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في ولاية مختارة في ماليزيا
محمد فردوس عبد الرحمن ومحمد أمان الله

A Genealogy of Moderate Islam: Governmentality and Discourses of Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy
Ahmad Risky Mandhatillah Umar

Islamic School and Arab Association: Ahmad Sürkatt’s Reformist Thought and Its Influence on the Educational Activities of al-Irshād
Motoki Yamaguchi

Post-Islamism and the Remaking of Islamic Public Sphere in Post-reform Indonesia
Muhammad An索r
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Post-Islamism and the Remaking of Islamic Public Sphere in Post-reform Indonesia

Abstract: The following essay examines post-Islamism in post-reform Indonesia by focusing on contestation in the remaking of the Islamic public sphere. I argue that the public sphere is not only an arena of contestation between Islamists and secularists, but also among the proponents of social movements that mobilize Islam as a source of legitimacy. In the first section, I present a brief review of the notion of post-Islamism and Islamic public sphere as categories of analysis to examine the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia. Next, I explain the topography of Islamic movements in contemporary Indonesia. Post-Islamist contestation in the remaking of the Indonesian Islamic public sphere is examined in the third section. It is limited to four topics, i.e. the dynamics of Muslim intellectual movements, post-Islamist women’s activism and piety movements, Islamic visibility in pop culture, and discourses of shari’a implementation in Aceh. Finally, the article concludes that the dynamics of Indonesian post-Islamists and their contestation are not only helping to strengthen the praxis of democracy in the post-reform era, but they are also diverting public attention from the temptation of radicalism and violence in the name of religion.

Keywords: Indonesian Islam, Post-Islamism, Islamic Public Sphere.

Kata kunci: Islam Indonesia, Post-Islamisme, Ruang Publik Islam.
This essay examines the dynamics of post-Islamism in post-reform Indonesia (since 1998), focusing on contestation in the remaking of the Islamic public sphere. The study argues that the development of post-Islamism in Indonesia post-reform contributed to divert public attention from the temptation of Islamic radicalism, apart from reviving the democracy. In contrast to van Bruinessen and other scholars who say that the Islamic movement in the post-reform Indonesia turned to become more conservative (Bruinessen 2013), radical (Feillard, Madinier, and Wong 2011), this paper proposes that post-Islamism has shifted Islamic radical movements into periphery positions (see Azra and Hudson 2008, 5–7). My paper confirms Hasan's thesis that post-Islamism in Indonesia has very much to do with “the democratic consolidation that facilitated the opening of political opportunity in the era of Reformasi and the burgeoning of modern democratic idioms as a result of moderate Muslims’ campaign against Islamist radicalism” (Hasan 2013a, 177).

Post-Islamism is a new socio-political trend characterized by a retreat from the idea of creating an Islamic state. It seeks greater accommodation for the rights of women, youth and non-Muslims. The scope of its influence is not uniform across the Muslim world, and its popularity as socio-political project depends on numerous contextual conditions (Amin 2012, 170). The emergent trend of post-Islamism as an embedded aspect of the process of contemporaneous change in Muslim societies is informed by colonial history, post-colonial socio-economic conditions, new interpretations of Islam and worldviews, and experiences of Islamic revivalist movements at different geographical location (Sinanovic 2005, 433–36).

Scholarly works about post-Islamism and contemporary Islamic movements mushroomed after Asef Bayat (1996) published his essay entitled “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society”. Bayat (2013, 7) “discussed the articulation of the remarkable social trends, political perspectives, and religious thought that post-Khomeini Iran had begun witness—a trend that eventually came to embody the ‘reform movement’ of the late 1990s”. Bayat (2007a) said that the victory of the Iranian revolution, which promised freedom and the rise of Islam, in fact largely disappointed supporters. This disappointment initiated the reinterpretation of Islamic doctrine as a counterpoint for interpretation of the regime (Bayat 1996, 43–52). While the Iran’s regime promote
Islamism and reject democracy, post-Islamist movement actually “wants to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom (albeit at varying degrees), with democracy and modernity, to achieve what some have termed an alternative modernity” (Bayat 2013, 9).

Recent studies have demonstrated multiple post-Islamisms in many Muslim countries. Cavatorta and Merone (2015, 27–42) have documented at least two notions of post-Islamism. One aspect of post-Islamism seemed to indicate that such religious references were either pointless or would be bent so out of their real meaning as to become irrelevant for politics. Another aspect of post-Islamism suggested, however, the possibility and the potential for ideological evolution, and it is second aspect that has forcefully emerged when rethinking Islamist politics.

Bayat is the most prominent scholar who popularized the notion of post-Islamism as the transformation of political ideology beyond Islamism. Bayat (2007b) argues, since the 1990s, the state political orientation of Islamism has gradually been replaced by an individualized focus on modern Muslim lifestyle, with political ideology transforming itself into a life philosophy of systematized personal piety. However, Bayat’s view has generated criticism, particularly from Ihsan D. Dagi (2004, 2013) and Dominik M. Müller (2013, 2014). Both scholars believe that ideological movement of the Islamists and the post-Islamists is basically same, that is: Islamization, both through state as well as society.

Dagi (2013, 71–72) argues “the emergence of post-Islamism out of Islamist movements demonstrates the ‘learning capacity’ of the Islamist and their ability to transform themselves to answer the challenge they have faced”. The notion of post-Islamist refers to those who are known for their Islamic views but do not now prescribe the construction of an Islamic society by means of state power (Dagi 2004, 136). Therefore, “post-Islamism is not only about changing strategies for political struggle. It is deeper and more fundamental: abandoning the idea that an Islamic state is both theoretically and politically possible” (Dagi 2013, 73). Dagi concluded that “Islamism is not dead; some within it are transforming in a self-critical and creative manner to face an ideological and political impasse” (Dagi 2013, 71).

Müller (2014) examines post-Islamism through endeavors of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS, Parti Islam se-Malaysia) and its Youth Wing (Dewan Pemuda PAS) in synthesizing Islam and popular
In contrast to the assumption of a post-Islamist turn in which a focus on individual Islamic lifestyle and modern consumption patterns replaced the state political orientation of “classical Islamism” as argues by Bayat, Müller has argued that “the case of contemporary PAS Youth does not exhibit sufficient evidence to uphold this argument” (Müller 2014, 160). Müller’s view substantiates the suspicion of Dagi (2013), in which post-Islamism is actually not more than a marketing strategy of the Islamic state ideology, or the view of Olivier Roy (Roy 2002, 97) that post-Islamism means “the privatization of re-Islamization”.

The discourse of Indonesian Post-Islamism attracts the attention of scholars like Noorhaidi Hasan (2009, 2013a, 2013b), Ariel Heryanto (2014) and Hans Abdiel Harmakaputra (2015). Hasan said that the development of post-Islamism in post-reform Indonesia was marked by the growth of Islamic civil organization organizations, which zoom in on promoting harmony between Islam and democracy, human rights, advocacy for minority groups, and promotion of gender equality (Hasan 2009, 2013a, 2013b). Heryanto (2014) focuses on pop-culture and the politics of screen culture to show the contestation of post-Islamists’ articulation of Indonesian Islam in everyday life. Meanwhile Harmakaputra discusses Indonesian post-Islamism through Muslims relations with non-Muslims. Harmakaputra held that the presence of Islamic civil society, which is progressively oriented, and the acceptance of non-Muslim leaders (referring specifically to the Governor of Jakarta) are sufficient evidence that Indonesian post-Islamism is strengthened. Unlike those studies, my essay focuses on the contestation of post-Islamists in remaking Islamic public sphere.

This essay is structured as follows. In the first section, I will present a brief review of the notions of post-Islamism and the Islamic public sphere. Next, I will explain the topography of contemporary Indonesian Islam. Post-Islamist contestation in the remaking of the Indonesian Islamic public sphere will be discussed in the third section. This section is divided into four topics, i.e. the dynamics of Muslim intellectual movements, post-Islamist women’s activism, Islamic pop culture, and the implementation of Islamic law in Aceh. This article will resolve with conclusions that confirm the vitality of Islam in reproducing a public sphere in post-reform Indonesia.
Post-Islamism and the Islamic Public Sphere

This section will explore the notions of post-Islamism and the Islamic public sphere and implement these as categories of analysis to examine the dynamics of the Indonesian Islamic public sphere. The term post-Islamism cannot be considered in isolation from Islamism. Islamism is any social movement that advocates and pursues the maximized application of Islamic teachings (as understood by its proponents) in the widest possible scope of public life, including but not restricted to the formal adoption and enforcement of sharia law as the basis of government in a given nation-state (Heryanto 2014, 39). Although Islamic movement are not merely Islamic state oriented (Burgat 2008), Islamism always seeks a greater role for Islam in the government, economy, and social life of Muslim countries (Chernov-Hwang 2009, 8).

According to Olivier Roy (2002, 58), Islamism is a brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that claims to re-create a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing sharia, but by first establishing an Islamic state through political action. Islamist supporters believe in Islam as a religion that offers a complete solution to all problems that face Muslims in all places and times (Roy 1994, 37). For them, the Qur’an offers a programmatic blueprint for an “Islamic state” that contains prescriptions for all aspects of everyday human life. Therefore, Islam should be the foundation for the management of state and social life (see Arat 2005; Howe 2005; Ismail 2006).

According to Bayat, “post-Islamism represents both a condition and a project, which may be embodied in a master (or multidimensional) movement. In the first place, it refers to political and social conditions where, following a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy, and sources of legitimacy of Islamism are exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters” (Bayat 2007b, 10–11). Not only a condition, “post-Islamism is also a project, a conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains” (Bayat 2007b, 11). Post-Islamism is expressed in the idea of fusion between Islam (as a personalized faith) and individual freedom and choice; and post-Islamism is associated with the values of democracy and aspects of modernity (Bayat 1996, 45). While Islamism is more concerned with fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the divine state, post-Islamism seeks to merge and marry rights with duties for all citizens.

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Post-Islamism, in other words, is “an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scripture, and the future instead of the past” (Bayat 2007b, 11).

Post-Islamist society is not anti-religious, although it reflects a tendency to re-secularize religion among a vast number of the population. The idea of an Islamic state is no longer dominant among the public political culture a post-Islamist society (Badamchi 2015, 681). Hasan (2012, 381) argues that the emergence of post-Islamism can be seen as an alternative which gains ground amidst the failure of the project that attempts to position Islam as a political ideology and is thereby changing the political landscape of Muslim states. Parallel with Bayat, Hasan (2013a, 160) said that the experiences of many Muslim countries confirm that the Islamist project has instead stigmatized Islam and transformed it into an enemy of modern civilization. As an alternative to religious radicalism, post-Islamism offers Muslim a way to actualize religious beliefs and values while still following the path of modernity and globalization, without plunging into violence and joining a cycle of militancy.

The conceptualizations of post-Islamism above are similar to the patterns of mainstream Islamic thought and its movements in contemporary Indonesia. It is equivalent to other social categories, such as Islamic modernist (Noer 1996), Islamic neo-modernist (Barton 1995, 1–75, 1997, 323–50), Islamic post-traditionalist (Kersten 2015b; Rumadi 2015), moderate Muslim (Freedman 2009, 107–27; Noor 2007, 447–81), substantive Islam (Azra 2000), progressive Islam (Arifanto 2012; Nurjanah 2013), as well as liberal Islam (Nurdin 2005, 20–39). However, the categories above are certainly different from post-Islamists’ notions, both epistemologically and axiologically.

Those concepts have constraints when used to explain the diversity of Indonesian Islamic movements. The following illustration might explain the problem and show the importance of post-Islamism as a category of analysis. As far as contemporary Indonesian Islamic movements are concerned, proponents of modernist, neo-modernist, traditionalist, or post-traditionalist viewpoints are similar in being religious moderate, but they obviously cannot be generalized. Muhammadiyah is, in many studies, described as a modernist
Muslim organization, while NU (Nabdlatul Ulama) is constructed as a traditionalist Muslim organization. Both are among largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, and both share the idea of Pancasila as the appropriate state ideology for Indonesia and reject the idea of an Islamic state in Indonesia, even though both organizations have different—sometimes even conflicting—doctrine and religious articulation.

Likewise, liberal Muslims, especially youth, have initiated the post-traditionalist movement within NU as well as the neo-modernist movement within Muhammadiyah. Though post-traditionalists and neo-modernists are allies in promoting liberalization of Islamic thought, religious pluralism, liberal democracy, and the firm rejection of an Islamic state, so far we cannot find any concept that may unite these both social entities. Greg Barton's (1997, 34) frame of neo-modernist Islam which encompassed Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid led to objections. The concepts of progressive Islam and liberal Islam, which are meant to bring together proponents of neo-modernism and post-traditionalism into a single group of thought, unfortunately do not accommodate the full range of tendencies of each respective group, for example, the movement of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). Liberal Islam and PKS are not only different, but are contradictory in responding to Indonesian religious issues.

The notion of post-Islamism is useful for analyzing contemporary Indonesian Islam. But this “theory can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of Indonesian case with some modification and qualification” (Heryanto 2014, 41). This is because Indonesia has never encountered a situation where an Islamist group held national political power, like Iran and Egypt. Heryanto (2014, 41) note that,

“A distinction needs to be made between political post-Islamism, which pertains to formal governance at the state level, the core concern of Bayat’s research, and cultural post-Islamism, which includes both the high culture of the intellectual elite and the more lowbrow culture that finds expression in popular culture and everyday life”.

Instead of departing from the failure of Islamism, Indonesian post-Islamists in the post-reform era faced the Islamists who had attempted Islamization through the state amid the process of democratic transition that was ongoing. Recognizing specific local differences, I contend that Bayat’s concepts of post-Islamism are useful for the analysis of current trends in Indonesia.
Besides the concept of post-Islamism, it is important to unpack the notion of the Islamic public sphere. It cannot be separated from Jürgen Habermas’ notion of public sphere. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas (1991) describes the development and eventual decline of the bourgeois public sphere in Europe between the 18th and 20th centuries. The public sphere formerly controlled by bourgeois groups had transformed into an exchange arena of critical thinking that could not be claimed as private property. People from diverse backgrounds had access to articulate ideas both directly (face to face) and indirectly (through the media).

Habermas (2006, 73) defines the public sphere as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body”. In line with Habermas, Charles Taylor defining the notion of public space as “common space in which members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these” (C. Taylor 1992, 220). Similarly, Riaz (2013, 300) defined the public sphere as a “zone of autonomous social activity between family and the ruling authorities”.

Experts such as Calhoun (1992) and Fraser (1992, 109–42) argue that the public sphere differs depending on social and political context, and that public spheres may be multiple. The multiplicity of the public sphere exists not only between communities, political ideologies, races, religions or religious sects, but it may happen within a particular community internally. This is because the subject of the discourse of the public sphere is individuals, not communities. The public space in the perspective of Bourdieu’s theory of habitus (Bourdieu 1977, 1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), is a process of negotiation between agencies (subjects, individuals) with a structure which then forms social practices.

Regarding religion and the public sphere, Habermas has been criticized for neglecting religion in his account of the rise of the bourgeois public sphere and in his narrative of the public sphere’s transformation. For example, “he ignored the movements of pietism and religious revivalism that were so successful in different parts of Germany, including, as well as in Scandinavia and other Protestant
majority parts of Western Europe” (Eickelman and Salvatore 2002, 96). Calhoun argues, Habermas, like most other mid-century scholars, assumed that religion declined as societies modernized. This view prevented Habermas from understanding “the role of religion both as a central thematic topic in the early public sphere and one of its enduring institutional bases” (Calhoun 1992, 36).

In contrast to Habermas’ thesis, many scholars have argued that religion has played a very important role in the development of public spheres outside the West. Nilüfer Göle (2002) argues with regard to Turkey that the idea of public is Western, but that it circulates in non-Western contexts, and the ways its concepts, ideas, and institutions are adapted depend on local agencies and cultural fields. According to Göle, public spheres must be analysed on their own terms, and should not be viewed as foreign impositions because of the blend with local cultural significations. According to Göle (2002, 176), in the Turkish context of voluntary modernization, the public sphere is institutionalized and imagined as a site for implementation of a secular and progressive way of life”. In her most recent book, Göle (2015, 1) examines “the ways these religious claims do not lead to a totalistic rejection of the secular but give way to new cultural constellations, re-assemblages, and realignments between secular and Muslim actors”. Other scholars such as Casanova (2006; 1994), Hefner (2000), and Asad (2003) also consider religion a constitutive feature of the public sphere.

Similarly, Eickelman and Salvatore proposed the notion of “religious public sphere” (2002, 92–115), or “public Islam” (2006), which refers to the diversity of intellectual contributions, thought, and many others in the realm of religious public life. Members in the sphere of public Islam participate in open discussions and critical negotiations of various issues in a way that eventually leads to achieving common good (maṣlaḥah al-ʿāmmah) (Salvatore and Eickelman 2006). Although the nature and substance of these discussions are different from those adopted in the West, the definition of the “common good”, and requirements and principles that are needed to achieve it, converge with the western understanding of such a concept (el-Nawawy and Khamis 2010, 233). Given that the ideal of “common good” is reached through continuous public debates and contestation, “there can scarcely be a single conception of it, nor can it simply be equated with that which is best for most people” (Zaman 2006, 130).
My paper applies Asef Bayat’s notion of post-Islamism and Habermas’ public sphere to analyze the dynamics of Islam in post-reform Indonesia. My interest is in how Indonesian post-Islamism mobilizes in the public sphere to address issues of national and mainstream relevance. Accordingly, I will show how Indonesian post-Islamism competes in shaping the public sphere. But before the discussion continues, in the next section, I will first describe the topography of contemporary Indonesian Islam.

**Topography of Contemporary Indonesian Islam**

Since the fall of Soeharto’s New Order in 1998, Islamic politics has taken on a greater role in Indonesian public life (Ichwan 2013b, 60; Rinaldo 2013, 49; Tanuwidjaja 2010, 29–49). This phenomenon has been widely discussed by Indonesianist scholars (see Hosen 2007; Platzdasch 2009; Porter 2002). Here is not the place to repeat that discussion. Suffice it to say that Indonesian Muslims show diversity of expression that has been seen since the nineteenth century. Diversity appears in the realms of politics, culture and socio-intellectual dynamics.

In the political domain, the reform movement of 1998 facilitated Muslims’ engagement in more substantive electoral democracy and brought about an end to the stifling political environment of the Old Order and New Order. Muslims welcomed the 1999 election with enthusiasm and managed to deliver Abdurrahman Wahid as the country’s fourth president. After the 2004 elections, Islamic parties continued to play important roles. A political coalition led by the Democratic Party, with the support of almost all parties including Muslim mass-based and Islam-principled parties, successfully delivered Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the sixth president. The maintainance of votes of Muslim-based parties such as PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, the National Mandate Party) and PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, the Awakening State Party), and the increased number of votes for PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, the Prosperous Justice Party) was the ticket for them to remain in the vortex of power when the prospective incumbent returned to win the 2009 election. In the 2014 election, the only Muslim mass-based party represented this time within the circle of power was PKB, as the regime has moved to the control of the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) with the former mayor of Solo, Joko Widodo, chosen as Indonesia’s seventh president.
In the cultural domain, Indonesia has seen rising militant Islamism which is characterized by the strengthening of religious symbols, the growth of Islamic institutions, as well as the emergence of a new lifestyle based on Islam (Hasan 2009, 230). A conservative current, morally rigorist and often intolerant of religious minorities, has seen its influence grow within Muslim organizations and beyond (Feillard, Madinier, and Wong 2011, 272). Accordingly, Indonesia's successful transition to democracy has not been accompanied by an increase in individual religious freedom. While the vigilante groups use antidemocratic violence, they share a common goal with those large swaths of civil society seeking to live in a nation where belief in God is part of the overlapping consensus necessary for a functioning democracy (Menchik 2014, 619, 2016, 91). Something that should be underlined is that most Indonesian Muslims do not agree with the use of jihād for violence, such as terrorist bombings, demolition, or raids that cause human casualties and loss of property (Sakai and Fauzia 2014, 55).

Faith-based consumerism and Islamic pop culture have developed variants that previously might have been inconceivable. Islam-based print media such as magazines, pamphlets, books, and novels are growing rapidly (Hasan 2009, 230). Electronic publications via radio, television, internet, film, cassette, DVD or others related to Islam are increasingly widespread and confirm the connectedness of Islam and pop culture (Akmaliah 2015, 351–73; Saluz 2009, 215–42). The rise of Islam in the public sphere is encouraging the advocates of Islamism and post-Islamism, although both groups have different understandings of the phenomenon.

In the social-intellectual arena, Islamic discourse has been enlivened by the emergence of diverse blocs of Islamic thought which are willing to articulate Islam with democracy, modernity, and secularism; or reject these ideas altogether. They appear in an individual capacity or as representatives of institution or community. At each entity within civil society, one can also find figures that Gramsci (1971) would refer to as public intellectuals to speak for the community. Thus, it is not surprising, some terms such as “NU intellectual”, “Muhammadiyah intellectual”, “HTI intellectual” and so forth are known to us. The post-reform era has facilitated the emergence of Muslim intellectuals who vary towards incorporating Islam.
The dynamics of contemporary Islam in the post-reform era can also be tracked through the activities of Muslim women. Budianta (2003, 171) suggests that “in Indonesia in particular, the economic crisis and the multidimensional upheavals that followed were blessed tragedy for the overall course of the women’s movement”. According Suryakusuma (2011), the notion “state ibuism” (mother-ism) of the New Order as an intermediary matriarchal hegemony against women, inspired feminist groups to mobilize resistance. Continuous oppression of women has changed them. Not only secular feminism but religious feminism also played an important role. They came with various strategies, but the movement crystallized around the goal of achieving gender equality. They mobilized religion not only as a source of guidance in a personal life, but also as the basis of values for the management of social life.

Furthermore, Islam had specific regional dynamics. After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, the loosening of centralized control over local governance emerged as a major theme in the new national movement for political and social reform. The 1999 Act on Local Governance set the basic terms for devolution of some governmental powers to the district and municipality levels. Although authority over religious affair was not among the areas devolved to district-level governments, some local leaders nevertheless interpreted decentralization as empowering them to implement regional regulations (peraturan daerah, perda) relating to morality, dress, and other aspects of life traditionally covered Islamic law (Feener 2013b, 137–38). This has had unfortunate consequences, not least insofar as the dictum of sharia-nuanced regional regulations has ignored the reality of religious diversity in Indonesia.2

Robin Bush (2008, 174–77) states that “formalization of Islamic law in Indonesia” is marked by the emergence of bylaws (peraturan daerah) on sharia regulations. Bush identified at least 78 sharia-nuanced bylaws after one decade of Indonesia’s reform. Based on characteristics of sharia bylaws, as much as 45 percent (35 regulations) are categorized as regulations relating to morality, while the other 55 percent (43 regulations) are concerned strictly with Islamization. Of the 43 regulations categorized into the latter group, 40 percent (17 regulations) relate to the requirement for students, children, couples who want to get married, and others to be able to read the Quran; as much as 33 percent (14 regulations) requires students, and the community in general, to adopt an Islamic dress code, as well as 27
percent (12 regulations) relating to regulation of almsgiving (zakat) (Bush 2008, 178–79).

The formalization of Islamic law increasingly gained its momentum when President BJ. Habibie in 1999 issued the a special autonomy to Aceh. For the central government, granting special autonomy was part of the problem-solving strategies to overcome separatism, while the implementation of sharia law for Aceh was “social engineering” forming “a new Aceh”, which would be synonymous with Islam both politically and culturally (Feener 2012, 275–311). However, the implementation of Islamic law has not been accepted unanimously by the people of Aceh. Residents who live on the border of the provinces of Aceh and Sumatra Utara, such as the district of Aceh Tenggara, responded negatively to the implementation of sharia law. Similarly, progressive Muslim activists and some women affected by the implementation of Islamic law not only objected, but also articulated resistance, although this was done symbolically or not frankly (see Afrianty 2011, 37–68).

The topography of Islam in the post-reform era is much more colorful than the previous regime (Old Order and New Order). Santrinisasi which began to emerge in the second half of the New Order got going rapidly. Diverse categories of Islam, such as radical Islam, salafi, conservative, fundamentalist, traditionalist, modernist, liberal, post-Islamist, and so forth are competing for the newly liberated public sphere. Each has its own perspective, although the boundary distinguishing between groups is often unclear. The following narrative discusses Indonesian post-Islamism and its contestation in the remaking of the Islamic public sphere by focusing on four themes, i.e. the post-Islamist intellectuals, Muslim women’s movement, dynamics of Islamic pop-culture, and dynamics of sharia law in Aceh.

**Islamic Public Sphere in Contestation**

**Post-Islamist Intellectuals in the Post-reform Era**

The socio-political circumstances that forms the experience of Indonesian post-Islamist intellectuals is different from the post-Islamist intellectuals in the Middle East or other Muslim countries. The background of post-Islamist intellectuals in Iran was previously Islamist, and some of them are former government officials who were appointed following the revolution. But the disappointment over
the result of the revolution brought them around to rethinking the position of religion in the context of nation (Bayat 2007b, 85–86). Similarly, the post-Islamist intellectuals in Pakistan were transformed from Islamist activists (Amin 2010). Dagi (2013) even asserted that the post-Islamist activists who hold the reins of power in Turkey today (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) are in fact Islamists who changed the strategy of their movement to be seen as more inclusive, in response to the current socio-political condition.

This is in contrast with Indonesian post-Islamist intellectuals, who from the beginning rejected Islamism and accepted the finality of Pancasila as the state principle by mobilizing Islam as the basis of their argument. They conscientiously adopt modernity, emphasizing these ideas as a “critical reasoning” which is as important to modern life, rationality, freedom, respect for human rights, pluralism, science and the free market. At the same time, they promote the importance of faith, spirituality, and religion-based ethics in managing the nation-state.

The Indonesian post-Islamists have emerged as a result of the semi-systematic regeneration by previous intellectuals, especially Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Both Madjid and Wahid, as shown in a number of studies, represented the flow of contemporary Indonesian Islamic thought. Madjid (1939-2005) in the 1970s launched a movement for a radical renewal of Muslim thinking under the provocative slogan “Islam Yes! Islamic Party No!” (Kersten 2015a, 38). His thoughts soon became widespread since the polemics of his short paper that examined the issue of secularization and modernization were delivered in a public discussion forum (Barton 1997). Meanwhile Wahid (1940-2009), also known as “Gus Dur”, was a NU intellectual who called for indigenization of Islam (pribumisasi Islam) in the context of Indonesian-ness. The idea of pribumisasi Islam rests on interdependence between religion and culture in daily life (Mujiburrahman 1999, 342). The efforts of Madjid and Wahid to “Indonesianize” Islam then influenced significantly the character of Indonesian Muslims in formulating religion-state relations.

Indonesian post-Islamist intellectuals articulate their ideas through various institutions. Key bodies (and some of their leading intellectuals) include Paramadina (Budhy Munawwar-Rahman, Luthfi Assyaukanie), JIMM ([Network of Young Intellectuals of Muhammadiyah] Zuly Qodir), Fahmina Institute (Husein Muhammad), LKiS ([Lembaga

The majority of Indonesian post-Islamist intellectuals grew up in the santri tradition and also attended higher education in an Indonesian or foreign university (Niam 2008), either Middle Eastern or Western. Therefore, they have the ability to access broadly a vast range of Islamic sources, be it the Qur’an, hadith, or the thought of classic scholars. Niam (2010, 311) notes, “what is interesting to note is that although contemporary Indonesian intellectuals were educated in Western schools and stood in close contact to western thought and culture, they were nonetheless interested in their own culture and realized the necessity of its implementation in society”. They may have had Western education, but they speak and write using Islamic terminology, standards, and values (Federspiel 1992, 246).

Indonesian post-Islamist intellectuals tried to combine western culture and the heritage of Islamic culture. They reflected a deliberate attempt to forge an identity and orientation of thought that distinguished the group from both the Islamist and secular intellectuals. Post-Islamist intellectuals felt that a new type of intellectual was needed to replace both the the religious fanatics who were preoccupied with God but ignore humans, and the secular intellectuals who focused on humans alone but neglected God. They offer a balanced linkage between the dimension of divinity and humanity, or Islam with modernism, democracy and secularization (Bayat 2007b, 85). Their ability to integrate both dimensions contributes significantly to the preservation of Islamic moderatism Indonesia. They encourage Islam to play a role in the management of national life, while still promoting religious inclusiveness and multiculturalism, at the same time rejecting all forms of monopoly of Islam in public sphere arrangements.
They explicitly rejected the idea of “Islam is the solution”, a slogan repeatedly pushed by Indonesian radical Islamic groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Liberation Party of Indonesia), the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front), the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Council of Mujahidins), and others. They acknowledge the many limitations of Islam to solve humanitarian problems. Nevertheless, they believe that religious faith must be encouraged, not only because it makes life tolerable by enabling humans to cope with the harsh realities of life, but also because it can provide mechanisms for internal control against individual abuse of others, just as democracy facilitates external control (Bayat 2007b, 91). Unlike the Islamist intellectuals who tend to scapegoat outsiders (mainly Westerners) as the cause of Muslim backwardness, the post-Islamist intellectuals emphasize the internal aspects that hinder the progress of Muslims. They believe Muslims, rather than blaming the West, should strengthen democratic institutions and critical reasoning of fellow Muslims, without ignoring the good things that come from the West (cf. Abdillah 1996, 13–24; see Harvey 2009).

Though they share ideas in responding to various religious problems, Indonesian post-Islamist activist groups often compete with each other in coloring the Islamic public sphere. As an example, I will describe the contest between Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL, Liberal Islamic Network) and the Wahid Institute as proponents of post-traditional Islam. JIL was set up in Jakarta in 2002 by group of Jakarta-based young intellectuals such as Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Luthfi Assyaukanie, Saiful Mujani, and Ahmad Sahal. They organized discussions, seminars, and workshops to disseminate liberal, progressive views on Islam. They also established an active website and moderated a chat group online as an interactive forum for critical debate on Islam (Hasan 2013a, 168–69). Meanwhile, the Wahid Institute was established by group young Muslim intellectuals affiliated to the largest mainstream Muslim organization, NU. The founders included Ahmad Suaedy, Rumadi and Abdul Moqsith Ghazali. The Wahid Institute has been active in organizing a campaign for tolerant Islam, pluralism, and religious freedom. Various innovative programs have been introduced both to facilitate communication and cooperation between Muslim and non-Muslim progressive intellectuals and to enhance Muslim intellectuals’ capacity to raise awareness among grassroots Muslims of the importance of pluralism and democracy (Hasan 2013a, 169).
Ulil Abshar-Abdalla has criticized the strategy of post-traditionalist movements. Ulil argued that the emergence of the Islamic post-traditionalist community represented the failure of NU youth to establish dialogue with outside reality, as well as their disappointment and jealousy toward other communities. Post-traditionalism, in Ulil’s view, is a more sophisticated method to preserve the conflict between PMII and HMI, between NU and Muhammadiyah, and between modernists and the traditionalists (cf. Rumadi 2015, 251). Meanwhile, Jadul Maula (a founder of LKiS in Yogyakarta and NU youth activist), based his interviews with Rumadi, reveals that the agenda and movements of the liberal Islamic community give the impression of being elitist and do not address real problems in society (cf. Rumadi 2015, 132). Similarly, Rumadi (2015, 132) says that post-traditionalist Islam with its various paradigmatic elaborations seeks to develop a populist religious concept related to real issues in society. Rumadi (2015, 186–87) argues that Islamic post-traditionalism can be seen as an alternative and a model of Islamic thought which has been formed through a sufficiently lengthy dialectic process between the wealth of Islamic traditional Islamic sciences and other scholarship. The contestation among JIL and the Wahid Institute explains multiple contemporary Indonesian post-Islamists.

Indonesian post-Islamist intellectuals disseminate their ideas through books published both in Indonesia and abroad (García 2004, 121–45; Muzakki 2007, 419–46, 2009; Watson 2005, 177–210). We know that Indonesia’s publishing houses, such as Gramedia, Erlangga, Mizan, Serambi, Pustaka Pelajar, Gema Insani Press, Pustaka al-Kautsar, and others are focused on publishing Islamic books. Likewise LKiS, one of the publishers of Islamic books and social science which is managed by young NU affiliates, actively disseminates the ideas of progressive Islam. According to Watson (2005, 179),

“The proliferation and high visibility of these religious publications in Indonesia today believes the fact that this ready availability of Muslim reading material is a relatively new phenomenon, the origins and development of which require some description. As we shall see, the manner in which these developments have occurred tells us much about the nature of Indonesian Muslim culture and the dissemination of new ideas within the community at large.”

In addition, post-Islamist intellectuals also speak at numerous conferences, symposia, and seminars assembled to discuss national
issues or rally support for national policies, and they write extensively in prominent journals designed to promote the interests of nation or the Muslim community. According to Kersten (2015a, 46), “two prominent academic outlets are *Studia Islamika* and *Al-Jamiah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, which were started by intellectuals associated with the State Islamic Institutes in Jakarta and Yogyakarta”. Their ideas also spread through educational institutions, Islamic circles, lectures on radios and televisions, magazines, and online activities. All televisions have talk-show programs and religious services. National newspapers like *Kompas*, *Tempo*, the *Jakarta Post* or *Republika* are media that to some extent provide a place for post-Islamist intellectuals to articulate their ideas. Through various channels, their ideas influence the formation of the Islamic public sphere in contemporary Indonesia.

**Women Activists and the Islamic Public Sphere**

The Islamic public sphere “has been an arena of contest in which activists and militants brought forth challenges to traditional interpretative practices and authority to speak for Islam, especially to articulate its social interests and political agendas” (Anderson 2003, 887). As examined many previous studies, the contestation takes place between groups that want to show the totality of Islam, emphasizing the substantive dimension of Islam, and those who negate its presence in the public sphere (For details, see Baso 1999; Effendy 1998; Farhi 2001, 315–39; Hefner 2000; Maarif 1985; Noer 1996). Here is not the place to repeat those discussions. Instead, this section will only explore the contestation among Indonesian post-Islamist women activists in the remaking Islamic public sphere in the post-reform era.

Before continuing the discussion, it is important to point out that different religious and political contexts underlie the emergence of post-Islamist women’s movements in Iran, Egypt, and Indonesia (the former two being the subject of Bayat’s studies). Significantly, these differences affect the characteristics of post-Islamist women’s movement in each country. Bayat (2007b, 71–84) argues the sociopolitical context that underlies the emergence of women’s post-Islamist Iran is an annoyance at the outcomes of Iran’s revolution. According to him, persistent oppression against women transformed them into revolution supporters’ groups actively expressing protest against the post-revolutionary government. A number of actions provoked
this response, such as Khomeini’s cancellation of the Iranian Family Protection Act of 1967, cancelling the appointment of female judges, limiting women’s rights to initiate divorce, and prohibiting women from travelling alone without a male mahram. Besides these, under Islamic law in force in Iran since the 1979 revolution, women were forced to observe an Islamic dress code: they must wear loose clothing, known as hijab or chador. At the same time, restrictions on polygamy were removed. All these new rules made revolution supporters’ groups reconsider support for the government.

Bayat (2007b, 155–61) showed the different forms of socio-political circumstances in Iran and Egypt. While women post-Islamists in Egypt were born from the conversion of the secular middle class, creating people who actively promoted personal piety though non-politically (Mahmood 2001, 2005), female post-Islamists in Iran moved in the opposite direction: from proponents of Islamism toward opposition against the Islamist-ruled government (Kian 1997). Bayat argued that women of the middle-class in Egypt are generally more likely to increase piety compared to other social groups for their sins, because their space is much larger than the other classes have access to. As a member of the middle class, they are very likely to attend night clubs, bars, binge drink, dance, date, or appear “half naked” on the beach. Therefore, to get back to tranquility and peace, they feel the need to repent and obey orders, often joining the community of faith. Unlike post-Islamist Iranian women who are active in responding to the social and political situation, the phenomenon of post-Islamists in Egypt instead encourages women to immerse themselves in the promotion of personal piety and politics to avoid crowds.

Indonesia’s experiences in a number of things differ in many ways from Iran’s and Egypt’s. It should be remembered that neither Islamism nor secularism formed the backdrop of post-Islamist women in Indonesia. As indicated in the previous section, Indonesian post-Islamists originally opened a space against secularization that used theological arguments. In line with this understanding, even if Indonesian post-Islamist women activists have strong Islamic tradition backgrounds, they still strongly rejected the use of Islam as the only value system in Indonesia’s public space. Indonesian post-Islamists have not only rejected Islamic state images, but also actively promoted the establishment of a gender-sensitive constitution and, at the same time,
respected the plurality of Indonesian society. Regardless of the different sociopolitical contexts that underlie their emergence, it is important to recognize the same characteristics of post-Islamist women in a number of countries such as Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, or other Muslim-majority countries.

Post-Islamist women share views on issues related gender and religion in public spaces. Post-Islamist women intellectuals equipped Muslim women with the conceptual resources necessary to sustain their struggles. They set out to deconstruct the patriarchal readings of the scriptures, offering gender-sensitive perceptions that would allow women to be equal with men, to take on social and political positions as judges, legislators, mayors, governors, or presidents. The post-Islamist women activists, familiar with both the western feminist debates and Qur’anic teachings, are struggling within the Islamic discourse to revoke those anti-women laws and practices that are said to have religious justifications (Bayat 1996, 48). They articulate a blend of piety and freedom, between the religiousness and the rights. The agenda of their movement is not rooted in the text of the abstract formulations, but the everyday experiences of women. They embrace Islam in all its totality as a system that can accommodate the rights of women, only when viewed from a feminist lens (Bayat 2007b, 76). While establishing strict adherence to Islam practices, they reinterpret religious doctrines to be relevant to the principles of gender equality and justice.

Indonesian post-Islamist women are not a monolithic entity. Some may be shocked to see the contestation of post-Islamist women activists in Muslim Indonesia in the remaking public sphere. Rachel Rinaldo, for example, shows the contestation through four case studies of women’s organizations, namely Fatayat NU, Rahima, PKS women and Women’s Solidarity (Solidaritas Perempuan) (Rinaldo 2008, 1781–1804, 2013, 62–191). The activists have mixed responses on various issues such as polygyny, pornography, abortion, women’s leadership, women’s careers, fashion, as well as various other themes related to women and nationality (see Aryanti 2013, 375–88; Dewi 2008, 161–85; Doorn-Harder 2002, 164–90). Based on the notion of critical pious agency, Rinaldo reveals that Indonesian post-Islamist women use different paths to mobilize piety in coloring Indonesia’s public space construction.

As an example of post-Islamist women’s activism, the author will review a cursory debate about polygyny. In 2004, a group driven by...
a leading post-Islamist woman activist, Musdah Mulia, urged the government to prohibit the practice of polygamy and impose strict sanctions for perpetrators of unofficial marriage (nikah siri). They launched the Counter Legal Draft of the Compilation of Islamic Law (CLD KHI [Kompilasi Hukum Islam]), proposing the abolition of polygamy.\(^7\) While the legality of polygamy in the Muslim majority view was based on a literal understanding of the Qur’an, Surat al-Nisā’, verse 3, post-Islamist women activists proposed an empirical argument based on everyday experience about the negative impacts of polygamy for women and children (see Nurmila 2009). The proposal for the government to prohibit polygamy soon became a public controversy. Not only in religious discussion forums, Islamic circles, and campuses, the polygamy theme even was discussed in the realm of pop culture (television, radio, media). Quite a lot of books discussing the polygamy were published during post-reform Indonesia.\(^8\)

A more recent public debate on polygamy appeared on November 30, 2006, when Detik news agency revealed the secret second marriage of a famous preacher, Kyai Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym). This sparked public debate in much of the national and local media, which again pointed to the generally negative attitudes about his polygamy, notably by spreading a campaign through SMS messages to boycott his preaching (Nurmila 2009, 76–77). The television camera ate it up, and for several weeks the scandal became fodder for popular gossip magazines and television programs. As a result, his audience dropped dramatically. Hosterey (2012, 212–13; 2016, 175–87) reported that after Aa Gym’s polygamous marriage became known to the public, the number of visitors to Aa Gym’s pesantren was down 80 percent. He lost his pending television contract, and his business empire started to crumble. For several years before the polygamy revelation, each weekend at Daarut Tauhiid had the crowded, energetic atmosphere of a festival. After the revelation, the only ones dining in the nearby food stall were local college students and a hawker of tabloids. Seemingly overnight Daarut Tauhiid turned into a ghost town.

The post-Islamist women represented by Fatayat NU and Rahima participated in demonstrations and other events criticizing polygamy. In the wake of the Aa Gym case, for example, they helped to organize an International Women’s Day celebration with the theme of rejecting polygamy as violence against women and children (Rinaldo 2013, 98–
Fatayat and Rahima acknowledge that the Quran allows men to marry four wives, but they maintain that the verse about polygamy needs to be understood with regard to its historical context in the sixth century. Meanwhile, PKS women express a different view of polygamy. PKS women’s statements about polygamy show how they approach the Qur’an. While some women acknowledged that they dislike the practice, they agreed with the PKS leadership that polygamy cannot be outlawed because it is explicitly permitted in the Qur’an (Rinaldo 2008, 1792, 2013, 144–45).

Indonesian post-Islamist women activists have been creative in composing good strategies for their movements through discussion and education to synthesize religion and secularism. Sometimes they apply euphemistic concepts of Western feminism which are received less well by certain Islamic communities (such as pesantren). They utilize information media such as television, radio, publishing, the Internet, social media, or the like to disseminate ideas in order to foster public discussion. In the following section, I will show a post-Islamist activist’s attempt to use popular culture to color the Islamic public sphere. I will also witness, for example, the debate over polygamy among post-Islamist activists on the popular culture stage.

Post-Islamism and Islamic Pop Culture

As the New Order regime collapsed and the valves of democracy opened in Indonesia, public space was ornamented by the emergence of Islamic pop culture. Pop culture has become an important arena through which Muslims in contemporary Indonesia constitute ideas about Islam, piety and gender. Muslim intellectuals, novelists, producers and directors, artists, musicians and others are the bearers of the treatises of pop culture who claim to speak in the name of Islam or both Islam and nation (Hoesterey and Clark 2012, 207).

The development of an Islamic pop culture has taken place in Indonesia where Islam has become part of an extensive consumer culture and served as much as an important identity marker as a sign of social status and political affiliation (Hasan 2009, 231; 2013b, 2–3). Heryanto (2014, 49–73) has argued that popular culture can at times be at the very heart of national politics. Therefore, the emergence of Islamic popular culture after the collapse of the New Order regime describes the position of Islam in the contemporary Indonesia politics. In other word, the
diversity of representations of Islam in the realm of pop culture in the post-reform era, at same time, explains the diversity of Indonesian Islam.

Islamic popular culture such as Islamic cinema, Islamic soap operas (sinetron Islami), print media, fashion, music and so forth, has achieved prominence in post-reform Indonesia. A detailed account of the dynamics of Indonesian Islamic pop culture is beyond the scope of this paper, however. In this section, I will examine only two themes: the encounter of Islam with screen culture and the emergence of Islamic fashion.

Islamic screen culture revolves around popular films. Some famous Islamic movies that were released in the post-reform era include Ayat-ayat Cinta / The Verses of Love (Hanung Bramantyo 2008), Ketika Cinta Bertasbih / When Love Has Prayer Beads (Chaerul Umam 2009), Perempuan Berkalung Sorban / Women Wearing a Turban (Hanung Bramantyo 2009), Berbagi Suami / Love for Share [or sometimes translated Husband for Sharing] (Nia Dinata, 2006), 3 Doa 3 Cinta / 3 Prayers 3 Loves (Nurman Hakim, 2008), Tanda Tanya / Question Mark (Hanung Bramantyo, 2011) and others. These films have raised issues of daily Indonesian life such as gender relations, family life, religious radicalism, pluralism, the new piety, and other national issues as their main themes.

The Islamic themes in Indonesian films have shown how film narratives can be utilized to portray various type of piety, which is not only related to pure worship (ibadah murni) but also the functionality of religion in socio-political life. The various depictions of piety in Indonesian Islamic films have shown the flexibility of Islam in Indonesia as it is addressed to the mass audience. Islam in these films is depicted as the source of inspiration for Muslims to face contemporary life. According to Heryanto (2014, 48), more than simply illustrating the tensions between the desire for wealth and moral respect during the current Islamization of Indonesia, the production and reception of selected Indonesian films constitute a critical site for the forceful expression of conflicts, negotiations and attempts to reconcile the conflicting parties and ideologies.

Although Ayat-ayat Cinta and Berbagi Suami, for instance, make polygamy the main narrative point, each speaks from different perspectives. The first film offers an sympathetic attitude towards polygamy, while the latter strongly criticizes polygamy (see Barker
Ayat-ayat Cinta depicts the trials and tribulations of Fahri Abdullah, an Indonesian student living in Cairo. The film tells the story of how Fahri is studying at al-Azhar University, but there are almost no scenes that show Fahri’s activities attending lectures in the classroom. The movie depicts instead Fahri’s romantic life with his two wives (Aisha and Maria). The portrayal of Fahri’s life with his two wives in one home really attracts the emotions of audiences as it relates to human love and women’s sacrifice (Hakim 2010, 114–15).

Berbagi Suami has a contrasting depiction and representation that opposes polygamy. The film challenges the state ideology of the united and inclusive patriarchal family in other ways, too (Chin 2012, 147). The film’s portrayal of gender-based inequality in family power relations and of the abuse of this inequality are made even more glaring through the depiction of polygamous relationships. Examples of gender inequity and injustice abound in the narrative of Pak Lik and his wives. One of the problems is highlighted through Sri, Pak Lik’s first wife, who unknowingly contracts a venereal disease from him and is persuaded by Siti to seek treatment at clinic. Sri’s story reflects lower class women’s lack of access to education on health and family planning. Moreover, the film calls attention to the manner in which women are reduced to sexual objects and playthings; all the co-wives are at the beck and call of Pak Lik, and in Siti’s case she is even deprived of right to say “no” to sex (Chin 2012, 144).

In contrast, polygamy in the film Ayat-ayat Cinta is depicted in a more conservative manner. It appears more as a solution for some problems rather than as a condition for conflict. Sexual desire is not seen as a reason for Fahri to practice polygamy; this is indicated by his disapproval of the marriage proposal of Nurul’s uncle. Rather, it is religious and humanistic reasons that encourage Aisha to command her husband to marry a Coptic lady for his second wife. In short, polygamy is by no means widely permitted in this film. The reason is that even though some conflicts occurring in their marriage are always finally solved, still the dramatic and complicated conflicts that arise before and after the marriage likely foreshadow the hard life of polygamous family. Nevertheless, “death” as the solution to the conflict which provides the film’s happy ending can strengthen the message (Huda 2010, 57–58).
Less than a year after Ayat-ayat Cinta’s mega success, it became apparent that the controversy about its Islamic value had not ended. The discourse about Islam in screen culture was enlarged through the film Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. Perempuan Berkalung Sorban was the first time marriage between Islam and feminism was portrayed in a film, and it engendered criticism against traditionalist Islam (Sasono 2013, 64). Perempuan Berkalung Sorban laid out the harshest critiques against the dark sides of patriarchy that still take place in the Indonesian Muslim community. Through this movie, the director Hanung Bramantyo described the majority of Muslim men as the typical egoistic person, irrational, intolerant, and immoral or tyrannical. The Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI, a quasi-governmental association of Islamic scholars established during the Suharto era) criticized the film as misrepresenting the ulama and leading the ummat into heresy. On the other hand, the feminist movement and “progressive” Muslims thought that the film is really brave in uncovering one of the unquestioned misdeeds that has been conducted by traditional ulama, which is to disregard women and base that denigration on Islamic teachings (Sasono 2013, 64). Regardless of the controversy, these films contributed in enriching the representation of gender and Islam in the popular culture sphere.

Screen culture also responds well to the growing tendency of intolerance, religious radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia in the post-reform era. The film 3 Doa 3 Cinta showed the phenomenon of transnational religious movements and their impact on public schools, particularly as regards religious radicalism. Some scenes in the movie show how a group of people whose backgrounds are not mentioned recruit students for involvement in bombings. Nurman Hakim’s film 3 Doa 3 Cinta does not project a utopian vision of Islam. Rather, Hakim explores terrorism, homoerotic play and same-sex relations in Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) (Hoesterey and Clark 2012, 220–21). Similarly, the film Tanda Tanya shows the complexity of the roots of religious radicalism in the Indonesian Muslim community. The plot of Tanda Tanya has a multicultural society’s harmony overshadowed by threats of religious radicalism. Throughout this movie, religious radicalism is not only described as a result of doctrinal factors, but also an outcome of economic issues, politics, culture, family, and sometimes even one’s personal life.
Furthermore, the dynamics of pop culture are linked to the dynamics of urban fashion in Muslim society. It is something undoubted that the fashion world transformed in a more religious direction in the last two decades (since 1990s). Needless to say, the encounter between religion, piety and consumerism in the fashion arena has established Islamic hybridity. The trend of the veil (*hijab*) that emerged in the early 1990s, for example, experienced a significant metamorphosis in the post-reform era (see Brenner 1996, 673–97; Smith-Hefner 2007, 389–420). Nancy Smith-Hefner (2007, 414) suggest that “jilbab, kerudung, cadar, fongki—the different form that Javanes veiling takes represent different visions of Islam, different constructions of community, and different ways of engaging modern pluralism”. Meanwhile Suzanne Brenner (1996) has shown that veiling practices during the New Order regime as an expression of transformation, ownership of individual responsibility in a strong patriarchal society.

The *hijab*, before becoming a marker of traditionalism and conservatism, shifted in meaning toward being a symbol of Islamic popular culture and cosmopolitanism. Many artists appear on television wearing the veil, both as a natural expression of everyday life as well as part of soap opera or movie acting. Veiling tutorials circulate in the form of DVDs, training programs, as well as television shows that almost always get a lot of followers. We also witness the emergence of magazines that specifically report the development of Islamic dress fashion. Annisa R Beta reveals that the emergence of hijabers community (*komunitas Hijaber*), who voluntarily campaign it to young urban Muslims in Indonesian, as a cultural practices and reproduction of individual piety in public sphere (Beta 2014, 377–89; cf. Jones 2010, 617–37).

The development of models and variations of Islamic dress that adorn Islamic public spheres sometimes confuse religious authorities. While Islamic dress is associated with the expression of personal piety, at the same time, in pop culture, such motives are not always prioritized. Ma’ruf Amin, Vice Chairman of the MUI, in mid-2014 for example, prohibited the wearing of headscarves combined with super tight dress as response to the controversy emergence of *jilboobs* (a variant hijab fashion, combined with super tight dress). In the pop culture landscape of *hijab* variants, such model is actually something predominant. As Featherstone (2001) has shown, pop culture is characterized by the
reversal of religious orthodoxy and glorification of consumerism and aesthetics. In the landscape of popular culture, the hijab's multiple and often contradictory meanings can no longer be controlled (Heryanto 2014, 48). The hijab is no longer seen as a marker of personal piety alone, but a carefully calculated combination of aesthetics, consumerism, and religious identity (Beta 2014, 380).

The phenomenon of the Islamic movie above shows the characteristic of Indonesian Islamic pop culture. It is different from, for example, experiences of Malaysian pop-Islamism (Müller 2014) as well as Iranian post-Islamism. Based on dynamics of the Youth Wing (Dewan Pemuda) of Partai Islam se-Malaysia (PAS), Müller showed the role of a political party in forming Islamic pop culture. Malaysian Pop-Islamism is part of PAS's strategy to gain a large number of members in order to realize its political goals, i.e. Islamization through the state as well as society. Meanwhile the emergence of populist cinema in the post-revolutionary Iran upholds the ruling ideology. Non-Islamic cinema in Iran affirms post-revolutionary Islamic values more fully at the level of plot, theme, characterization, mise-en-scene and portrayals of women. Quality cinema engages with those values and tends to critique current social conditions (Naëcy 2000, 559). This is different from Indonesian Islamic pop-culture, which is not driven by political mobilization nor by critique toward Islamism as the state ideology. The plurality of Islamic cinema in Indonesia post-reform reflected the diversity of Islamic values in society, rather than the ruling ideology.

**Aceh, State and Islamic Public Sphere**

In 1999, the central government in Jakarta allowed the Provincial Government of Aceh to implement precepts of “syariat Islam”, that is, Islamic law, in religious, cultural and educational matters (Afrianty 2015, 58). Feener (2013b, 2–6) argued that implementation of Islamic law in Aceh is a social engineering project to establish an Islamic Acehnese people by mobilizing power. This privileging of Islamic orthodoxy has been conceptualized by Jeremy Menchik (2014) as “godly nationalism”. The involvement of the state (in this case, the provincial government of Aceh) in the reproduction of the religious public sphere contributes to invigorating the dynamics of Islam in post-reform Indonesia.

The substantive legislation of Islamic law in Aceh is contained
in regional regulations referred to locally as Qānūn. Several Qānūns were promulgated to implement sharia, such as the Qānūn 11/2002 on the implementation of the sharia in the field of Islamic belief (‘aqīdah), worship (‘ibādah) and symbols (shi‘ār); Qānūn 12/2003 on the prohibition of alcohol consumption and the like (khamr); Qānūn 13/2003 on the prohibition of gambling (maysir); and Qānūn 14/2003 on the prohibition of improper relationships between men and women (khalwah) (see Hasan 2013b, 56). For more details, Qānūn 11/2002 regulate such things like mandatory Islamic dress, mandatory Friday prayers, the necessity of Ramadan fasting, the prohibition of religious conversion, and similar issues, providing for worldly as well as existing other-worldly sanctions on violators.

Aceh’s government has also established a set of institutions with the primary task of ensuring the successful implementation of sharia law. The main responsibilities are entrusted to the Department of Islamic Law (DSI, Dinas Syariat Islam), the Shari’a Police (WH, Wilayatul Hisbah), Ulama Consultative Council (MPU, Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama), and the Sharia Court. These four institutions are in charge of ensuring the construction of Aceh’s public sphere in line with the regulations of sharia law (Feener 2013a, 15–32). Efforts are made to socialize the enforcement of sharia law through designated programs: teaching, training, lectures, discussions and installation of billboards and banners about the finer points of Islamic law.

DSI and WH at the district/city level also conduct raids against alcohol consumption, gambling, and “illicit” meetings between men and women, and apply sanctions to violators. These patrols also pushed the women of Aceh to veil themselves, the men to go to the mosque for Friday prayers, and all people to fast during Ramadan. Ill-educated and sometimes brutal, these squads quickly became unpopular amongst the population, and their patrols were sometimes set upon by angry crowds. Their behavior and efficacy were often questioned: it managed to make the life of women who did not wear the veil and that of young illegitimate couples very difficult indeed, yet failed to drive the men to the mosque on Fridays. In particular, the Qānūn Khalwah forbidding proximity of unmarried men and women was wildly implemented by small groups in the population. As for corporal punishment, it was driven not so much by the wish to inflict physical suffering than by desire to publicly humiliate and warn: no physical injury must arise
from the cane lashings dispensed during grandiloquent ceremonies (Feillard, Madinier, and Wong 2011, 231).

The narrative above indicates that Aceh’s public sphere is not an arena in which citizens feel free in expressing Islam. The role of residents is only to participate in enlivening the public sphere, insofar as this is in accordance with the guidelines specified by the state. It is understandable that not all regulations of Islamic law have been accepted by the Acehnese. Afrianty (2015, 64) categorize these different views in two groups. The first believes that Islamic legal regulations that derive from sharia principles need to be formalized in the form of public regulations, while the other argues that the formalization of sharia law will only result in the politicization of religion. Those who are of the second view argue that the implementation of Islamic law is part of an attempt by the central government in Jakarta to pacify the Acehnese over socio-economic and political grievances. They argue that Islamic law in Aceh is not a divine law that comes from God, so it is open to criticism. They believe that the current sets of Islamic legal regulations are merely political decisions that can be amended.

Current studies show the resistance of some Acehnese against the enforcement of sharia law. The most renowned works written by Reza Idria, Moch. Nur Ichwan, and Reed Taylor address the dynamics of the formation of counter publics. Idria examines cultural resistance of civil society in Aceh against shariatism. Many books and media articles have been written by contemporary Acehnese intellectuals such as Fuad Mardhatillah (2009, 63–102), Affan Ramli (2010), and Husni Mubarak A. Latief (2009, 111–22). They have criticised this version of sharia as a “top down policy” formulated without popular consent. Towards the end of 2009, when the draft Qānūn Jināyah (Islamic Criminal Law) was published through the mass media, hundreds of activists from the Civil Society Network of People Concerned about Sharia (JMSPS, Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil Peduli Syariah) protested and refused to promulgate the bill (Idria 2016, 256–57). The movement was successful to urge the governor to postpone the ratification of the draft of Qanun Jinayah. But this success did not last long, because in 2014, in the period of leadership of Governor Zaini Abdullah, the regulation was passed on the full vote from the Aceh legislature.

Ichwan also shows progressive Muslim criticism against the implementation of sharia law in Aceh. Ichwan (2013a, 151) explores
alternative sharia voices of progressive Muslim intellectual activists, NGO activists, gender activists, tarikat communities, and LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transsexual) activists in Banda Aceh. Ruwaida, a member of Women Solidarity of Aceh (Solidaritas Perempuan Aceh) said that her institution focuses on pushing for the implementation of Islamic bylaw to accommodate the principles of gender equality and human rights (personal communication, December 19, 2014). When carrying out my research in Banda Aceh in September 2013, Teuku Muhammad Jafar, an NGO activist at FIRLA (Forum Islam Ruhmatan Lil ‘Alamin; Islamic Forum of Blessing for the Universe), helped to introduce me to a number of activists across religious, ethnic, cultural and sexual orientation lines who were preparing a series of activities in commemoration of world peace. Jafar said that the activity aimed at articulating the importance of developing Aceh after conflict and tsunami, placing the diversity of religious communities, ethnicity and culture as social reality that should be honored (personal communication, September 4, 2013). Ichwan argues (2013a, 137–79), the voice of progressive Muslim activists represents a counter to the standardization of sharia committed by the state. Despite the criticism against shariatism, Aceh’s post-Islamist activists have created non-sharia spheres against domination of the state (in this case, the provincial government of Aceh) and Islamic scholars (ulama) in the public sphere.

Taylor (2015, 289–301) traces female resistance against state domination over the Islamic public sphere. Taylor introduces the notion of heterotopia when explaining the diverse meanings of sharia law within the imagination of women in Aceh. According to him, the imagination of women in Aceh regarding the implementation of Islamic law is not always the same as the imagination of the elite clergy or local government authorities. Taylor classifies the responses of Acehnese women into three groups: who tend to agree, those who reject, and women who do not feel any impact from the implementation of sharia law. The first group sees the implementation of sharia as required, while the latter two groups are of different views. Sharia law in the everyday experiences of the latter two groups of women is not useful, and not a few of those had bad experiences as a result of the implementation of sharia law.

Ansor (2014a, 60–83) more specifically discusses Langsa women’s symbolic resistance. Using the notion of James C. Scott’s hidden
transcripts (1985, 1990), Ansor shows that women’s resistance against the disciplining of the female body in the name of sharia, although done in silences and unorganized. Resistance is expressed through (1) redefining the conception of piety in different ways from the official understanding of the state; (2) redefining the reason behind wearing Islamic dress; (3) deligitimatizing the authority of state sharia apparatus through gossip, rumors or defamations; (4) revealing satire, memes and criticisms through online media; as well as (5) localizing regulatory compliance towards sharia only in particular times and certain places.

For a detailed description of the emergence of resistance against sharia in the public sphere, the following are my research findings from fieldwork carried out in Langsa in 2012. Qānūn No. 14/2003 on khalwah (Seclusion), for example, banned opposite-sex couples from being alone together (seclusion). The regulation defined seclusion as “action by two or more people without legal bond (marriage) in nonpublic place” (Article 1, paragraph 2). The concept of seclusion does not cover acts such as dating in public space. To avoid such regulation, some teenagers in Langsa date while riding motorcycles. That phenomenon can be easily found in Langsa where on Thursday and Saturday nights, some teenagers assemble in pairs on the Langsa Ring Road on motorcycles. This is done to avoid raids by the Islamic police (WH). This phenomenon, indeed, confuses the Islamic police. Most of the Islamic police debate on whether they have the authority to arrest people with no legal bonds riding motorcycles in the crowd. Moreover, the legal loophole in the regulation also inspires the emergence of a number of coffee shops designed to accommodate the teenagers who want to date without any fear of being netted by Islamic police. Thus, a number of coffee shops were opened and these places were loaded with teenage couples.

The depiction above reveals the creativity of the Acehnese people in producing resistance narratives against the state dominations. The true public sphere is an arena of contestation for diverse perspectives, values and interests. Therefore, responding to state control, they come up with a counterpublics (Warner 2002). Warner describes counterpublics as self-organized; they emerge out of shared concerns (Warner 2002, 69). Meanwhile Qian (2014, 603) said that “counterpublic spheres provide underrepresented social groups with opportunities to speak out in one’s own voice to enact and express diverse social positions and
Counterpublics, according to Kuppinger (2011, 33) “not only strive to make their voices heard; more importantly they work to fundamentally remake feature, discourses, and types of public engagement”.

In line with this, al-Na‘īm, (2008) suggests that state policies for the regulation of the public sphere are constituted through the process of “civic reason”. The notion “civic” here refers to “the need for policy and legislation to be accepted by the public at large, as well as for the process of reasoning on the matter to remain open and accessible to all citizens”. By invoking civic reason, al-Na‘īm points out that the rationale and the purpose of public policy must be based on the sort of reasoning that most citizens can accept or reject. Citizens must be able to make counterproposals through public debate without being open to charges about their religious piety (Al-Na‘īm 2008, 7–8). The post-Islamist activists’ struggle in Aceh is to create a public sphere that is really a match for the neutralization of sharia public sphere promoted by the Acehness elites. The dynamics of Aceh’s society strengthen the argument regarding diversity of the Indonesian Islamic public sphere.

Concluding Remarks

When using the notion of post-Islamism to analyze the dynamics of the contemporary Indonesian Islamic pop, Heryanto (2014) recognizes this concept is derived from the socio-political context and historical experiences that are different for Muslim Indonesia. Post-Islamism emerged in the context of post-revolutionary Iran (Bayat 2007b, 2013) and secularism in Turkey (Dagi 2013). The emergence of the Iranian post-Islamism stemmed from the anxiety and disappointment of its followers after a decade of revolution, while the Turkish post-Islamist movement emerged as a response to the hegemony of coercive secularism which was used officially by the state. Regardless of these differences, the notion of post-Islamism is still helpful to explain the dynamics of contemporary Indonesian Islam.

This paper suggests that post-Islamism has contributed significantly to the reproduction of the public sphere in post-reform Indonesia. Post-Islamism is not only thriving in the political sphere, but also in the academic tradition, popular culture, and even the daily life of Indonesia Muslims. As this article demonstrates, Indonesian post-Islamism not only has a varied expression, but also competes in the remaking of
the Islamic public sphere. My findings show that the disposition of post-Islamism in Indonesia differs from other scholars’ findings such as Bayat, Dagi and Müller, who tend to place post-Islamism as monolithic communities. The dynamics of Indonesian post-Islamism challenge the notion that the public sphere is a homogenous, secular and liberal democratic site.

To conclude as preliminary study, I believe that this article is only able to observe the arena of “surface” dynamics of contemporary Indonesian Islam. Many of the interesting issues can be elaborated more in depth through future research. Correlating the theme of post-Islamism with Islamic pop culture, for example, post-Islamist intellectual genealogies and gender relations are actually topics that can be developed in separate research. Alternatively, the dynamics of Acehnese post-Islamism after sharia law would constitute a challenging theme. In my opinion, the study about post-Islamism in Indonesia can be reached by at least two approaches, i.e. thematic and geographical. The first model is done by connecting post-Islamism with certain contemporary discourses, while the second model by tracing the dynamics of post-Islamism in certain areas in Indonesia.
Endnotes

1. I greatly appreciate to three anonymous reviewers and the editors of Studia Islamika for providing detailed commentary and helpful suggestions for revisions on earlier versions of this article. My deepest thanks go also to Kevin W. Fogg (Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, University of Oxford), M. Enay Saputro (IAIN Surakarta) and my colleagues at IAIN Langsa (Yaser Amri, Mhd. Rasid Ritonga, Budi Juliandi and Cut Intan Meutia) for critical comments and editing my English that elevated this paper to its current state. In no way, however, are they responsible for the opinion and data contained within it.

2. I recognize the limit of the notion of public sphere advocated by Habermas, who is credited with bringing the issue to the fore, and apply his idea selectively in formulating my understanding of the public sphere. Nevertheless, Habermas’ notion of public sphere has contributed to the development of democracy in various countries, including Muslim-majority states.

3. The implementation of sharia in the era of local autonomy is not without controversies and has provoked reactions. Some are worried about the fact that government leaders use sharia bylaws to garner votes from constituents through the politicisation of religious values (Fauzy 2012, 99).

4. The notion of “santrinisasi” usually refers to the process of reinforcement of Islamic identity in the Indonesian public sphere. An identification of santri in Indonesia was made through the useful work of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. Santri are further divided into two groups, koler (traditionalist) and modern (modernist). The former, following Geertz, accommodated local practices and rituals in their Islam and affiliated politically with Nahdatul Ulama, whilst the latter were determined to purify Islamic teachings from local syncretic practices and preferred to join Masyumi (Geertz 1960, 148–78). Yon Mahmudi introduced three types of new santri: convergent, radical and global. Santri described as “convergent” are both traditionalist and modernist activists who tend to merge with each other. The ‘radical’ santri are usually pessimistic about the traditionalist and modernist struggles in Islam and demand radical change in Indonesia. The “global” santri are more influenced by trans-national movements in the Middle East, yet still form part of both traditionalist and modernist groups at home (Machmudi 2008, 69–70).

5. Apart from these two names, some Indonesian Muslim intellectuals that have played a significant role in producing new intellectuals in the post-reform period are Djohan Effendy, Harun Nasution, Munawir Sjaizali, Dawam Rahardjo, Syafi'i Marif, Quraish Shihab, Azymardi Azra and Komaruddin Hidayat. Apart from those names, there also some other names of worth mentioning, such as Hasyim Muzadi, Din Syamsuddin, Said Aqil Siradj, dan Haedar Nasir who are the leaders or former leaders of two largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, NU and Muhammadijah. These men (and notably all are men) have acted as mentors who contributed to regenerating new Muslim intellectuals in post-reform Indonesia.

6. Other titles are Journal of Indonesian Islam (UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya); Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies (IAIN Salatiga); Ulumuna: Journal of Islamic Studies (IAIN Mataram).

6. Polygamy is the practice whereby a person is married to more than one spouse at the same time, as opposed to monogamy, where a person has only one spouse at a time. In principle, there are three forms of polygamy: polygyny, in which one man is married to several wives; polyandry, where one women is married to several husbands; and group marriage, in which several husbans are married to several wives, i.e. some combination og polygyny and polyandry (Zeitzen 2008, 3). In this article, the notion of polygamy and polygyny
are used interchangeably to imply polygyny.

7. For detail discussion about the Kompilasi Hukum Islam see Euis Nurlaelawati (2010).

8. Marzuki Wahid (2014), a member of CLD KHI project, then published his book on Indonesian fiqh. It contains studies either on the dynamics of CLD-KHI or contemporary Indonesian fiqh. Other former CLD KHI members, such as Musdah Mulia (2004a, 2004b, 2011), had previously written a number of books, proposed an important review of KHI, nevertheless, a number of books which strongly criticized these ideas emerged and launched at the same period.

9. The film Ayat-ayat Cinta started the Islamic film boom in 2008. It had massive media coverage due to its association with the novel that had been the best-selling book of 2007. When it went to screen, the film attracted a record-breaking 3.6 million cinema goers in Indonesia (Hariyadi 2013, 449).

10. Menchik (2014, 594, 599) defines “godly nationalism” as “an imagined community bound by a common, orthodox theism and mobilized the state in cooperation with religious organizations in society”.

11. Despite restrictions in dress code placed on Muslim women, the rest of Christian women in Aceh feel the impact as well. Many Christian women in Langsa chose to wear a headscarf or hijab when they are in the workplace, schools, or universities, either in order to adapt to the new circumstances or to avoid Islamic clothes raids (see Ansor 2014b, 2016, 11–30; Ansor, Arroaf, and Amri 2016, 129–31; Ansor and Meutia 2016, 157–74).

12. Langsa Ring Road is a four kilometer road located in an oil palm plantation run by a state-owned company. Since the place is surrounded by oil palms and isolated from the residential areas, it has become a favorite place for teenagers in Langsa to spend their leisure time by riding motorcycles around in pairs.

Bibliography


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Muhammad Ansor, Faculty of Shari’ah, State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Langsa, Indonesia. Email: ansor_riau@yahoo.co.id.
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مدير التحرير:
أومان حف الرحمن

هيئة التحرير:
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ديبوين شرف الدين
جراحات برهم الدين
غاد حلي
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سيف الأم
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دادي دامادي
جاجان جهراي
دين وحيد
أحمد أبو حركين

المجلس التحرير الدولي:
محمد فريد شهاب (جامعة شريف هنداية للإسلايمية الحكومية مراكها)
توفيق عبد الله (المركز الإندونيسي للعلوم)
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محمد نداء فضلان

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سعودية إسلامية
الطريقة والمراعاة الاجتماعية
الاجتماعية بدأوا في القرن التاسع عشر.
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محمد أدبي مصالح الإسلام

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في ولاية مختارة في ماليزيا
محمد فردوس عبد الرحمن ومحمد أمان الله