Daud Beureu’eh and The Darul Islam Rebellion in Aceh
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Abstract
This paper seeks to explore the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh under the leadership of Daud Beureu’eh, particularly the main factors which instigated the rebellion, the dynamics which took place during the rebellion, and the end of the rebellion. The Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh occurred because of several factors. Firstly, the people of Aceh were disappointed with the central government of Indonesia which failed to fulfill its promise to grant Aceh special autonomy. Secondly, there was a clash between the ulemas (Moslem clerics) faction who supported the autonomy and the uléëbalangs (customary leaders) who opposed the autonomy because they did not want the ulemas to assume dominance in the government of Aceh. Third, the Indonesian central government at that time was adopting a parliamentary system which was highly unstable and inconsistent in its perspective on and treatment of Aceh. The Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh is considered unique in that it did not claim as many lives as other Darul Islam rebellions in various regions throughout Indonesia. This rebellion effectively ended on May 8, 1962. In order to bring this conflict to a speedy end, the central government gave up military operations and sought for political settlement and amicable dialogues with DI/TII to reach a consensus concerning the Aceh problem. Peace in Aceh was secured after the central government decided to grant Aceh the status of Daerah Istimewa (Special Region), which meant that Aceh was given the right to exercise a special autonomy in the areas of religion, education, and tradition.

Keywords: Aceh, Daud Beureu’eh, Darul Islam, PUSA

Abstrak

Kata kunci: Aceh, Daud Beureu’eh, Darul Islam, PUSA

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A. Introduction

It is understandable that the government of the Republic of Indonesia (RI), in the early years of the country’s independence, had not been able to accommodate all aspirations of its people and regions. It is understandable that the people living in a particular region—who had their own history and had maintained their distinctive customs for a great many years before the independence of the Indonesian Republic—wanted the central government to acknowledge their existence. It is also understandable that, out of disappointment, members of a community or a region decided to take a radical measure or even to launch a rebellion in order to achieve their aspirations. Nevertheless, the best way to solve such matters is by sitting together to find mutual solutions which are necessary for creating peace throughout the nation and for fostering trust between the regional and central governments.

This paper seeks to explore three main subjects: the background of the emergence of the Darul Islam/Tentara Nasional Indonesia or DI/TII (Darul Islam/Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia) rebellion in Aceh, the progress of the rebellion, and the policies adopted by the government of the Indonesian Republic to deal with the rebellion from its beginning to its end. The causes of DI/TII rebellion in Aceh can be divided into two categories: external factors and internal factors. One external factor is the fact that the central government failed to accommodate the aspirations of the Aceh people. The Aceh people were disappointed with the central government who did not grant their wish to make Aceh a separate province or a special autonomous region. On behalf of the Aceh people, the leader of Darul Islam in Aceh, Teungku Mohammad Daud Beureu’eh, asserted the same demand. Using his great influence among the Aceh people, he had previously assisted the Indonesian government in fighting against the Dutch colonizers and in collecting money from the Aceh people when the central government was in need of funds. Because of his great contributions, Daud Beureu’eh was once appointed as the Military Governor of Aceh by the central government, but then he turned against the government out of disappointment. Another external factor instigating the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh is the political condition at national level. The conflict between Partai Nasional Indonesia or PNI (Indonesian National Party) and Masyumi Party also affected the Aceh people, most of whom were the supporters of Masyumi. When Masyumi’s influence was suppressed during Ali Sastroamidjodjo’s administration, the rebellion in Aceh erupted.

One internal factor is the conflict between the ulemas (Moslem clerics) and the uléëbalangs (customary leaders). The ulemas and the uléëbalangs were actually the two most important pillars in the Aceh society. The uléëbalangs played a great role in maintaining the practice of customary laws and in governing certain regions, whereas the ulemas played a great role in maintaining the practice of Islamic laws. In the early stages of Indonesian revolution and independence, the ulemas gained more influence within the Aceh society to the point that they gradually dominated the government of Aceh at the expense of the uléëbalangs. In order to reclaim their power, the uléëbalangs took the side of the central government and opposed the ulemas’ aspiration to form a separate
province of Aceh.

On December 23, 1950, *Persatuan Seluruh Ulama Aceh* or PUSA (All Aceh Islamic Scholars Association) held a congress in Kutaraja which resulted in several decisions, one of which was a common aspiration to form an autonomous region for the people of Aceh. In order to strengthen his position, Daud Beureu’eh established a relationship with S. M. Kartosuwiryo who in turn asked him to become the Governor of Darul Islam in Aceh. In December 1953, approximately one hundred representatives from various areas in Aceh attended a meeting which was convened in Daud Beureu’eh’s residence. The meeting discussed strategies for carrying out a coup d’état and for establishing a military region. The meeting was followed up by the proclamation of the establishment of Negara Islam Indonesia or NII (Islamic State of Indonesia) by DI/TII on December 20, 1953.

The proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia in Aceh was met with various reactions. PKI and PNI, two staunch political opponents of PUSA, suggested that the DI/TII rebellion had to be crushed by a military offensive. Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) urged the government to establish a movement called Anti Teraor Aceh or ATA (Antiterrorist Movement in Aceh) in which the civilians were to be armed against the rebels. Meanwhile, Partai Nasional Indonesia or PNI (Indonesian National Party) established a “Front Nasional” (“National Front”), which was then renamed Gabungan Partai-Partai dan Organisasi or GPO (Alliance of Political Parties and Organizations), and urged the government to launch “Pagar Desa” (literally “Village Fence”) movement in which the villagers were to be armed to protect their boundaries. In response to the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh, the government of the Republic of Indonesia conducted a meeting which was attended by the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Attorney General, the Army Chief of Staff of Indonesia, and the National Police Chief. The meeting decided that the central government would launch a large-scale military operation in Aceh. In response to the decision, the Commander of Regiment I Infantry in Kutaraja asked the Aceh people to remain calm and to support the government in quenching the rebellion.

Islamic parties such as Masyumi suggested a more peaceful solution to the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh. Meanwhile, the ulamas in Aceh who disagreed with Daud Beureu’eh’s actions tried to persuade the people to believe that the actions taken by Daud Beureu’eh and his followers were wrong. They encouraged the people not to participate in the rebellion and to choose the right course of action, that is, to support the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and its government. Those ulamas and Islamic parties believed that DI/TII rebellion did not occur because the Aceh people hated the central government in the first place. Indeed, during the struggle period, the Aceh people provided considerable support to the Indonesian Republic.

The government took several measures to deal with the rebellion: limiting the movement of the rebels, improving the defense throughout Aceh, strengthening military posts, securing postal and logistic routes, and sending new troops to increase the number of those already posted to Aceh. In addition
to that, the government also offered scholarships for Acehnese students who studied outside Aceh. The Indonesian government also encouraged clerics who did not side with the rebels to help persuade the people not to participate in the rebellion. The government also promised that, when the situation is back to normal, they would bring development to Aceh in all areas, particularly in the form of railways and roads.

In August 1961, the central government and DI/TII Aceh initiated a peace dialogue. The central government sent a delegation of twenty eight people which consisted of several regents, clerics, army officers, and police officers to Daud Beureu’eh’s quarters in East Aceh. After the meeting was concluded, many rebels surrendered to the government in Kutaraja. The government, through its delegation, agreed with Daud Beureu’eh’s terms that the Sharia law (Islamic law) was to be adopted in Aceh. This agreement was then officially enacted on April 7, 1962 with the approval of the Regional People’s Representative Council. After a long journey towards peace, Daud Beureu’eh eventually returned to Kutaraja on May 8, 1962. Daud Beureu’eh solemnly announced that, by the order of his people, he now returned to his people. He also declared that the enmity which had been raging between his group and the Indonesian government for eight years, ten months, and twenty seven days officially ended that day. Negotiations and peaceful measures proved effective in ending the rebellion in Aceh. A highly popular policy called “Konsepsi Prinsipil Bijaksana” (literally “Wise Principal Conception”) which was proposed by Sjamaun Gaharu and was adopted by the regional government proved to be able to suppress the rebellion. It was the right decision on the part of the government, considering the fact that Daud Beureu’eh and the Aceh people had made great contributions to the country and that DI/TII Aceh was willing to settle the problem through peaceful consensus.

B. Discussion

1. Causes of the Rebellion

The Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh erupted because the Aceh people were disappointed with the central government of Indonesia. This disappointment can be traced back to the moment when President Soekarno gave his promise to the Aceh people, and this promise was recorded in a conversation between Soekarno and Daud Beureu’eh which took place in 1948. In the conversation, Soekarno asked the Aceh people, through Daud Beureu’eh, to provide the Indonesian government with the much needed supplies for maintaining the independence of the Indonesian Republic. Daud Beureu’eh granted Soekarno’s wish, and Soekarno in return granted Aceh a special autonomy status.

Therefore, it is true that Aceh was once granted the status of a province with special autonomy. The President’s promise was thus fulfilled by the issuance of Deputy Prime Minister’s Regulation in Lieu of Government’s Regulation Number 8/Des/WKPM/1949 on December 17, 1949 by the Deputy Prime Minister Sjafrudin Prawiranegara. The Decision Letter mandated the establishment of the Province of Aceh which covered the whole area of the former Aceh Residence and a part of Langkat Regency. However, the regulation proved to be contentious. The regulation was opposed not only by the opponents of PUSA, especially the uléébalangs, but also by the
government officials in North Sumatra Province, as well as the government of the Indonesian Republic in Yogyakarta. In addition to that, the regulation was considered to be in contravention of the RIS (Republic of the United States of Indonesia)-RI agreement which stipulated that Indonesia consisted of only ten provinces, three of which were located in the island of Sumatra, but Aceh was not one of them.2

The new government in Yogyakarta, under the Prime Minister Abdul Halim, rejected the establishment of the Aceh Province. Indonesian leaders in Yogyakarta thought that the establishment of a new province in North Sumatra was unconstitutional because Deputy Prime Minister Sjafrudin announced the establishment of the Aceh Province three days after the Second Hatta Cabinet had been abolished on December 2, 1949. Sjafrudin justified his decision by arguing that he had obtained Hatta’s approval, but the government did not accept this. The government then demonstrated its refusal to acknowledge the establishment of a new province in North Sumatra by not sending any representative to the inauguration of Daud Beureu’eh on January 30, 1950.3

In spite of many oppositions, the government of Aceh Province kept ruling the province de facto, while the central government did not take any decisive action with regard to the de jure status of the Aceh Province. Meanwhile, the Federal Government of Republik Indonesia Serikat or RIS (Republic of the United States of Indonesia) in Jakarta decided not to meddle with the issue of the Aceh Province, which was part of the Republic of Indonesia, whose government was situated in Yogyakarta. Both State Prime Minister Halim in Yogyakarta and Federal Prime Minister Hatta in Jakarta tried their best not to demonstrate any sign of direct opposition to the demands of the Aceh people; they wanted to avoid confrontation with the Aceh people because they were focusing on achieving a more important goal, which was the establishment of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, both Prime Ministers decided to delay any effort to settle the Aceh problem.4

Because of that reason, Halim’s government in Yogyakarta did not issue any public statement until it formed an investigation commission led by Susanto Tirtoprojo, the Minister of Home Affairs. This commission was sent to Aceh in mid-March 1950 to investigate the case.5 Susanto very carefully explained to the Aceh people that the central government had not decided anything with regards to the establishment of the Aceh Province and that more information was needed before Yogyakarta could take any definitive decision.6

In the middle of May 1950, RIS and RI reached an agreement on the establishment of a unitary state. The agreement stipulated that Sumatra Island only consisted of three provinces without Aceh, because the area was considered as part of the North Sumatra Province. To implement this agreement, the government established Panitia Penyelenggaraan Pembentukan0

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3Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, p. 36.
4Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, p. 40.
5S. M. Amin, Sekitar Peristiwa Berdarah di At- jeh, Jakarta: Soeroengan NV, 1956, p. 29.
6Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik: p. 41.
The government of the Indonesian Republic ignored the protest and issued Central Government’s Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 5 of August 14, 1950. This Regulation effectively incorporated Aceh Province into North Sumatra Province. This action sparked further protest from the people of Aceh.\(^{11}\)

In addition to the Aceh people’s disappointment with the central government, the conflict between the ulémas and the uléëbalangs also played a significant role.\(^{9}\) This motion included these following demands: (1) the central government has to maintain the Province of Aceh which had been established by Deputy Prime Minister Sjafrudin Prawiranegara and (2) if Aceh is not allowed to become a separate province under the central government of the Indonesian Republic, the native people of Aceh who hold positions in the government and who share the same aspirations will return their mandate to the central government through the regional government. The motion also contained a long and detailed explanation concerning all the reasons why it was right and proper that Aceh should be granted autonomy and power to manage its own region.

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\(^{10}\)Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, p. 42.

great role in steering the progress of the rebellion. The *ulemas* and the *uléëbalangs* are the two most important pillars in the Aceh society. The *uléëbalangs* played a great role in maintaining the practice of customary laws, whereas the *ulemas* played a great role in maintaining the practice of Islamic law. In other words, the *uléëbalangs* were customary leaders who had traditionally led certain regions in Aceh, whereas the *ulemas* were spiritual leaders.\(^{12}\)

The conflict between those two groups can be traced back to the early years of the revolution period. At that time, the *ulemas* exercised a powerful influence in the regional government of Aceh. This situation was resented by the *uléëbalangs*. They thought that the regional government during the revolution period had failed to revive and promote traditional values and customs among the Aceh people, and the *uléëbalangs* used this drawback as an excuse for seeking revenge. Threatened by the *uléëbalangs*’ action, the *ulemas* sought ways to maintain their power within the regional government. For that reason, they demanded a special autonomy for Aceh. In response to this, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo said that the demand for autonomy was only their pretext for challenging the influence of the *uléëbalangs*.\(^ {13}\)

The conflict between the *ulemas* and the *uléëbalangs* had been taking place years before the Indonesian independence. The cause of this conflict was Dutch’s political policies. In order to occupy Aceh, the Dutch established relationships with the *uléëbalangs* and prevented the *ulemas* from entering the government. In this way, the power of the *ulemas* was suppressed.\(^{14}\) In spite of the suppression, the *ulemas* still exercised a great influence among the Aceh people. This was because the relationship between the *ulemas* and the Aceh people was not based on social bonds, but based on the spirit of fraternity as fellow Moslems. In contrast, the relationship between the *uléëbalangs* and the common people was comparable to the relationship between landlords and peasants. In addition to that, many of the *uléëbalangs*’ actions were against the interests of the people. This diminished people’s support to the *uléëbalangs*.\(^ {15}\)

During the Japanese occupation period, the *ulemas* began to gain more influence in the regional government. The Japanese appointed some of the *ulemas* as members of Dewan Rakyat Aceh (People’s Council of Aceh). In addition to that, the *ulemas* were also given opportunities to hold positions in government offices and religious courts.\(^ {16}\) In spite of this, the Japanese still used the service of the *uléëbalangs* to hold administrative positions in many areas.\(^ {17}\) After the Indonesian independence, the power of the *ulemas* was gradually increasing. The people of Aceh supported the *ulemas* in fighting the Dutch colonizers. On October 15, 1945, the Aceh *ulemas* signed a pact which called upon the Aceh people to unite under the Supreme Leader

\(^{12}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*, p. 52.

\(^{13}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*, p. 52.

\(^{14}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*, p. 54.

\(^{15}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*, p. 54.


\(^{17}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*, p. 54.
Soekarno as part of their commitment to maintain the independence of Indonesia. They also added a religious overtone to the struggle by describing it as *perang sabil* or a holy war.\(^{18}\)

The conflict between the *ulemas* and the *uléëbalangs* continued when the *ulemas’* demand for autonomy was ignored by the central government. Therefore, it is only natural that the *uléëbalangs* supported the central government because they opposed the idea of autonomy for Aceh. If Aceh were given autonomy, the *ulemas* would gain the upperhand, and this was precisely what the *uléëbalangs* did not want to happen. The conflict between the *uléëbalangs* and the *ulemas* did nothing but aggravated the situation, thus hampering any effort towards peace.

In addition to those two factors, the third factor instigating the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh was the political situation at national level, especially the conflict between PNI and Masyumi. The conflict between these parties in turn affected the Acehnese people as the supporters of Masyumi. When Masyumi’s influence was suppressed during Ali Sastroamidjojo’s administration, the rebellion in Aceh erupted. From the perspective of the Aceh people, the rebellion was the manifestation of a common Islamic aspiration which was strongly tied to the dynamics of Masyumi’s influence in the central government. The Aceh people believed that any change in the composition of the parliament would certainly have an impact on the parliament’s policies on Aceh and its people. Therefore, in order to prevent against the enactment of policies unfavorable to them, the Aceh people decided to take an immediate action in the form of a rebellion.\(^{19}\)

2. **Progress of the Rebellion**

The Aceh people’s disappointment with the central government’s policy did not abate. In response to the Aceh people’s objection to Aceh being incorporated into the Province of North Sumatra, the government of the Indonesian Republic sent a delegation to Aceh\(^{20}\) on September 26 to discuss the matter. Led by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the delegation was personally welcomed by Daud Beureu’eh and Aceh leaders, but the discussion did not lead to any agreement.\(^{21}\) After that, Vice President Mohammad Hatta personally came to Aceh on December 23, 1950, but he was rejected by the Acehnese people.\(^{22}\)

On December 23, 1950, PUSA held a congress in Kutaraja which resulted in several decisions. One of the decisions was that the Acehnese people still insisted on their demand for autonomy. Another decision was that the Acehnese people would take actions if the central government refused to fulfill the demand. The congress also discussed strategies to gather support for the people’s rebellion and revolution in Aceh.\(^{23}\) In such a volatile situation, on January 22, 1951 Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir

\(^{18}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*, p.55.

\(^{19}\)Sjamsuddin, *Pemberontakan Kaum Republik*, p. 4.

\(^{20}\)This delegation consisted of Mr. Assaat (Minister of Home Affairs), Sarimin Reksodiharjo (Deputy Governor of North Sumatra), and other top leaders from Medan. In addition to them, M. Nur El Ibrahim also joined the delegation (Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*, p. 47).

\(^{21}\)Sjamsuddin, *Pemberontakan Kaum Republik*, p. 47.

\(^{22}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*, p. 47.

\(^{23}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*, p. 47.
visited Aceh to persuade Aceh leaders to retract their demands. Even though the Prime Minister was not able to persuade the Acehnese leaders, the meeting nonetheless reduced the tension between Aceh and the central government.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition to having a conflict with the Indonesian central government, PUSA also had a conflict with Badan Keinsyafan Rakyat or BKR (People’s Awareness Agency) which was established by the ulâ‘ëbalangs. This body was established to support and help the central government in their effort to raise the people’s awareness of the central government’s policies concerning Aceh. This body also aimed to strengthen the relationship and communication between the people, the central government, and various groups in the region.\textsuperscript{25}

While the conflict was still raging, a congress of all Indonesia Moslem clerics and scholars was convened in Medan from April 11 to 15, 1953. At the congress, Daud Beureu’eh in his speech expressed his view on the role of state in Islam. The ulémas there came to a conclusion that the central government had been discriminative against Aceh because it had undermined the role of the ulémas and their much-valued Sharia laws. The participants then declared their intention that, in the next general election, they would make an attempt to transform the Republic of Indonesia into an Islamic state.

As a follow-up to the Medan congress, on April 29, 1953 Daud Beureu’eh led a PUSA congress in Langsa, East Aceh. Following this congress, PUSA established an organization which consisted of former Aceh combatants. The congress then encouraged the participants to persuade people to vote for Islamic parties in the next general election.

The next phase of the rebellion was marked by the establishment of mass organizations such as Pandu Islam (Islamic Scout) under the leadership of A. Gani Mutyara. The dormant Pemuda PUSA (PUSA Youth) was also revived. Pandu Islam, Pemuda PUSA, and other mass organizations were also given military training.\textsuperscript{26} In order to gather the popular support, Daud Beureu’eh conducted a visitation to various areas in Aceh. In each area, Daud Beureu’ehannounced the decisions of the Medan congress. He also reminded the people to keep vigilant about any incident that might occur in the future.\textsuperscript{27}

Daud Beureu’eh’s next move was establishing contact with S. M. Kartosuwiryo. He was even appointed as the Governor of Darul Islam in Aceh. This information was delivered by Mustafa Rasyid, an emissary from Kartosuwiryo who was arrested on May 1, 1953. A secret message indicated that Daud Beureu’eh and Amir Husen Al Mujahid even went to Bandung to hold a meeting with the leaders of Darul Islam. This visit was the follow-up of a secret meeting which decided to send two delegates to Bandung. This secret meeting was held on March 13, 1953 and was attended by Husen Al Mujahid, Hasan Ali, Sayed Abubakar, and A. R. Hanafiyah.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{24}Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{25}Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{26}Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{27}Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{28}Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p.49; and C. van Dijk, \textit{Darul Islam}:
In December 1953, another secret meeting was held in Daud Beureu’eh’s residence and was attended by approximately one hundred representatives from various areas throughout Aceh. The meeting discussed strategies for launching a coup d’état and for establishing a military region. The climax of the meeting was the proclamation of Negara Islam Indonesia or NII (Islamic State of Indonesia) in Aceh on December 20, 1953.29

The establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia in Aceh was originally planned to be proclaimed on August 7, 1953. This plan was then postponed until August 17, 1953, as recommended by Mohammad Hatta. Because of lack of preparation, this plan was further postponed until mid-December 1953.30 After several postponements, the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia in Aceh was finally proclaimed at midnight on December 20, 1953. At the same time, President Soekarno and other high officials of the Indonesian Republic were visiting Medan to attend the Pekan Olahraga Nasional or PON III (the Third National Sports Week).31

3. Confronting the DI/TII Rebellion in Aceh

The establishment of Darul Islam or NII in Aceh triggered various reactions. Some suggested a full-blown military offensive, while others suggested peaceful negotiations. The first option was mostly championed by PUSA’s political opponents such as PKI and PNI, whereas the second option was championed by Islamic parties such as Masyumi.

The first response made by the Commander of Regiment I Infantry in Kutaraja to this proclamation was making a military announcement. This announcement informed the people that a rebellion had erupted and that they had to remain calm and vigilant. Besides that, the people were also encouraged to fully support the state apparatus in their effort to quench the rebellion.32

Similar response was also made by some factions within the ulemas who did not agree with Daud Beureu’eh. These ulemas were Hasan Krueng Kalee, Teungku Makam, Teungku Abdul Salam Meuraksa, Teungku Saleh Meugit Raya, Teungku Muda Wali, and Labuhan Haji. They stated that Daud Beureu’eh and his proponents were actually taking the wrong course of action. They also encouraged those who opposed the rebellion to persuade those who joined the rebellion to give up violence and take the right course of action.33

Three days after the establishment of Darul Islam in Aceh, the Communist Party of Indonesia went to the office of North Sumatra Governor to demand that the government launch a counter-rebellion movement called Anti Teror Aceh (Antiterrorist Movement in Aceh) in which the common people were to be armed against the rebels. Before sending a full delegation of twenty people, PKI had sent two representatives to meet the governor, but they were all refused by the

29Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, p. 50.
31Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, 50.
32Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, p. 64.
33Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, p. 65.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian National Party established a “National Front” which was then renamed Gabungan Partai-Partai dan Organisasi or GPO (Alliance of Political Parties and Organizations). This movement united various parties and organizations throughout Aceh. This movement demanded that the government require every village to establish “Pagar Desa” (literally “Village Fence”) movement in which the villagers were to be armed to protect themselves against the rebels.35

In response to the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh, the government of the Indonesian Republic organized special meetings. In a meeting which was attended by Prime Minister Zainul Arifin, the Minister of Defense, the Attorney General, the Army Chief of Staff of Indonesia, and the National Police Chief, it was decided that the central government would send a large military force to Aceh.36

Harian Rakyat reported on September 24, 1953 that the Communist Party of Indonesia made this following statement:

“There is only one thing that the government can do: they have to unite with the people to crush these separatists. With regard to this matter, PKI sincerely and wholeheartedly declared that our party gives its full support to the government of the Republic of Indonesia in suppressing the Darul Islam [rebellion] in Aceh, West Java, and elsewhere.37

On September 26, 1953 Keng Pofeartured a statement by Sudibyo, the leader of Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia or PSII (Indonesian Islamic Union Party). He said that Islamic parties still hoped for a peaceful settlement on the grounds that the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh was not an expression of Aceh people’s hatred towards the central government. This conviction could be proven by the fact that, during the struggle period, the Aceh people provided considerable assistance for the Republic of Indonesia. Because of that, the problem of DI/TII in Aceh could still be settled in an amicable manner. He also said that the best way was to let the ulenassolve the problem by themselves because this rebellion rose from the ulamas.38

On October 28, 1953, the government of the Republic of Indonesia issued an official statement concerning DI/TII in Aceh. The statement consisted of four chapters. The first chapter offered a historical account covering events from the proclamation of the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh to the responses made by the central government with regard to the rebellion. The second chapter explained the background of the rebellion which could be traced back to the Kingdom of Aceh. The third chapter described the actions taken by the central government to suppress the rebellion. The fourth chapter described the actions which would be taken by the central government with regard to regional government’s policies.39
The third chapter mentioned that the government took various measures to deal with the rebellion. These measures consisted of localizing the rebel forces, improving internal security, strengthening military posts, securing logistic routes between military posts, and sending new troops to increase the number of those already stationed in Aceh. Besides that, the central government also offered scholarships for Acehnese students who studied outside Aceh.40

The fourth chapter mentioned that, in order to suppress the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh, the government of the Indonesian Republic invited the ulamas who did not side with the rebels to win back those who had joined the rebellion. The government also promised that, when the situation was back to normal, they would bring development to Aceh in all areas, particularly in the form of railways and roads.41

The central government’s effort to suppress the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh was marked by contrasting opinions which ensued not only from regional parties and organizations, but also from the cabinets which ran the Indonesian government from time to time during the rebellion. This situation led to the adoption of different and sometimes conflicting policies by each administration, while the policies of these cabinets were greatly influenced by the ruling party.42

4. Ali Sastroamidjodjo Cabinet

The Ali Sastroamidjodjo Cabinet was one of the cabinets which had to deal with DI/TII rebellion in Aceh. The cabinet resorted to full military operations in order to suppress the rebellion. At that time, the government’s army managed to seize control of cities, even though the hinterland remained largely controlled by DI/TII.43

The government’s military force took offensive measures in countering DI/TII’s attacks on Indonesian military posts. Each attack was responded by arsons, random arrests, and on-sight shootings. For example, a DI/TII’s attack on a Mobile Brigade convoy in Cot Tupah village near Bireuen in early September 1954 prompted the Army to arrest eighty five people.44

Besides in Aceh, many people were also arrested in other cities such as Jakarta, Medan, and Palembang. Several PUSA top leaders were arrested in Medan, such as Hasjmy, Syeh Marhaban, and Nyak Neh Rica. The central government also took action against Acehnese soldiers who were associated with Darul Islam, such as Major Hasballah Haji, a military commander in Medan, who was transferred to the Indonesian Army’s Headquarters in Jakarta.45

In addition to military actions, the Ali Sastroamidjodjo Cabinet also sought for rapprochement with the supporters of DI/TII by appointing S. M. Amin, a Masyumi politician, as the Governor of North Sumatra. By implementing this policy, the cabinet attempted to improve its image among the Acehnese.

40 Iismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 68.
41 Iismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 67.
42 Iismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 68.
Moreover, the cabinet also appointed the uléëbalangs and BKR members as counselors at military bases. Furthermore, the cabinet also supported the ulemas from Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah or Perti (Union for Islamic Education), who opposed PUSA's rebellion, to dissociate the Acehnese people from DI/TII.47

In addition to those policies, the Ali Sastroamidjodjo Cabinet also introduced some policies concerning the development of Aceh. The government promised to give a financial assistance of twenty million rupiahs to the Acehnese people. The government also promised to construct roads, to build irrigation facilities, to provide electricity, and to improve education in Aceh. These plans were even incorporated into the 1953/1954 National Budget. However, this policy was not fully welcomed by the opposition group. DI/TII said that the policy only proved that the previous cabinets had mistreated the Acehnese people.48

The cabinet’s policies attracted much criticism. In the parliament, opposition parties such as Masyumi and the Socialist Party expressed their severe criticisms against the cabinet. Mohammad Natsir, a Masyumi politician, severely criticized the cabinet’s harsh and arbitrary treatment of Aceh. Natsir thought that the DI/TII problem in Aceh could only be settled through negotiations. Besides that, many central and regional-level newspapers also criticized the government.49

Criticisms were not only directed towards the cabinet’s military actions, but also towards the fact that the cabinet had admitted too many uléëbalangs into the regional government.49 Those criticisms eventually forced the central government to send a diplomatic mission to Aceh whose aim was to offer a recommendation on the reorganization of Aceh regional government. In addition to that, the central government was also expected to take account of local factors and not to give too much privilege to the uléëbalangs and their supporters.50

The central and regional governments did not always work in harmony with regard to their policies on DI/TII. For example, Governor S. M. Amin established a personal relationship with DI/TII leaders in the hope that Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjodjo would change his attitude if this strategy proved successful. Governor S. M. Amin argued that military measures would not stop the DI/TII rebellion. This was clearly in contrary to the Prime Minister’s view who was confident that the DI/TII rebellion would shortly be crushed by military offensives.51

In his effort to create peace, S. M. Amin sent a personal letter (dated December 5, 1953)52 to Daud Beureu’eh,

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46Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 70; and Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, p. 129.
47Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 70.
48Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 71.
49Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 71.
50Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 72.
51Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. pp.72-73.
52Below is quoted from a letter which was sent by S. M. Amin:
Medan, December 5, 1953.
The Honorables:
Dear my fellow countrymen, This letter is sent as a personal letter, bearing with it a great hope that it may assist us in our effort to put an end
Hasan Ali, Husen Al-Mujahid, and other Darul Islam leaders which basically tried to persuade them to settle the conflict in an amicable way. The letter was answered by Husen Al-Mujahid who told the Governor that peaceful settlement was always possible as long as there was goodwill on both sides. Two other letters were sent to the leaders of Darul Islam on March 8 and April 10, 1954 by courier, but none of them ever reached their destination.\textsuperscript{53}

S. M. Amin’s effort failed to convince the central government, and the central government prohibited the governor to maintain any further personal contact with Darul Islam. The central government also stated that they would not enter into any agreement with Darul Islam. The situation became worse when Darul Islam sent a letter (dated June 1, 1954) which demanded that the central government acknowledge Aceh as part of Darul Islam movement.\textsuperscript{54}

written correspondence between S. M. Amin and the leaders of Darul Islam was thus ended because the Governor was disappointed with Darul Islam’s response. S. M. Amin then sent a final letter which ordered Darul Islam to surrender. In response to the letter, Darul Islam officially declared a rebellion.\textsuperscript{55}

5. Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet

This cabinet was led by Burhanuddin Harahap from Masyumi, so it was only natural that the government’s approach towards DI/TII now became more lenient than in the previous administration. Muhammad Hatta’s effort to solve the DI/TII problem through amicable consensus—which came to a halt during the First Ali Sastroamidjodjo Cabinet—was resumed during the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet.

Prime Minister Burhanuddin Harahap sent two envoys, Hasbullah Daud (Daud Beureu’eh’s son) and Abdullah Arief, to negotiate with Daud Beureu’eh. This negotiation achieved a better result. The leaders of the rebellion also agreed to support Islamic parties in the upcoming general election and not to disturb the general election.\textsuperscript{56}

In September Hasbullah Daud and Abdullah Arief returned with promising results. The Prime Minister immediately told Governor S. M. Amin about the government’s reasons for opening a negotiation with DI/TII. The Governor immediately tried to reopen a personal written correspondence with DI/TII leaders which had been broken for a while. Unfortunately, because of various impediments, his letters were never received. (\textsuperscript{55}Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p.73.\textsuperscript{56}Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 74.)
received by the addressees.\(^57\)

Prime Minister Burhanuddin Harahap sent another delegation to DI/TII in Aceh with Abdullah Arief as the government’s representative. In the meeting which took place from October 28 to November 1 [1954?], it was agreed that, in order to secure a successful conclusion, both parties would declare a ceasefire. Daud Beureu’eh demanded that the negotiation be formal and open, not informal or closed.\(^58\)

However, on the one hand, the Prime Minister could not accept the terms requested by Daud Beureu’eh with regard to the open nature of the meeting because it would mean that the central government acknowledged Darul Islam. On the other hand, the Prime Minister did not want to lose the sympathy of Masyumi’s supporters in Aceh. Therefore, the Prime Minister chose to delay issuing any policy on DI/TII. This action reignited the tension between both parties.\(^59\)

In response to the protracted conflict between the central government and DI/TII, Kongres Mahasiswa, Pemuda, Pelajar, dan Masyarakat Aceh se-Indonesia (the Congress of Aceh Students, Youths, and Communities throughout Indonesia) was organized in Medan from September 15 to 19, 1956. This congress was attended by representatives from various organizations in and outside Aceh. The congress was also attended by the ulamas and representatives from mass organizations throughout Indonesia. The congress was chaired by a presidium with Teungku Abdul Sjam as its chairperson and Anis Idham as its secretary. The congress resulted in several decisions and resolutions and prepared a plan for the development of Aceh.\(^60\)

Not long after the congress, a reunion of the former soldiers of Divisi Gajah 1 (literally “Elephant Division 1”) was held from October 9 to 12, 1956 in Yogyakarta. All of the participants agreed that the stability in Aceh had to be achieved through peaceful negotiations. It was also agreed that the duty of maintaining security in Aceh had to be borne by the people of Aceh. Besides that, the reunion also led to the formation of a command for maintaining security under the direct control of the National Army Staff.\(^61\)

In the 1955 General Election, Masyumi won two-thirds of Aceh people’s votes. This new development helped pave the way towards a peaceful settlement between DI/TII and the government of the Republic of Indonesia. When the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet came to power, the government eventually issued Law Number 24 of November 24, 1956 regarding the Establishment of the Province of Aceh. Ali Hasymi was elected as the Governor of Aceh, while Sjamun Gaharu was appointed as the Commander of Aceh Military Command.\(^62\)

However, the enactment of Law Number 24 of November 24, 1956 regarding the Establishment of the Prov-

\(^{57}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*. p. 75.

\(^{58}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*. p.75.

\(^{59}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*. p.75.

\(^{60}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*. p.76.

\(^{61}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*. p.76.

\(^{62}\)Ismail, *Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan*. p.76.
ince of Aceh did not automatically stop the DI/TII rebellion against the government of the Republic of Indonesia. It would, take quite a long time before Daud Beureu’eh eventually proclaimed his peace declaration. In spite of this, the enactment of Law did facilitate further efforts towards peace. Under the leadership of Ali Hasymi and Sjamun Gaharu, Aceh entered a new stage in its history when the regional government started to adopt more prudent and peaceful strategies to bring about reconciliation with the rebel forces.

6. End of the Rebellion

In order to achieve reconciliation with the rebel forces, Sjamun Gaharu, the Commander of Aceh Military Command, formulated an idea which he called “Konsepsi Prinsip Bijaksana” (literally “Wise Principal Conception”). This idea involved abandoning military operations and seeking for political settlement. In order to achieve this, the government and DI/TII had to work together to seek for a solution to settle the Aceh problem.63 In mid-1957, the government convened a negotiation with a number of DI/TII leaders in the village of Lam Teh. This negotiation is known as “Ikrar Lam Teh” (literally the “Lam Teh Pledge”). In this negotiation, both parties pledged to support the development of Islam, as well as to bring prosperity and security to the Aceh people. Besides that, both parties also agreed to announce a ceasefire. However, in spite of this effort, Daud Beureu’eh still refused to compromise because he maintained that Aceh would only enter into negotiations with the Republic of Indonesia if the central government recognized Aceh’s status as an Islamic state within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.64

Following the “Lam Teh Pledge”, both parties ceased to engage in armed struggle, even though there was no definitive sign that DI/TII would surrender yet. This ceasefire survived until 1959 and paved the way towards peace. Many DI/TII supporters then decided to end their rebellion and return to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

At the beginning of 1959, DI/TII in Aceh began to show signs of disintegration. They were divided into three factions. The first faction consisted of Teungku Daud Beureu’eh and his followers who insisted on their initial demands and refused any kind of compromise. The second faction consisted of the members of the Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia, such as Ayah Gani, Hasan Saleh, Amir Husin Al-Mujahid, A. Gani Mutiara, Muhammad Amin, Ahmad Hasan, and Ishak Amir. This faction tended to adopt a milder attitude towards the Indonesian government. The third faction consisted of Hasan Ali and other members of the Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia who remained loyal to Daud Beureu’eh.

A “Dewan Revolusi” (literally the “Revolutionary Council”) was established on March 15, 1959 by the Majlis Syuro (People’s Representative Council) of the State of Aceh. Daud Beureu’eh’s leadership, both civil and military, was taken over by Hasan Saleh, a TII Colonel who at that time was also acting as the Minister of War. In addition to that, the cabinet was also reshuffled.65

In a pronouncement signed by Amir Husin al-Mujahid, the Revolutionary

63Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 76.
64Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 77.
65Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 78.
Council declared its desire to bring eminence and happiness to the people of Aceh. The Revolutionary Council then proceeded to issue the Statement of the Head of NBA/NII on March 26, 1959. The Statement indicated that the Revolutionary Council would continue negotiations with the government of the Republic of Indonesia and that they would consider this policy as “a principle, but not a tactic”.

In response to the establishment of the Revolutionary Council, Daud Beureu’eh remained silent and avoided an open war. This was because Daud Beureu’eh was very confident that he would be able to force the ulamas and the Acehnese people to suppress the Revolutionary Council. Daud Beureu’eh had reasons to be confident because several DI/TII leaders such as Salah Adri had defected from the Revolutionary Council. The same action was then taken by one of his followers, Abdurrahman Hasjim, who organized the “Operasi Badak Hitam” (literally the “Black Rhinoceros Operation”) to bring down the Revolutionary Council. This plan, however, was cancelled by Daud Beureu’eh.

Because popular support to the Revolutionary Council was getting stronger, Daud Beureu’eh eventually decided to cooperate with Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or PRRI (the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia). Some of PRRI leaders came to Aceh to meet Daud Beureu’eh and expressed their willingness to supply arms to Negara Bagian Aceh or NBA (the State of Aceh). Some of PRRI leaders were then appointed as NBA’s military counselors. With this new support, NBA then began to consolidate its forces and prepared itself to bring down the Revolutionary Council.

By cooperating with PRRI, NBA became stronger and even succeeded in preventing the Revolutionary Council from taking over areas under the influence of Daud Beureu’eh. Daud Beureu’eh also managed to regain people’s support, which was marked by the defection of one regiment of the Revolutionary Council in Aceh Besar Regency to Daud Beureu’eh. This regiment refused to arrest NBA leaders who campaigned against the Revolutionary Council. In spite of this ominous situation, Sjamaun Gaharu still preferred an amicable settlement. Even though he supported the Revolutionary Council, it was not possible for him to launch military offensives to suppress NBA because this would weaken people’s support to the regional government. If this happened, the people would transfer their allegiance to Daud Beureu’eh.

Sjamaun Gaharu was concerned that all efforts towards peace would be hampered because antagonisms within the Revolutionary Council had been known by the public, including its political opponents. Sjamaun Gaharu’s policies to resolve the conflict through peaceful negotiations were also criticized by anti-PUSA groups such as Perti and the uléëbalangs. Members of the Regional People’s Representative Council also criticized the Command-
er’s policy to organize a negotiation between the rebels and the Revolutionary Council.72

In addition to local oppositions, Sjamaun Gaharu and the Revolutionary Council also had to face opposition from the central government. The Revolutionary Council conducted a meeting with A. H. Nasution as the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff to grant Aceh the status of a Special Region, but this plan fell through when it was proposed to the Djuanda Cabinet and the President. At a meeting between Ishak Amin (the representative from the Revolutionary Council) and Prime Minister Djuanda, the Prime Minister said that the government could not grant Aceh the status of a Special Region in spite of the fact that this had been promised by the Army. The main reason was that, in Djuanda’s opinion, there could not be any Special Region in Indonesia other than Yogyakarta.73

Unsatisfied by the cabinet’s policy, the Revolutionary Council threatened to launch a rebellion. In response to this threat, the Prime Minister then called a cabinet meeting. Sjamaun Gaharu and Hasjmi were also invited to attend the meeting. They said that peace could only be achieved if the central government was willing to honor the Lam Teh Pledge, that is, by granting Aceh the status of a Special Region.74 A negotiation between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Revolutionary Council was then conducted on May 26, 1959. The central government was represented by Deputy Prime Minister Har-

di, whereas the Revolutionary Council was represented by Teuku Abdul Gani Usman and Hasan Saleh. The Regional Government of Aceh was represented by Governor A. Hasjmi as the leader of the delegation, with Lieutenant-Colonel Teuku Hamzah, Major Nak Adam Kamil, Regent Zaini Bakri, and others as members.75

The negotiation resulted in a decision that the Revolutionary Council would return to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia on the grounds that Indonesia had readopted the 1945 Constitution. After hearing the statement, Deputy Prime Minister Hardi issued Government’s Decision regarding the Transformation of the Province of Aceh into Aceh Special Region. Hence, Aceh was granted special autonomy in the areas of religion, education, and tradition.76

This negotiation further weakened the NBA’s position, in spite of the fact that the state was still supported by thirty percent of its original followers.77 This situation prompted NBA to strengthen its cooperation with PRRI which culminated in the establishment of Republik Persatuan Islam or RPI (Islamic Unity Republic)78 on February 8, 1960. Following this declaration, PRRI and NBA were officially abolished.79

RPI’s establishment was a sur-

72Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 80.
73Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 81.
74Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 81.
prise for KDMA. Some of its staff, including Teuku Hamzah, KDMA’s Chief of Staff who had replaced Sjamaun Gaharu, blamed the previous Chief of Staff for being too lenient to Daud Beureu’eh (quoted from an interview between Gade Ismail and Sjamaun Gaharu on August 16, 1991). Next, Teuku Hamzah effectively ended Sjamaun Gaharu’s “Wise Principal Conception” by deploying military forces in February 1960. This military offensive was not known by Sjamaun Gaharu because at that time he was still in Jakarta.\footnote{Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p. 80.} Colonel Teuku Hamzah told the central government that Sjamaun Gaharu had to leave Aceh and attend a special course for senior staff at Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (the Army Staff and Command School) in Bandung, while Teuku Hamzah had to remain in Aceh as an Acting Commander. Sjamaun Gaharu was outraged by these orders and in return put Colonel Teuku Hamzah under house arrest at the end of August 1960.\footnote{Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p. 81.}

The next military commander replacing Sjamaun Gaharu was Colonel Muhammad Yasin. He was an instructor at the Army Staff and Command School in Bandung. He was well-known as a deeply religious officer who had a close relationship with the Aceh people. Therefore, Muhammad Yasin’s policies were essentially the same as, or even more lenient than, Sjamaun Gaharu’s.\footnote{Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p. 82.}

Ever since he assumed the military leadership of Aceh, Muhammad Yasin was always in favor of peaceful approaches. He reestablished contact with the rebel leaders, even though this did not mean that he entirely abandoned military efforts. Muhammad Yasin did not want the people to get an impression that he gave harsh treatment to the rebels. Therefore, he only launched small scale military advances. Besides that, these advances were led by Nyak Adam Kamil, an army officer who was a native of Aceh.\footnote{Sjamsuddin, \textit{Pemberontakan Kaum Republik}, p. 323.}

Yasin believed that the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh could only be ended by addressing two principal aspects: physical and psychological. On the one hand, he was confident that his troops could crush the RIA militia which at the end of 1960 was reported to possess only 2,500 troops, 1,500 light guns, 52 machine guns, 12 bazookas, and five mortars.\footnote{Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p. 83.} In spite of this report, he argued that physical suppression could only produce temporary physical security, while psychological security would remain unprotected. In his opinion, such superficial sense of security would only cause more problems in the future. Yasin therefore invited the rebels to surrender by their own will, so that psychological reconciliation can be truly achieved. In return of this capitulation, he offered a general amnesty to RIA leaders which would be declared by President Soekarno at the 1960 celebration of Indonesia’s Independence Day.\footnote{Ismail, \textit{Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan}, p. 84.}

Yasin’s invitation was not seriously contemplated by the rebels. Very few TII members accepted Yasin’s invitation. Besides that, Yasin’s call for the Aceh people not to provide any form of support to the rebels did nothing to stop
the rebellion. This was because Daud Beureu’eh still exerted great influence among his followers. Daud Beureu’eh also ignored the threats of both the Indonesian central government and the Aceh regional government in Kutaraja which declared the promised amnesty would only apply for those who surrendered before October 5, 1961.86

Yasin immediately reestablished written correspondence with Daud Beureu’eh, which yielded some positive results. In his first letter dated march 1961, Yasin, addressing Daud Beureu’eh as “ayahanda” (literally “eminent father”), asked Daud Beureu’eh to resume his place among the Aceh people. As a token of goodwill, Yasin offered Daud Beureu’eh a Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. The letter received a warm reply, but Daud Beureu’eh also criticized Yasin’s attempt to influence the Aceh people in many places who, in the government’s opinion, did not give a positive response to the government’s approaches.87

At the beginning of August 1961, Daud Beureu’eh sent A. R. Masjim to meet Yasin in Kutaraja. The meeting was concluded by an agreement to settle the Aceh problem through a consensus. On that occasion, Yasin also expressed his desire to meet Daud Beureu’eh personally. As a token of goodwill, Yasin sent a present to Daud Beureu’eh and his family.88

Since then, Daud Beureu’eh started to adopt a less radical approach towards the regional government. This was partly because his influence among the Aceh people and his followers began to wane. The Aceh people also began to support the Indonesian government’s policies because the central government gradually began to fulfill their demands for autonomy. Besides that, the fast development brought about by the Indonesian government and its policy in Aceh began to be felt by the Aceh people. The rebels and their supporters started to feel uneasy with their course of action because their struggle was no longer supported by the people. In addition to that, the central government’s decision to readopt the 1945 Constitution attracted considerable support from all regions in Indonesia, including Aceh. After reclaiming his position as the leader of the country’s executive, President Soekarno gave freedom to the provinces to manage their own territory.89 Moreover, frequent defeats by the Indonesian Army further weakened RIA’s influence. The government of the Indonesian Republic also placed native people of Aceh in various positions in the military. This action placed the rebels in a great psychological dilemma because it meant that they now had to fight against their own countrymen.90

In August 1961, Yasin announced that RIA had made peace with the regional government even though Daud Beureu’eh had not totally surrender because he still demanded that Sharia law be adopted in Aceh. This announcement was opposed by the uléëbalangs and Perti, as well as by PNI and PKI. They disagreed with the central government’s plan to grant general amnesty to former rebels.91

86Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, p. 85.
87Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, p. 85.
88Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan. p. 85; and Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, p. 325.
89Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, pp. 85-86; and Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, p. 327.
90Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, p. 87.
91Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, pp. 85-86; and Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, p. 327.
In response to this opposition, Yasin immediately sent a delegation of twenty eight people which consisted of several regents, Moslem clerics, as well as army and police officers to meet with Daud Beureu’eh in East Aceh. As the leader of the delegation, Muzakkir Walad persuaded Daud Beureu’eh to resume his position as the leader of the Aceh people under the Republic of Indonesia. Yasin also threatened to quell any faction who opposed the peace process. On October 17, he even declared that he would impose death sentence to anybody who attempted to impede the government’s efforts towards creating peace.

Following the meeting, many rebels surrendered to the regional government in Kutaraja. Meanwhile, Daud Beureu’eh, accompanied by Ilyas Leube, still refused to surrender. They decided to go into exile in the forest in East Aceh. Yasin then visited Daud Beureu’eh and talked to him for two and a half hours. Yasin eventually agreed on Daud Beureu’eh’s terms that the Sharia law shall be adopted in Aceh. This agreement was officially promulgated on April 7, 1962 with the support from the Regional People’s Representative Council and some generals in the capital.

After a long journey towards peace, a convoy of automobiles and buses carrying local leaders and government officials was sent to East Aceh to fetch Daud Beureu’eh back to Kutaraja. On May 8, 1962, after praying in Kutaraja Mosque, for the first time after leaving Kutaraja in 1950, Daud Beureu’eh solemnly announced that, by the order of his people, he now returned to his people. He also proclaimed that the enmity and conflict which had been raging for eight years, ten months, and twenty seven days officially ended that day. After that, Daud Beureu’eh returned to his hometown and refused to live in a house provided for him by Yasin in Kutaraja.

C. Conclusion

From the above historiography, it is clear that Darul Islam in Aceh was part of Darul Islam; this was one of the states under the Islamic State of Indonesia whose capital is located in West Java. Darul Islam in Aceh was established on August 7, 1953 as a protest against the government of the Republic of Indonesia which ignored their aspiration for special autonomy. In addition to this general cause, it soon became clear that this rebellion also occurred because of conflicts of interest among various factions in Aceh.

The DI/TII rebellion in Aceh must therefore be viewed in relation to the competing interests of various elements in Aceh during that era. The Aceh people, led by the ulamas who united under Persatuan Seluruh Ulama Aceh or PUSA (All Aceh Islamic Scholars Association), were disappointed because President Soekarno did not fulfill his promise to grant Aceh special autonomy. The Aceh people felt betrayed because their contributions to the central government during the struggle period were ignored. Tension between Aceh and the central government quickly escalated when Aceh, which had actually become an autonomous region, was abolished as

Keutuhan, p. 88.

92Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, p. 88.

93Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, p. 88.

Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik, p.327.

94Ismail, Tantangan dan Rongrongan terhadap Keutuhan, p. 89.
a political entity and was incorporated into the Province of North Sumatra.

In addition to PUSA’s disappointment with the central government, PUSA also had a conflict with the uléëbalangs. The uléëbalangs who resented the ulemas because their influence and power were gradually undermined by PUSA, especially during the early years of the independence period, took sides against PUSA. Naturally, they established strong cooperation with the central government. This internal conflict added further complication to the effort to create peace in Aceh. The central government, which had always been supported by the uléëbalangs, was eventually forced to relinquish its allegiance to their allies for the sake of making peace with DI/TII in Aceh, which was led by PUSA members.

Besides those two factors, the DI/TII rebellion was also instigated by the parliamentary system adopted by the central government at that time. The parliamentary system had one serious flaw: it was so unstable that many cabinets held power for only a very short period of time. Therefore, many policies were left uncompleted, which included those concerning regional governments. This situation decelerated and disturbed the progress of development in those regions. This is one of the reasons why there were many rebellions in various regions throughout Indonesia at that time, including Aceh.

In general, there were two opposing factions in Aceh with their respective interests. The ulemas who united under PUSA demanded that Aceh’s autonomy be implemented in accordance to the Sharia law. Meanwhile, the uléëbalangs tried to win the favor of the government of the Indonesian Republic by helping it to combat the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh. On the one hand, some uléëbalangs then turned their allegiance to Daud Beureu’eh because they perceived that Daud Beureu’eh was greatly supported by the people. On the other hand, some ulemas, especially the members of Perti, did not agree with PUSA’s actions. Therefore, Perti was supported by the uléëbalangs and the central government.

Darul Islam in Aceh was led by Daud Beureu’eh, a charismatic and influential Moslem cleric in Aceh. Using his great influence among the Aceh people, he once helped the government of the Indonesian Republic to fight the Dutch colonizers. He also once encouraged the Aceh people to provide financial aids for the Indonesian government. Because of his great contributions, Daud Beureu’eh was appointed by the central government as the Military Governor of Aceh. However, Daud Beureu’eh then turned against the central government out of disappointment. Great support from the Aceh people made it difficult for the central government to suppress his rebellion. The central government then adopted various policies to settle the problem.

In order to end the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh, the government of the Republic of Indonesia tended to favor non-military measures. A policy called the “Wise Principal Conception” which was proposed by Sjamaun Gaharmang, aimed to reduce the tension. This policy then proved to be able to suppress the rebellion. The government opted for this policy because they were aware that Daud Beureu’eh and the Aceh people had done great service for the Indonesian government. Besides that, DI/TII in Aceh was always willing to settle the conflict through amicable ways.
Being a key figure in the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh, Daud Beureu’eh was a strong-willed leader. He refused to surrender even though several PUSA members such as Hasan Saleh, Ayah Gani, Amir Husin Al-Mujahid, A. Gani Mutiara, Muhamad Amin, Ahmad Hasan, and Ishak Amir had given up. Even though Aceh had once again been granted autonomy, Daud Beureu’eh was still not satisfied. He finally decided to surrender only after his demand for the adoption of the Sharia law in Aceh had been granted by Military Governor Yasin. Yasin’s decision was supported by the Regional People’s Representative Council and several generals in the capital city, and the policy was officially promulgated on April 7, 1962. Daud Beureu’eh then proceeded to announce his Peace Declaration on May 8, 1962 in Kutaraja Mosque.

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Books:


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