected without review.

Articles should be written in American English between approximately 10,000-15,000 words including text, all tables and figures, notes, references, and appendices intended for publication. All submission must include 150 words abstract and 5 keywords. Quotations, passages, and words in local or foreign languages should...
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